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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
This thesis is an examination of the internationalization of antitrust policy, a topic of 
great contemporary significance and debate. The strategy adopted in the thesis has 
three different aims. The first aim, the basic aim on which all else depends, is to 
expand the way into the jungle of the internationalization of antitrust policy. The 
second is to open up issues in the discourse between law and politics in this area that 
seem susceptible to further research and thinking. Finally, the third aim is to 
formulate an approach and to try to lay down some foundations on which the present 
thesis, as well as future study whether academic or otherwise, can be constructed. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to the 
thesis. It states the purposes of the thesis. It also gives, inter alia, an account of the 
different examples of internationalization as well as an explanation of the terminology 
used in the thesis. Chapter 2 clarifies some central concepts and ideas. It explains the 
concept of competition and its economic understanding. Chapter 3 examines the goals 
of antitrust law and its political perception. Chapter 4 considers the use of discretion 
by antitrust authorities and how this affects the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
Chapter 5 constructs a framework of different theories which can help understand the 
process of internationalization and how can an international system of antitrust be 
constructed. Chapter 6 examines the antitrust experience of the EC. Chapters 7 and 8 
respectively examine the doctrines of sovereignty and extra-territoriality. Chapter 9 
deals with the relations between antitrust and trade policies. Chapter 10 gives an 
account of the past, present and future of the internationalization of antitrust policy 
from a comparative perspective. It examines, inter alia, the perspectives of states, 
international organizations, the business community and the consumer. Finally, 
chapter 11 offers some concluding remarks. 
The thesis is intended to be an original and empirical inquiry. The theory presented in 
the thesis is general, in the sense that it is not tied to any particular jurisdiction, but 
seeks to give an explanatory and a clarifying account of the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. 
The thesis begins \Vith refining some central concepts and ideas, including the concept 
of competition and antitrust law as well as an examination of the goals of the latter. 
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This is a central theme in the thesis which illustrates the need to build bridges 
between different disciplines - law, economics and political science - with respect to 
the internationalization of antitrust policy. This theme also contributes to 
understanding the process of internationalization and complements its underlying 
rules, principles and guiding policies. 
The thesis concludes by reviewing the landscape of the internationalization of 
antitrust policy and asking what further developments can be expected to appear on 
the horizon. It will be suggested that the adopted approach in the thesis has much to 
commend it in a world of relentless globalization, where conflicts between different 
states and between states and multinational undertakings may make legal and political 
decisions regarding the process of internationalization more central. 
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The twentieth century witnessed a heated debate between capitalism and communism 
over the desirability of competition in the market place. The years preceding the last 
quarter of the century saw a tendency on the part of many nations to favour a tradition 
of exerting strict control over the planning and management of their domestic 
economies. Towards the end of the century however the scene began to change 
dramatically with a move on the part of those nations from monopolization to 
demonopolization and from state control and planning to liberalization and 
privatization. This important development has enormously contributed to the growing 
recognition that, on the whole, competition can be regarded as an effective tool for 
enhancing innovation, furthering economic growth and safeguarding the well being of 
nations. Remarkably, the debate seems to have settled in favour of the market 
mechanism, and this has enhanced the desirability of competition. 
The growing recognition of the value of competition has been accompanied by a 
relentless process of globalization and a sharp increase in the removal of hindrances 
to the flows of trade and investment between nations. ' It has also been accompanied 
by a considerable increase in the number of nations, which - particularly over the last 
two decades - have come to recognize not only the desirability of competition but 
also the need to protect it. 2 The law used to protect competition is commonly referred 
to as "antitrust law", or "competition law". 3 Today, nearly 90 nations have adopted 
some form of antitrust law and at least 25 others are in the process of developing 
' See A. Fiebig "A role for the WTO in international merger control" (2000) 20 Nw. J. Int'1 L. & Bus. 
233, at p 235. 
The term "nations" for this purpose is taken to include the EC. 
2See M. Palim "The world wide growth of competition law: an empirical analysis" (1998) 43 Antitrust 
Bull. 105. 
3 , Antitrust law" is the term used in the US. The term "Competition law" is a synonym used more 
commonly outside the US. The term "antitrust law", unlike the concept of "competition", encounters 
hardly any previous usage in the English language. See D. Gerber Law and Competition in Twentieth 
Century Europe (Oxford, 1998), at p 4, analyzing the translation of the term into other languages. 
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antitrust legislation. 4 Most of the laws of those nations share many common features. 
These include prohibitions on certain horizontal agreements between undertakings 
(such as cartels aiming at market sharing, price fixing etc. ), certain vertical restraints 
and abuses of market power by powerful undertakings. In more than half of those 
nations, there is also a prohibition on anti-competitive mergers between undertakings. 
In addition to these similarities, there are also many differences in definition, 
objectives, approach and alike. It is important at this point to give an account of some 
of these differences. First, there is a lack of consensus between nations with respect to 
the meaning that should be given to terms such as "competition" and "anti- 
competitive". Secondly, there is a debate regarding whether competition particularly 
needs antitrust law at all and whether it can be protected using other types of law and 
policy. In some nations the laws are referred to as laws against "restrictive trade 
practices". These laws may be more concerned with regulating how large 
undertakings use their market muscle than with removing hindrances to free market 
competition. 5 Thirdly, there are differences regarding the antitrust law traditions of 
nations and the degree of seriousness to which they enforce their antitrust laws, 6 
especially when foreign undertakings may be the beneficiaries of enforcement 
actions. Some nations enjoy a tradition of vigorous enforcement of the law, but many 
do not. Some nations have a tradition of separation of antitrust law enforcement and 
decision-making from politics, but others do not. Some nations have a tradition of 
state control and planning, which in some cases has been disintegrating, and others 
have a strong tradition of liberalization and privatization. Fourthly, there is no 
agreement on the proper goals of antitrust law. The possibilities range from economic 
to social to political goals. Fifthly, there is lack of agreement regarding the right ? 
4 See D. Valentine "Antitrust in a global high tech-economy", paper delivered before the American Bar 
Association of the District of Columbia at the 8`h National Forum for Women Corporate Council (April 
30,1999), available at <http: //www. ftc. gov/speeches/other/dvatspeech. htm>. Also, see W. Rowley & 
N. Campbell "Multi-jurisdictional merger review-is it time for a common form filing treaty? ", 
Appendix I in Policy Directions For Global Merger Review, a special report by the Global Forum for 
Competition and Trade Policy (1999). 
5 Report of the American Bar Association Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice 
on The Internationalization of Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence (December, 
1999). 
6 D. Gerber "Afterword: Antitrust and American Business Abroad revisited" (2000) 20 Nw. J. Intl L. 
& Bus. 307, at p 312. Gerber believes that this is an important point because it causes uncertainty, 
creates incentives for undertakings to seek "havens" in which antitrust law enforcement is weak and 
therefore distorts competition. See further chapters 7 and 8. 
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institutional approach to protect competition. In some nations it is done 
administratively, whilst in others it is done judicially. 8 
These differences, as well as others which will become apparent in the discussion, are 
important and therefore cannot be ignored. The differences have been widened by the 
fact that in some nations, notably the US and the EC, antitrust law is well-developed 
and the policies underlying it are in a constant state of change and evolution, whilst in 
other nations antitrust law is just seeing the light of the day. 9 
Generally, a position of difference is not particularly healthy. The current challenge in 
global antitrust policy seems to be how one can move from a position of difference to 
a position of similarity. This is a challenge that is currently facing the antitrust 
communities of different nations. Those who have realized the existence of this 
challenge and the need to move closer to a position of similarity have been seeking 
ways to "internationalize" antitrust policy. However, even here differences have 
surfaced regarding how the "internationalization" should be viewed. At one end of the 
spectrum, some nations are "unilateralist" in their approach and thinking. Quite 
frequently, they are willing to export their antitrust laws into other jurisdictions, a 
factor which, as will be seen, can be problematic. 1° At the other end of the spectrum, 
other nations seem to believe that there is scope for creating some common order 
within antitrust law and policy. Here some nations have opted for a "bilateral", ' I some 
for a "regional" and some for a "pluralist" approach, whilst still others have proposed 
a "global" order. These alternatives stand in complete contrast to, whilst also offering 
greater benefits, than the unilateralist position as a matter of course. Between these 
two ends, some nations have opted for a mixture of these approaches. 
7 See pp 38-45 Post. 
8 See J. Griffin "What business people want from a world antitrust code" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 
39, at p 44; C. Bellamy "Some reflections on competition law in the global market" (1999) 34 New 
Eng. L. Rei'. 15, at pp 18-9. 
9 See W. Hannay "Transnational competition law aspects of mergers and acquisitions" (2000) 20 Nw. J. 
Int 'l L. & Bus. 287, at p 287. 
10 See chapters 8 and 10. 
11 "Bilateral" is used to refer to the conclusion of bilateral agreements between states, in particular 
between their domestic antitrust authorities. See for example the agreement entered into between the 
EC and the US (September 23,1991) OJ [1995] L-95/45 as corrected by OJ [1995] L-131/38, 
discussed at pp 99-101 Post. 
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I. THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The present thesis argues for a serious (perhaps even a fresh) consideration of 
antitrust policy and its place in the global economy. The need for this consideration 
arises in the light of several problems that seem to require attention. "The problems 
are: 1) national law, because of its bounds, cannot catch all the conduct that harms the 
nation's citizens; 2) at the other extreme, national law, because of its reach, regulates 
other nations' people and transactions and intrudes on other nations' prerogatives and 
order; 3) systems' laws clash; 4) nations lack vision when the problems are bigger 
than nations; and 5) nations are increasingly less representative of people and firms 
that reside within their borders but that produce, sell or buy in global markets. 
Therefore, people and firms that reside outside the borders are increasingly regulated 
without a voice. " 12 
In other words, there is a need to consider antitrust policy within the global economy 
in light of market globalization, ' 3 the fact that antitrust policy enforcement by several 
antitrust authorities in the world has become international in recent years, that such 
enforcement triggers conflicts between nations and that gradually norms and 
expectations have developed around antitrust policy and have increased in importance 
and in geographical scope. 14 
12 E. Fox "Global problems in a world of national law" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 11, at pp 11-2. See 
also Fiebig, at p 233, note 1 Ante; P. Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, 
1995), at p 384. 
13 The concept of globalization is susceptible to different meanings, depending on the context in which 
it is applied. The concept therefore may not be easy to define. In the present context, the concept is 
employed to refer to market globalization. 
Globalization has been particularly fostered by advances in technology and the elimination of barriers 
hindering the flows of trade and investment between nations. In light of globalization, the number of 
antitrust policy matters that transcend national boundaries has been increasing. These matters relate to 
restrictive practices in areas of international nature such as air or sea transport, export cartels, 
international cartels, mergers and abuse of market dominance. See generally M. Walters Globalization 
(Routledge, 1995); J. Dunning The Globalization of Business: The Challenges of the 1990s (Routledge, 
1993). 
A recent press release by the World Trade Organization (WTO) has stated that the year 1998, for 
example, witnessed a $6.5 trillion of exports of merchandise and commercial services world-wide. 
(April 16,1999), available at <http: /'www. wto. org>. 
" Other reasons include the shortcomings of both bilateral agreements between antitrust authorities and 
the convergence of antitrust laws of different nations in addressing international antitrust issues. See 
chapters 9 and 10. 
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The strategy adopted in this thesis has three different aims. The first aim, the basic 
aim on which all else depends, is to expand the way into the jungle of 
internationalization of antitrust policy. The second is to open up issues in the 
discourse between law and politics of the internationalization of antitrust policy that 
seem susceptible to further research and thinking. Finally, the third is to formulate an 
approach and to try to lay down some foundations on which the present thesis, as well 
as future study on this topic whether academic or otherwise, can be constructed. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis examines the process of the internationalization of antitrust policy. It 
enquires into the nature of this process, whether it is a matter of law or politics (or 
both), and the direction in which this process should be focused. '5 
In examining the nature of internationalization, first the limits of antitrust law have to 
be outlined. It seems sensible to start with some basic concepts and to examine the 
point and goals of the law. It would be a fruitless exercise to discuss the law and 
politics of the internationalization of antitrust policy without having first enquired into 
the raison d 'etre and aims of the law. This, in turn, entails a further inquiry into how 
its doctrines have evolved and the nature of its ultimate impact upon public and 
private power, the structure and function of institutions and markets and the economic 
freedom of the individual. 16 This in itself is an inquiry into another thread of antitrust 
(in addition to law and economics): the role and influence of politics and the 
relevance of the principles of liberal democracy. '7 The significance of this thread can 
be illustrated in the following manner. Generally, political ideology and initiative 
15 See further chapter 6. 
16 R. Bork The . Antitrust Paradox (Basic 
books, 1978), at p 3. 
1' Political influence and the principles of liberal democracy are not identical. Although the principles 
of liberal democracy bear strong links to several issues with respect to the construction of an 
international system of antitrust, there remain other important issues that should be examined within a 
different framewvork. The question of sovereignty is an example in point. As chapter 7 shows, several 
threads of that question seem to have a wider implication that need to be evaluated within a wider 
framework than that of the principles of liberal democracy. 
There has been little exposition of the potential importance of politics in explaining antitrust policy. A 
contributing factor towards this seems to be that economists chose first to determine to what extent 
economics, not politics, was a systematic factor in antitrust law enforcement. See chapter 2 for an 
examination of the role of economics and economists in antitrust policy. 
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serve as the basis for enacting different antitrust laws in different nations. 
18 This is 
based on the view that underlying the concept of antitrust is a serious concern about 
excessive economic power, and a general awareness that the principles of liberal 
democracy may be undermined if market economic democracy is not afforded 
adequate protection. 19 As political ideology is crucial in the adoption of antitrust law 
in different jurisdictions, it is essential when examining the internationalization of 
antitrust policy to consider issues inherent in such ideology. 20 In particular, it is 
necessary to be aware that the regulation of competition and enforcement of antitrust 
law by administrative institutions can involve bureaucratic politics and bureaucratic 
decision-making. To an extent, the merits of antitrust law enforcement, whether 
national or regional (such as the case with the EC), 21 carry implications of political 
directions ordered by administrative and political institutions. 
The nature of this inquiry opens up the need for new insights from various disciplines, 
including political science. These insights are valuable in order to understand the 
internationalization of antitrust policy and complement its rules, normative principles 
and guiding policies. It seems that lawyers and political scientists have a great deal of 
mutual interest in the internationalization of antitrust policy, which could be realized 
by constructing an adequate dialogue between the two disciplines. 22 
18 A. Fels & G. Edwards have argued that the enactment of antitrust law is a political act, and, as such, 
political factors should be given paramount consideration. See C. Ehlermann & L. Laudati (eds. ) 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart Publishing, 1998), at 
p 58. 
19 It is important to emphasize that the present discussion is more concerned with economic democracy 
than political democracy. 
According to Amato, antitrust law should be traced to the fight against restrictions on the freedom of 
individuals by economic power. See G. Amato Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing, 
1997), at p 96; H. Thorelli The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an Antitrust Tradition (John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1954); E. Fox "The Modernization of antitrust: a new equilibrium" (1981) 
66 Corn. L. Rev. 1140; E. Sullivan (ed. ) The Political Economy of the Sherman Act (Oxford, 1991); D. 
Millon "The Sherman Act and the balance of power" (1988) 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219. 
20 This is where rubber hits the road. The thesis will develop this proposition by demonstrating that the 
internationalization of antitrust policy is subject to political influence. 
21 See chapter 6. 
22 On constructing dialouges between different disciplines, see generally J. Weiler "Community, 
member states and European integration: is the law relevant'? " (1982) 21 J. C. M. S. 39; R. Pryce The 
Politics of the European Community (Butterworths, 1973). 
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The present study bears a political science approach. 
23 This approach is adopted 
because of the particular emphasis this study places on the importance of institutional 
dimensions and politics, including the way in which policy processes complement the 
law in this area. Thus, it is receptive to insights regarding the choice of methodology 
within political science and political regulation. To some extent, this emphasis reflects 
the need to develop an inter-disciplinary approach to the topic and the sense of 
importance of institutional endowments and their relevance to the internationalization 
of antitrust policy. 24 Generally, it seems that political scientists themselves have been 
very slow to undertake systematic work on antitrust policy, leaving this area to 
lawyers and economists. 25 It has been argued, however, that lawyers and economists 
"will periodically concede the importance of politics and of institutions, but will tend 
to proceed to analyse legal principles, economic models, and individual cases as in a 
vacuum, innocent of any systematic recognition of political acceptability or political 
bargaining". 26 Awareness of institutional and political dimensions can vastly 
contribute to understanding the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
III. THE EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 
Several examples of the "internationalization" of antitrust policy may be identified. 
First, there is the idea of bilateral co-operation between different antitrust authorities 
around the world. Bilateral co-operation revolves around the enforcement of the 
domestic antitrust laws of the nations concerned. It can take the form of formal 
agreements between the domestic antitrust authorities of those nations which normally 
include, inter alia, provisions on information-sharing and comity. 27 Secondly, there is 
23 Institutions have an important role to play in antitrust policy. The internationalization of antitrust 
policy makes the case for considering institutional dimensions particularly pressing. 
24 See M. Staniland What Is Political Economy (Yale University Press, 1985); D. North Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Granovetter 
"Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness" in M. Granovetter & R. 
Swedberg The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
25 C. Doern & S. Wilks Comparative Competition Policy (Oxford, 1996), at p 4. 
26 Ibid., at pp 4-5. The authors argue that their assertion is not intended to be dismissive of law and 
economics disciplines, or to imply that academic lawyers or economists invariably overlook political 
factors. They merely (and it seems rightly) emphasize "a systematic bias and an understandable, if 
regrettable, narrowness of viewpoint" on the part of either discipline. 
27 See for example the EC-US agreement (September 23,1991) (OJ [1995] L-95/45 as corrected by OJ 
[1995] L-131/38). discussed at pp 99-101 Post. Other bilateral agreements have been entered into by 
different nations, including Canada, Australia and New Zealand. See chapters 8 and 9 for a discussion 
on these agreements. 
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the idea that domestic antitrust laws can converge towards some common points and 
standards. 28 The basic idea here is to harmonize the different antitrust laws of 
different nations. The third example involves creating a detailed international antitrust 
code to be adopted by nations. 29 A fourth example of internationalization focuses on 
establishing an international system of antitrust within a framework of autonomous 
international institutions. 30 Nations would apply the principles emerging from the 
system under the auspices of an independent antitrust authority. The system would 
also provide for a minimalist procedure with a mechanism to resolve disputes among 
participating nations. Arguably, this example is the most central, but certainly the 
most ambitious, of all four. It may be appropriate to note in passing that this list of 
examples is not meant to be exhaustive. However these are the four main, principal 
(and important) examples which have emerged over the years. 
IV. SOME REFLECTION ON TERMINOLOGY 
At this stage, a comment on the employment of terminology in the thesis would be 
appropriate. 
(A) System of antitrust 
Quite frequently reference will be made to a "system of antitrust". It is essential to 
explain this concept, which it is submitted, includes at least three different 
components. 31 First, there is the concept of competition itself, which is entrenched in 
28 See chapter 6. Also, see pp 250-3 Post. 
29 See pp 253-4 Post. 
30 See the proposal put by the "Wise Men Group", a group of experts commissioned by K. van Miert 
former Commissioner for antitrust policy in the EC, "Competition policy in the new trade order: 
strengthening international co-operation and rules" COM (95) 359, available at <http: //www. europa 
. eu. 
int>. The proposal is discussed in chapter 6. 
31 The concept of "system" is suitable to accommodate the three components concerned. The "system" 
functions as an operative whole, combining the interaction of its ideas and the factors influencing its 
operation. It is believed that a special relationship exists between these components, which will be 
explored at different levels in the thesis. The thesis will draw on the knowledge and insights of the 
disciplines to which these components belong to build an analytical framework in which they could be 
interwoven and therefore complement and enrich one another. See M. Dabbah "Measuring the success 
of a system of competition law: a preliminary view" (2000) 21 ECLR 369, at pp 370-1. 
Note the employment of the concept by other writers. For example, Gerber uses the concept system to 
analyze how institutions interact with norms in relation to the protection of competition. According to 
Gerber, the concept thus becomes more specific and functional, and more analytically valuable, 
because it focuses on the characteristics and consequences of those interactions. Gerber, at p 4, note 3 
Ante. 
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economics. The following chapter will demonstrate how the economic philosophy of 
competition has become its dominant intellectual discourse. 32 No study of antitrust 
law and policy which lacks appreciation for the role that competition plays within the 
market economy can be justifiable. As Dewey, in a characteristically trenchant style, 
remarked: before deciding what antitrust law ought to be, it is necessary to understand 
what the process of competition is really like. 33 Secondly, there is antitrust law which 
concerns applying a body of legal rules and standards to deal with market 
imperfections and restoring desirable competitive conditions in the market. The third 
component is antitrust policy, 34 which is anchored in politics. This deals with public 
authorities' intervention beyond certain market imperfections, such as market failures 
or "externalities". 35 The corollary of this provides that sovereign states are responsible 
for the formulation of different public policies, and public institutions possess 
discretion to ensure their implementation in practice. In Bork's view, antitrust law 
exemplifies one of the most elaborate deployments of governmental force in areas of 
life still thought primarily committed to private choice and initiative. 36 
(B) An international system of antitrust 
In the present thesis, a distinction is made between a system of antitrust and an 
international system of antitrust. Such a system will inevitably be hybrid in nature. It 
is to be constructed not only on the basis of ideas originating at the national level, but 
also on the basis of understanding international politics and international economic 
issues. Constructing the system will also involve some appropriate recourse to 
principles of public international law. Finally, to avoid any likely confusion of 
terminology between this system and other systems (national/regional) of antitrust, 
the former will be referred to uniformly throughout this thesis as an international 
system of antitrust. 
32 See Amato, at p 1, note 19 Ante. 
33 D. Dewey "The economic theory of antitrust: science or religion" (1964) 50 Virginia L. Rev. 413, at 
p 414. 
31 Note that the term "antitrust policy" has been given different interpretations in different jurisdictions 
and in different contexts. See WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 34. 
' Market failure connotes the existence of circumstances in which private forces in the market fail to 
sustain "desirable activities" or to estop "undesirable activities". See F. Bator "The autonomy of market 
failure" (1958) 72 Q. J. Econ. 351. 
36 Bork, at p 3, note 16 Ante. 
24 
(C) The internationalization of antitrust policy 
Another distinction is made between an international system of antitrust and the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. It is argued that an international system of 
antitrust can be ultimately constructed through the process of internationalization. The 
process of "internationalization" seeks to deal with issues, which seem to be vital in 
order to construct this system. The term "internationalization" is employed in this 
thesis, not only to highlight the need to accommodate the various national interests 
and decision processes into how international institutions are designed and politically 
justified, but also to refer to the actual penetration of international pressures into the 
concrete functioning of domestic institutions. These thoughts show that the process of 
internationalization functions as a "double-edge sword". They also result in legal, as 
well as political, implications for the internationalization of antitrust policy. Hence the 
inclusion of the words "law and politics" in the title. These implications will be 
explained and analyzed in the different chapters. 
V. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 refines some concepts and ideas that are 
important to understand, including the concept of competition. Chapter 3 examines 
the goals of antitrust law and its political perception. Chapter 4 considers the use of 
discretion by antitrust authorities and how this affects the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. It will be argued that this use of discretion can lead to similar antitrust 
laws in different jurisdictions being radically different in their enforcement -a 
situation that often leads to divergence in the legal standards between those 
jurisdictions. Chapter 5 constructs a framework of different theories which can help to 
understand the process of internationalization of antitrust policy and how an 
international system of antitrust can be built. Chapter 6 examines the antitrust 
experience of the EC. Chapters 7 and 8 examine the doctrine of sovereignty and extra- 
territoriality respectively. Chapter 9 deals with the relationship between antitrust and 
trade policies. Chapter 10 gives an account of the past, present and future of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy from a comparative perspective. It examines, 
niter alia, the perspectives of states, international organizations, the business 
community and the consumer on the internationalization of antitrust policy. Finally, 
chapter 11 concludes. 
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*** 
This thesis is essentially an examination of the internationalization of antitrust policy, 
with a special reference to the law and politics thereof, as evidenced in the actions and 
statements of antitrust authorities, political bodies and decisions of law courts. To a 
great extent, the thesis can be seen as an original and empirical inquiry. The theory 
presented in the thesis is general, in the sense that it is not tied to any particular 
jurisdiction, but seeks to give an explanatory and a clarifying account of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 
The thesis begins with refining some central concepts and ideas, including the concept 
of competition and antitrust law as well as an examination of the goals of the latter. 
This is a central theme in the thesis which illustrates the need to build bridges 
between different disciplines with respect to the internationalization of antitrust 
policy. This theme also contributes to understanding the process of 
internationalization and complements its underlying rules, principles and guiding 
policies. 
The thesis concludes by reviewing the landscape of the internationalization of 
antitrust policy and asking what further developments can be expected to appear on 
the horizon. The recommended approach in the thesis has much to commend it in a 
world of relentless globalization, where conflicts between different states and between 
states and multinational undertakings may make legal and political decisions 
regarding the process of internationalization more central. 
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Chapter Two 
REFINING SOME CONCEPTS AND IDEAS 
This chapter gives a broad account of some central concepts and ideas. It is divided 
into three parts. Part I discusses the idea and concept of competition and its economic 
understanding. Part II provides some historical perspective of a particular political 
idea and political philosophy about antitrust law. Part III gives a brief conclusion. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITION 
(A) The meaning of competition 
It is desirable to clarify the meaning of competition at the outset, in order to facilitate 
a better understanding of its economic implications. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines the term in the following way: 
I. a. The action of endeavouring to gain what another endeavours to gain at the same 
time; the striving of two or more for the same object; 
b. Rivalry in the market, striving for custom between those who have the same 
commodities to dispose of ... 
"I 
As far as academic definitions of the concept are concerned, they do not seem to be 
identical. The definitions given by the following scholars can be used to illustrate this 
point. Whish states that: 
"Competition means a struggle or contention for superiority, and in the commercial world this 
means a striving for the custom and business of people in the market place. ,2 
Goyder, on the other hand, opines that competition is: 
"The relationship that exists among any number of undertakings which sell goods or services 
of the same kind at the same time to an identifiable group of customers. "3 
(Oxford University Press, 1989), at pp 604-5. The writer's choice of dictionary should not be seen as 
capricious. It was chosen because of the speciality of definition. Compare with Johnson 's Dictionary of 
the English Language and the Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
2 R. «'hish Competition Law (Butterworths, 2001), at p 1. 
D. Goyder EC Competition Law (Oxford, 1998), at p 9. 
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From the above definitions, it can be gleaned that the term competition refers to: 
1. The existence of both a process and a relationship; ' 
2. In a commercial sense, a close association with the concept of market place; 
3. Having some aim or purpose. 
It is submitted that competition connotes the existence of a process of rivalry between 
undertakings which, in the pursuit of self-interest, endeavour to win custom in the 
market. 5 Competition is structured first and foremost on the freedom to compete. ' It is 
the flywheel of a free economy, the very expression of its spirit and both the cause 
and the result of its successful operation. 7 Because competition in the commercial 
world is concerned with the market place, it seems to be evolutionary in substance 
and dynamic in form. 8 
4 Whilst Whish based his definition on that appearing in the Oxford Dictionary, Goyder seems to have 
opted for a wider term to describe competition. Whish used the term "struggle", which connotes a 
"process" and is therefore the correct term to be employed. Goyder used the term "relationship", which 
is wide and normally used to describe different situations. In antitrust law, these situations may range 
from a vertical agreement between a supplier and a buyer, to joint dominance to tacit collusion. Hence, 
it is submitted that, though in the wide sense competition concerns a relationship, it is more appropriate 
to employ a term that would connote the existence of a process, since the term relationship falls short 
of offering a specific definition. 
For an account of the "different meanings" of competition, see R. Bork The Antitrust Paradox (Basic 
books, 1978), at pp 58-61; White Motor Co. v. US 372 U. S. 253,281 (1963). 
5 The thesis explains that competition is more than a relationship between market participants. Note in 
this regard how economists and lawyers view competition. Economists for example equate competition 
with impersonal price-making, the most impersonal being the "purest", whereas lawyers tend to view 
competition as rivalry among undertakings to sell goods or services. Despite these differences in the 
thinking of economists and lawyers however, both disciplines would view competition as a dialogue of 
challenge and response -a sequence of moves and responses between competing undertakings. See J. 
Clark Competition As a Dynamic Process (Brookings Institution, 1961), at pp 14-5; E. Mason 
"Monopoly in law and economics" (1937) 47 Yale L. J. 34. 
6 It has been argued that liberty of action ought not to be subjected to political influence. In some cases 
it is directed not restrained. Freedom, on the other hand, is not to be construed as liberty to cause harm 
or detriment. See H. Lutz American Legal Writing During the Founding Era (Liberty Press, 1983); M. 
Charleston Rudiments of Law and Governments Deducted from the Law of Nature (Library of 
Congress, 1783). 
' See S. Khemani "Competition policy: an engine for growth" (1997) 1 Global Coinp. Rev. 20, at p 23. 
The truth behind this statement can be deduced from the way competition has evolved into a "world" 
concept. International organizations, such as the WTO, have adopted the concept like an item of faith. 
In this way, competition has been associated with the process of market globalization and liberation. 
See WTO Annual Report (1997), ch 4; E. Fox "Competition law and the agenda for the WTO: forging 
the links of competition and trade" (199-5) 4 Pac. Rijn L. & Policy J. 1; E. Fox "Toward world antitrust 
and market access" (1997) 91 Ani. J. Int'l L. 1. 
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(B) The function of competition 
The definition of competition should be distinguished from the function which it is 
supposed to perform in the market place. 9 The function of competition can be 
illustrated by explaining two notions of competition. First, there is customary 
competition, which is seen as a dominant dynamic element and a regulatory- 
mechanism within the free market system. Its function within Smith's "invisible 
hand" of the market mechanism is to co-ordinate market deals and transactions. 
Secondly, there is dynamic competition. 1° According to this notion, competition is a 
continuing process, based on market innovation in which competitive advantages 
accruing from current market oligopolies or positions of market dominance are the 
outcome of past efficiencies and are readily available to be made use of by the 
undertakings concerned. " In this sense, theorists of dynamic competition are far less 
concerned about economic power and an unbalanced market structure than scholars of 
customary competition. ' 2 
These notions of competition aside, today it is generally thought that competition is 
desirable. 13 Economists in particular, have always argued in favour of the desirability 
Whish, at p 1, note 2 Ante. 
10 Dynamic competition involves the idea of achieving an optimal degree of innovation and the 
diffusion of new technological advances over time. Such an emphasis on the aim of overall economic 
efficiency (as opposed to consumer welfare per se) has come to be known as the "total welfare 
approach". See P. Crampton "Alternative approaches to competition law: consumer's surplus, total 
welfare and non-efficiency goals" (1994) 17 World Comp. 55, at pp 55-86. Also, WTO Annual Report 
(1997), at pp 39-40. 
This notion of competition can be contrasted with competition in a static sense, which connotes the 
existence of optimal allocation in resources in order to meet the demand side in the market, incurring 
the lowest possible cost at any given point in time. 
11 See P. Auerbach Competition: The Economics of Industrial Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), at pp 
22-7. See, however, the views of Schumpeter who emphasized the so-called creative gale of 
destruction, which shows that competition is not a given virtue as such. J. Schumpeter Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976). 
12 Reference can be made here to scholars of "contestable markets" who argue that markets may not be 
highly competitive, but it is unlikely that undertakings will diverge in their economic behaviour than if 
the market were to be otherwise - as long as the market is "contestable", namely the likeliness potential 
competitors can easily enter and begin to compete when market imperfections provide the opportunity 
to do so. See W. Baumol, J. Panzar & D. Willig Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry 
Structure (Harcourt Brace, 1988). 
13 Whish, at p 11, note 2 Ank' 
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of competition. 14 Hay has argued that a successful market economy depends on the 
existence of competition and an effective antitrust policy. This desirability seems to 
have been enhanced by several factors: first, monopoly does seem to lead to poor 
quality, restriction in output and harm to consumers; secondly, there is an incentive to 
achieve productive efficiency in a competitive market; thirdly, the suggestion that 
innovation is only possible in the case of monopoly has no foundation; fourthly, 
competition offers the consumer a greater degree of protection and choice. ' 
For the discipline of economics, economic efficiency and the maximization of 
consumer welfare are the underlying aims of antitrust law. 16 Traditionally, economic 
theory has presupposed that goods and services will be produced in the most efficient 
manner under circumstances of "perfect competition". " The idea behind this 
economic approach and understanding is intended to provide a simple test, which 
would be cognizable for most laymen. 18 In particular, the rules of "perfect 
competition" are intended to be quite simple to apply. Whish has argued that this test 
and the neo-classical analysis associated with it are seductive in their simplicity: 
14 F. McChesney "In Search of the public interest model of antitrust" in F. McChesney & W. Shughart 
(eds. ) The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public Choice Perspective (Chicago, 1995), at 
pp 25-32. 
15 D. Hay "The assessment: competition policy" (1993) 9/2 Ox. Rev. Econ. Pol'y 1. Contrasts this with 
certain twentieth century alternative economic thoughts, which seem to be competition-sceptics. These 
argue that competition considerations are not the only co-ordinating force within liberal markets, and 
that their dominance of the intellectual discourse of antitrust is over developed. They also contend that 
co-ordination of private economic behaviour is also possible via other terminals such as social 
collusion, the creation of collectivist norms and decisions and hierarchy and the virtues of social 
responsibility. See Auerbach, ch 2, note 11 Ante; G. Hodgson Economics and Institutions (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1988). 
16 Bork stated that "(1) [t]he only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of 
consumer welfare; therefore, (2) `Competition', for the purposes of antitrust analysis, must be 
understood as a term of art signifying any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be 
increased by judicial decision". See Bork Paradox, at p 51. Bork also wrote that "Congress intended 
the courts to implement (that is to take into account in the decision of cases) only that value we would 
today call consumer welfare. To put it another way, the policy the courts were intended to apply is the 
maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction. This requires courts to distinguish between 
agreements or activities that increase wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it through 
restriction of output". See R. Bork "Legislative intent and the policy of the Sherman Act" (1966) 9 J. 
Latin & Econ. 7. 
" See R. Lipsey & K. Chrystal An Introduction to Positive Economics (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995); 
0. Williamson . Antitrust 
Economics (Blackwell, 1987). 
18 See F. Scherer & D. Ross Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Houghton 
Mifflin, 1990), chs 1 and 2, D. Swann Competition and Consumer Protection (Penguin, 1979), ch 3; 
Williamson, Ibid; Whish, ch 1, note 2 Ante. 
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"If the sole function of competition law were the maximization of consumer welfare by, 
achieving the most efficient allocation of resources and by reducing costs as far as possible, 
the formulation of legal rules and their application would be relatively simple. There would of 
course be the problem that such a policy would be essentially economic and that lawyers 
would have difficulties when asked to step outside their own discipline, but at least it would 
be possible to proceed by reference to some single, unifying aim. "19 
Attractive as this simplicity may be, several claims can still be advanced against this 
economic approach. First, the theory of conventional economic analysis suffers from 
ambiguity of definition and narrowness of viewpoint. 20 Secondly, it will be seen, in 
due course, 21 that economic efficiency and consumer welfare are far from being the 
only, or even dominant, goals of antitrust law. 22 Thirdly, economists do not seem to 
be able to craft viable rules suitable for the economic efficiency implications of 
particular market behaviour and structure. 23 At one end of the spectrum, there is the 
view that elements of market behaviour and structure may encompass the variability 
of economic undertakings, technological advances, commercial planning, strategies 
and markets; all of which makes it difficult in practice to devise suitable rules to 
address such issues. At the other end of the spectrum, stands the fact that different 
economic approaches speak of identical issues differently. 24 Fourthly, economists 
should not stray into imaginary domains about markets which enjoy "perfect 
19 Whish, at pp 12-3, note 2 Ante. 
20 At some stage Bork, in contrast to what has been stated in note 16 Ante, appeared to recognize that 
US Congress intended to implement a broader spectrum of values than the neo-classical concept of 
consumer welfare in the enforcement of antitrust rules. See R. Bork "The role of the courts in applying 
economics" (1985) 54 Antitrust L. J. 2, at p 24. 
21 See pp 38-45 Post. 
22 The academic criticism of this goal is extensive. See P. Carstensen "Antitrust law and the paradigm 
of industrial organization" (1983) 16 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 487; E. Fox "The Modernization of antitrust: 
a new equilibrium" (1981) 66 Corn. L. Rev. 1140; E. Fox "The politics of law and economics in 
judicial decision making: antitrust as a window" (1986) 61 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 554; R. Lande "Wealth 
transfers as the original and primary concern of antitrust: the efficiency interpretations challenged" 
(1982) 34 Hastings L. J. 65; J. May "Antitrust practices in the formative era: the constitutional and 
conceptual reach of state antitrust laws, 1880-1918" (1987) 135 U. Penn. L. Rev. 495; L. Orland "The 
paradox in Bork's antitrust paradox" (1987) 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 115; R. Pitofsky "The political content 
of antitrust", (1979) 127 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1051; F. Rowe "The decline of antitrust and the dilution of 
models: the Faustian Pact of law and economics" (1984) 72 Geo. L. J. 1511; L. Schwartz "`Justice' and 
other non-economic goals of antitrust" (1979) 127 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1076; J. Flynn "Antitrust 
jurisprudence: a symposium the economic, political and social goals of antitrust policy" (1977) 125 U. 
Penn. L. Rev. 1182. 
23 Hay, at pp 6-12, note 15 Ante. 
'' Williamson, at p 315, note 17 Ante; Also on this issue, as far as industrial economists are concerned, 
see D. Hay "Competition policy", (1986) 2 Ox. Rev. Econ. Pol 'v 1. 
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competition". This state of competition does not seem to be attainable. 
`' Markets are 
disorganized in substance, complex in structure, and are far from being capable of 
generating any strains of "perfect competition". 
Other claims which can be advanced are based on the fact that the aggregation of 
theories of "contestable markets" and the intellectual influence of Chicago School 
theories have, to a certain extent, undermined the conventional view on the 
desirability of competition. 26 The Chicago school of thought has been particularly 
prominent in supplying a great deal of the existing US antitrust ideology. The 
School's "successful" life span covers the last two decades. 27 Unlike neo-classicism 
theory, it advocates a more relaxed approach to antitrust policy. 
In reality, the discipline of economics is subject to a pragmatic pressure to attack the 
most serious market failures, to construct principles of reasonable behaviour and to 
ultimately pursue a goal of "workable competition". 28 The concept of "workable 
competition" encompasses an idea that is different from a theory (it is generally 
wider). It operates like a norm that changes according to variation in economic 
theorem and the conditions and structure of the market, such as shifts in the behaviour 
of undertakings, the attitude of public institutions, causes and effects of market 
globalization and evolution in technological advances. 
More recent American radical theorizing, however, transcends this position towards 
applying a new "public-choice" approach. McChesney and Shughart, for instance, 
have crafted a strategic path hoping to return the attention of antitrust scholars to first 
principles, forcing them to consider seriously whether competition or antitrust policy 
has any legitimate place in a market-based economy. 29 The "public-choice" approach 
25 See Whish, at pp 4-6, note 2 Ante. 
26 Bailey "Contestability and the design of regulatory and antitrust policy" (1981) 71 Am. Econ. Rev., at 
pp 178-183; Baucool, Panzar & Willig, note 12 Ante. 
2' See the review of the School's theoretical influence in W. Shughart "Be true to your school: 
Chicago's contradictory views of antitrust and regulation" in McChesney & Shughart, at pp 323-40, 
note 14 Ante. 
2' ' Ibid., at pp 1-12. 
29 Ibid., at p 330. 
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is interesting because of its views on the importance and role of states and 
institutional dimensions, domestic and international. 30 
(C) Competition and contextual economics 
Awareness of fundamental economic theories is an essential step in evaluating various 
antitrust policy debates. 31 Frequent and infrequent changes in antitrust policy alike 
have a great impact on the discipline of economics. 32 Thus, an examination of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy requires some appreciation and evaluation of 
economics theories and doctrines. 33 
It was said in the previous chapter that the present view adopted of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy requires various disciplines to be in harmony 
with one another. Just as the disciplines of law and political science must bear in 
mind various economic interpretations, so too economists should be encouraged to 
remain aware of policy designs offered by political scientists. According to Hay, the 
appropriate design of policy is crucial to the successful operation of antitrust policy. 34 
Several scholars have argued that economic factors have always played an important 
role on the international plane and that events in the final years of the twentieth 
century forced different interests to concentrate their attention on the inevitable 
tensions and continuing interactions between economics and politics. 35 
30 See further chapter 10. 
i According to Whish, "competition is about the way in which markets work: economic analysis is 
vital if reasonable policy decisions are to be made and if the law is to be applied in a sensible way". At 
p 46, note 2 Ante. 
32 See D. Neven, R. Nuttall & P. Seabright Merger in Daylight (London: Centre for Economic 
Research, 1993), ch 2; J. Bishop & M. Kay European Mergers and Merger Policy (Oxford, 1993). 
This point is of a particular importance in the light of the argument that payments and concessions 
between states are quite inevitable in the internationalization of antitrust policy. This has been 
advocated, in particular, by economists who have examined the economic incentives behind the process 
of internationalization. See for example A. Guzman "Is international antitrust possible? " (1998) 73 
N. }". U. L. Rev. 1501, at p 1505. 
34 Hay, at p 12, note 15 Ante. 
;' See R. Gilpin Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1987), at p 
3, M. Porter Competitive Advantage of Nations (Macmillan, 1990), K. Ohmae Borderless World: 
Power and StratcK' in the Interlinked Economy (Harper Collins, 1990). 
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(D) Competition, economists and policy consideration 
Normally, when public policy considerations are injected in the market place, 
analytical dilemmas appear. 36 It is difficult to decipher which of the public policies 
should be called antitrust policy when the majority of such policies are actually or 
symbolically capable of affecting the process of competition in the market. There is a 
query as to whether it should be industrial policy, trade policy, consumer protection 
policy, other types of social policy or only public policy, which should be expressly 
named antitrust policy. 37 As a result of globalization, the distinction between these 
policies has become a fine one. It appears that antitrust policy, therefore, potentially 
has very wide scope, encompassing all policies that effect the conditions of 
competition. 38 This point is central to the present examination of the law and politics 
of the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
Leaving the dilemma of searching for the appropriate form of public policy to one 
side, the issue of public intervention in order to regulate economic behaviour is itself, 
prima facie, a source of difficulty. This is an issue to which the discussion returns 
later. 39 For present purposes however, it is interesting to observe in this regard the 
paradox of mainstream economics theorists where, on the one hand, they discourage 
public regulation of industrial policy but, on the other hand, they are less sceptical as 
far as public regulation of antitrust policy is concerned. Writing during the 1930s 
economic depression in the US, Simons, the first Chicago school scholar, held the 
view that: 
"There must be outright dismantling of our gigantic corporations and persistent prosecution of 
producers who organize, by whatever methods, for price maintenance or output limitations ... 
Legislation must prohibit, and administration effectively prevent, the acquisition by any 
private firms, or group of firms, of substantial monopoly power, regardless of how reasonably 
36 See G. Amato . 4ntitrust and the 
Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing, 1997), at p 2. 
37 See chapter 3. 
38 D. Fidler "Competition law and international relations" (1992) 41 Int'l Comp. L. O. 563, at p 564. 
See, for example, how Articles 87-89 EC are included in the antitrust policy chapter of the Treaty of 
Rome which shows that provisions on state aid are regarded as relevant to EC antitrust law and policy. 
Also, see Article 96 EC which gives the European Commission the right to take measures to override 
national laws and regulations that distort conditions of competition. 
39 See pp 48-5 1 Post 
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that power may appear to be exercised. The Federal Trade Commission must become perhaps 
"4° the most powerful of our government agencies. 
From a critical stance, and in the light of the above analysis, it seems that there is lack 
of consensus amongst economists on how competition should be viewed, and whether 
it can be seen to offer a reliable explanation of the behaviour of undertakings in the 
market. Economists also disagree over the nature and extent of competition that 
should be encouraged in the market. Despite this lack of consensus however, there 
seems to be a recognition that competition is needed to deliver the benefits available 
from the market. Hence, it is desirable to encourage competition and adopt law(s) to 
protect it. 41 
(E) The means and end debate 
The final issue to be considered in this part is the evergreen debate about whether 
competition is an end in itself or a means for attaining some other objective. The 
answer to this question does not seem to be particularly easy. Nor has the debate been 
definitely settled in favour of one view. Nevertheless, the more acceptable view seems 
to be that competition is a means to achieve economic prosperity and ensure 
economic fairness in the market place. 42 Competition, therefore, is not an ultimate 
goal in itself, 43 but rather an instrument to enhance the welfare of people and ensure a 
proper functioning of markets. Protecting competition through law and policy would 
40 H. Simons A Positive Program for Laissez Faire. Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1934), at p 43. It may be added that Simons' call to the antitrust 
barricades is ironic, for it may be argued that depression may actually have been partly caused by 
antitrust law enforcement. 
41 C. Doern & S. Wilks Comparative Competition Policy (Oxford, 1996), at p 1. 
42 This seems to be the prevailing view according to many scholars. See C. Bellamy "Some reflections 
on competition law in the global market" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 15, at p 16. Also, C. Ehlermann 
& L. Laudati (eds. ) European Competition Law Annual 1997. Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart 
Publishing, 1998), at pp 123-4. 
43 Note that there can be an argument that competition is an end in itself. For example, the case where 
the Jeffersonian or atomistic competition is simply pursued to the end of having many small, 
independent businesses. This was a motivation behind the Celler-Kaufer Act (1950) when US Congress 
amended the merger provisions of the Clayton Act (1912). It could be argued, however, that this can be 
reduced to an argument that competition is a means to achieve some other purpose, since in this case it 
is striving for perfect competition and thus maximizing consumer welfare. Equally though this idea of 
having a thriving small business culture seems to be an end in itself. 
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make little sense if it were not believed that competition would help to achieve such 
goals. " 
II. SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF A PARTICULAR IDEA AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
The historical perspective of antitrust law sheds light on how it has developed and 
informs how it will continue to evolve. 
The general antithesis towards monopoly and restrictive business practices is a very 
old one. 45 As early as 1602, in the case of Darcy, 46 the common law of England 
consolidated its stance towards monopoly. In that case, the King's Bench Division 
held that monopoly leads to poor quality, harms consumers and restricts 
competition. 47 In the centuries that followed, this common law view had a far- 
reaching effect. For example, the view was mentioned in the debates leading to the 
enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) in the US, during which Congressman J. 
Sherman argued that Congress was setting forth "the rule of common law, which 
prevails in England and in this country". 48 
The historical perspective of the antitrust law in other jurisdictions also has its own 
political idea and philosophy. 49 In the EC, for example, it is widely recognized that 
antitrust policy arose as a result of political and economic necessity. 50 Judge Bellamy, 
a former Member of the European Court of First Instance, has argued that the purpose 
behind including antitrust rules in the Treaty of Rome was to support the political idea 
44 See pp 26-7 Ante. 
45 See Dyer's Case (1414) YB 11 Hen 5 of 5 p126. 
46 Darcv i,. Allein (Case of Monopolies), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260. (K. B. 1602). 
4 Ibid., at pp 1262-3. 
48 20 CONG. REC. 1 167 (1889). This statement led some scholars to believe that the Sherman Act has 
a transatlantic origin, if not quite a global one. See for example Bellamy, note 42 Ante. But also see R. 
Posner Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (University of Chicago Press, 1976), at pp 22-3. 
a9 Bellamy, at pp 15-7, note 42 Ante. 
so See Goyder, ch 3, note 3 Ante. Also, A. Neale & D. Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the United States 
of . Amnerica: 
A study of Competition Enforced By Law (Cambridge University Press, 1980), at p 439; 
Amato, at p 2, note 36 Ante. 
36 
behind the Treaty, namely to establish not only a single market but also ultimately "an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". 51 
In the light of this fact, it seems that EC antitrust law, like English common law and 
US antitrust law, 52 all originated from a particular political idea or a political 
philosophy. This indicates a fundamental point about antitrust law: that it is extremely 
difficult to separate antitrust law from the political and historical framework in which 
it is set up. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There are three main conclusions. First, awareness of fundamental economic theories 
is essential to evaluate various antitrust policy debates. In particular, awareness of 
international economic issues is important to understand the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. However, economic theories do not seem to be consistent concerning 
how competition should be conceptualized, whether it merits protection, and if so how 
it should be protected. Secondly, it would be beneficial if economists are encouraged 
to consider policy designs offered by other disciplines, especially those offered by 
political scientists. It is believed that this would enhance consistency with regard to 
defining competition and its role in the global economy. Thirdly, the above brief 
historical perspective begs the question of whether constructing a "global framework" 
within antitrust policy is possible when the antitrust laws of nations do not share the 
same, or similar, historical origins and goals. This, in turn, relates to the overarching 
point and goals of antitrust law, which is considered in the following chapter. 
51 Bellamy, at p 16, note 42 Ante. 
', One must bear in mind that it was to break up the Standard Oil and U. S. Steel monopolies that the 
various US antitrust laws were passed. For a good account of the political perspective of the Sherman 
Act and other US antitrust laws, see E. Kintner An Antitrust Primer (Macmillan, 1973), at pp 16-26. 
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Chapter Three 
ANTITRUST LAW: GOALS AND 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter examines two important issues. The first issue, examined in part I, is the 
point and goals of antitrust law, which has always been a subject of heated debate, 
whether at national, regional or international level. ' The second issue, examined in 
part II, is the political perspective of antitrust law, which is a difficult issue as it 
requires antitrust lawyers to step outside their own discipline. The conclusion of the 
chapter is contained in part III. 
I. ANTITRUST LAW: CONCEPT, GOALS AND RELATED MATTERS 
This part begins with considering antitrust law as a concept, then examines its 
objective and purpose and finally prepares the stage for a nexus to be established with 
the discussion on the political perspective of antitrust law. 
(A) The concept of antitrust law 
Antitrust law, the "law" used as an expression of the idea of competition, is generally 
negative and prohibitory in both nature and wording. 2 This is obvious since antitrust 
law does not directly encourage competition, but rather seeks - through the 
employment of legal systems - to prevent any form of anti-competitive behaviour in 
the market. 3 
' See remarks by F. Jenny in C. Ehlermann & L. Laudati (eds. ) European Competition Law Annual 
1997: Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart Publishing, 1998), at p 3. 
2 See H. First "Antitrust law" in A. Morrison (ed. ), Fundamentals of American Law (Oxford, 1996); R. 
Bork The Antitrust Paradox (Basic books, 1978), at p 70. 
3 This definition corresponds to other definitions employed by different writers. Fidler, for example, 
uses the term "antitrust law" to refer to "those laws and rules directed at the competitive behaviour of 
economic entities". D. Fidler "Competition law and international relations" (1992) 41 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 
563, at p 564. 
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The fact that law is used to protect competition has raised some difficult questions, 
especially since over the years, the idea of competition has adapted to evolving 
intellectual influences as well as legal and political changes. Nations differ with 
regard to whether antitrust law should be concerned with regulating uses of power by 
large undertakings than with the removal of hindrances to free competition; whether it 
protects competitors or the process of competition; and whether it is more concerned 
with the interests of consumers than the interests of producers. Differences between 
nations also exist with regard to the type of procedures and enforcement mechanism 
that should be relied on, to enforce antitrust law. 
Quite interestingly, the point of using antitrust law to protect competition has been 
questioned. Khemani has argued that enacting antitrust law does not guarantee 
competition will ensue, that competition can exist without having antitrust law. This 
argument is supported with reference to the high degree of competitiveness enjoyed 
by states such as Japan, Singapore and Taiwan in the international arena. 4 Khemani 
has put forward two reasons why such nations consider and adopt some form of 
antitrust law: first, because they are forced, due to market globalization, to address the 
issue of competitiveness. Secondly, such nations turn to antitrust law in order to 
s ensure that powerful domestic undertakings do not replace former state monopolies. 
In spite of this view, it was said in the previous chapter that competition needs law as 
a form of expression. In particular, there is a need to protect competition by antitrust 
law, in order to guarantee the benefits of the market. 
(B) The goals of antitrust law 
Writing in 1978, Bork emphasized that determining what the goals of antitrust law are 
is a precondition to rationalizing antitrust policy and building a body of coherent 
rules. 6 
The search for the goals of antitrust law is not particularly easy. 
7 Two reasons can be 
offered in support of this view. First, the nature of antitrust law continues to be quite 
' See chapter 10. 
Ehlermann & Laudati, at pp 150- 1, note 1 Ante. 
6 Bork, at p 50, note 2 Ante. 
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fluid, and its identity in general remains to some extent veiled. 8 This is evident from 
the academic literature in recent years. Gerber, for example, has referred to the 
situation in Europe to show that there is little awareness, including on the part of 
antitrust law specialists, of how European systems of antitrust law have developed, 
why they were created and the extent to which the systems have achieved their 
intended goals. 9 
Secondly, there is no consensus on the issue of goals. Several goals have been 
claimed in the name of antitrust law. It seems that the possibilities range from 
economic to social to political goals. In the US, the idea that the purpose of antitrust 
law is to enhance economic efficiency and maximize consumer welfare has been 
dominant. Some would argue that the aim of antitrust law is to protect small or 
medium undertakings. 10 Or perhaps its purpose is to prevent the emergence of private 
monopolies, which is capable of harming producers and consumers and ultimately 
threatening democratic society itself. In Eastern Europe and South America, antitrust 
law is seen as a means of facilitating the move from monopolization to 
demonopolization and from state control and planning to liberalization and 
privatization. " In the EC, antitrust law has one important objective, namely furthering 
market integration. 12 
The lack of clear consensus on goals may not generally matter very much to the 
extent that it is thought that competition is "good" and anti-competitive restraints are 
"bad". ' 3 However, not all nations believe that competition is good, let alone the fact 
that even in some of those nations where a system of antitrust has been introduced, 
competition and antitrust law and policy do not seem to be taken seriously. More 
importantly, having consensus in respect of the goals of antitrust law does matter 
7 This is an evergreen "old" debate, which seems to stretch from the birth of the concept of antitrust 
law to the present time. 
8 R. Bork The Tempting of America (Sinclair-Stevenson, 1990), at pp 331-3. 
9 D. Gerber Labt' and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (Oxford, 1998), at p 2. 
10 C. Bellamy "Some reflections on competition law in the global market" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 
15, at p 17. 
" See chapter 10. 
12 See chapter 6. 
13 C. Doerr & S. «Vilks Comparatii i' Competition Policy (Oxford, 1996). at p 1. 
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when one is faced with the internationalization of antitrust policy. '4 Given this view, 
any attempt to create a "global standard" within antitrust law and policy could be 
doomed to failure unless there is such consensus. 15 For this reason, it is essential to 
initially consider the issue of goals of antitrust law. 
1. Antitrust law: legislative intent and the dynamics of the law 
Before studying the different goals of antitrust law it is important to make a few 
general comments on the legislative intent behind its enactment. It is submitted that 
the search for the goals of antitrust law should not be confined strictly to the search of 
legislative intent behind its formulation. One ought to realize too that the law has, or 
is, capable of having wider, as well as other, overriding goals. For this reason, a heavy 
emphasis amongst lawyers on the legislative intent of antitrust law could lead to a 
great narrowness of viewpoint. 16 
The issue of legislative intent is pertinent for discovering the motivation behind the 
enactment of a particular antitrust law by a group of legislators at a particular time. It 
is crucial to remember this because antitrust law does not stand in isolation but rather 
stands within a wider framework (identified in the introduction to the thesis as 
"system"). 17 This means that antitrust law belongs to an order, where different 
disciplines, factors and interests are interwoven together, which all evolve constantly, 
and all according to changes related to the relevant time period. 18 Even within the 
same jurisdiction, changes may occur over time. These include changes in the mix of 
14 Note, however, that antitrust scholars are divided on this point. Those who are more in favour of 
internationalization tend to believe that consensus on the issue of goals does not present a problem, 
while those more sceptical about internationalization tend to believe that lack of consensus on the issue 
is a real problem. See E. Fox "Competition policy objectives in the context of multilateral competition 
code" in Ehlermann & Laudati, at p 135, note 1 Ante. 
Nevertheless, it should not be thought that it is not possible to favour internationalization whilst at the 
same time regard the issue of goals as one demanding careful attention. 
15 See WTO A, znual Report (1997), ch 4. 
16 J. Flynn "The Reagan administration's antitrust policy, `original intent' and the legislative history of 
the Sherman Act" (1988) 83 Antitrust Bull. 259, at p 263. 
" See chapter 1, note 31 and accompanying text. Note the existence of Article 3(g) EC. The Article 
provides that the EC shall have as its task the establishment of a "system ensuring that competition in 
the Common Market is not distorted". (Emphasis added) 
18 Report of the American Bar Association Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and 
Practice on The Internationalization of Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence 
(December, 1999), at note 23. 
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goals of antitrust law, the extent to which public intervention is acceptable and 
generally assumptions about the market place. One must not lose sight of the fact that 
market conditions are not static, rather may be influenced by various currents and so 
understanding antitrust law changes accordingly. 19 Thus, placing a particular 
emphasis on legislative intent would lead to overlooking the importance of the issue 
of goals. 
2. Identifying the goals of antitrust law 
The first thing to be said is that within a particular antitrust law, different provisions 
may aim to achieve different goals which may all fall along a spectrum of different 
policies. 20 Hence, it is advisable to analyze the various provisions of a particular 
antitrust law in terms of the policies underlying them. 
Many goals have been advocated under antitrust law, but no exhaustive list may be 
drawn up, nor is any particular goal on the list conclusive. Several categories of goals 
- as referred to in statements of political institutions, antitrust authorities, court 
decisions and the work of academics and practitioners - may be identified. For the 
sake of convenience, it is proposed that those goals be classified into three broad 
categories: economic, social and political. 
(i) Economic goals 
The first category includes goals that concern issues of economic efficiency, the 
promotion of trade, facilitating economic liberalization (including privatization) and 
enhancing the development of a market economy. 21 The previous chapter mentioned 
this economic dimension, and concluded that the claims made by various schools of 
thought in economics are not decisive on the issue of goals. 
19 R. Whish Competition Law (Butterworths, 2001), at p 16. 
20 See WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 39. Also, see Bellamy, at p 18, note 10 Ante, where the author 
speaks of antitrust law being placed in "a broader the social compact". 
21 The literature here is abundant. See E. Fox & E. Sullivan "Antitrust-retrospective and prospective: 
where are wie coming from? Where are we going? " (1987) 62 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 936; K. Elzinga "The goals 
of antitrust: other than competition and efficiency, what else counts" E. Sullivan "Economics and 
more humanistic disciplines: what are the sources of wisdom for antitrust? " (1977) 125 U. Penn. L. R. 
1 191 and 1214 respectively; J. Brodley "The economic goals of antitrust: efficiency, consumer welfare, 
and technological progress" (1987) 62 A'. 1'. U. L. Rev. 1020. These articles, with no exception, attempt 
to show that economic efficiency should not be considered as the only goal of antitrust law. 
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(ii) Social goals 
The second category deals with consumer protection other than in the above- 
mentioned technical sense of economic efficiency. This covers the idea of 
safeguarding the consumer from undue exercise of market power and the dispersion 
of socio-economic power of large undertakings, safeguarding the opportunities and 
interest of small and medium-size undertakings, the protection of democratic values 
and principles, the protection of "public interest" and ensuring market fairness and 
equity. 22 
Underlying this antipathy towards the risks of private power are the principles of 
justice and economic equity in a market democracy. Former US President, Franklin 
Roosevelt, for example, once warned that the liberty of democracy can be threatened 
if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger 
than their democratic state itself. 23 
(iii) Broader political goals 
The third category relates to wider overriding political aims, such as those relating to 
the process of integration in communities based on economic unions and free trade 
areas. The justification for including this third category is grounded on the recognition 
of these goals in some jurisdictions; 24 and by the fact that antitrust law is related to 
experience. 25 Therefore, when examining antitrust law, one ought not to generalize 
22 G. Amato Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing, 1997), at pp 2-3. A more practical 
explanation of this point can be found in Whish, at p 13, note 19 Ante. 
23 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, New York, File 277. Some writers in the US, especially those who 
were not convinced by Bork's arguments, saw wealth distribution as being the primary value and goal 
underlying the legislative history of the Sherman Act. See R. Lande "Wealth transfers as the original 
and primary concern of antitrust: the efficiency interpretations challenged" (1982) 34 Hastings L. J. 65, 
at p 65. 
It has been argued, however, that principles of fairness and equity normally advantage inefficient 
undertakings and disadvantage the most efficient ones. See F. Easterbrook "The limits of antitrust" 
(1984) 63 Texas L. Rev. 1; "Report from official Washington" (1982) 51 Antitrust L. J. 3. Furthermore, 
there seems to be some indication that these principles have ceased to be taken into account under US 
antitrust law. See NYNEX Corp. vv. Discon, Inc. 119 S. Ct. 493 (1998). 
2' See M. Dabbah "International competition policy" in I. Akopova, M. Bothe, M. Dabbah, L. Entin & 
S. Vodolgin (eds. ) The Russian Federation and European Law. (Forthcoming, 2001) 
2' See M. Lerner (ed. ) The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes: His Speeches, Essays, Letters, and 
Judicial Opinion (New fork: Random House, 1943), at pp 51-4. In the case of the EC for example, 
antitrust law is recognized as an important tool in achieving the goal of market integration. See chapter 
6. 
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about the classification of goals. The manner in which antitrust law is interpreted and 
applied in different jurisdictions demonstrates that there are many situations in which 
it can be used, other than the above-mentioned categories of economic and social 
goals. 26 These situations can relate to specific sectors in national economy, -' or even 
interstate sectors such as the EC. 28 
3. Some comments on the classification of goals 
These categories, including the various aims therein, are rather competing with each 
other. 29 It has been said that it is hard to expect such diverse "types of interests" to be 
consistent with one another. 3° As a result, two concerns arise. The first relates to the 
extent that diversity on the issue of goals may affect the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. The second concerns ascertaining which of these goals should be 
pursued in order to construct a global order within antitrust law and policy. 3 
Recent views within the WTO seem to indicate that these concerns should not be 
particularly problematic because there may be convergence in the goals of antitrust 
law towards certain "core" principles. It is argued that convergence is to be expected, 
as nations increasingly look to one another for lessons and, as an increasing number 
of nations seek to become partners in the global trading system. Such an approach is 
in use already, albeit in a limited form, in certain jurisdictions and international 
organizations. 32 
26 For a good comparative study see "Competition policy in the OECD countries" (OECD, Paris, 
1986). 
27 For example to deal with particular national issues such as economic developments, financial probity 
and unemployment. 
28 See C. Ehlermann "The contribution of the EC competition policy to the Single Market" (1992) 29 
CMLRev. 257. 
29 See E. Petersmann "Legal, economic and political objectives of national and international 
competition policies: constitutional functions of WTO `linking principles for trade and competition"' 
(1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 145, at p 155. 
30 The WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 39. 
31 See chapters 9& 10. 
'' See for example the work of the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy "Interim report 
on convergence of competition policies" (Paris, 1994c); US Federal Trade Commission "Anticipating 
the 215f century competition policy in the new high-tech global marketplace" (1996). Several nations 
have adopted "core" objective approach, including Canada (Canadian Competition Act (1986)) (More 
information can be found on the Canada Competition Bureau's web site 
<h :" vwtw. strategis. ic. gc. ca/competition>) and Norway (See the Konkurranstilsynet's web site, 
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The difficulty associated with convergence approach however, is that it may not be 
possible to succeed in making these goals coincide. 33 For example how can one arrive 
at the "core" of antitrust law's purpose by convergence of goals covering economic 
efficiency (economics) and others dealing with generic concepts such as fairness and 
justice (law)? The fear is that certain goals, let alone their adoption by strong states, 
will prevail over other goals. Of course, those "other goals" may be advocated by 
weaker states. 34 For example, in developed states, the primary goal of antitrust law 
policy is to enhance an efficient allocation of resources and maximize consumer 
welfare in the traditional economic sense. In contrast, developing states tend to have a 
broader goal for antitrust law, namely building a market economy and securing the 
political acceptance necessary for this. 35 
Even if convergence is both possible and effective and an agreement on the goals of 
antitrust law amongst different systems of antitrust may be reached, there can still be 
great disparity between states regarding the means of convergence and regarding how 
the means to achieve these goals is perceived. 36 This can be illustrated by the way in 
which different states consider antitrust policy should be enforced. 
Assume that state A, state B and state C share identical goals for antitrust law. A 
fundamental cause of divergence in antitrust policy between them would be that the 
means of achieving those goals may be differently conceived by each state. This 
<http: //www. konkurransetilsynet. no>). This issue is covered in the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) "Draft commentaries to possible elements for articles of a model 
Law of laws" (Geneva: August, 1995). See also ABA, at p 16, note 18 Ante. Chapter 6 contains some 
useful discussion of this issue in relation to the EC. 
33 It has been argued that convergence is not possible when different goals are claimed in the name of 
antitrust law and when antitrust policy is dynamic and constantly evolving. See M. Azcuenaga "The 
evolution of international competition policy: a FTC perspective" (1992) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 1, at p 
13. 
34 See A. Guzman "Is international antitrust possible? " (1998) 73 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1501, at p 1505, at 
1501. The author argues that the prospects for substantive international antitrust policy are slim. 
International agreements in respect to antitrust policy, he concludes, would benefit some nations 
(potential winners) at the expense of others (potential losers). 
'' Ehlermann & Laudati, at p 35, note 1 Ante. It may be of interest to consider the views normally 
expressed by the US which show the existence of a controversy with regard to the respective positions 
of strong and weak states. According to officials in the US, the internationalization of antitrust policy, 
in general, and the convergence of goals in particular, will lead to a lowest common denominator, 
whereby states with strong systems of antitrust will be forced to accept weaker goals advocated by 
other states with weaker systems of antitrust. See remarks by J. Klein, Ibid., at pp 247-60. See further 
chapter 10. 
36 See pp 16-7 Ante. 
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divergence of perception may be attributed to lack of agreement between the states 
over the optimal means of achieving identical goals which is generally caused by 
differences in the circumstances prevalent in each state. For example, culture may 
affect the optimal means of achieving a particular goal and thus, the choice of 
antitrust law and policy. 37 This is reflected by the fact that antitrust law tradition may 
differ from one nation to the next. A central feature of the EC antitrust law tradition 
has been the idea that antitrust law is special and that using law to protect competition 
moves outside the discipline of law. In light of this view, EC antitrust law is a new 
type of law which deals with problems for which traditional legal mechanisms are not 
suitable, and thus it requires correspondingly non-traditional methods and procedures. 
This contrasts sharply with the approach of US antitrust law, which relies primarily on 
traditional legal forms and institutions in protecting competition. 38 The following 
quote by Whish brings the discussion full circle: 
"There is no single coherent policy which binds EC or UK law together: there is no simple 
premise from which decisions flow through the application of logic alone. In particular 
competition policy does not exist in a vacuum: it is an expression of the current values and 
aims of society and is as susceptible to change as political thinking generally. Because views 
and insights change over a period of time, competition law is infused with tension. 
Furthermore different systems of competition law reflect different concerns, an important 
point when comparing the laws of the US, the EC and the UK. As already noted, competition 
law has now been adopted in at least 80 countries, whose economies and economic 
development may be very different. It is impossible to suppose that each system will have 
identical concerns. , 39 
Other differences, such as the size of the state, may also affect the choice of antitrust 
law and policy. 40 Hence such structural differences as well as differences in 
substantive law, between states may lead them to diverge with respect to the goals of 
antitrust law. 41 
37 See L. Haucher & M. Moran Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford, 1989), at p 3. 
38 Gerber, at p 12, note 9 Ante. 
39 Whish, at p 12, note 19 Ante. See also WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 34. 
'0 For example a relatively small economy may choose to offer an efficiency defence to mergers with 
anti-competitive effect (Section 96 of the Canadian Competition Act (1986)), whereas a larger 
economy may not opt for such a defence (the US). 
41 See further chapter 10. 
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II. A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ANTITRUST LAWN' 
(A) The heart of the matter 
A fundamental point about antitrust law, which is common to most if not all 
jurisdictions, is how it is seen as a response to an important problem of democracy. 42 
Amato explains that this point concerns how private power may be employed to 
infringe not only the freedom of other individuals, but also the balance of public 
decisions "exposed to its domineering strength". 43 
According to Amato, on the basis of the principles of liberal democracy, this problem 
is two-fold and constitutes a real dilemma: 
"Citizens have the right to have their freedoms acknowledged and to exercise them; but just 
because they are freedoms they must never become coercion, an imposition on others. Power 
in liberal democratic societies is, in the public sphere, recognized only in those who hold it 
legitimately on the basis of law, while in the private sphere, it does not go beyond the limited 
prerogatives allotted within the firm to its owner. Beyond these limits, private power in a 
liberal democracy 
... 
is in principle seen to be abusive, and must be limited so that no one can 
take decisions that produce effects on others without their assent being given. 
On the basis of the same principles, the power of government exists specifically to guarantee 
against the emergence of phenomena of that sort ... 
But this, which is its task, is also its 
limitation: abuses forbidden for individuals are not allowed for rulers either. Here is then the 
dilemma. 
In a democratic society, then there are two bounds that should never be crossed: one beyond 
which the unlegitimated power of individuals arises, the other beyond which legitimate public 
power becomes illegitimate. Where do these bounds lie? This is the real nub of the 
dilemma. , 44 
Applying this analysis, it seems that there is an apparent inconsistency between two 
perspectives on the role of competition and antitrust law. 45 The idea of competition is 
rooted in the freedom of economic undertakings. 46 However, antitrust law can limit 
this freedom. At first sight, this limitation seems to be inconsistent with the idea of 
competition, its dynamic and democratic values. This apparent inconsistency results 
in a balance being struck between two sets of considerations and interests associated 
42 See generally E. Kintner An Antitrust Primer (Macmillan, 1973). 
43 Amato, at p 2, note 22 Ante. 
44 Ibid., at p 3. Reference is made to the principle of liberal democracy because this dilemma really has 
its roots entrenched there. See J. Locke Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 
1988), at p 118. 
45 ABA, at p 20, note 18 Ante. 
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with them. One is concerned with the interests of those whose freedom is limited by 
the law, which is a short-term consideration. This consideration is normally prevalent 
in jurisdictions where public authorities are hostile to dominant undertakings and 
assume that such undertakings have, and will use their, economic dominance to harm 
small competitors. The other relates to the interests of those whose freedom is, or may 
be, limited by the actions of others, in the case of anti-competitive practices of 
undertakings. This is a long-term consideration because it takes into account the 
consequences for those whose freedom would be limited over time, should the law 
fail to address the limitation on their freedom or the source of harm to their interests .4 
Put another way, the balance is essentially between the bounds of public power and 
private power and the relationship between these two forces. As a corollary of this 
balance, the question arises of whether the market can be relied on to address 
competition concerns and to provide for itself in the long term, or whether there is a 
need for public intervention to address such concerns in the short term. 48 
(B) Who makes decisions? 
This apparent inconsistency reveals an interesting aspect of antitrust law, that the law 
is about who should hold power over making various types of decisions that affect the 
market and its functioning. This aspect has already been identified in the literature. 
Whish, for example, argued several years ago that antitrust law is a matter of who 
makes important commercial decisions. 49 One view might be that each undertaking 
should be left to decide its own policy in the hope that self-interest and the public 
interest will somehow coincide. On the other hand it might be thought that public 
autthorities should take a more interventionist approach. The author supports his view 
with reference to the EC, where the way in which the European Commission has 
applied Article 81(1) EC - by historically opting for a wide view of practices falling 
46 See pp 26-7 Ante. 
47 Gerber, at p 9, note 9 Ante. 
48 It has been argued that there are two opposing perspectives of antitrust law. "The first is antitrust law 
that delays intervention to the last, leaving the market to provide as far as possible by itself for a 
definition of its own dynamics and its own equilibria: only imminent risk, with no alternatives, of 
output restriction justifies and permits intervention. The second is antitrust law that seeks to prevent 
that risk emerging and inserts itself more frequently and earlier into ongoing market dynamics, seeking 
to influence their structure. " See Amato, at p 112, note 22 Ante. See also chapter 7. 
49 Whish, at p 15, note 19 Ante. See also WTO Annual Report (1996). 
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within the Article and then exempting certain agreements under Article 81(3) - shows 
a fair degree of diri gism. 5° 
The issue of decision-making - or more commonly, the making of important 
commercial decisions - is central to the present work. Its relevance resides in the 
query of whether the state or business undertakings should be the key player in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 51 In turn, this query leads to another on 
whether entrusting decision making to one side as opposed to the other affects the 
process of internationalization. 
Normally, the internationalization of antitrust policy is debated from the perspective 
of the states, who are viewed as the sole and major players in the process, since they 
hold the final say. Recently however, some recognition has emerged that the 
internationalization needs to be considered at least from a shared perspective. 52 The 
other point of view in question is that of the business community. This is because the 
internationalization of antitrust policy is in part a response to the globalization of 
markets - which is a direct result of the operation of business undertakings in markets 
beyond national boundaries - and so the needs and the role of business undertakings 
should be considered within the process. 53 This is an issue which will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 10. 
(C) Public intervention 
In regulating the conditions of competition in the market, the "invisible hand" of 
competition may, at times, be replaced with the more visible hand of public 
institutions. 54 Whilst it is understandable that this is inevitable in some cases, 
especially to address anti-competitive behaviour in the market, it seems that public 
intervention can generate some uncertain implications. These uncertain implications 
are a source of difficulty in the internationalization of antitrust policy. First, the afore- 
50 Ibid. 
51 Gerber, at p15, note 9 . 4nte. 
See chapters 7 and 10. 
`' See E. Fox "Global problems in a world of national law" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 11, at pp 11-3. 
Also, J. Griffin "What business people want from a world antitrust code" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 
39. 
53 See R. \Veintraub "Globalization effect on antitrust la«-" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 27. 
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mentioned opposing perspectives of antitrust law can exist in two different 
jurisdictions. For example, this is the case with the EC and the US. Secondly, the 
perspective within one jurisdiction may change over time. The Critical Legal Studies 
movement has attempted to explain this sentiment with reference to the way in which 
the application of US antitrust law has been handled: 
"Antitrust law was enacted for the people. Although vague in its terminology, one thing was 
clear; antitrust was meant to check exploitation, control power, and thus enhance the quality of 
life for the common person. But almost at their first opportunity, the judges turned the law 
against its beneficiaries. The first antitrust injunction affirmed by the Supreme Court was an 
injunction against the workers' strike led by Eugene Debs. Congress was constrained to 
respond, and adopted an explicit labour exemption. 
History shows that the antitrust laws have been a tool to legitimate power. Through the years 
some justices tried to deflect this trend, but the economic forces pushed the law to its logical 
end. "Exploitation", once a reason for the law, is now offered as a reason for not enforcing it. 
People in power to connote the process whereby participants in the market place seize every 
opportunity to make more money and thereby contribute to the alleged public good use 
exploitation as a positive word. If the law interferes with the freedom to exploit, it is labelled 
perverse law, and the judges, not wanting to be labelled perverse or blamed for holding back 
American business, find ways to construe the law to condone freedom of exploitation. 
Practices that were once illegal are now to be at most, "merely" unfair, not an area for antitrust 
enforcement. 
Ironies abound. The biggest steel companies in the nation merge, the biggest oil companies 
merge, the biggest airlines merge, all with the blessings of the Justice Department and the 
FTC. The two biggest car companies in the world form a joint venture with the consent of the 
FTC. The Justice Department withdraws the Government's monopoly case against IBM 
because it is afraid the Government will win. Cartels are blessed as long as they are export 
cartels and "only" hurt citizens of other nations, such as those of the third world. Thus the law 
against exploitation has become the law for exploiters. Efficiency and power win. Antitrust 
and the free market are one, save only for the occasional government action or pronouncement 
to "remind" the people that business is being regulated in the public interest. "55 
If one traces these uncertain implications to their origin, it becomes apparent that the 
reason different perspectives on antitrust policy exist, arises from the way antitrust 
law is applied by public institutions . 
56 Therefore, there is an important issue in the 
relationship between the law, as it appears in statute, and the way it is applied by 
institutions in practice. This relationship has been examined by Gerber, who has 
'' Whish, at p 15, note 19 Ante; E. Fox "The politics of law and economics in judicial decision making: 
antitrust as a window" (1986) 61 N. }'. U. L. Rev. 444, at p 554. 
" Franklin Roosevelt Library, New York, File 277. See also Kintner, at pp 228-32, note 42 Ante. 
One ought to realize however, that a change in administration in Washington D. C. can impact on such 
views with regard to the application and enforcement of US antitrust law. 
'" See remarks of a leading official in the Reagan administration on the Federal Trade Commission and 
its officials, that they are "hostile to the business system, to the free trade, and who sit down and invent 
b. " 1ti o 
Uy{º. 
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explained that in this relationship antitrust law, as it appears in the statute, defines and 
configures power relationships, and, in turn, public institutions manipulate the statute 
and its interpretation in order to achieve institutional, other political, and even 
personal goals. 57 
In light of the discussion thus far, this adequately shows that antitrust law may be, and 
actually is, subject to political influence. The politics of a system of antitrust is 
apparent from the manner in which antitrust authorities apply their domestic antitrust 
law, whether in the way the goals of antitrust law receive legal expressions in the 
statutes or in their guidelines and policy statements based on these statutes. 58 These 
expressions vary from one jurisdiction to the next, which, in turn, affects the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 59 
There are several points that illustrate how politics is apparent in this instance which 
can also provide a subtle ground for scrutinizing the law and politics of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. The first point, arising from the manner in 
which antitrust law cases are decided, is the potential causal distance between 
antitrust policy (however defined) and its outcomes. "The policy journey from statute 
to regulation to guideline, and form complaint to case to warning to enforcement to 
appeal to court ruling, is more akin to the Olympic policy marathon than the 100- 
"60 metre policy implementation dash. 
The second point is the issue of independence of antitrust authorities. As different 
players and interests are involved in antitrust law and policy, there is a possibility that 
antitrust authorities become subject to political pressures. Khemani has argued that 
theories that justify more meddling and interference in the economy". D. Stockman, Director of Office 
Management and Budget, Chicago Tribune, at A-1, cols. 2-3 (February 23,1981). 
'' See D. Gerber "The transformation of European Community competition law" (1994) 35 Harv. Int '1 
L. J. 97, at p 100. Also, see D. Tarullo "Norms and institutions in global competition policy" (2000) 94 
Am. J. Int'l L. 478. 
58 Doern and Wilks argued that three modes of such political expression exist: the goals of the core 
antitrust policy areas; the extent and nature of non-antitrust policy goals that are allowed by statute to 
be considered in decision-making; and exemption provisions. See p 15, note 13 Ante. 
59 See chapter 4. 
60 Doern & Wilks, at p 14, note 13 Ante. 
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distancing antitrust authorities from these pressures is favourable from a legal 
standpoint61 as much as from the point of view of the institutional structure: 
"Political independence of the administrative mechanism to deal with competition conflicts 
should be fostered. In order to address trade-related issues, the law should establish standing 
of private, foreigners and exporters, including those without subsidiaries. Non-discrimination 
principles, i. e. national treatment, should also be provided. "2 6 
The third issue relates to the question of whether antitrust law aims to protect 
competition or competitors, which directly arises from the issue of point and goals. 
Faull has opined that this question may lead the antitrust community down dangerous 
paths - as has happened in the EC - with the emergence of two different groups: one 
that believes the purpose of EC antitrust law, in particular Article 81 EC, is to protect 
the freedom of undertakings to sell goods and provide services, and another that 
believes that the aim of the law is to protect the process of competition. 63 
Other views however, have been less concerned about this question. Kobayashi has 
argued that: 
"It may be useful to compare competition policy with medical care. The direct objective of 
medical care is to cure the patient's illness, to remove impediments to health. Similarly, the 
direct objective of competition policy is to eliminate impediments to competition such as 
cartels, abuses of dominance, and so forth. There is a substantial parallelism between the two. 
The state of health of each individual is different from one person to another. The course of 
illness differs, the effect of injuries differs, and therefore the medical care given to each 
individual differs. However, the direct objective remains the same: to remove the impediment 
to health. Similarly, with regard to competition policy, the economic conditions of each nation 
differ, and impediments to competition differ. Therefore the measure taken under the 
61 It is important to ensure that decisions regarding the investigation and prosecution of particular cases 
are consistent with consideration of "natural justice" or procedural fairness. There is no doubt that 
injecting more considerations of fairness and justice will reduce the influence of politics. This can have 
a positive impact on the issue of making of important commercial decisions in the market. Ensuring an 
adequate degree of independence can also help to ensure the administration of antitrust law does not 
itself become an instrument of rent seeking. See A. Krueger "The political economy of rent-seeking 
society" (1974) 64 Ant. Econ. Rev. 291; J. Buchanan "Rent seeking and profit seeking" in J. Buchanan, 
R. Tollison & G. Tullock (eds. ) Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society (1980). See WTO Annual 
Report (1997). 
62 Ehlermann & Laudati, at p 140, note 1 Ante. See also R. Posner "The Federal Trade Commission" 
(1969) 46 Chi. -Kent L. Rev. 48, at p 54. Posner noted that the politicization of antitrust law at the US 
Federal Trade Commission was due to its dependence on Congress. Note also the proposal on the table 
in the EC to establish an independent non-political antitrust authority in order to separate between 
political regulatory powers and decisional ones. See C. Ehlermann "Reflections on a European Cartel 
Office" (1995) 32 CMLRev. 471; A. Pera & M. Todino "Enforcement of EC competition rules: a need 
for reform'? " (1996) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 125. See further chapters 10 and 11. 
63 Ehlemann & Laudatti, at p 12, note I Ante. 
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competition law to remove those impediments must differ, although the objectives of 
competition policy are the same: to protect the process of competition. "64 
III. CONCLUSION 
There are three main conclusions. First, a discussion on the point and goals of 
antitrust law is central to the internationalization of antitrust policy, which confirms 
the presumption made at the beginning of the chapter. Secondly, the discussion of 
goals opens up a scope for demonstrating that it is difficult to separate antitrust law 
from a political perception at any one time. The politics of antitrust law in general, 
and the internationalization of antitrust policy in particular, become visible in several 
ways. A common factor to these ways is the manner in which public institutions give 
legal expression to the goals of antitrust law, whether in statutes, or in the way they 
interpret, apply and enforce these instruments. The third conclusion is that it is 
imperative to consider the issue of public intervention in the market. This, in turn, 
raises questions of institutional approaches and arrangements, which are examined in 
the following chapter. 
64 Ibid., at p 21. 
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Chapter Four 
THE USE OF DISCRETION 
Antitrust authorities and public authorities more generally enjoy discretion in the way 
they may regulate conditions of competition in the market, and in the way they 
implement and enforce antitrust policy. ' However, this use of discretion can be an 
issue of concern in antitrust policy, in general, and in the internationalization thereof, 
in particular. The concern in this instance mainly arises from the way in which similar 
antitrust laws in different jurisdictions may be radically different when enforced -a 
situation that often leads to a divergence in the legal standards amongst those 
jurisdictions. 2 This divergence in some cases may be facilitated by natural factors, 
such as culture, experience and other structural issues, which are special to those 
jurisdictions individually. 3 Although, in other cases the divergence can be the pure 
result of the use of discretion by antitrust authorities. Hence, it is important to inquire 
to what extent this use of discretion, in general, and the resulting divergence, in 
particular, affect the internationalization of antitrust policy. 4 
This chapter examines the use of discretion by antitrust authorities, an issue hardly 
explored in antitrust law literature, and its relation to the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. As part of the analytical exercise, the chapter considers questions of 
institutional approaches, political factors and policy designs. The chapter is structured 
The use of discretion is quite common to most legal systems in the world. Davis has argued that 
various policies and their instruments should be viewed within a framework to be wielded by 
administrative institutions with high level of discretion. See K. Davis Discretionary Justice (Baton 
Rouge, La., 1969), at pp 216-7. 
The fact that antitrust law is normally vague in terminology makes the use of discretion by antitrust 
authorities quite inevitable. See p 59 Post. 
2 A. Guzman "Is international antitrust possible" (1998) 73 N. I'. U. L. Rev. 1501, at p 1545. 
See L. Haucher & M. Moran Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford, 1989), at p 3. 
Also, pp 44-f . -late. 
According to some views, divergence between different jurisdictions is also problematic when it 
comes to comparing between these jurisdictions. See C. Doern & S. Wilks Comparative Competition 
Policy (Oxford, 1996), at p 20. 
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as follows. Part I attempts an explanation of what discretion really is and compares it 
with rule-making. Part II then identifies several cases in which the use of discretion 
can be an issue of concern. This is followed by part III which proposes some solutions 
to deal with cases where the use of discretion can be problematic. Part IV spells out 
the implications of the present analysis, before part V offers a conclusion. 
I. A FRAMEWORK 
(A) Explaining discretion 
In the present context, discretion must be distinguished at the outset from competence, 
that is the legal power to act. When antitrust authorities make use of discretion, the 
effective limits on their exercise of power leave them free to make a choice from 
amongst possible courses of action or inaction. Some elements of this statement merit 
particular emphasis. First, discretion is not limited to what is authorized or what is 
legal but includes all that which is within the effective limits on the power of antitrust 
authorities. Much discretion may be seen as illegal or at least of questionable legality. 
Secondly, cases involving a choice to do nothing are definitely included. Perhaps 
inaction decisions are ten or twenty times as frequent as action decisions. Some 
examples of inaction decisions can be found in the way antitrust authorities select 
cases for investigation, open proceedings and formulate decisions in those cases. In 
the last example, discretion is exercised not merely in the adoption of final decisions, 
but also in interim steps; and interim choices are far more numerous than final ones. 5 
Thirdly, discretion is not limited to substantive choices but extends to procedures, 
methods of action and many other non-substantive factors. 
(B) Discretion vis-a-vis rule-making 
To gain a better understanding of what discretion really is, it should be compared with 
rule-making approach. The latter does not only connote a proceeding to make rules, 
but also refers to the means for gathering the necessary facts from which it may be 
determined what kind of rules should be formulated. According to this approach, 
those who exercise authority must conform strictly to the rules. The expositors of the 
rules are the courts, which perform their duties within the rigorous confines of written 
norms. Along with administrative and bureaucratic institutions, they only have the 
The truth behind this can be seen in the case of the EC. See, for example, the European Commission 
21 S` Report on Competition Policy (1991). 
ýý 
power to interpret and apply, and not alter, those rules. 6 This vie" of institutions and 
their role is based on considerations of fairness and protection against abuse(s) of 
public power. It insists on enhancing the equal treatment of all by eliminating the 
effects of personal inclination in the decision-making process. By requiring 
conformity with stated rules, ' it ensures that natural and legal persons will be able to 
plan their conduct in accordance with predictable outcomes. 
II. IDENTIFYING INSTANCES OF DISCRETION 
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to give an account, albeit brief, of instances 
in the practice of antitrust authorities which highlight the existence of use of 
discretion. Normally, this use of discretion is apparent in the following situations: 
(A) Case selection and initiation of proceeding 
Antitrust authorities generally enjoy wide discretion in their choice of cases for 
investigation. A good example is provided by the practice of the European 
Commission. The Commission has wide discretion in deciding whether or not to open 
proceedings. This has been confirmed not only by the Commission itself, but also by 
the EC Courts. 8 
(B) Adoption of binding decisions 
Caution is necessary when discussing the use of discretion by antitrust authorities in 
the outcome of antitrust proceedings. This is because not all antitrust authorities in the 
world enjoy the necessary competence to formulate legal propositions - in the form of 
binding decisions on undertakings - when they apply their domestic antitrust laws. 
This can be illustrated with reference to the situation in the US and the EC. In the US, 
"the judges play a leading role. Litigation plays a leading role. Despite the influence 
of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, it is largely judge- 
6 F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago, 1944), at pp 72-3. Also, see report of the Franks 
Committee on Administrative Tribunals in the UK (Cmnd. No. 218,1957), at p 6. 
' As Duguit observed. "no organ of the state may render an individual decision ý hich would not 
conform to a general rule previously stated". L. Duguit Traite De Droit Constitutionnel (Paris, 1927), 
atp681. 
8 See Commission 14th Report on Competition Policy (1984), in which the Commission referred at p 
119 to the judgment of the ECJ in Joined Cases 43 & 63/82 Dutch/Flemish book [1984] ECR 19. Also, 
see the Opinion of Advocate General Rozes in Case 210/81 Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission 
[1983] ECR 3045, at p 3070. The most important case on this issue however, is Case T-24/90 . Automec 
srl i'. Commission [1992] 11-2223. 
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made law. In the [EC], the primary decisions are taken first by administrators, the 
senior officials of the Commission. And when it comes to judicial control at the level 
of the Court of First Instance, it is judicial review. .. 
"9 
However, those antitrust authorities which are able to issue binding decisions on 
undertakings enjoy wide discretion. On this view, some antitrust authorities enjoy 
more discretion than others; in terms of their ability to formulate binding decisions in 
antitrust cases. This means that the use of discretion can vary from one antitrust 
authority to the next, a situation that can impact on the internationalization of antitrust 
policy. 
(C) Informal and interim settlements 
Not every investigation initiated by an antitrust authority results in a final binding 
decision. More often, an antitrust authority reaches more informal or interim 
settlements with business undertakings rather than final decisions. It is submitted that 
an antitrust authority normally enjoys wide discretion in reaching these settlements. 10 
Despite the practicalities of these settlements, there seems to be some concern 
however, regarding the way these settlements are reached. Van Bael exemplified this 
concern with reference to the practice of the European Commission: 
"It is unquestionable that settlement procedures should be encouraged because they save time 
and money for both the Commission and the defendant, while at the same time the 
complainant or public at large enjoy faster relief from restrictive effects of violation. 
However, since the Commission, by entering into settlements, is in fact shaping its policy 
without any of the procedural safeguards provided by an administrative proceeding, it is 
9 C. Bellamy "Some reflections on competition law in the global market" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 
15, at p 18. 
10 A good example is furnished by the settlements that the European Commission reached with Fiat and 
Alfa Romeo (See (1984) 17 EC Bull. No. 11, at p 24) and with British Leyland (OJ [1984] L-207/1 1). 
In the first case, a settlement between the Commission and the parties was reached when Fiat and Alfa 
agreed to instruct their dealers to refrain from promoting the purchase of right-hand-drive cars on the 
Continent which were sold at lower prices than those in the UK. In the second case, a binding decision 
and a fine was imposed by the Commission on British Leyland, even though the latter made similar 
commitments to those of Fiat and Alfa Romeo. 
A similar claim can be made about the position adopted by the Commission in merger cases. Compare, 
for example, British Airways/British Caledonian (Noted in Commission 180' Report on Competition 
Policy (1988), at p 81) and British Sugar/Berisford (noted in Commission 12`x' Report on Competition 
Policy (1982), at p 104) with Electrolux/Zanussi and Philips/Grundig, which were completed without 
any intervention on the part of the Commission. 
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imperative that the Commission's actions in this respect be sufficiently transparent so as to 
remain subject to public and judicial scrutiny. " ' 
In light of this comment, it is submitted that the settlement practice of antitrust 
authorities should be monitored. Once a proceeding is commenced, antitrust 
authorities should not be at liberty to ignore any existing minimum procedural 
safeguards simply by embarking on a course toward settlement. '2 
(D) Exemptions 
The issue of exemptions in antitrust policy is problematic. For example, where 
antitrust law cases involve two or more states, one state may tend to grant an 
exemption to harmful activities by its own undertakings on grounds of industrial 
policy or the state in question may believe that these activities do not raise any 
concerns for its domestic market. However, these activities may be harmful to the 
conditions of competition, and undertakings in the other state(s) concerned. For 
example, these activities may impede the access of foreign undertakings to the 
domestic market. 13 The fact that an exemption for the source of harm may be 
defended by the exempting state on the basis that no prescriptive law applies at all, 
can lead to conflicts between the states concerned. 14 Furthermore, an antitrust 
authority which enjoys the competence to grant exemptions to undertakings from 
antitrust law necessarily enjoys wide discretion. 
(E) Differences in procedure 
A comment on the fact that systems of antitrust in the world differ on procedure 
would provide an invaluable insight. There are several reasons why procedural 
differences have to be examined within the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
The fact that in some jurisdictions the competence to grant exemptions is not always 
' I. Van Bael "Insufficient judicial control of EC competition law enforcement" (1992) Ford. Corp. L. 
Inst. 733, at p 735. 
12 Some help can be found here by looking at the US Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (1974), 
which provides an adequate framework for ensuring transparency and judicial control of settlement 
practices of the US antitrust authorities. 
Observing minimum procedural safeguards is expected to enhance the rights of undertakings, the 
propriety and credibility of antitrust authorities, as well as reduce the risks of uncertainty, inconsistency 
and unjust results. 
13 The issue of market access is examined in chapter 9. 
14 See E. Fox "ToNvard world antitrust and market access" (1997) 91 Ain. J. Int'l L. 1, at p 1. 
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conferred upon antitrust authorities, but rather is the prerogative of the judiciary and 
the legislature - as is the case in the US -1' means that divergence in the legal 
standards between different jurisdictions is inevitable. For example, in the EC system 
of antitrust an investigation is initially opened by the European Commission which 
may lead to a prohibition, and then a grant of an administrative exemption, a practice 
that has given rise to a great deal of criticism. 16 In some cases, the Commission's 
decisions may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (CFI), and an appeal can 
even bring the case before the ECJ. 
The EC jurisdiction is really an inquisitorial jurisdiction. It is not an adverserial 
jurisdiction. The ECJ in antitrust cases decides on the need to call witnesses, cross 
examines them and decides on the need to appoint an expert to make a report. This 
contrasts with the more adversarial US system, where the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission bring an action before the courts. Deciding an antitrust 
case under the US system involves judges, a jury (in criminal cases), a sworn 
testimony, interrogations, discovery and cross-examination. 
Finally, it ought to be acknowledged that procedures used in the relevant system of 
antitrust greatly influence substantive law developments. Therefore, it is important to 
examine the issue of procedure, in particular whether courts or administrative 
authorities should decide on antitrust law cases in an international system of antitrust. 
III. DEALING WITH DISCRETION 
(A) The possible ways 
It should not be thought in the light of the discussion in the previous part that the use 
of discretion is undesirable. Nor should it be assumed that the use of discretion by 
antitrust authorities is untrammelled under all circumstances. As a matter of fact, that 
discussion shows that there are instances in which the discretion of antitrust 
authorities may be quite constrained. The use of discretion by antitrust authorities, 
j5 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are not authorized under US antitrust 
laws to issue exemptions from the statutory prohibitions. However, this does not mean that exemptions 
are non-existent under US antitrust law. Congress has occasionally introduced exemptions, for example 
in relation to export cartels under the Webb-Pomerane Act (1918), railroad cartels, mergers deemed in 
the "public interest" and certain shipping cartels. For a good discussion of these exemptions see J. 
Griffin "United States antitrust laws and transnational transactions: an introduction" (1987) 21 Int'l 
Law. 307, at pp 314-7. 
16 See chapter 6. 
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like the use of discretion by administrative authorities in general, is not fixed but 
rather lies along a sliding scale, where in every instance something needs to be done. 
Whether the use of discretion by antitrust authorities is wide or narrow depends on the 
way in which each nation's system of antitrust functions, on how antitrust policy and 
its role is conceived in the relevant system. As domestic antitrust authorities differ in 
their use of autonomy, the chapter proposes what should be done in all cases must 
normally take one of three forms: confining, structuring and checking. 17 By confining, 
it is meant to establish outer-boundaries and keeping discretion within them. The 
ideal, of course, is to put all necessary discretion within the boundaries, and to put all 
unnecessary discretion outside the boundaries, by drawing dividing, bright lines. 
Structuring includes encouraging antitrust authorities to develop plans, policy 
statements and rules, as well as open rules and open precedents. Finally, checking 
refers to judicial supervision and review. These three different alternatives are now 
examined in turn. 
1. Confining discretion 
Discussing constraints on discretion involves an attempt to answer questions such as 
whether the use of discretion by antitrust authorities should be uncontrolled. It is 
proposed here that this use of discretion should be confined. ' 8 The vague nature of 
antitrust law often means that discretion is delegated to antitrust authorities. The law 
often fixes certain limitations but leaves the ambit of discretion relatively open. By 
and large, it can be argued that the legislature usually does about as much as it 
reasonably can do in specifying the limits on delegated discretion. However, it may be 
deficient in providing further clarification. This is particularly the case where 
experience is needed to provide a foundation for this clarification. In such an instance, 
the legislature is almost deficient in correcting the assumption of discretion by 
antitrust authorities due to pressures on its time and the inability for it to draft for 
every contingency arising in relation to competition. 
17 The terms were borrowed from Davis, note I Ante. 
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2. Structuring discretion 
Since there is little scope for legislative intervention in order to confine the use of 
discretion, developing standards by antitrust authorities, and then, as circumstances 
permit, confine their own discretion through principles and rules is more promising. 19 
This movement from vague standards to unambiguous standards, broad principles and 
rules can be accomplished by policy statements. It can also be accomplished by 
adjudicatory opinions or by the exercise of rule-making power. 20 A considerable part 
of the task of antitrust authorities should be devoted to facilitate compliance with the 
antitrust law by helping undertakings to understand it. Not only judicial policy, but 
also administrative policy must be developed by precedent and on publicly stated 
grounds. Only in this way can the law be clarified in a sensible way. Undertakings 
have the right to know what kind of behaviour would lead to prohibitions under the 
relevant antitrust law. Publishing policy statements by antitrust authorities and relying 
on a rule-making approach should help in developing a consistent antitrust policy. `' 
A more diligent use of antitrust authorities' rule-making power is a far more 
promising means of structuring the use of discretion than urging the legislature to 
enact more meaningful standards. This is not because clarification of law by antitrust 
authorities is preferable to clarification by the legislature; since the opposite is often 
true. The reason that the former clarification is more promising is that the legislature 
may not be expected to provide the needed clarification. Legislators know their own 
limitations, they know they are ill-equipped to plan detailed programmes for a policy 
that changes rapidly, all in relation to time and they recognize that antitrust authorities 
are better equipped because they can work continuously for long periods in specific 
areas. 
18 Note the relevance of this issue in the context of centralization/decentralization in EC system of 
antitrust, where much of the recent 'modernization debate', namely making Article 81(3) EC directly 
applicable, has been about confining the use of discretion under this provision. See further chapter 6. 
19 A "rule" is a specified proposition of law, a "principle" is less specific and broader and a "standard" 
is still less specific and often rather vague. See generally R. Dworkin Law's Empire (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1986). 
'() See statements by T. Arnold, former US Attorney General, in the 1938 Department of Justice Annual 
Report. 
21 See M. Dabbah "Measuring the success of a system of competition law: a preliminary vie'w" (2000) 
21 ECLR 369, where it is argued that "competition advocacy" is one of the factors that ought to be used 
to measure the success of a system of antitrust. 
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Thus, the hope lies in the clarification of vague statutory standards. 22 The typical 
failure in a system of antitrust, which is correctable, is not legislative delegation of 
broad discretion with vague standards; but the procrastination of antitrust authorities 
in resorting to their rule-making power to replace vagueness with clarity. All 
concerned - business undertakings, legislators and the courts - should urge antitrust 
authorities to consider and adopt earlier and more diligent use of the rule-making 
power. 
However, the typical tendency of antitrust authorities to refrain from resorting to the 
rule-making power may be understandable. Waiting for a case to arise, then clarifying 
only to the extent necessary to decide the case, and then waiting for the next case, is 
one way to construct antitrust principles. 23 In some circumstances, the slow process of 
making law only through adjudication is a necessity, for antitrust authorities may 
really be unable to decide more than one case at a time. Moreover, sometimes even 
when they can do more, they properly eschew early rule-making. Developing law 
through adjudication is a sound and necessary process; the majority of antitrust law in 
most jurisdictions is the product of this process. 
Despite this fact, the argument can be advanced that antitrust authorities, by and large, 
have fallen into habits of unnecessarily delaying the use of their rule-making power. 
They often hold back even when their understanding suffices for useful clarification 
through rule-making - for reasons of resources or perhaps priorities in handling their 
investigations. When antitrust authorities do so, the likeliness for them to make use of 
discretion will be quite high. This is a point which requires significant thinking and 
academic comment. 24 
22 See further chapter 6. 
2' See Report of the American Bar Association Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and 
Practice on The Internationalization of Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence 
(December, 1999), at p 26. 
2. A more detailed examination of these issues somewhere else led me to this exact conclusion. See 
Dabbah, note 21 Ante. 
Clearly, merger cases furnish a very good example of how antitrust authorities make use of discretion 
and delay the use of rule-making power for reasons of resources anf priorities in their work. 
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3. Checking discretion 
The use of discretion by antitrust authorities needs a framework of judicial control, in 
order to separate between guided and unguided use of discretion. This discussion may 
be made more concrete by reference to the situation in the EC. 
(i) The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
The ECJ enjoys wide powers under EC law, including the power to review decisions 
by the Commission. 25 However, the ECJ has not always been in favour of exercising 
this power, especially in cases where the Commission has utilized its discretion - 
including those cases involving wide discretion. This attitude of the ECJ can be 
identified in the light of several of its major judgments. In the early case of Consten 
and Grundig, the ECJ considered that "the exercise of the Commission's powers 
necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic matters. A judicial review of 
these evaluations must take account of their nature by confining itself to an 
examination of the relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the 
Commission deduces therefrom. Their review must in the first place be carried out in 
respect of the reasons given for the decisions which must set out the facts and 
considerations on which the said evaluations are based". 26 
Twenty years later, the ECJ came to a similar conclusion, noting that the Commission 
based its decision on an assessment of complex economic situations. In the case of 
Remia BV v. Commission27 the ECJ held that it must limit its review of such an 
assessment to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied 
with, whether the facts on which the choice is based have been accurately stated and 
whether there has been a manifest error of assessment or abuse of powers. 
It is obvious from these two judgments that the ECJ is reluctant to second-guess the 
decisions of the Commission, unless there is a clear abuse of power. 28 This attitude of 
the ECJ is controversial. The mere fact that the Commission has not committed any 
2' See Article 230 EC. 
26 Joined Cases 56 & 58/64 Establissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. 
Commission [ 1966] ECR 299, at p 347. 
27 See Case 42/S4 Remia BVv. Commission [1985] ECR 2545. 
28 See M. Mendes Antitrust in a Ul orld of Interrelated Economies: The Interplay Between Antitrust and 
Trade Policies in the US and the EEC (Editions de lUniversite de Bruxelles, 1991), at p 82. 
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`manifest error' in adopting its decisions in antitrust cases should not necessarily 
mean that it has properly discharged its obligation of ensuring a proper application of 
EC antitrust rules. The discretion enjoyed by the Commission cannot and should not 
veil the requirement to produce informative decisions. It is advisable that the rule 
remains `in dubio pro reo' instead of `in dubio pro Commissione'. 29 
Some writers, however, seem less concerned about this attitude of the ECJ. It has 
been said that as the executive arm of the EC, it is sensible that the Commission is 
enabled to establish its own role as principal guardian of EC antitrust law, expand its 
geographical reach and conduct itself in any manner that enhances its international 
legal personality and recognition. 30 
The need for increased judicial monitoring is particularly important when set against 
the backdrop of the Commission's decision-making process. 31 Whilst in principle, 
decisions in antitrust cases are supposed to be reached by the full Commission - as a 
collegial body - in practice most of these decisions are reached through the so-called 
"written procedure", and not after a debate involving the entire Commission. Under 
this procedure, a draft decision is distributed amongst all directorates general in the 
Commission. A decision is considered to be adopted, unless objections are submitted 
within a time limit - normally less than a week. This actual state of affairs reiterates 
that the power to make decisions rests with those who handle the cases. The 
Commission acts as prosecutor, judge and possibly jury. On the basis of this situation, 
the ECJ's reluctance to perforrn more intervention in the practice of the Commission 
and its decisions means that the use of discretion by the Commission can go 
32 uncontrolled . 
29 See opinion of Advocate General Rozes in Case 210/81 Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission [1983] 
ECR 3045, at p 3070. 
'0 See J. Friedberg "The convergence of law in an era of political integration: the Wood Pulp case of 
the Alcoa Effects doctrine" (1991) 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 289, at pp 322-3. See also the view expressed by 
Hax,,, k in favour of this situation of a "highly centralized system" which he contrasted with "the 
Byzantine proliferation of statutes and enforcement authorities in the US, quoted in Mendes, at p 82, 
note 28 Antc. 
31 See for example Re Continental Can Co. Inc. [1972] CMLR D 11. 
32 The position of the EC can be contrasted Nvith that of Germany where the Karnmergericht does not 
hesitate to Feview the discretionary findings of the Bundeskartellamt. This situation is remarkable since 
the Bundeskar-tellamt is a specialist body, whereas the CoMIMssion is a political institution. Of course, 
the discretionary findings of the Bundestkartellamt cannot be equated with those of the Commission, 
which is responsible for a Nvider variety of policies and concerns. For a general discussion on the 
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(ii) The Court of First Instance (CFI) 
Establishing the CFI in 1989 marked the creation of a specialist court, and antitrust 
policy falls within the CFI's competence. The Commission's decisions can be subject 
to judicial review by the CFI, whose judgments, in turn, are subject to appeal to the 
ECJ. 
Since its foundation, the CF1 has produced several judgments, which make it difficult 
to discern the direction in which its jurisprudence has been moving. Nevertheless, it 
has produced some good judgments which show that the use of discretion by the 
Commission is being subjected to close scrutiny. In Italian Flat Glass, for example, 
the CFI held that the Commission should bear the burden of proof in antitrust cases 
and that this required standard is not satisfied by the Commission merely "recycling" 
the facts of the case. 33 A similar attitude by the CFI can be seen from its decision in 
PVC, where the CFI lamented the sloppy decision-making process of the 
Commission. 34 
In a more recent case, European Night Services v. Conimission, 35 the CH annulled the 
Commission decision, emphasizing the obligation on the Commission to set out the 
facts in individual cases and considerations having decisive importance in the context 
of its decisions. The CFI stated that while the Commission was not required to discuss 
the issues of law and facts and the considerations which have led it to adopt its 
decision, it is required under the EC Treaty to make it clear to the CFI and the 
undertakings concerned the circumstances in which it has applied EC antitrust rules. 
Thus, when a Commission decision applying EC antitrust law lacks important 
analytical data - which is vital to the application of EC antitrust provisions and to 
enable the CFI to establish whether an appreciable effect on competition exists - such 
as reference to market shares of the undertakings concerned, the Commission is not 
entitled to remedy such defect by adducing for the first time before the CH such data. 
German system of antitrust see Gerber D Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (Oxford, 
1998), at pp 276-306. 
33 Joined Cases T-68,77 & 78/89 Societ6 Italiana 11'etro v. Commission [1992] 5 CMLR 302. 
'; Joined Cases T-79/89, T-84-86/89, T-91-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89 & T-104/89 
BASF AG v. Commission [ 1992] 4 CMLR 357. 
35 Cases T-374-5 & 388; 94 [1998] CMLR 718. 
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Against these good judgments however, stands a line of cases in which the CFI has 
not been inclined to intervene with the use of wide discretion by the Commission, 
especially with regards to the imposition of fines and mitigating circumstances. 36 
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
(A) A matter of choice 
Adopting a particular institutional approach by antitrust authorities is essentially a 
matter of choice. The idea inherent in this kind of choice should be considered in light 
of the reasons for which the approach is adopted. Indeed, those reasons depend on the 
category of goals that are advocated in the relevant system of antitrust. Consequently, 
the category of goals impacts on the type of institutional approach. This means that 
divergence in the goals between different systems of antitrust can lead to differences 
in institutional approaches between those systems, which inexorably affects the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 37 
(B) Political factors and policy considerations vs legal rules 
It is also apparent from the above discussion that one of the main questions regarding 
the internationalization of antitrust policy concerns whether judges or administrators 
will decide antitrust cases in a global context. 
This question corresponds to two different perspectives about the role of law courts 
and antitrust authorities, which have to be taken into account. On the one hand, if 
antitrust policy is regarded as being subject to political influence, the resulting 
internationalization thereof is likely to be seen as matter of debate on the use of 
discretion by administrative and bureaucratic institutions. If, on the other hand, 
political influence is ruled out, because, for example, one understands antitrust law as 
a means of protecting and maintaining a valued social good, the internationalization 
36 See Case T-7/89 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v. Commission [ 1992] CMLR 84; Case T-69/89 Radio 
Telefis Eireann i% Commission [1991] 4 CMLR 586. This attitude by the CFI is quite surprising in the 
light of the purpose for which the CFI was established. Consider the following view of Advocate 
General Vesterdorf expressed in the same case, that "the very creation of the Court of First Instance as 
a court of both first and last instance for the examination of facts in cases brought before it is an 
invitation to undertake an intensive review in order to ascertain whether the evidence on which the 
Commission relies in adopting a contested decision is sound". Ibid., at p 125. 
'7 The implications here can be seen in the light of the fact that different states, including developed 
and developing states, do not agree on what the goals of antitrust law are or ought to be. See pp 38-45 
Ante. 
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of antitrust policy is likely to be seen as a matter of debate on legal rights, judicial 
analysis, and judicial decision-making. In this instance, the influence of political 
factors and policy considerations would be decreased. 38 
(C) Further issues 
The internationalization of antitrust policy has been advocated partly as a response to 
market globalization -a phenomenon that makes it clear that markets have become 
wider than states and that antitrust law matters frequently transcend national 
boundaries. 39 In this situation, domestic antitrust rules may not be suitable for 
regulating conditions of competition in those markets in general, and for addressing 
matters such as international jurisdiction, in particular. On this view, there seems to be 
a clear absence of adequate rules in this situation. Clearly, this is a situation in which 
the law ends. 
In this situation, antitrust authorities have several options open to them. 40 In all 
options, the use of discretion will begin, 41 with the choice between either beneficence 
or tyranny, 42 either justice or injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness. Yet no 
member of these authorities would admit that where law ends beneficence, injustice, 
tyranny or arbitrariness begins. On the contrary, they would have everyone believe 
that where law ends, wise and just use of discretion begins. 
Lastly, one has to appreciate the significance of two different issues. First, the use of 
discretion is related to the query of who should hold the locus of power in a system of 
antitrust. This is so, since the question is, how interventionist should public power be 
in the process of competition. Linked to this question is the understanding that a 
system of antitrust will usually function on the assumption that public power has the 
38 See chapter 3, note 61 and accompanying text. 
39 See chapters 1 and 3. 
40 These options include extra-territorial application of domestic antitrust laws, reliance on co-operation 
agreements, which may exist between the antitrust authorities concerned etc. See further chapters 8 and 
9. 
41 Antitrust authorities are largely concerned with applying the law, with making discretionary 
determinations, and with various mixtures of law, discretion and politics. As a matter of fact, they are 
much more occupied with discretion than with law. 
42 W. Pitt's words, "Where law ends tyranny begins" are engraved in stone on the Department of 
Justice Building in Washington D. C. 
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final say in any anti trust-rel ated matter. "' The second point is that the fact that the use 
of discretion vanes among different systems of antitrust affects the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. These points are important because apart from 
anything else, they present an analytical challenge, which extends to issues of political 
bargaining and political acceptability possessed by the different players concerned. --' 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are three primary conclusions. The first being, the basic one, that antitrust 
authorities make use of discretion, which in some cases may be wide discretion. 
Secondly, the use of discretion affects the internationalization of antitrust policy, 
especially since it often leads to divergence in the legal standards amongst different 
systems of antitrust. Lastly, something must be done to deal with the use of discretionI 
particularly in cases where the use of discretion is wide. This can take the form of 
confining, structuring or checking discretion. 
It is recommended that confining discretion is a particularly good option to pursue, 
since it has the advantage of encouraging antitrust authorities to enhance the 
coherence of their decisional practice and to develop antitrust policy in a steady and 
sensible way. Not only would this lead to greater certainty in the practice of antitrust 
authorities, but also would make it more reliable for undertakings who often are in 
need of such certainty in their handling of market operations. The net result would be 
that the internationalization of antitrust policy - leading to the creation of an 
international system of antitrust - would be more achievable. 
Confining discretion can also be supplemented with checking discretion. This is also 
desirable, since it would encourage antitrust authorities to keep within the confine of 
their discretion as well as afford undertakings the opportunity to bring actions - 
whether within or outside an international system of antitrust - against antitrust 
authorities in order to ensure that their interests and rights are adequately protected. 
41 As the discussion in chapter 3 demonstrated, the question in particular, is whether the 
internationalization of antitrust policy should be arrived at with public initiative (states being the main 
actors and decision-makers) or private initiative (the market and business undertakings deciding for 
themselves). Arguably, the implications of having states as the primary actors in this matter are far- 
ation of reaching- and would carry Nvith them a great impact on the entire process of internati iz I 
antitrust policy. One direct consequence would be that this process would be made subject to more 
political influence. See chapter 10. 
44 See further chapter 10 for a detailed account of the players concerned. 
68 
Chapter Five 
A FRAMEWORK: THE DIFFERENT 
THEORIES 
It was said in the first chapter that the internationalization of antitrust policy is a 
process through which an international system of antitrust can be established. 
According to the fourth, and arguably most central example of internationalization 
mentioned in that chapter, this system will include autonomous institutions. This 
chapter considers some theories which can facilitate a better understanding of the type 
of considerations that need to be taken into account regarding how this system can be 
established. 
I. REALISM 
From a Realist perspective, autonomous institutions in an international system of 
antitrust will be essentially ineffectual by imposing rules and standards upon 
sovereign states which do not conform to those states' own interests and priorities. ' 
Hence, to pursue a form of internationalization leading to an international system of 
antitrust is pointless and absurd. 
This view is explained on the basis of two Realist perspectives. At one end of the 
spectrum, it is unlikely that states will co-operate towards the creation of an 
international system of antitrust, especially if this would mean that states would have 
to limit their sovereignty in favour of the autonomous institutions in the system. At 
the other end of the spectrum and assuming that states would co-operate if they 
decide, for example, to limit the effect of rules and principles of an international 
system of antitrust, domestic courts and antitrust authorities would not apply that 
system's law due to reasons relating to sovereignty. 
2 
' For a detailed account on Realism see R. Wellek The Concept of Realisin in Literary Scholarship 
(J. B. Wolters, 1961), A Carr6 Realists and Nornzalists (Oxford, 1964). 
2 See chapter 7. 
69 
Realism asserts the primacy of national politics over international antitrust law (the 
law from above) and emphasizes the limits that sovereign states may impose upon 
their involvement in an international system of antitrust, which will stop well short of 
any surrender of sovereignty to autonomous institutions in such a system. Realism 
places no emphasis on the importance of autonomous institutions in this system. From 
here, it professes that such institutions have a very marginal role to play. 
II. NEORATIONALISM 
This approach to the internationalization of antitrust policy and the importance and 
effectiveness of autonomous institutions in an international system of antitrust, 3 
proceeds ftom the basic Realist premise of the superiority of sovereign states. 
However, Neorationalists accept there is scope for co-operation among states and a 
role for such institutions based on rational choice made by sovereign states towards 
some forin of co-operation on the creation of an international system of antitrust. 
Neorationalists assert that autonomous institutions in an international system of 
antitrust will in fact be unable to impose their rules and standards on sovereign states 
and their domestic antitrust authorities or law courts, which may even be part of such 
a system. Any scope for co-operation between states towards the creation of an 
international system of antitrust and the ability of autonomous institutions to play any 
role in such a system do not result from an obligation of states to co-operate or from 
any autonomous power or discretion, enjoyed by these institutions. Sovereign states' 
co-operation towards the creation of an international system of antitrust with 
autonomous institutions, and their acceptance of rules and standards enunciated by 
such institutions , indicate that sovereign states would act rationally. 
Sovereign states 
in this case would opt for the gain that could result from co-operating, and from 
complying with those rules and standards, rather than the potential benefits from 
opting for no systematic antitrust policy on the international plane. Neorationalism 
argues that it is in the sovereign states' own interest to establish a system of antitrust 
and to transfer some competence to its institutions. This will have the benefit of 
relieving states, 1. titer alia., from having to enter into bilateral agreements that 
anticipate any disputes that may anse among them. 
See G. Garret "International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal 
market" (1992) 46 Int'l Organizahon 533. 
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III. NEOFUNCTIONALISM 
Neofunctionalism is a political theory of how autonomous institutions can be fon-ned 
and thereafter integrate their own domain in an international system. 4 This approach 
explains how individual interests and players may be involved, with specific 
identities, motives, and objectives in the creation of the system. Whilst this 
Neofunctionalist type of system construction has already been considered in certain 
areas, 5 it has never been applied to antitrust policy. 
Neo functionalism is generally concerned with explaining the methodology and 
reasons behind sovereign states' decisions and actions to cease to be wholly 
sovereign. It explains how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge or mix with each 
other so as to limit the factual attributes of sovereignty whilst acquiring new 
techniques for addressing different dimensions in their relationship, including any 
conflicts that may arise between them. In particular, it describes a process whereby 
political players in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new centre, where institutions 
enjoy jurisdiction over the pre-existing absolutely-sovereign states. 6 
Neofunctionalism is employed in the present context to explain several features in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. It can help us understand the process of 
internationalization, and in particular the relationship between antitrust and trade 
pol I Cy. 7 Trade policy has international orientations and links, whereas antitrust policy 
seems to be more inward-looking and derives its validity from national origins. 8 
Neo functionalism can help to explain how spillover(s) arise from trade to antitrust 
policy, which consequently can help advance antitrust policy towards the international 
plane. Three different types of spillover may be mentioned in this context: sectoral 
' The term was borrowed from E. Hass "The study of legal integration: reflection on the joy and 
anguish of pretheorising" (1970) 24 Int'l Orgaiiiiation 607. 
See E. Hass "Technocracy, pluralism and the new Europe" in S. Graubard (ed. ) A New Europe? 
(Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1964). 
6 E. Hass "International integration: The European and the universal process" (1961) 15 Int'l 
Oi-ganization 366. 
See chapter 9. 
S See E. Fox "Toward world antitrust and market access" (1997) Am. J. Int'l L. 1, at p 1. 
1 
spillover, political spillover and spillover enhancing common interests. These will be 
described in turn. 
(A) Sectoral spillover 
Sectoral spillover refers to the interdependence between the different sectors of a 
modem industrial economy. It is based on the assumption that an action taken in one 
sector makes achieving the original goal dependent on taking further actions in related 
sectors. As a result, further actions will be necessary. Sectoral spillover presupposes 
the existence of a common objective and simply dictates that the jurisdiction of the 
authorities charged with implementing that objective can expand as necessary to 
address whatever obstacles stand in the way. 9 
(B) Political spillover 
This describes the process of an adaptive behaviour among nations. In this type of 
spillover, national expectations and values would shift towards the international plane, 
where national interest groups and political actors coalesce in response to sectoral 
spillover. 10 
(C) Spillover enhancing common interests 
This occurs when sovereign states face significant hurdles in creating a common 
framework within a particular policy while acknowledging the necessity of reaching a 
consensus to safeguard other aspects of interdependence among them. One way of 
overcoming such deadlock is by exchanging concessions in related fields. " 
Neo functionalism will also help elucidate the role of different players in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. The primary players in the construction of an 
international system of antitrust are not only sovereign states, but also forces above 
and below the state. Actors below the state include the individual and business interest 
groups and consumers etc. Above the state, there are existing regional and 
supranational orders, for example those within the framework of the EC, the North 
' See 1. Claude Sii., ords Into Plow Shares (New York, Random House, 1977); E. Hass & L. Lindberg 
The Political D_ynamics of the European Economic Integration (Stanford University Press, 1963). 
10 E. Hass Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford University Press, 1964). 
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 12 Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANCESTRA), the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the WTO. 13 These organizations 
promote integration, foster the development of interest groups and cultivate ties with 
them. 
What role is there for sovereign states within this setting of internationalization? 
According to Neofunctionalism, a sovereign state's role is "creatively responsive". 14 
As holders of the ultimate political power through their decisional authority, 
sovereign states may accept, side-step, ignore, or even sabotage decisions from above 
or below, which have been made regarding market conditions. 
*** 
Realism and Neorationalism ultimately seem to lend only marginal support to the 
fourth example of internationalization through which an international system of 
antitrust can be established. At best, these theories focus on traditional forms of co- 
operation between sovereign states. Hence, they may be more suitable for pursuing 
examples one and two of internationalization, namely the ones on co-operation 
between domestic antitrust authorities and convergence of national antitrust laws. ' 5 
The theory of Neofunctionalism on the other hand seems to have a great deal to offer 
in terms of propositions and ideas, which could be plausible to various interests and 
players, if the fourth example of internationalization is to be pursued. The theory 
seems to be able to accommodate the variety of goals that are claimed in the name of 
antitrust law. It should also prove useful in examining the relationship between 
antitrust and trade policy, especially in relation to introducing market access principle 
under antitrust policy, an issue examined in chapter 9. 
'' It has been argued that the existence of concessions and compensatory payments by developing 
countries to developed countries is necessary in order to reach a meaningful international antitrust 
policy. See A. Guzman "Is international antitrust possible" (1998) 73 N. Y U. L. Rev. 1501, at p 1505. 
12 Canada-Mexico-United States, 32 I. L. M. 289 & 32 I. L. M. 605 (December 17,1992). 
13 For a review of these frameworks see R. Harmsen & M. Leidy "Regional trading arrangements" in S. 
Khemani (ed. ) International Trade policies: The UruguaY Round and Beyond (Background Papers vol. 
II, IMF, Washington D. C., 1994). 
" R. Harrison Europe in Question. - Theories c! f Regional International Integration (London: Allen 
tTnNN, in, 1974), (a' p 80. 
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Lastly, much of the development of Neofunctionalism over the years arose in the 
context of the EC. 16 For this reason, looking at the case of the EC will, inter alial Ir 
facilitate better understanding of the application of the theory and fumish an example 
of the internationalization of antitrust policy. EC antitrust experience is examined in 
the following chapter. 
15 See chapter 10. 
16 E. Hass The Uniting of Eumpe (Stanford University Press, 195 8); Hass & Lindberg, note 9.4 nte. 
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Chapter Six 
EC ANTITRUST POLICY 
This chapter examines the antitrust experience of the EC. Several features of this 
experience make it suitable to provide some insights into the law and politics of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. In particular, this experience furnishes an 
example of a successful system of antitrust operating beyond national boundaries, 
which is supported by a rich political background, especially on the relationship 
between law and politics. ' Other important features also exist. These will be alluded 
to later in the discussion. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Part I gives an account of some important 
introductory issues. Part 11 describes the role of the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in EC antitrust policy. Part III examines the 
relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws, followed by part IV, giving an 
account of the importance and the influence of EC antitrust law beyond the single 
market. Part V spells out the implications of the present analysis. Finally, Part VI 
gives a conclusion. 
I. SOME INTRODUCTORY ISSUES 
(A) The special characteristics of EC antitrust law 
2 
EC antitrust law is thought to be a unique type of la,, N, . This uniqueness arises 
from 
several facts. First, EC antitrust law is enforced in a special context, namely the goal 
of market integration and therefore it has a market- inte grating aspect. 
3 In this context, 
the law belongs to a wider system, designed to eliminate barriers between states and 
' See further below. 
2 See generally D. Gerber Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (Oxford, 1998). 
3 See Articles 2 and 3 EC. 
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enhance the creation of a single market. -' During the past forty years or so, the law has 
come to be widely recognized as fundamental to furthering this single market goal, 'ý 
initially in the form of the Common Market and later to establish the Internal Market. 6 
Attaining this goal required not only eliminating restraints imposed by Member 
States, but also ensuring that those restraints would not be replaced by pnvate 
restraints resulting from the behaviour of private undertakings, because both were 
considered capable of harming this goal. For this reason, and others, antitrust laxv was 
introduced to address such concerns 7 and this has contributed towards antitrust law 
becoming of central importance in the EC .8 Secondly, and this is a point that arises 
ftom the previous one, associating antitrust law with the single market integration 
goal has meant that the law has developed in many ways that depart from the 
"traditional" approach, which can be observed in systems of antitrust in other 
jurisdictions. This has meant that EC antitrust law was not adopted solely to enhance 
efficiency and ensure consumer welfare, but also to serve as a "tool" to achieve a 
wider political goal. 9 Thus, the law has a variety of goals. Thirdly, EC antitrust law 
reflects a European regulatory approach. Fourthly, and more importantly for the 
purposes of the present thesis, the EC constituted a "new legal order of international 
law". " Adopting and using antitrust law in this legal order, it is submitted, supplies an 
4 See Report of American Bar Association on Private Anti-conipetitive Practices as Market Access 
Barriers (January, 2000). 
5 Many commentators share the view that antitrust policy is regarded as the most fundamental and 
successful of EC policies. See L. McGowan & S. Wilks "The first supranational policy in the European 
Union: competition policy" (1995) 28 E. J. Pol. Res. 141. 
' See B. Hawk "Antitrust in the EEC-the first decade" (1972) 41 Fordhain L. Rev. 229, at p 231; U. 
Kitzinger The Politics and Econo? nics of Eui-opean Integration. - Britain, Eui-ope, and the United States 
(New York, 1963), at pp 22-58; CoMITUssion 23 rd Report on Competition Policy (1993). Similar 
aspirations can also be found in the Cockfield White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market 
COM (85) 3 10, at para. 14. 
' See Article 3(g) EC which states that the EC shall include "a system ensuring that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted". To this end, specific rules were adopted in order to deal with different 
types of harmful private economic behaviour. See in particular the main provisions in Articles 81 and 
82 EC, and Regulation 4064/89 EC (The Merger Regulation). 
8 See P. Massey "Reform of EC competition law: substance, procedure and institutions" (1996) 
Fordhain Coi-p. L. Inst. 91. 
9 See M. Mendes . 4ntitmst in a 
World of Interrelated Econoinies. - The Interplay Between Antitrust and 
Ti-ade Policies in the US and the EEC (Editions de lUniversite de Bruxelles, 199 1), at p 74. 
10 This view derives force from the words of the ECJ in its ground-breaking 'udgment of I'an Gend en Zý j 
Loos, where it firri-Ay heralded that "the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law 
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example of the internationalization of antitrust policy. Consequently, it is helpful to 
draw on the successes or failures of the antitrust experience of this new legal order. 
(B) The nature of EC antitrust law 
It has been argued that EC antitrust law, like the antitrust laws of many nations,, was 
desired neither by lawyers nor by economists, but by politicians and by "scholars 
attentive to the pillars of the democratic systems, who saw it as an answer (if not 
indeed "the" answer) to a crucial problem of democracy". " 
The involvement of these factors in the creation, and arguably the development, of EC 
antitrust law supports the view expressed in previous chapters; that it is difficult to 
divorce antitrust law from a particular political idea at a particular point in time. 12 
Furthermore, it supports the view that a study on antitrust law and policy needs to be 
approached in an inter-disciplinary manner. ' 3 In the case of the EC, this is obvious 
from the fact that the creation and development of EC antitrust law is as much about 
politics as law and economics. 14 
There are two additional comments that are worth making in respect of the nature of 
EC antitrust law and experience. First, despite the fact that the wording of the antitrust 
provisions in the EC Treaty has not changed for over forty years, the policies 
for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within linuted fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals". 
Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Adininistratie der Belastingen [ 1963] ECR 1. 
The question of legal personality and nature of the EC has also been considered on other occasions by 
the ECJ. The following characteristics of the legal order established by the EC have been emphasized 
by the ECJ. By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EC created its own legal system which 
became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States. By creating a Community of 
unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on 
the international plane and real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of 
powers, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights. This lirrutation of Member States 
sovereignty is permanent. Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at p 593. See how this view of the 
ECJ corresponds to EC Legislation. Article 281 EC states that the EC has legal personality, and Article 
312 EC states that it has concluded for unli MIted duration. 
" G. Amato .4 ntitrust and the 
Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing, 1997), at p 2. 
12 See pp 35-6 . Ante. 
13 See pp 19-21 4nte. Also, see Dabbah M "Measuring the success of a system of competition law: a 
preliminary view" (2000) 21 ECLR 369, at p 371. 
14 Amato, at p 2, note 11 . -finte. 
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underlying its antitrust law have changed according to changes in time and political 
thinking. These changes reflect the political nature of EC antitrust policy, especially at 
the level of EC bureaucratic politics. This arises in several situations. One situation 
which merits mentioning is the adoption of decisions in some antitrust cases, 15 where 
compromises may be reached between antitrust policy and other types of policies, 
often industrial policy, within the Commission. 16 
The second comment relates to another made in the introduction to the thesis, 17 that 
one of the aims of the present study is to examine whether the nature of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy is a matter of "law" or "politics" (or both). In 
this regard, considering EC antitrust law experience is crucial because it can provide a 
subtle ground for this examination. An illustration of this point ensues from EC 
antitrust law at its inception: 
"German participants tended to see the competition law as fundamentally 'juridical'-legal 
norms that had to be interpreted and applied according to judicial methods. At the very least, 
the decade-long controversy over the introduction of a German competition law conditioned 
German participants to think of Community competition as 'law'. 
Decision-makers from other Member States were often inclined to view Articles 85 [now 81] 
and 86 [now 82] not as 'enforceable law', but rather as programmatic statements of policy 
intended to guide adrrunistrative decision-making of the Conunission. Thus the French, for 
example, tended to see competition law in political and policy terms, preferring to base 
decisions on the evaluation by Community officials of the needs of the Community and its 
Member States. They were steeped in the values and methods of dirigisme and planification 
which tended to view competition law in that light. "' 8 
" See further chapter 4 for a discussion on the use of discretion by the Commission, as an example of 
the political nature of EC antitrust policy. 
16 1. Maher "Alignment of competition laws in the European Community" (1996) 16 Y E. L. 223, at p 
229. See also Report of the American Bar Association Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law 
and Practice on The Internationalization of Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence 
(December, 1999). 
Former Commissioner K. van Miert once said, antitrust policy "is politics"; quoted in C. Doern & S. 
Wilks Coinparath, c Competition Policy (Oxford, 1996), at p 254. For an illustration of the kind of 
compronuses in question in the CornnUssion decisional practice, see A&ospatialelAlenialDe Havilland 
(Case IV/M. 053) OJ [ 199 1] L-334/42; [ 1992] 4 CMLR M2; FordlVW OJ [ 1993] L-20/14; [ 1993] 5 
CMLR 617. 
17 
At pp 19-20.4nte. 
18 Gerber, at p 346, note 2 Ante. (Footnotes ornitted) 
This, in turn, raises the issue of seriousness of antitrust law beyond national boundaries. Initially, some 
Member States believed that EC law, in general, and EC antitrust laý,, ', in particular, can be enforced 
seriously under such circumstances, whilst others held a completely opposite view. 
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The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that EC antitrust experience provides 
significant insights into the legal and political dimensions of the internationalization 
of antitrust policy that can and need to be explained. The EC system of antitrust has 
developed enormously over the years. However, as will be seen, it has the potential to 
develop further. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The EC Treaty established new autonomous institutions in order to interpret, apply 
and enforce EC law. 19 Two EC institutions, namely the ECJ and the Commission,, 
came to play a central role in interpreting and enforcing EC antitrust law. 20 Much of 
the meaning of EC antitrust law has been provided by these two institutions. As a 
result, they also provoked the most controversy surrounding its application. 21 
(A) The Commission 
The use of law to protect competition in the EC meant the law had to be separated 
from domestic attributes, since the aim was to deal with private anti-competitive 
economic activities beyond national boundaries. According to Forrester and Norall, 22 
marginalizing the role of Member States in this case and centralizing a new 
supranational institution was necessary for establishing a "culture of competition" 
because EC antitrust rules were novel and almost revolutionary. From the beginning, 
the rules required fundamental changes in deeply ingrained habits of thought and 
patterns of economic conduct. There was very little trust within the Commission of 
the business community, lawyers and judges in Member States to apply the rules 
19 Article 7 EC. 
20 Not, however, the role of the Court of First Instance (CFI), exanuned at pp 64-5 Ante. 
2' For example, the employment of Article 82 EC by the Comriussion and the ECJ has made it difficult 
to decipher the aims of the provision. See M. Dabbah "Conduct, dominance and abuse in 'market 
relationship': analysis of some conceptual issues under Article 82 EC" (2000) 21 ECLR 45; V. Korah 
"Tetra Pak II-lack of reasoning in Court's judgment" (1997) 18 ECLR 98. Also, see remarks by R. 
Whish on the "Future of competition policy" in C. Ehlermann & L. Laudati (eds. ) European 
Conipetition Law, 4nnual 1997. - Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart Publishing, 1998), at p 502. 
II -- 1. Forrester & C. Norall - The Laicization of CornmunitY law: self-help and the rule of reason: how 
competition law is and could be applied" (1984) 21 CMLRev. 11, at p 13. 
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23 
either correctly or even in good faith. Other reasons for centralizing a new 
institution in EC antitrust policy can also be identified. These relate to the fact that the 
Commission had expenenced legal and economic experts, which made it a more 
suitable institution and more qualified to decide cases with legal, economic and 
political significance. On the other hand, the decision of the founding Member States 
to hand over responsibilities to the Commission was the result of the economic 
growth which the EC witnessed in the first fifteen years, which corresponded to the 
exact aim of the Treaty as expressed in Article 2 EC. 
This view is in line with the Commission's own view on the matter. Recently, the 
Commission has emphasized that in the early years antitrust policy was not a widely 
known phenomenon throughout the EC. According to the Commission, centralized 
enforcement of EC antitrust rules was the only appropriate system at the time when 
the interpretation of EC antitrust law , in particular 
Article 81(3) EC was still uncertain 
and when the EC's main objective was to further the goal of market integration. As a 
centralized institution, the Commission believes that it was enabled to establish 
uniforin application of EC antitrust rules throughout the Member States, promote 
market integration by preventing the erection of private barriers and create a body of 
rules acceptable to all Member States and the industry as fundamental to the proper 
24 functioning of the single market . 
This process of institutional centralization was initiated by Regulation 17/62 EC, a 
measure that proved to be of great difficulty to draft. 25 The powers of the Commission 
are rooted in this Regulation, which specifically defines the role of the Commission in 
EC antitrust POIICY. 26 
23 See M. Hutchings & M. Levitt "Concurrent jurisdiction" (1994) 15 ECLR 123; M. Reynolds & P. 
Mansfield "Complaining to the Commission" (1997) 2 Eur. Counsel 34. 
2' See White Paper on "The Modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty", (April 28,1999), at para. 4 (Papei-). 
25 OJ [1962] 204. See V. Korah. An Introductory Guide to EC Coinpetition Law and Practice (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1994); A. Deringer "The distribution of powers in the enforcement of the rules of 
competition and the Rome Treaty" (1963) 1 CAfLRev. 30. 
26 Note, however, the existence of Regulation 4064/89 EC which upon its enactment rendered 
Regulation 17/62 inapplicable to Mergers. 
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(B) The Court of Justice 
The ECJ is a strong self-made intellectual leader in EC law in general, and in EC 
antitrust law in particular. This leadership is partly the result of the ECJ's own 
conception of its role, partly due to the state of political sclerosis from which the EC 
suffered from the late-1960s to the early-1980s and partly due to the teleological 
27 vision which the ECJ had of the EC and antitrust law . 
The ECJ has developed EC antitrust law mainly through advancing the propositions it 
created over the first two decades following 1957. A major tool in achieving this has 
been the ECFs unique interpretative method, namely teleological reasoning. 28 
Through this type of reasoning the ECJ considered EC antitrust law within a specific 
context: the goal of single market integration. The ECJ viewed the availability of a 
centralized institution - the Commission - to achieve this goal as necessary. To this 
end , it was willing to 
interpret EC antitrust law in a specific way in order to enhance 
the powers of the Commission and place it at the centre vis-6-vis Member States and 
their domestic antitrust authorities. According to Goyder, in doing so, the ECJ 
provided the Commission with "windows of opportunity" where the ECJ would look 
beyond the facts of a particular case, confirming its willingness to support particular 
policy developments of antitrust law by the Commission. 29 By contributing towards 
the expansion of the prerogatives of the Commission, the ECJ has strengthened EC 
antitrust law. 
The significance of the ECJ cannot be understated. First, in centralizing the 
Commission in antitrust policy, it can be said that the ECJ adopted a political role. 
This becomes clear when one considers this issue within a wider framework covering 
EC law in its entirety, where the ECJ seems to have played a major role toward 
market integration. 30 Extending the scope of antitrust law towards a wider political 
27 M. Dabbah "The dilemma of Keck: the nature of the ruling and the practical implications of the 
judgment" (1999) Ii-ish J. E. L. 84; D. Gerber "Trans for-mat ion of European Community competition 
law" (1994) 35 Hai-v. Int'l L. J 97, at pp 127-30. 
28 See generally J. Bengoetxea The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (Oxford, 1993); 
B. Van der Esch "The principles of interpretation applied by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and their relevance for the scope of the EEC competition rules" (199 1) Fordham Corp. L. 
Inst. 223, at pp 225-34. 
29 See Goyder D EC Competition Law (Oxford, 1998), at pp 578-82. 
30 See P. Craig & G. De Burca EU Law (Oxford, 1998), at p 88. 
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goal, such as market integration, can mean that the act of doing so is political .31 
In 
light of this, the ECJ seems to have widely assumed a policy-making role. Secondly, 
the ECJ has played a substantial role in establishing a system of antitrust beyond 
national boundaries. This fact has some implications for the present study because the 
internationalization of antitrust policy involves a question of what role the judiciary 
32 would play in this process and ultimately in an international system of antitrust. 
111. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EC AND DOMESTIC ANTITRUST 
LAWS 
(A) The issue of influence 
The relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws is normally examined from 
legal and economic perspectives. 33 In the present thesis however, this relationship is 
examined from a political perspective as it is believed that the relationship concerns 
political factors as much as legal and economic ones. The need to consider how EC 
antitrust law influences domestic antitrust laws is of particular significance for several 
reasons. One reason that stands out at this stage, relates to the fact that not all Member 
34 States had systems of antitrust upon their accession to the EC . In this regard, it is 
important to consider the role played by the EC system of antitrust in constructing 
domestic systems of antitrust. 
(B) The first twenty-five years: characterizing the relationship 
During the first twenty-five years of the EC, the relationship between EC and 
domestic antitrust laws stood exclusively on a jurisdictional competence criterion. 35 
31 See A. Green Political Integration By Jurisprudence. - The Work of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities in Political Integration (Sijthoff, 1969). 
The flip-side of this argument is that a political topic has been "judicialized". This would, of course, 
raise the question whether this is desirable or inevitable. See chapter 8. 
32 See C. Bellamy "Some reflections on competition law in the global market" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 15. Also, see chapters 4,8 and 11. 
33 See Massey, at pp 117-21, note 8 Ante; J. Temple Lang "European Conu-nunity constitutional law 
and the enforcement of Community antitrust law" (1993) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 525. 
34 One such Member State is Italy. See M. Siragusa & G. Scassellati-Sforztlne "Italian and EC 
competition law: a new relationship-reciprocal exclusivity and common principles" (1993) 29 
CHLRev. 93; F. Romani "The new Italian antitrust law" (1991) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 479; B. Cova & 
F. Fine "The new Italian Antitrust Act vis-a-vis EC competition law" (1991) 12 ECLR 20. Also, see the 
Italian antitrust authority's web site <http: //www. a. uýcm. it>. 
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The applicability of the criterion was detennined according to a "two-bamer theory" 
- introduced by the ECJ early in its jurisprudence. 
36 This theory, which defined the 
respective areas -EC and domestic - of competence, modelled the basic components 
of the relationship between both sets of laws. It provided that EC antitrust law was 
applicable wherever there was an effect on interstate trade. 37 Member States were 
free, however, to apply their domestic antitrust laws to conduct affecting conditions of 
competition within their individual territories, provided that such action did not 
conflict with EC antitrust law. 
The fact that during this period both laws were applied within two separate spheres of 
competence did not, however, exclude the possibility of co-ordination amongst these 
spheres . 
38 Yet there was no indication of a strong motive to co-ordinate. This lack of 
motive can be attributed to several factors, the most important of which was the 
existence then of certain limitations on the competence of domestic courts to enforce 
antitrust law generally. 39 Domestic systems of antitrust functioned almost exclusively 
on the basis of enforcement by administrative institutions. 40 For this reason, those 
who wished to complain about anti -competitive restraints had little motive to turn to 
the judiciary to seek a remedy to injury sustained by them as a result of such 
restraints. They found it easier, less expensive and less uncertain instead to commence 
legal actions before their domestic antitrust authorities or complain to the 
35 C. Kirchner "Competence catalogues and the principle of subsidiarity in a European constitution" 
(1997) 8 Cons. Pol. Econ. 71. 
36 Case C-148/68 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1. 
37 See J. Faull "Effect on trade between Member States and Community: Member States jurisdiction" 
(1989) Foi-dham Coip. L. Inst. 485. 
38 In the early-1970s, it was clear that domestic courts could apply most of EC antitrust law. See Case 
127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie elal v SVSABAM and NVFonier [1974] ECR 51, at para. 16 & 
17. 
39 See J. Bourgeois -EC competition laxv and Member States courts" (1994) 17 Fordham Int'l. L. J 17 331; Forrester & Norall, note 22 Ante. 
40 Also, it was obvious that anti-competitive activities of undertakings could affect markets in more 
than one Member State. Hence, it was not possible for domestic courts to regulate such activities when 
they affected markets beyond national boundaries. 
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Commission. 41 Added to this inclination is the fact that the way in which EC antitrust 
law was supposed to be applied in domestic courts was highly unclear. 42 
Other factors leading to a lack of motive for co-ordination between the two spheres 
related to the fact that under the centralization system (discussed below) domestic 
courts were only authorized to apply certain, but not all, parts of EC antitrust law. For 
example, they were not authorized to issue individual exemptions under Article 81(3) 
EC, since Regulation 17/62 reserved this power for the Commission's exercise only. -' 3 
This limitation on the ability of domestic courts to apply EC antitrust law in its 
entirety also discouraged complainants from seeking to enforce EC antitrust law, in 
particular Article 81 EC, in domestic courts, 44 whilst encouraging them to stay 
proceedings and seek an exemption from the Commission as a defensive tactic. 
These limitations on the competence and jurisdiction of domestic courts did not mean 
that co-ordination between EC and domestic spheres of competence were not possible 
through other channels. One option was for domestic antitrust authorities to enforce 
EC antitrust law. 45 However, the fact that domestic antitrust authorities also lacked 
46 competence to grant exemptions under Article 81(3) EC , combined with some of 
them lacking even authority under their domestic laws to apply EC antitrust law in the 
first place meant that this option was even less popular than the courts' option. 
" See R. Whish "Enforcement of EC Competition law in the domestic courts of Member States" 
(1994) 15 ECLR 60, at pp 61-2; L. Hi1jemark "Enforcement of EC Competition law in national courts- 
the perspective of judicial protection" (1997) Y E. L. 83. 
42 See D. Hall "Enforcement of EC competition law by national courts" in P. Slot & A. McDonnell 
(eds. ) Procedure and Enforcement in E. C. and U. S. Competition Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), at p 
42, L. Ritter EEC Competition Law-A Practitioners Guide (Kluwer, 1991), at p 718; G. Cumming 
"Assessors, judicial notice and domestic enforcement of Articles 85 and 86" (1997) 18 ECLR 370; C. 
Kerse EC Antio-ust Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell, 1994), at pp 81-2; C. Kerse "The complainant in 
competition cases: a progress report" (1997) 34 CMLRev. 230; 1. Van Bael "The role of national 
courts" (1994) 15 ECLR 6. 
43 See Article 9 of the Regulation. 
44 Even if a domestic court found the Article 81 EC prohibition applicable, the defendant undertaking 
might be able to convince the Conu-nission to issue an exemption and thus render the legal action 
meaningless. 
4 5Notice on Co-operation between the Commission and National Competition Authorities in handling 
cases falling within the scope of Article 85 and 86 EC (the "Notice") OJ [1996] C-262/5, at p 13. 
46 It was obvious that a domestic antitrust authority might expend its resources to bring an action under 
Article 81 (1) EC over which it did not have ultimate control. See M. Fernandez Ord6fiez "Enforcement 
by national authority of EC and Member States' antitrust law" (1993) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 629. 
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(C) The second twenty-rive years: the centralization and decentralization debate 
The relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws, including the division 
between their respective spheres of competence received little attention in the period 
between 1957 and early-1980s, whether in the legal literature or on the agenda of the 
Commission officials. 47 On the basis of this situation, there was hardly any 
consideration of whether a change in the fon-nal relationship was necessary in terms 
of expanding the co-ordination between EC and domestic spheres of competence. 
From the mid-1980s however a change of thought regarding this relationship began to 
appear on the horizon. 48 In particular, the revival of the process of market integration, 
as marked by the introduction of the Single European Act (SEA) 1986, indicated that 
it was no longer possible to maintain a fon-nal division of competence. This 
development brought into question the criterion of jurisdictional competence as a 
determining factor in the relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws. The 
process of market integration in the EC was deepening and this raised the issue of the 
need for a fundamentally more co-operative and integrated framework for EC law in 
general, and for antitrust law in particular. This spawned the existence of what has 
materialized as a central debate in EC antitrust law and policy, namely the 
centralization/decentralization debate. 
1. Centralization 
Centralization is essentially a centripetal process which, in the early years of the EC, 
suggested that power should be concentrated at the EC level. Different factors led to 
this perspective. One motivation was the concern on the part of officials of the 
Commission at the dawn of the Treaty to pool power in Brussels and marginalize the 
role of Member States and their domestic antitrust authorities in antitrust policy. 
Another reason emerged from the goal of single market integration. The common 
feeling, in the light of this goal, was that EC antitrust law and institutions had to 
gradually move towards the heart of the antitrust policy scene in the EC. Hence, 
47 It seems that the reason for this relates to the economic difficulties during that period, with the Oil 
Shock, as well as political scelosis at international level generally. 
48 During this period, there was a change of econonUc conditions and political consensus within the EC 
was growing. 
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domestic antitrust laws were pushed to the side and were confined to dealing with 
antitrust policy issues that raised concerns within their national boundaries. 49 
2. Decentralization 
Against the above perspective of centralization stands a centrifugal process that calls 
for the delegation of authority to the national level. This process is known as 
decentra ization. Te process has entered the EC anti II 'trust policy scene since the mid- 
198 OS'50 when the Commission began to properly consider the need to involve 
domestic courts and domestic antitrust authorities in applying EC antitrust law. 51 
Several factors contributed to this trend. Most significantly, it was apparent that the 
Commission was unable to meet its responsibilities under the system because: first, 
there was lack of resources, mainly caused by financial and political factors; 52 and 
secondly, there was the possibility (one may say it was a fact) that the EC in the mid- 
1980s was going to expand geographically. 53 
Major events that took place in the late-1980s and early-1990s made the case for 
decentralization even more pressing. These events included the collapse of the Soviet 
'9 This development seems to have been confirmed by introducing the Merger Regulation, Regulation 
4064/89 EC in 1989. The Regulation authorized the Merger Task force of the Commission to take 
mergers with political economic and legal significance out of the control of domestic antitrust 
authorities. 
50 Prior to this, the Commission was hesitant about decentralization, because: first, it was thought that it 
would reduce the capacity of EC institutions to influence the development of EC system of antitrust; 
secondly, it would afford Member States the opportunity to use it to further their own objectives and 
individual interests; and thirdly, it would increase the risk of inconsistencies within the system. See J. 
Meade "Decentralisation in the implementation of EEC Competition law-a challenge for the lawyers" 
(1986) 37 N. T L. Q. 101. 
51 See Commission 13'h and 15'hReports on Competition Policy (1983) and (1985), at paras. 217 and 
38 respectively. 
i -) See Hiljernark, at p 87, note 41 Ante. 
53 In 1986 Spain and Portugal acceded to the EC, and the accession of more countries such as Sweden, 
Finland and Austria was appearing on the horizon. Also, the accession programme included countries 
which upon acceding to the EC had either no antitrust law or had systems of antitrust at a very early 
stage of development. This meant that undertakings and future officials in those countries would have 
to be informed about antitrust law concepts, and this would cause an increase in both the financial and 
educational burdens of the Commission. 
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Union in 1989,54 the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992.; ý' and 
56 the impending accession of more states during that period . 
(i) The types and ineanings of decentralization 
Three different types of decentralization with three corresponding meanings can be 
identified: 
(a) The application of EC antitrust law by domestic courts 
This variant of decentralization calls for further involvement of domestic courts in 
interpreting, applying and enforcing EC antitrust law. The Commission regarded 
increasing the function of domestic courts as a good way to deal effectively with the 
problem of its extensive caseload whilst simultaneously foster awareness of and 
enhancing compliance with EC antitrust law at the national level. In addition, 
decentralization in this manner was also desirable, since no change to the "two-barrier 
theory" was necessary, nor would the Commission be forced to loosen its grip on EC 
system of antitrust. 
This type of decentralization became apparent in the early-1990s, with the 
Commission concentrating its earlier efforts to encourage bringing legal actions 
before domestic courts rather than having complainants go to Brussels to seek a 
remedy. 57 These efforts were concluded later in a Notice concerning Co-operation 
Between the Commission and Courts of the Member States With Regards to the 
54 The changing situation in Central and Eastern Europe meant that the EC had to at least consider the 
possibility of expanding its membership to include certain Central and Eastern European Countries 
where the concepts of competition and antitrust law were unfamiliar. See pp 102-12 Post. 
is The TEU introduced the principle of subsidiarity under Article 5 EC, which provides the EU should 
not regulate conduct that could be regulated at least as effectively at the national level. The principle of 
subsidiarity did not require changes in the EC system of antitrust. However, it has played a central role 
in the relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws, and in this form it entered the 
central ization/decentralization debate. See B. Francis "Subsidiarity and antitrust: the enforcement of 
European competition law in the national courts of Member States" (1995) 27 Law and Pol ý in Int'l 
Bus. 247; R. Alford "Subsidiarity and competition: decentraliZed enforcement of EU competition laws" 
(1994) 27 Corn. Int'l L. J 275; R. Wesseling "Subsidiarity in Community law: setting the right agenda 
(1997) 22 ELRev. 35. 
-, b See notes 53 and 54 Ante. 
57 C. Ehlermann, "The European Conununity, its law and lawyers" (1992) 29 CAILRev. 213, at p 225 
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Application of Articles 85 (now Article 81) and 86 (now Article 82) EC, issued by the 
Commission in 1993.58 
Several purposes seem to underpin the Notice. 59 First, it highlights both the 
Commission's efforts to encourage private actions and the importance the 
Commission attaches to the issue of compliance . 
60 Secondly, it strongly heralds the 
principle that cases with no particular political, economic or legal significance for the 
61 EC should, as a general rule, be handled by domestic courts or antitrust authorities . 
Thirdly, the Notice offers procedural guidelines for domestic courts to follow in 
handling the application of EC antitrust law. The Notice specifies the factors that 
62 domestic courts should consider when deciding cases and the steps they should take. 
Essentially, domestic courts are directed under the Notice to base their decisions on 
EC antitrust law to the extent it is possible for them to predict how the Commission, 
and possibly EC courts, would decide the antitrust dispute. 63 
During the first year of its existence, the Notice triggered some scepticism over 
whether it would generate a significant increase in utilizing domestic courts. This 
doubt was based on the view that neither the Notice itself, nor any other relevant 
Commission actions, change the basic attitude of undertakings with regard to the risks 
and uncertainties attached to legal actions brought before domestic courtS. 64 As a 
matter of fact, this scepticism has continued throughout the Notice's existence. There 
5' OJ [1993] C-39/6. Some have argued that the Notice was a reaction on the part of the Commission 
for lack of response to the intensification of its earlier efforts. See R. Wesseling "The Comn-iission 
notices on decentralisation of E. C. antitrust law: in for a penny, not for a pound" (1997) 18 ECLR 94. 
59 See A. Riley "More radicalism, please: the Notice on Co-operation Between National Courts and the 
Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty" (1993) 14 ECLR 93. 
60 See paras. 15 and 16 of the Notice. 
61 Note the coincidence in timing in introducing the Notice and the subsidiarity principle which seemed 
to suggest that the Commission was here applying the principle within EC antitrust law. See para. 14 of 
the Notice. 
62 See paras. 17-32 of the Notice. 
63 The Notice recommends that domestic courts take into account in addition to the judgments of EC 
courts, the decisional practice of the Cornrnission under the block exemptions. The understanding 
seems to be that the more legal territory these exemptions cover, the less serious an obstacle it is that 
domestic courts cannot issue individual exemptions under Article 81(3) EC. The Notice indicates that 
the Commission will actively use this mechanism as a means of furtheriniz decentralization. 
antitrust authorities" (1996) 64 See C. Ehlermann "Implementation of EC competition la,, N, by nati III 
17 ECLR 88, at p 89. 
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is no doubt that some hurdles still remain in the face of this type of decentralization, 
such as those relating to domestic courts' lack of competence to issue individual 
exemptions. 65 Despite this scepticism, it can be said that, on the whole, the Notice is a 
positive step forward in co-ordinating the relationship between the Commission and 
domestic courts. 
(b) The application of Community antitrust law by domestic antitrust authorities 
The second variant of decentralization relates to domestic antitrust authorities directly 
enforcing EC antitrust law. For many years, there was relatively little incentive on the 
part of the Commission to advance this variant. 66 Several reasons may be professed 
for this lack of enthusiasm. First, for a number of years the Commission viewed this 
variant of decentralization as complex and more uncertain than decentralization via 
domestic courts. The Commission thought this option would have rendered inevitable 
orchestrating the relationship between domestic antitrust authorities and itself - 
through co-ordination in the decision-making between officials of those authorities 
and its own officials. This was seen as risky because each set of officials enjoys a 
degree of discretion and each is receptive to policy considerations and responds to 
67 pressures of the system of antitrust within which it operates. The second reason is 
that domestic antitrust authorities showed little interest to enforce EC antitrust law 
68 
rather than their own domestic antitrust laws. 
Despite this obvious reluctance by the Commission to pursue this variant of 
decentralization, and the equally evident lack of incentive on the part of domestic 
antitrust authorities to apply EC antitrust law, the Commission issued a Notice on Co- 
6' G. Marenco "The uneasy enforcement of Article 85 E. E. C. as between Community and national 
levels" (1993) Foi-dham Coip. L. Inst. 605. 
66 During the first twenty-five years of the EC, this option was not realistic. Most domestic antitrust 
authorities had limited resources and experience. Furthermore, not all domestic antitrust authorities 
were authorized under their domestic laws to apply EC antitrust law. Some Member States, notably 
Italy, did not even have systems of antitrust, let alone the fact that major differences existed between 
national antitrust laws and EC antitrust law. See Temple Lang, at pp 571-5, note 33 Ante. 
67 The Commission also thought that this could impose significant additional costs on the Commission 
as xvell as interfere with its capacity to control efforts to protect competition in the EC. 
68 To a certain extent, this is understandable because they lack competence to issue individual 
exemptions under Article 81(3) EC. They are primarily responsible for the development and 
enforcement of their own domestic antitrust laws, and their competent performance is likely to be 
judged in light of the fulfilling of this task. 
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operation Between the Commission and National Competition Authonties in 
Handling Cases Falling within the Scope of Article 85 (now Article 81) and 86 (now 
Article 82) EC (the "Notice") in 1996 . 
69The Notice, which indicates the willingness 
of the Commission to consider seriously this type of decentralization, specifically 
refers to the principle of subsidiarity (the allocation of competence principle) as a 
justification for increased transfer of competence, albeit in a limited manner, to 
domestic antitrust authorities. 70 Whilst clearly of value, this allocation of competence 
principle - as introduced in the Notice - is limited in terms of its sphere of operation 
and application, mainly due to the lack of competence of domestic antitrust authorities 
to grant exemptions under Article 81(3) EC. 
The Notice shows that the Commission has come to recognize the importance of co- 
operation with domestic antitrust authorities. It shows the benefit of such co- 
operation, especially to avoid duplication of antitrust enforcement .71 The Notice does 
not, however, fundamentally change the attitude of domestic policy makers to think 
more positively with regard to the process of decentralization. It is clear, in light of 
the Notice, that making this type of decentralization more viable requires further 
significant steps on the part of the Commission towards consolidating its efforts in 
this direction. 72 
69 OJ [1996] C-262/5. 
70 The Notice states that "if, by reason of its scale or effects, the proposed action can best be taken at 
Community level, it is for the CornrrUssion to act. If, on the other hand, the action can be taken 
satisfactorily at national level, the competition authority of the Member State concerned is better placed 
to take it". 
In light of this allocation principle, the competence of the Commission or the relevant domestic 
antitrust authority to act is determined by the siZe and effect of the agreement. 
Regarding cases in which the allocation principle is applicable, the Cornmission takes the position that 
, A7here the main effects of conduct are within one Member State, the domestic antitrust authority of that 
state may handle the case. Nevertheless the Commission reserves the right to take a case where it 
considers that it has important political, econornIc or legal significance - for example, if it raises new 
points of law or if it involves conduct in which another Member State has a particular interest. See 
Commission 25 th Report on Competition Policy (1995). This position seems to be confirmed by 
Commission's Paper on modernization, note 24.4nte. See pp 96-8 Post. 
71 The Notice aims to avoid the possibility that domestic antitrust authorities will expend effort and 
resources in cases which the Commission ultimateIN, takes out of their area of competence. 
'2 See pp 96-8 Post. 
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Domestic authorities applying their own antitrust laws 
A third variant of decentralization is for domestic antitrust authorities to continue to 
apply their own domestic antitrust laws, but to do so more increasingly. 73 Naturally, 
this variant of decentralization has been little discussed, mainly because the 
Commission and the antitrust community always used the terin decentralization to 
mean only the decentralized application of EC antitrust law . 
74 Nevertheless,, two 
reasons can be advanced to explain why this variant should also be considered. First., 
it responds to the values and concerns attached to the principle of subsidiarity. These 
values and concerns reduce the centralization of power at EC level and increase the 
authority of Member States to protect competition, where they can do so, at least as 
effectively as the Commission. Secondly, to the extent that domestic antitrust 
authorities satisfactorily protect competition by relying on domestic antitrust laws, the 
Commission would accomplish its objectives without drying up its resources any 
further. 75 
In spite of the above factors, it can be argued that an increased reliance by domestic 
authorities on their domestic antitrust laws is controversial. First, for over a fifty-year 
the Commission has sought to establish EC antitrust law as the basis of market 
integration. It seems that an increased reliance on domestic antitrust laws would 
reverse this process. Secondly, it reduces the superiority and authority of the 
Commission. Affording domestic antitrust authorities the opportunity to advise the 
business community, make important commercial decisions and decide on the norms 
to be followed by undertakings would pose a threat to the superiority of the 
Commission. Thirdly, the Commission doubts the extent to which domestic antitrust 
laws may be relied on to protect competition at least as satisfactorily as EC antitrust 
law. Fourthly, restrictions on competition often have a cross border effect. Therefore, 
these restrictions might infringe the laws of more than one Member State and thereby 
create conflicts among Member States as well costs in both time and resources. 
3 See P. Bos "Towards a clear distribution of competence between EC and national competition 
authorities" (1995) 16 ECLR 410. 
For example, the Corfirnission's policy has always been to strengthen the role and effectiveness of 
EC antitrust law, and increased reliance on domestic law is a step in the opposite direction. 
75 Increased reliance on domestic antitrust laws in such cases may also avoid many of the difficulties 
that arise when the Comnussion and one or more domestic antitrust authority apply EC antitrust law. 
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Fifthly, a Member State is not necessarily able to address effectively restrictions 
which have effects in more than one Member State, because it is not guaranteed that it 
will have unlimited, or even in some cases sufficient, access to information and 
76 
evidence in other Member States . 
It is suggested, however, that the concern triggered by these factors can be eliminated 
to the extent that domestic antitrust authorities would enforce similar substantive 
antitrust rules in similar ways. There is no doubt that the closer domestic systems of 
antitrust are, the easier it should be to develop means of distributing authority between 
the Community level and the domestic level, especially in difficult cases and those 
involving regulating evidentiary matters. Furthermore, the more similar these systems 
are, the more meaningless the distinction between EC and domestic antitrust laws 
becomes. The net result in applying domestic antitrust law by domestic antitrust 
authorities will be less objectionable. 
(ii) The convergence of domestic antitrust laws: a closer relationship 
The renewed confidence between the mid- I 980s and the early- I 990s in achieving the 
goal of single market integration - as evidenced through the introduction of the SEA 
and the TEU in 1986 and 1992 respectively - opened a new chapter in the EC 
antitrust policy scene. Since that time, several Member States have either introduced 
new systems of antitrust similar to the EC model or altered their systems so as to 
77 bring them more into line with that model. Interestingly, this recent shift toward 
76 There is also the argument that increased reliance by domestic antitrust authorities on their domestic 
laws can undermine the supremacy of EC antitrust law and the values of the one-stop shop principle. 
77 Recently, the UK has reformed its antitrust law in this manner. The new law adopted Articles 81 and 
82 EC standards, but maintained the "public policy" standard in merger control. See the UK 
Competition Act (1998), which came into force on March 1,2000. For a good account of the new 
Legislation see B. Rodger & A. MacCulloch The UK Competition Act (Hart Publishing, 2000); P. 
Freeman & R. Whish A Guide to the Competition Act 1998 (Butterworths, 1999); S. Singleton 
Blackstone's Guide to the Competition Act 1998 (Blackstone, 1999). Also, see UK Office of Fair 
Trading's Web site <ht! p: //www. oft.. izov. uk> and the UK Competition Commission's web site 
<http: //www. mmc. gov. uk>. 
In its 25h Report on Competition Policy (1995), at p 36 the Commission stated that convergence of 
domestic antitrust laws has taken place in nine different Member States. 
Whilst the present discussion will not attempt to deal with the situation in individual Member States, it 
will attempt to offer more than general comments on the relationship between EC and domestic 
antitrust laws. See the following literature on the situation in individual Member States, P. Wessman 
"Competition sharpens in Sweden" (1993) 17 World Comp. 113; J. Ratliff & E. Wright "Belgian 
competition laN-,,,: the advent of free market principles" (1992) 16 World Comp. 33, S. Martinzez Lage 
1 (1996) 17 ECLR 194; T. Liakopoulos "New rules "Significant developments in Spanish antitrust law" I 
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greater convergence has been the result of initiatives on the part of certain Member 
States rather than the result of the decentralization efforts on the part of the 
Commission. 78 
Several factors have contributed towards the convergence of domestic antitrust laws. 
In particular, three main factors are worth mentioning. The first are economic factors. 
The arguments of business undertakings in different Member States have emphasized 
that they and interstate commerce would benefit from operating under uniform 
79 
antitrust rules in different Member States . Secondly, the willingness on the part of 
domestic antitrust authorities to learn from each other has increased, especially since 
the late-1980s. Thirdly, there has been a growing recognition throughout Europe of 
the value of competition. This can be seen fTom the way that the market mechanism 
has become more dominant, which has made it necessary to adopt measures to protect 
its dynamics and ensure its proper functioning. To some extent, this has presented an 
ideological shift. It has also reflected a growing awareness of the need for economic 
reinvigoration throughout Europe and that increased competition was the most likely 
means of fostering strong and healthy economic environment. 
(a) Types of convergence 
There have been two different types of convergence. The first is textual 
convergence, 80 under which there has been an increase in following the framework of 
on competition law in Greece" (1992) 16 World Conip. 17; K. Stockmann "Trends and developments 
in European antitrust laws" (1991) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 441, at pp 448-69. Also, Comrrussion 28 th 
Report on Competition Policy (1998), at pp 329-57. 
78 Accommodating EC-like type of antitrust rules enabled a Member State to demonstrate its support to 
Member States, such as France and Germany, who were pursuing further integration, and such a 
Member State could expect that its support would be appreciated by supporters of these initiatives. 
Countries seeking future accession to the EC in the early-1990s, expressed an interest to "converge 11 
their laws. Sweden, Austria, and Finland were in various stages of accession, and by enacting antitrust 
laws similar to EC antitrust law they could demonstrate their support for the integration efforts of 
existing Member States and of EC institutions. 
79 The intensifying battle for foreign investment among Member States also created incentives for 
business undertakings to follow the domestic legal environment that was not significantly different and 
more stringent than that of the EC. The "definite" possibility in the early-1990s that certain countries 
ýN, ere likely to accede to the EC added more vigour to the views of business conu-nunity. Also, the 
present possibility that in ten years, the EC may have 25 Member States, as opposed to 15, strengthens 
such arguments. 
80 H. Ullrich "Harmonisation within the European Union" (1996) 17 ECLR 178. 
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Articles 81 and 82 EC. In some cases, some domestic laws, such as the French law, 81 
merely followed the basic framework of these provisions, whilst others, such as the 
Swedish laws, adopted their terminology. 82 The second is institutional and procedural 
convergence. In this sense, viewing the EC system of antitrust as a model for 
convergence is more ambitious than its textual counterpart. Nevertheless, general 
patterns of change at the institutional level have been to move towards more judicial 
characteristics and institutions that are inclined towards more judicial roles in 
domestic systems of antitrust. They have adopted roles that involve interpretation, 
application and enforcement of antitrust provisions at the national level, unlike the 
administrative control regimes which previously existed in the Member States 
concerned. To this end, domestic antitrust authorities have increasingly, for example, 
been given greater independence from political influence. 
(b) Stages of convergence 
Convergence mainly involves two stages. The first is the adoption at the national level 
of similar patterns of convergence towards EC antitrust law. The second stage 
concerns efforts to co-ordinate EC and domestic systems of antitrust. The 
developments which these stages may lead are salient. It can be expected that the 
interaction between these stages will play a central role in shaping the future 
relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws. Further integration within the 
EC calls for an increasingly integrated system of antitrust. The interaction of the 
stages of convergence may help to clarify the future dynamics of this system and its 
different components. 83 This is all the more likely, since it is not clear whether the 
components - EC and domestic - of the system will operate on a closely integrated 
basis or whether mere formal jurisdictional rules will link these components 
together. 84 
81 See generally F. Jenny "French competition law update: 1987-1994" (1995) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 
203. For information on the French system of antitrust law see Director General's web site, 
,, ouv. 
fr/DGCCRF/index-d. htm> and the Competition Council's web site, <htti): //www. finances., p 
<hqp: //www. finances.. P, ouv. fr/conseilconeurrence>. 
82 See A Widegren "competition law in Sweden -a brief introduction to the new legislation" (1995) 
Fordhain Corp. L. Inst. 241. 
83 See generally Maher, note 16 Ante. 
84 See generally Temple Lang, note 33 Ante. 
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It is not difficult to identify the picture that seems to be emerging in the light of this 
closer relationship between EC and domestic systems of antitrust. The emerging 
antitrust landscape places the EC system at the heart of the development of antitrust 
policy and principles in the EC and provides a centre to which domestic systems of 
antitrust are primarily connected. The "two-barrier theory" will continue to constitute 
a key element, as the question of competence to investigate and decide in a particular 
antitrust law case - the Commission or the relevant domestic antitrust authority - will 
continue to be a central issue. This is a difficult (and largely political) issue because 
the Commission's power and authority may be threatened with the involvement of 
domestic antitrust authorities. This means that political conflicts will be located along 
that decisional edges. Moreover, it is a political issue because decision-makers in the 
EC and in Member States are generally committed to different and sometimes 
inconsistent policy and personal objectives. 
(c) System structure: horizontal and vertical co-operation 
Two dimensions are surfacing in the relationship between EC and domestic systems 
of antitrust. The first may be referred to as "vertical co-operation". This dimension 
includes factors such as the extent to which Commission officials and those in 
domestic antitrust authorities share common interests and forge institutional means to 
pursue and protect such interests. Whilst policy-makers at either level share the 
common goal of protecting the process of competition, they often diverge with 
regards to the best means of achieving this goal. Also, it is not clear whether their 
interests coalesce with regard to other goals and values. In this way, establishing a 
common intellectual and communicative base for pursuing common interests between 
the EC and domestic systems of antitrust is a daunting project to undertake. 
The second dimension may be termed "horizontal co-operation". This dimension 
connotes the prospects of domestic antitrust authorities creating close links between 
themselves. This depends on the extent to which they perceive common interests. 
Also, the extent to which they are willing and able to create means to pusue such 
interests - independently of the "vertical dimension"' - will be another 
important 
factor in this regard. 
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(d) A Comment 
For many years, there has been little awareness of the importance of these 
dimensions. This is mainly due to the fact that until recently antitrust law has been 
examined exclusively from the perspectives of individual - EC or domestic - systems 
of antitrust. Hence, few, including lawyers, economists and policy-makers, have good 
knowledge of similar experiences and common and shared problems and solutions 
between the different systems. " 
The foregoing discussion demonstrated, however, that this situation has been 
changing and more attention is being drawn to the importance of these dimensions. Of 
course it is difficult to predict with sufficient certainty whether this importance will 
increase, and the degree to which these dimensions may integrate with each other. It is 
quite likely that this will be influenced by factors that are exogenous to the EC system 
of antitrust. These include factors such as the accession of third countries to the EC. 
The issue of accession in this regard depends on the countries that will accede, when 
they will accede and on the type of economic, political and legal traditions that will 
accompany their accession. 86 
Factors endogenous to the system will also be influential. One important endogenous 
factor that is likely to prove influential, concerns changes in global economic climate, 
and how far do these go. 87 Another important factor is how Member States perceive 
the EC system of antitrust. If the system is viewed as successful and useful, this will 
create incentives for Member States to move their own systems of antitrust closer to 
it., which means that the system will be likely to win support, force and influence. This 
is also likely to be mutually valuable, as the EC and domestic systems will support 
each other. If, on the other hand, a view to the contrary is held by the Member States, 
then it will be less likely they would take such steps. 
88 The issue of perceptions by 
8i Gerber, at p 3, note 2 Ante. 
86 See L. Ramsey "The implications of the Europe agreements for an expanded European Union" 
(1995) 44 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 16 1. 
87 See chapter 10. 
88 A major challenge for the Cornmission is likely to be whether it can manage its relationship with 
domestic antitrust authorities in a manner which would avoid creating incentives for the latter to define 
their own interests in opposition to it or to one another. To this end, the effectiveness of the "vertical 
dimension" seems to be a key factor in shaping incentives for the "horizontal dimension". 
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Member States demands careful examination in order to ensure a comprehensive and 
reasoned analysis and to avoid politically motivated assumptions, which may be 
harmful. 
The relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws should be seen to reside at 
the heart of the goal of market integration. Effective co-ordination between EC and 
domestic systems of antitrust is likely to foster this goal. This will also enhance the 
influence of the EC system of antitrust beyond the borders of the EC. Hence, it is 
important to support the co-ordination efforts in order to avoid any adverse effect on 
the image the EC system of antitrust within and outside the EC. 
(D) Recent developments 
On April 28,1999, the Commission introduced its White Paper on the Modernisation 
of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 (now Article 81) and 86 (now Article 82) EC 
(Paper). " The Paper presents a fundamental rethink by the Commission on the EC 
system of antitrust "which has worked so well" but which "is no longer appropriate 
for the Community of today with 15 Member States, II languages and over 350 
million inhabitants". 90 The Commission offers in the Paper some reasons for the 
proposed revision - albeit in incomplete terms. At paragraph 5 of the Paper, the 
Commission provides that the reasons for this rethink reside in Regulation 17/62 "and 
in the external factors to the development of the Community". Furthermore, at 
paragraph 10 of the Paper, the Commission explains that the current system is no 
longer adequate to meet the new challenges facing the EC. The Commission believes 
that it is essential to adapt the current system in order to remedy the present problem 
of resources, relieve business undertakings from unnecessary costs and bureaucracy, 
to enable the Commission to pursue more serious antitrust law infringements and to 
stimulate a simpler and more efficient system of control. 
According to the Commission, the time has now come when the responsibility of 
enforcing EC antitrust law, including a detennination of whether the criteria of Article 
89 OJ [ 1999] C- 13 2,11, [1999] 5 CMLR 208. 
90 See para. 5 of the Paper. 
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81(3) EC are satisfied, should be by domestic courts and antitrust authorities. 91 It 
therefore proposes that the notification and exemption system in Regulation 17/62 
should be abolished and replaced by a Council Regulation which would render the 
criteria in Article 81(3) EC directly applicable without a prior decision of the 
Commission. This proposal would leave the Commission in a position to concentrate 
its priorities, such as combating cartels with trans-national operations and effects. 
This does not, of course, mean that the Commission would relinquish being the 
guardian of EC antitrust rules. On the contrary, the Commission makes it clear in the 
Paper that it will continue to observe how these rules are applied by domestic courts 
and antitrust authorities. This will involve asserting jurisdiction in particular cases, 
namely those with legal, economic and political significance for the EC. 
The proposals of the Commission are radical, especially the Commission's proposal 
to abandon its monopoly to grant Article 81(3) EC exemptions. However, for 
undertakings and those advising them, ending the notification and authorization 
system provides a relief One of the problems with the current system has been that, 
for the majority of agreements, obtaining an individual exemption from the 
Commission required a notification to it. The Commission has suffered for many 
years from lack of resources and shortage of staff to keep up with the increasing 
number of notifications and for this reason the system is flawed. 92 The proposals in 
the Paper have the effect of abandoning the notification procedure completely. 
Notification will not be possible. Undertakings will be responsible for making their 
own assessment of the compatibility with EC antitrust law of their restrictive practices 
in the light of the relevant legislation and case-law. 93 
Abandoning notification will be an issue of particular challenge to undertakings and 
their legal advisors. This will help to harmonize the position of the EC on antitrust 
policy exemptions to that in the US, where undertakings have to be more self-reliant. 
It is to be anticipated that this issue, along with many other more detailed points of 
91 Domestic courts and antitrust authorities would be able to apply Article 81 EC in its entirety, rather 
than just Article 81 (1) EC and the provisions of the block exemptions, as now. 
92 One can of course argue that in spite of this, the system sill provided for notification for those who 
wish to notify. 
93 See para. 77 of the Paper. 
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law and practice, will be debated for a considerable time to come. Recently, a draft for 
Council Regulation on the implementation of Articles 81 & 82 EC has been 
produced. 94 The draft contains very important proposed provisions on the relationship 
between EC and domestic systems of antitrust. In particular, Article II of the 
proposed Regulation deserves mentioning. According to this provision, which deals 
with co-operation between the Commission and domestic antitrust authorities and 
courts, the application of EC antitrust rules will be on the basis of close co-operation 
between the two sides. The provision also states that national antitrust authorities and 
courts are required to inform the Commission at the outset of any proceedings 
involving the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC opened by them. Furthermore, 
domestic antitrust authorities and courts are expected to consult the Commission prior 
to adopting a decision under these provisions requiring an infringement be tenninated, 
accepting commitments by undertakings or withdrawing the benefit of one of the 
block exemptions. This obligation includes submitting to the Commission no later 
than one month before a decision is adopted a summary of the case and any related 
important documents. The Commission also preserves the right to request any other 
relevant documents. Finally, the provision states that where the Commission has 
decided to initiate proceedings, domestic antitrust authorities will be relieved of their 
competence to apply Article 81 and 82 EC. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND INFLUENCE OF EC ANTITRUST LAW 
BEYOND THE SINGLE MARKET 
Through its supranational position and international outlook more generally, the 
Commission has been seeking co-operation with other antitrust authorities in the 
world, as well as stretching the influence of EC antitrust law internationally, by 
exporting its concepts and ideas. This has been happening on different fronts, 
including: first, concluding bilateral agreements with antitrust authorities in third 
countries, formalizing co-operation in the enforcement of their antitrust laws; 
secondly, encapsulating antitrust rules in the European Economic Agreement 
(EEA); 95 thirdly, approximating antitrust laws in Association Agreements between the 
" COM (2000) 582. 
95 See J. Stragier "The competition rules of the EEA agreement and their Implementation" (1993) 14 
ECLR 30. 
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EC and European and Baltic Countries and in Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreements with other countries; 
96 
and fourthly, proposing international initiatives at 
97 
a multilateral level . 
(A) Bilateral perspective: The ECIUS relationship 
I. A ftamework of co-operation 
The co-operative relationship between the EC and the US in antitrust policy is 
governed by the bilateral agreement of September 23,1991.98 The agreement provides 
for co-operation in respect to several aspects of EC and US antitrust laws. 99 It has the 
benefit , including the opportunity, for the parties to exchange views in all cases of 
mutual interest and, when appropriate, to co-ordinate enforcement activities. 100 More 
importantly, the agreement introduced the principle of "positive comity". 101 Under 
this principle, one party to the agreement (known as the requesting party) can ask the 
other party (known as the requested party) to address anti -competitive behaviour, 
within the latter's boundariesl which has an effect on the interests of the former. 
96 See Commission's 25hReport on Competition policy (1995), at para. 221; D. Kennedy & D. Webb 
"The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities" (1993) 30 CMLRev. 1095, 
at p 1113. 
9' See p 112 Post. 
98 See OJ [1995] L-95/45 as corrected by OJ [1995] L-131/38. 
The literature on the issue of bilateral co-operation between the Comniission and the US antitrust 
authorities is abundant. See K. van Miert "International cooperation in the field of competition: a view 
from the EC" (1997) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 13, at pp 16-25; J. Parisi "The EC-US Agreement 
regarding the application of their competition laws: another step towards fostering international 
cooperation in antitrust enforcement", address before the European Trade Law Association (Brussels, 
December, 1991); D. Ham "International cooperation in the antitrust field and in particular the 
agreement between the United States and the Commission of the European Communities" (1992) 30 
CMLRev. 571; J. Griffin "ECIUS antitrust cooperation agreement: impact on transnational business" 
(1993) 24 Law & Pol ý Int'l. Bus. 105 1. 
99 See in particular Articles II-V of the agreement. Article Il deals with the need to notify the other 
party whenever it becomes apparent to one party that its enforcement activities are likely to affect the 
interests of the other. Article III deals with exchange of infori-nation between the parties. Article IV 
deals with co-ordination of enforcement activities between the parties. Article V deals with the 
important issue of "positive comity". 
100 See A. Haagsma. "International competition issues: the E. C. -U. S. agreement of September 23,1991" 
in Slot & McDonnell, at p 229, note 42.4nte. 
,01 See D. Conn "Assessing the impact of preferential trade agreements and new rules of ongin on the 
extratemtorial application of antitrust law to international mergers" (1993) 93 Columbia L. Rev. 119, at 
p 148, C. Ehlermann "The international dimension of competition policy" (1994) 17 Fordham Int'l. L. 
J. 833, at p 836. 
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Co-operation under this agreement has generally been quite close and productive for 
the last nine years. ' 02 A good example in which co-operation was seen as important is 
the CRSISABRE case. In this case, the US Department of Justice requested the 
Commission to investigate activities within the computer reservation system markets 
(CRS) that were suspected of hindering the ability of US based CRS undertakings 
from competing effectively in certain European markets. A claim was made by 
SABRE, owned by American Airlines, that the anti -competitive behaviour of the 
three large airline owners of Amadeus on the European side of the Atlantic, the 
leading CRS, impeded its ability to penetrate markets in Europe. ' 03 
The US Department of Justice decided to make a positive comity referral on the basis 
of the co-operation agreement between the EC and the US. J. Klein said that the 
Commission was in the best position to investigate this conduct because it occurred 
within the EC and consumers there are the ones who are principally at risk if 
competition has been distorted. "' By contrast, A. Schaub believed the case was 
"important psychologically". In its investigation, the Commission treated this as a 
priority case because it was aware of the fact that how it handles US positive comity 
referrals will certainly determine largely how the US antitrust authorities will handle 
its referrals. "' 
In 1997 the Commission began an "initial inquiry", which lasted for two years. This 
was followed in March 1999 by a formal proceeding against Air France, one of the 
three European airline owners of Amadeus named in the US request. The 
102 In the period from January 1995 to December 1996, for example, there were varying degrees of co- 
operation in nearly one hundred cases. See J. Griffin "EC & U. S. extraterritoriality: activism & 
cooperation" (1994) 17 Fordham. Int'l L. J 353. Note, however, the BoeinglMcDonnell Douglas case, 
which indicates that this has not always been the case. See OJ [1997] L-336/16. Yet, the recent 
MCI WorldcotnlSprin t case is a paradigmatic example of the European Commission and the US 
antitrust authorities working closer than ever before and sharing information constructively. See 
Comrrussion Press Release "Commission opens full investigation into the MCIWOrldcomlsprint 
merger" (February 21,2000), available at <hM: //www. europa. eu. int/comm>. 
103 It was alleged that the three airline owners in collaboration with their travel providers refused to 
supply SABRE with the same fare data which they supplied to Amadeus, in addition to denying the 
former the ability to carry out the various booking and ticketing functions available to the latter. 
104 US Department of Justice Press Release, "Justice Department asks European Communities to 
investigate possible anticompetitive conduct affecting U. S. Airlines' computer reservation systernsil 
(April 28,1997). See <htlp: /, "-ýN, NN, NNý. usdoj. eov>. 
105 Conunission Press Release "E. U. gives priority to U. S. Airline reservation case" (September 9, 
1997), <h! lp: //www. europa. eu. int/comm>. 
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Commission stated, on the basis of its initial inquiry, that Air France has 
discriminated against SABRE to favour Amadeus. 1 06 
It remains to be seen, however, whether this particular case will ultimately enhance 
the confidence of the EC and the US regarding the effectiveness of the principle of 
positive comity. 107 
2. Recent developments 
In June 1996, and in the wake of successful negotiations with the US authorities, the 
Commission adopted a proposal to build on the 1991 Agreement. The step to deepen 
the EC-US relations through another formal agreement was taken in 1998.1 08 The new 
agreement has many advantages. First, it contributes to advancing the principle of 
positive comity. Secondly, it confirms the efforts of the parties to continue employing 
the principle. Thirdly, it clarifies the manner in which the principle will be 
implemented. Further agreements enhancing the level of co-operation between the EC 
and the US, as well as between the EC and other nations, are in contemplation, 109 and 
should be welcomed. 
106 European Commission Press Release "Commission opens procedure against Air France for 
favouring Amadeus reservation system" (March 15,1999), Ibid. 
107 US Legislators have made positive statements regarding these first signs of EC responses to US 
requests for enforcement. Senator H. Kohl of the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Sub- 
committee stated that it was becoming obvious that the US most important positive comity agreement, 
with the EC, was beginning to generate benefits. See <http: //www. senate. pov/-kohl>. 
The recent case of MCIWorldconilSprint is a very good example of co-operation between the EC and 
the US, involving almost daily contacts and co-ordination of information gathering, joint meetings, 
j. oint negotiations with the under-takings as well as discussions on possible remedies. See A. Schaub 
"Assessing international mergers: the Conirrussion's approach", address before I Oth Anniversary 
Conference on EC Merger Control (September 14-15,2000), available at 
<hitp: //www. europa. eu. int/conuri/coLnpetition/speeches>. 
108 OJ [ 1998] L- 173/26, [1999] 4 CMLR 502. 
The agreement creates a presumption that in certain circumstances one party (so called "requesting 
party") will normally defer or suspend its own enforcement activities, where anti -c ompetitiv e 
behaviour is occurring principally in and directed principally towards the other party's territory. The 
proposed positive comity agreement is an important development in this respect, because it represents a 
commitment on the part of the US to co-operate with respect to antitrust enforcement rather than 
seeking to apply its antitrust laws extra-territorially. See chapter 8. 
109 An agreement has also been entered into with Canada. See Co-operation Agreement between 
Canada and the EC OJ [ 1999] L- 17 5 49, [1999] 5 CMLR 713. 
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(B) The EEA Agreement 
The body of EC law ( acquis communautaire) adopted into the EEA Agreement was a 
response instigated by the Commission to the process of globall 1 110 and the zat on, 
pressure the latter created for increased co-ordination in antitrust policy between 
different antitrust authorities. "' The antitrust principles in the Agreement apply where 
there is an impact on trade between an EFTA country and the EC. 1 12 The agreement is 
similar to the EC Treaty in that it does not require signatories to adopt EC antitrust 
rules into the domestic legal order. 
The EEA Agreement provides for consultation procedures between the parties on the 
antitrust rules therem. ' 13 These rules, according to the ECJ in its judgment in Wood 
Pulp, could in no way preclude the integral application of EC antitrust law. 114 Since 
this was also the view expomded by the Commission, it may well be that this explains 
why the Commission never thought it necessary to invoke these provisions in antitrust 
law cases. This view is reinforced by the "extra-territoriality" doctrine which was 
upheld by the ECJ in the same judgment, and which gives the Commission 
jurisdiction to act under the EC Treaty rules whenever an anti -competitive agreement 
or another anti -competitive practice, despite originating from outside the EC, is 
implemented within the EC. 1 15 
"0 See generally T. Jakob "EEA and Eastern Europe Agreements with the European Community" 
(1992) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 403; S. Norberg "The EEA agreement: institutional solutions for a 
dynarruc and homogeneous EEA in the area of competition" (1992) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 437. 
... Coninussion 25h Annual Report on Competition Policy (1995). 
112 See Articles 53-7 of the Agreement. There are clear rules on jurisdiction in the Agreement thus 
avoiding the possibility of duplication of efforts on the part of both the EEA Authority and the 
Comnussion when investigating a case. See Stragier, note 95 Ante. 
113 However, the consultation procedures providing for the implementation of these antitrust rules in 
the EEA Agreement have not been put to the test, save for one state aid case. See A. Hill "Brussels 
backs off in state aids rows", Financial Times (August 11,1992), at 2. 
114 Cases C-89/85.4 AhIstr6m OY i-. Commission [1993] 4 CNILR 407. The ECJ never had the occasion 
to rule on the question of direct effect of the provisions in the EEA Agreement, meaning in particular 
NvIiether private parties can directly invoke them before domestic courts. See Adams i,. 
Statitsannaltschaft des Kantons Basel-Stadt [1978] 3 CMLR 480, at pp 485-6 (Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court ruled against direct effect of Article 23 of the Free Trade Agreement between the EC and 
Switzerland)-, Case 104ý89 Hauptzollant Mainz v. C. A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG a. A [1982] ECR 3641, at 
p 3665. 
103 
(C) Bilateral agreements within Europe 
Several bilateral agreements with Central and Eastern European Countries have been 
entered into by the EC. There are two main types of such agreements: Association 
Agreements and Partnership and Co-operation Agreements. ' 16 These agreements 
exhibit some similarities, but they also differ in several ways. Unless otherwise stated, 
the term "agreements" is used in the following discussion to refer to both Association 
Agreements and the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EC and the 
Russian Federation. 
1. Some background 
(i) Association Agreements 
The general shift by the EC and Countries in Central and Eastern Europe to a new 
forin of Association Agreements in the 1990s reflected the unprecedented and 
profound political and economic transitions experienced by the latter countries. 117 
These Association Agreements signalled a desire on the part of these countries for 
closer links with the EC which seems to have been based not only on their geographic 
proximity, but also on shared values and increasing interdependence between them 
all. 1 18 On its part, the EC had already taken decisive steps towards the creation of a 
115 See chapter 8 on the doctrine of extra-territoriality. 
1" Partnership and Co-operation Agreements were signed with Russia, the Ukraine, and Central-Asian 
Republics. See Generally, M. Maresceau & E. Montaguti "The relations between the European Union 
and Central and Eastern Europe: a legal appraisal" (1995) 32 CMLRev. 1327. 
The discussion will use the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EC and the Russian 
Federation as an example. 
117 Initially, there were three separate Association Agreements between the EC, its Member States and, 
in turn, Hungary (OJ [1992] L-1 16/1), Poland (OJ [1992] L-1 14/1) and Czechoslovakia (OJ [1992] L- 
11511), which were signed on December 16,1991. Similar agreements with Romania and Bulgaria, 
however, were initiated on November 17 and December 22,1992 respectively. Agreements were also 
concluded later on with other countries bringing the number of all such agreements to a total of 10. The 
conclusion of all these agreements was the consequence of the conviction that free trade must go hand 
in hand with ensuring undistorted competition. See E. Faucompert, J. Konings & H. Vandenbussche 
"The integration of Central and Eastern Europe in the European Union - trade and labour market 
adjustment" ( 1999) 33JW. T. L. 12 1, at pp 132-4. 
For an overview of these Association Agreements, see C. Lucron "Contenu et port&e des accords entre 
la Communaut6 et La Hongrie, La Pologne et la Tch6coslovaquie" (1992) 35 Revue A Marchý 
Conintun et de L'Union Europýenne 293. A more up to date account of these agreements is available at 
<ht! p: /, ýNNýNN-NNr. europa. eu. iint/ conuiVdp, 04/intema/multillateral. htm> 
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system based on democracy and a market-oriented economy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, so for this reason its response was positive. 119 Hence, it was 
important for the EC to support the political and economic changes in these countries. 
(ii) The PCA between the EC and the Russian Federation 
The PCA between the EC and the Russian Federation was signed on June 14,1994. 
This Agreement follows from an earlier Trade and Co-operation Agreement between 
the EC and the USSR in 1989, which in less than two years was regarded as 
unsuitable for developing the relations between the parties. In entering into the PCA, 
Russia attempted to bring this Agreement closer to the Association Agreements. 
However, the EC, being concerned about the uncertainties in the transformation 
process in Russia and grounding its decision on geopolitical considerations,, opted for 
a much looser framework in political, legal and economic terms. Nevertheless, from 
the perspective of the parties, the Agreement indicated that Russia was no longer a 
state-trading country but "a country with an economy in transition". 120 The Preamble 
to the PCA also referred to a "political conditionality" clause, declaring that the 
parties are "convinced of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for 
human rights". 
2. The main contents 
The agreements are comprehensive. They provide for almost all aspects of economic 
activity, political dialogue and cultural co-operation in addition to trade, commercial 
and economic co-operation. The main areas covered by the agreements include 
political dialogue between institutions, free movement of goods, workers, 
establishment, services, payments, capital, competition and other economic 
provisions, approximation of laws, economic, cultural and financial co-operation and 
institutions. 
118 All these Association Agreements have been conceived with a view to substantially contributing to 
the countries' full integration into the EC both in economic and political terms. Although the question 
whether such integration must necessarily lead to future accession to the EC is not answered, such a 
step seems to be aspired to by all participating countries. For a general discussion, see Jakob, at pp 429- 
34, note 110 Ante; Ramsey, note 86 Ante. 
119 See generally Commission 9h Report on Competition Policy (1979), at p 9. Also, T. Frazer 
"Competition policy after 1992: the next step" (1990) 53 Af. L. R. 609. 
120 See generally Maresceau & Montaguti, at pp 133843, note 116 Ante. 
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3. The role of antitrust law in the agreements 
Antitrust provisions are prominent features of the agreements. In entering Into the 
agreements, all relevant parties concerned aimed to ensure that competition should not 
be distorted within the framework of the agreements. Including antitrust provisions in 
the agreements can be seen as contributing to a number of objectives: establishment 
of new rules, policies and practices as a basis for closer relations with the EC (in the 
case of Association Agreements, further integration into the EQ. Put differently, the 
antitrust provisions sought to give an appropriate framework for gradual co-operation 
with the EC. This power to support co-operation (in the case of Association 
Agreements, integation) which is attributed to the antitrust provisions is not entirely 
surprising as it has been one of the characteristic features of EC antitrust law. On the 
basis of EC experience, it is therefore almost logical for the free trade provisions 
contained in these agreements to be supplemented by antitrust provisions, in order to 
prevent private trade barriers from distorting hannonious economic relations between 
the parties. 
According to the agreements, restrictions of competition that affect trade between the 
parties will be assessed by the Commission or by the competent domestic authority of 
the relevant country, or by both, depending on the circumstances in question. The 
assessment is to be taken according to rules modelled on the antitrust policy chapter in 
the EC Treaty. To give practical effect to these general provisions, implementing rules 
were negotiated in order to ensure effective co-operation between the parties. 
121 
4. Matters requiring specific attention 
Including antitrust provisions in the agreements does not of course mean that 
regulating conditions of competition in cases in which the parties have an interest will 
be free of difficulty. Three problems may require specific attention: 
121 In the case of Association Agreements, the rules necessary to implement the antitrust provisions 
were agreed to be established by the Association Councils within a period of three years. See, for C, 
example, the implementing rules for the application of the antitrust provisions applicable to 
undertakings provided for in Arts. 33(l)(1) & (il) and 33(2) of the EC-Poland Interim Agreement OJ 
[1996] L-208,24. See M. Bldssar & J. Stragier "Enlargement" (1999) 1 EC Comp. Pol'y NewsL. 58; T. 
Vardady "The emergence of competition law in (former) socialist countries" (1999) 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 
229, at p 251; K. van Miert "Competition policy in relations to the Central and Easten European 
Countries-achievements and challenges" (1998) 2 EC Comp. Pol'i, NeivsL. 1, Jakob, note 110 Ante. 
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(i) Jurisdictional overlap 
First of all, the legal problems concern the question of how to deal with cases falling 
within both - EC and the relevant country -jurisdiction. Under Article 81 EC, the EC 
can assert jurisdiction over anti -competitive agreements implemented in the Common 
Market, in accordance with the Wood Pulp doctrine developed by the ECJ. 122 If the 
Wood Pulp condition is satisfied in these cases, EC law would apply. However, since 
close links between the economies of the EC and the other parties to the agreements 
will be established, it is possible that certain agreements, within the meaning of 
Article 81 EC, between undertakings, will be implemented within the territory of both 
parties. In this scenario, not only can the EC assert jurisdiction, but also the other 
party concerned. The question would therefore be how to address problems that might 
arise when more than one antitrust authority become involved and possibly reach 
different conclusions. The Associated Countries and Russia, for example, have 
undertaken to adapt their own antitrust rules to the principles covered by the EC 
antitrust policy chapter. However, this does not eliminate all the problems of 
concurrent jurisdiction. For example, there will always be scope for divergence in the 
way antitrust provisions are enforced by different antitrust authorities. 
Issues of jurisdictional overlap may arise in the context of abuse of dominance under 
Article 82 EC. However, they are likely to be less problematic. Abuse is likely 
primarily occur in the market where the undertaking in question holds a dominant 
position. 123 In this instance, questions of concurrent jurisdiction might anse less 
frequently. 
Regarding merger control, neither the PCA nor Association Agreements prejudice the 
exercise by the EC of its powers under the Merger Regulation, Regulation 4064/89 
EC. To the extent that Russia and the Associated Countries introduce merger control 
regime in their domestic systems, issues of jurisdictional overlap in merger cases are 
likely to anse. 
See chapter 8. 
123 However, note the situation can arise where dorninance and abuse can fall within different markets. 
See Tetra Pak Case T-83/91 [1997] 4 ECLR 726 and Irish Sugar Case T-228/97 [1997] 5 CMLR 666. 
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(H) No assertion ofjurisdiction 
Cases can be envisaged where neither the EC nor the other party concerned may 
assert jurisdiction. Decisions will need to be taken on the course of action to be 
pursued under such circumstances. In this context, an interesting question arises 
because an anti -competitive agreement between undertakings may not affect trade 
between Member States, but affects trade between the EC and the other party. Would 
the EC be able to deal with such an agreement on the basis of the provisions of the 
PCA or the Association Agreements9 It is doubtful that the provisions of the 
agreements have direct effect. 124 First, it seems that the requirement of 
unconditionality is not satisfied. This is because further implementation measures 
must still be decided upon. Secondly, the requirement of precision also does not seem 
to be met. The agreements do not include an "Article 81(3) EC" type of provision 
which means that exemption will be provided by way of interpretation. This in itself 
perhaps would not necessarily render the EC unable to take action. However, for EC 
jurisdiction to exist in such cases , it is necessary 
for it to be instituted by specific 
executing provisions in the agreements. 
(W) Interests ofparties 
It is possible to conceive cases where only one party has jurisdiction but, nonetheless, 
important interests of the other party may be involved. In this instance, the purpose of 
the implementing rules should be to provide the basis for a co-operative and 
transparent treatment of such cases by the relevant antitrust authorities. Above all, it is 
essential the process should be free forin complexities. Given inevitable differences 
between the market conditions of the parties, it can be expected that individual cases 
will be treated under different legal standards and so different conclusions will be 
reached. More significantly, a certain amount of co-ordination of action and a 
readiness to take into account the other parties' interests would be required. Co- 
operation in this instance could be modelled on the 1986 OECD Recommendation or 
the present co-operation agreement between the EC and the US. 
124 See the direct effect test, as introduced by the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos, note 10 Ante. See, for 
example, Article 63 of the EC-Poland agreement, in which it is stated that the Association Council may 
be required "at a later stage to exarrune to xvhat extent and under what conditions certain exemption 
rules may be directly applicable, taking into account the progress made in the integration process 
between the Community and Poland". 
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5. The place of secondary legislation 
Another salient issue concerns both certain EC secondary legislation (such as, block 
exemption regulations) and its future development. The principles covered by these 
secondary instruments should apply when it comes to assessing an anti -competitive 
practice under the agreements. On the other hand, if EC legislation changes in the 
future, then ways and means should be found to ensure that these developments are 
also taken into account in interpreting such agreements. 
6. EC interest 
In the case of the antitrust provisions under the Association Agreements which follow 
Articles 81 and 82 EC, each Association Council was supposed to establish rules for 
the implementation of these provisions by March 1,1995.125 The EC was active in 
providing advice to the Associated Countries on implementation, which is reflected in 
the similarity, at least prima facie, between the antitrust rules of the EC and the 
Associated Countries. 
In many respects, co-ordination in enforcement of the antitrust policies in the 
Associated Countries predicated on EC antitrust rules is in the latter's interest. 
Reliance by the EC on extra-territorial application of its antitrust rules is not 
guaranteed to be successful. 126 Also, EC undertakings may be served by strong 
enforcement of antitrust rules in the Associated Countries,, especially in areas of state 
aid, government monopolies and abuse of dominance. 
7. Approximation of laws 
The agreements contain provisions on the approximation of antitrust laws. 127 A 
distinction can be drawn however, between the PCA and Association Agreements. In 
125 See J. Fingleton, E. Fox, D. Neven & P. Seabright Competition Policy and the Transformation of 
Central Europe (CEPR London, 1995), ch 4& Appendix 2. 
'2" See chapter 8. 
127 See (1996) 1 EC Comp. Pol'j, NewsL. 38. Such approximation - which includes existing and future 
legislation - is considered a major precondition for forging closer links with the EC. The PCA contains 
a clause stating that Russia will "endeavour to ensure that [its] legislation shall be gradually made 
compatible with that of the Community". See Article 55 PCA. 
In the case of Association Agreements, approximation of laws was seen as a condition for the countries 
concerned to integrate into the EC. Whereas Hungary "shall act to ensure that future legislation is 
compatible -, vith Community legislation as far as possible", Poland "shall use its best endeavours to 
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the former, approximation is limited to endeavouring to ensure that legislation is 
gradually harmonized with EC antitrust law. For Association Agreements, given their 
image as pre-accession arrangements, 128 the approximation requirement is stronger 
and has generated national laws broadly aligned with EC antitrust law. 
The nature of the approximation requirement is open to some debate. 129 
Approximation is a major precondition for closer economic links with the EC, and the 
countries concerned undertake to ensure all future legislation is compatible with EC 
antitrust law. This commitment has , in effect, imposed an obligation to simply 
introduce, inter alia, antitrust rules similar to those found in the EC without imposing 
an alignment obligation, which would go beyond any obligation imposed on existing 
Member States. In the case of Association Countries, the Commission , in 
its 1995 
White Paper on Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union, has given the 
approximation requirement a narrow meaning by imposing a requirement on 
Associated Countries to comply not only with general antitrust principles, but also 
with the existing case law of the EC. The justification for this was in part that because 
EC antitrust rules do not enjoy direct effect within these countries, then a higher level 
of convergence is required than for existing Member States. 
The EC conception of antitrust is not necessarily ideal for these small, emerging 
markets. In a relatively advanced economy, there are often tensions between a strict 
antitrust policy and accommodation of the rapid structural changes in the economy. 
Hence , imposing an "approximation of laws" obligation on these countries leaves 
very little discretion to their governments. 1 30 In comparison, developed countries have 
generally, first developed their policies and then modified them in the light of 
international agreements. Thus, the inclusion of such a commitment would mean that 
ensure that future legislation is compatible with Community legislation", and the Czech and Slovak 
Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, for their part, "shall endeavour 
to ensure that [their] legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community". 
128 The preamble to the Poland agreement, for example, includes "recognising the fact that the final 
objective of Poland is to become a member of the Conu-nunity and that this association, in view of the 
parties, Will help to secure this objective". 
129 See Fingleton, Fox, Neven & Seabright, at p 55, note 125 Ante. 
130 F. Vissi "Challenges and questions around competition policy: the Hungarian experience" (1995) 18 
Fordham Int'l L. J. 1230, at 1241. 
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the policies of these countries will be shaped from the outset by international 
obligations. It should be pointed out here that whilst developed countries, during 
times of rapid structural change, modify antitrust policy to facilitate necessary 
changes, this will not be possible in the case of these economies in transition due to 
their international obligations. 
If accession to the EC is an objective, then approximation of laws at a general level is 
consistent, even essential, in order to realize that goal. 131 In this case, parachuting in 
laws on the basis of external obligations may not necessarily be objectionable. At the 
same time, the need for adopting antitrust law within the national legal order seems to 
be important in the context of the new market economies. If the aim of the countries 
concerned in creating closer co-operation with the EC is to develop market 
economies, as opposed to seeking future accession to the EC, probably the adoption 
of rules consistent with the cultural and institutional context of the country concerned 
is more desirable because they are more readily accepted by those to whom they 
apply, than parachuting in laws. 132 In this case, attention to effectiveness is more 
fundamental than approximation per se. The issue of effectiveness and approximation 
is perhaps more one of timing. The Commission may need to reappraise the 
importance of detailed convergence to allow for the proper development and 
absorption of EC antitrust law into the domestic law of such transitional economies. 
Domestic antitrust authorities and policy-makers in these countries on the other hand, 
will need to work out a careful compromise between the current needs of their 
economies and the aim of closer links with the EC. 
At a more general level, the inclusion of such an approximation commitment in the 
agreements can be seen as part of the regulatory competition between the US and the 
EC for influencing the post-Soviet states of Europe. ' 33 Approximation makes it easier 
for EC undertakings to operate in these countries and will also facilitate fuller co- 
operation with the EC and, in the case of Association Agreements, further integration 
131 Such approximation of laws is a sensible step because these countries will be able to ensure 
effective competition by their own means. It is also desirable from the point of view of economic 
undertakings because this will relieve them from having to deal with totally different systems of 
antitrust. This has both substantive law and procedural benefits. 
132 See chapters 10 and II- 
13 1 See McGowan & Wilks, at p 144, note 5,4nte. 
with a view to ultimate membership. Nonetheless, it seems that relations with the EC 
are very much driven by the internal agenda of the EC rather than the needs of these 
countries to develop. 134 As a result, one may conclude that the postponement of fuller 
co-operation between Russia and the EC and accession to the EC in respect of 
Association Agreements is premised not on the inability of the EC to consume goods 
produced in the East but on the inability of domestic undertakings of the countries 
concerned to withstand competition from EC undertakings. Thus, the approximation 
requirement may not be solely in the interests of the countries concerned, but also 
serves the interests of EC undertakings in general and, those of the EC in particular. 135 
Furthermore, the inclusion of this requirement in different forms reflects not only the 
different stage of development for the economies of the countries concerned, but also 
the lack of balance in the bargaining positions of the parties. 
8. Recent developments 
On September 25-26,2000, the Commission and 12 Candidate Countries held their 6 th 
Annual Conference. 1 36 The focus of the event was on the importance of full and 
efficient enforcement of antitrust law. At the conference, the Commission emphasized 
that establishing effective systems of antitrust in the countries concerned is of central 
significance to the ongoing accession negotiations. For the Candidate Countries,, 
negotiations on the EC antitrust policy chapter have been opened and full efficient 
enforcement of antitrust rules is of key importance in these negotiations. 
The Conference was a policy-oriented event, focused in particular on the development 
of EC antitrust law and on how to ensure the full and proper enforcement of its rules 
134 See Kennedy & Webb, at p 1095, note 96 Ante. 
Approximation is required even though EC antitrust law itself is not always the best model. The EC is 
driven by an integration agenda and yet insists on dealing with these countries one-by-one, rather than 
collectively, even though arguments in favour of approximation are centred around globalization and 
the need for shared responses by domestic antitrust authorities across national boundaries. 
The 
Association Agreements for example emphasize the existence of conditions, which have to be met 
before membership will be considered. 
135 Ramsey, note 86 Ante. A more informative and specific account can be found in P. Muchlinski "A 
case of Czech beer: Competition and competitiveness in the transitional econornies" 
(1996) M. L. R. 
658. 
136 These Countries are Bulgana, Cyprus, Czeck Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovania. Useful summaries of the various workshops of the 
conference are available at <http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/`colppetition>. 
112 
in Candidate Countries. It demonstrated the necessity of a timely application of EC 
antitrust law for a successful accession, and has re-confirmed the commitment of the 
Commission and Candidate Countries to enhancing co-operation in the filed of 
antitrust law. 
(D) Toward a wider framework of antitrust policy 
The Commission's efforts towards creating a wider framework of antitrust policy 
beyond the EC and Europe have been quite substantial. 137 These efforts have been the 
result of several factors, including those relating to increased globalization and 
technical changes and future accession to the EC, as well as the need build a global 
order within antitrust policy. These efforts are not examined at present since they are 
reviewed in chapters 9 and 10. 
(E) The value of EC antitrust law 
A final important comment to be made in this part relates to the value of EC antitrust 
law beyond the single market. EC antitrust law is a useful tool for nations that aim to 
introduce or develop a framework for competition in general and, for antitrust law in 
particular. It has been written: 
"European competition law experience is also, however, a valuable source of knowledge and 
guidance for policy-makers in states that are today trying to develop market economies and 
forge appropriate legal frameworks for them. Most such countries have competition law 
systems, but they generally play marginal roles, at least in part because there is little 
137 Various groups in the EC have attempted to tackle thi II is issue. In 1994 the "W'se Men Group", a 
group of experts commissioned by K. van Miert made some interesting proposals in order to strengthen 
the multilateral framework of antitrust rules and to promote international co-operation in this area. The 
Group has recommended strengthening plurilateral co-operation in response to global competition. It 
recommended to create a fully-fledged international instrument, including adequate enforcement 
structure, a core of common principles and a positive comity provision. The Group also put forward a 
proposal for a dispute settlement mechanism that could be used to settle disputes between member 
countries regarding their compliance with regard upon rules and principles of the instrument. See 
"Competition policy in the new trade order: strengthening international co-operation and rules" COM 
(95) 359, available at <hqp: //www. europa. eu. int>. 
The Comn-tission has been particularly active in discussions within the WTO, the OECD and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), adopting a code on restrictive 
business practices. The Commission has been a strong supporter of the Code, and it seems to endorse 
most of its views. An interesting feature of the Code relates to its terminology, which seems to be 
closely related to that of EC antitrust law, such as the concepts of "dominance" and "abuse". This, 
along with the fact the Code emphasizes the importance of institutional dimensions, and the interaction 
between these and substantive provisions, as the case with EC system of antitrust, makes it clear that 
EC antitrust law has played a central role in the development of this Code. See Commission 25h Report 
on Competition Policy (1995), section V; Cornryussion 28h Report on Competition Policy (1998). A 
detailed exarnination of the WTO, the OECD and UNCTAD can be found in chapter 10. 
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understanding of the dynamics, costs and consequences of such systems. Policy-makers often 
face situations that are similar to those faced by Europeans in the recent past, and thus 
European experience may aid them in identifying and perhaps achieving competition la"k, 
systems. " 138 
The fact that the EC system of antitrust has been successful, is a factor that will 
influence the decision of policy-makers in third countries to use it for insights and 
guidance when they consider adopting antitrust laws or changing their existing ones. 
The number of countries that have adopted antitrust laws on the basis of those of the 
EC has increased over the years. ' 39 As was seen above, some of these countries are 
already moving toward future accession to the EC, but others bear no relation to the 
EC, whether in geographical or other terms. 140 Such a development highlights an 
important role for EC antitrust law, and its growing success and importance presents 
an opportunity that the Commission has been keen to exploit in several ways. 
However, this is also a challenge for the Commission. Certain countries may not be 
willing to consult EC antitrust experience for insights and lessons. The US, for 
example, has been a forerunner in this respect because the common sentiment on t1l'. 
other side of the Atlantic has always been that such experience has little to offer to a 
system of antitrust which celebrated its Centenary over a decade ago. 14 1 To a certain 
extent, this reaction is understandable because the US has an extremely well- 
established tradition of antitrust law and Policy. 142 However, as will be seen, this 
reaction has some serious implications for the internationalization of antitrust 
policy. 143 The fact that the US system of antitrust is strong, and that US policy-makers 
are mostly unwilling to consider the EC system of antitrust for guidance on how 
antitrust policy may be internationalized means that the Commission will find it hard 
13' Gerber, at p 5, note 2 Ante. 
139 See pp 248-50 Post. 
"0 See Comrmission 2 8th Report on Competition Policy (1998). See also chapter 10. 
14 ' Gerber has argued that policy-makers in the US should find much of value in looking toward EC 
system of antitrust for lessons and insights. However, he notes in this regard that while "many 
European scholars, judges, and administrators have paid close attention to US antitrust law experience, 
their US counterparts generally have assumed that they have little to learn from European experience. 
As a result there have been few efforts by American scholars to analyze this experience and its 
potential relevance for the US". Gerber, at p 6, note 2 Ante. 
142 See ABA, at p 26, note 16 Ante. 
113 See pp 248-50 Post. 
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to advocate the development of an international system of antitrust on the basis of the 
principles and ideas developed in the EC system over the years. 144 It is doubtful 
whether the US, and several other countries, 145 will regard the EC system of antitrust 
- which provides a model of internationalization of antitrust policy - as a useful 
example for how to develop a comprehensive international system of antitrust. This 
can be seen from the number of occasions over the years on which the US rejected 
proposals put forward by the EC for such a system. 146 This situation has led to a 
conflict of views between the US and the EC which seem to constitute a hurdle in the 
face of the internationalization of antitrust Policy. 147 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
In spite of the state of stagnation and the divisive conflicts which the EC has suffered 
at certain stages of its existence, 148 its system of antitrust seems to have been largely 
successful. The political significance and influence of the system has been as 
extensive as its economic and legal impact. The success of the system can be looked 
at from the following angles: 
(A) The relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws 
The convergence of domestic antitrust laws seems to carry various implications for 
the separation between EC and domestic levels. In marking a new departure for the 
traditional EC/Member State relationship, this convergence has furnished an 
important example of how EC membership and this "new legal order of international 
law" affected the national legal order. This impact can be seen in light of the fact that 
convergence has even been considered by Member States which, on more than one 
144 The EC is in favour of this proposal. 
145 An example is Norway which has been reluctant to model its antitrust law on that of the EC. See 
chapter 10. 
140 See D. Gerber "The U. S. - European conflict over the globalisation of antitrust law" (1999) 34 New 
Eng. L. R. 123, at p 130. Also, pp 248-50 Post. 
One can also add that the US does not believe that international antitrust policy should usurp its own. 
Furthermore the US seems to be sceptical over how far the EC focuses on competitive impact as 
opposed to non-econorfflc factors. See further chapter 10. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See generally Craig & De Burca, at pp 13-4, note 30 Ante. 
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occasion, seemed unwilling to shift from their well- established systems of antitrust to 
the EC model. 149 
Convergence is not necessarily free from difficulties. Even with the existence of a 
comprehensive textual and procedural harmonization, there can still be scope for 
divergence between the EC and Member States on the one hand and among the 
Member States themselves on the other, insofar as policies underlying EC and 
domestic antitrust laws may differ. 150 It is true that such disparity may not present a 
difficulty if there is sufficient flexibility at the national level to accommodate the 
grounding of EC antitrust law within domestic legal orders and If the antitrust laws - 
EC and domestic - reflect general underlying principles. Still, divergence may prove 
problematic where the direct consequence of convergence leads to obfuscation in the 
relationship between EC and domestic antitrust laws, with the important differences 
between the two not being considered. 
Convergence may increase interest at the domestic level in developments at EC level, 
which may promote more two-way traffic between them. Moreover, it can be seen as 
a vote of confidence in the EC system of antitrust. At the same time, responsiveness 
to domestic legal culture in different Member States will inevitably lead to nationally 
specific antitrust laws, 151 albeit ones with a common genesis (as a result of 
convergence). 152 Furthermore, convergence may eventually allow for a better division 
149 A good example is Germany. There have been some calls to bring German law more in line with the 
EC rules on cartel. See P. Norman "Bonn plans cartel law change" Financial Times (April 28,1997); S. 
Held "German antitrust law and policy" (1992) Fordham Corp. L. 1.311; R. Bechtold "Antitrust law in 
the European Community and Germany - an uncoordinated co-existence? " (1992) Fordham Corp. L. 
Inst. 343. 
150 See B. Bishop & S. Bishop "Reforming competition policy: Bundeskartellamt - model or muddle" 
(1996) 17 ECLR 207. 
Given that EC antitrust law is shaped by policies underlying it, convergence of domestic antitrust laws 
within the EC depends not only on formal adoption of text and procedure of EC antitrust law at 
domestic level, but ultimately on the convergence of those policies. See Maher, note 16 Ante. 
151 The importance of culture has already been spelt out in chapters 3 and 4. See generally L. Haucher 
& M. Moran Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford, 1989), at p 3. 
15' Convergence of domestic antitrust laws has not meant that domestic antitrust laws have become 
non-existent. It has been shaped and influenced by the domestic systems which created these laws. In 
this sense, convergence embodies a balance or compromise between EC antitrust norrns on which 
domestic antitrust laws have been based and the domestic need to ground these concepts and ideas 
within the legal orders of the Member States. See J. Jacquernin "The international dimension of 
European Competition policy" (1993) 31 JCM. S. 9 1. 
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of competence between EC and national spheres, but in the short term, the problems 
associated with overlapping jurisdiction and the ensuing legal uncertainties are likely 
to remain. 
An additional comment should be made on the co-ordinating role of the Commission 
in relation to decentralized enforcement of EC antitrust law. Through this capacity, 
the Commission will be passively overseeing the way domestic antitrust laws develop. 
To ensure effective co-ordination, the Commission will need to facilitate informal 
contacts between domestic antitrust authonties, which will surely increase t1he 
importance of EC antitrust law. If this happens, the latter's influence on domestic 
antitrust laws may lead to increased interest at the national level in the way the fon-ner 
develops. 
The voluntary adoption of EC antitrust law norms in the legal systems of Member 
States can be contrasted with the experience of Central and Eastern European 
Countries,, where approximation of laws has been a priority for the Commission. Of 
course, convergence within the EC cannot be equated with the approximation of laws 
elsewhere in Europe. It is this angle to which the discussion now turns. 
(B) The EC and its agreements with neighbouring countries 
Some emphasis was placed above on the Commission's initiatives on a wider level in 
Europe. These efforts have led to the conclusion of different types of agreements 
between the Commission and its neighbouring countries. Clearly, the importance of 
the EC system of antitrust has increased in light of these efforts. As the Commission 
has linked some of these agreements (Association Agreements) to the objective of 
future accession to the EC, 153 it has placed itself, and the EC, in a superior bargaining 
position. Including an approximation of law requirement in those agreements has 
meant that EC antitrust law is becoming increasingly transposed into different legal 
systems and traditions. Arguably, this should be seen as one of the main successes of 
EC antitrust law experience. Accommodating EC-like antitrust law in Central and 
Eastern European Countries seems to indicate that EC antitrust law continues to be of 
importance in achieving further integration. Thus, the EC is likely to expand in 
153 See A. Fiebig "A role for the WTO in international merger control" (2000) 20 Nw. J Int'l L. & Bus. 
233, at p 237; See the Commission's document on "The enlargement negotiations after Helsinki" 
MEMO, /00/ 6 (February 6,2000). 
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geographic terms, whilst at the same time maintaining its rules and principles on 
which it was originally based and which have contributed to its development over the 
last forty years or so. This seems to have equipped the Commission Nvith the 
confidence and experience to advocate EC antitrust thinking beyond all EC and 
European boundaries. 
(C)EC antitrust law on the international plane 
It was said above that the EC has been particularly keen to demonstrate its antitrust 
lessons at a higher level, mainly through participating in multilateral discussions and 
contributing to the work of international organizations dealing with antitrust policy. 
However, the EC's success in this instance cannot be equated with that in the context 
of its relationship with its Member States, nor with that of its efforts at a wider 
European level. 
As far as the international plane is concerned, the EC has been presented with a 
"double-edged sword": an opportunity and a challenge regarding its antitrust thinking. 
At one end of the spectrum, this is an opportunity for the EC to inform the world on 
how to set up and operate a strong and successful new type of "International system of 
antitrust". 154 With its successes at both EC and European levels, the EC seems to be 
justified in advocating its views on a blueprint for international system of antitrust. At 
the other end of the spectrum, it is a challenge because the EC is competing with other 
nations that have a strong antitrust tradition. A leading example is the US, which is 
keen neither on surrendering to international antitrust interventions by international 
organizations, nor enthusiastic about receiving antitrust lessons from this side of the 
Atlantic. 
(D) The Commission as a supranational institution 
Pushing the discussion to its extremes, it is clear that the Commission - as a 
supranational institution - has contributed immensely to the success of the EC system 
of antitrust and its growing influence. In fact, the position of the Commission is rather 
special. The Commission is an EC institution and in becoming a leading player in the 
EC system of antitrust , it 
has confirmed its commitment to shaping this newly created 
legal order. Yet, the Commission is also an international institution, or a supranational 
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one to say the least. This is not only confinned by the fact that the EC is "a new legal 
order of international law", but more importantly, by how the Commission has 
developed the EC system of antitrust, both within and outside the boundaries of the 
EC. 155 In this way, the Commission has evolved into an institution with an 
international antitrust thinking. 
Since an early stage in the EC, the Commission paid close attention to the relationship 
between EC and domestic antitrust law. The original goal of the Commission within 
EC antitrust policy was to strengthen the role of the EC system of antitrust as a whole. 
Through committing itself to enhancing the system, the Commission has successfully 
expanded the importance and influence of the system. This success has depended to a 
large extent on the support the Commission has received from other key EC 
institutions, such as the Courts, the Council and Parliament, 156 and from important 
domestic forces, such as the sectors of national industry. 
The future success of the Commission, especially as far as its international antitrust 
thinking is concerned, will definitely continue to depend on these players. Still its 
success will also depend on the power of the Member States, which will arise from 
factors such as the extent to which they seek to co-operate with one another; the 
extent to which domestic politicians and policy-makers consider antitrust policy is 
important; and the extent to which officials of domestic antitrust authorities believe 
that can combat anti-competitive practices as satisfactorily as the directorate - general 
of competition in Brussels. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Looking at the developments of the EC system of antitrust over the last fifty years, it 
is clear that it has been successful and its success has immensely contributed towards 
its current, advanced state. Those developments have been gradual, but also largely 
unpredictable. The EC antitrust law experience is of significance not only for 
154 See Commission 28hReport on Competition Policy (1998). 
155 Some writers have strongly argued in favour of expanding the international reach of EC antitrust 
law by the Comnussion. See J. Friedberg "The convergence of law in an era of political integration: the 
WoodPidp & Alcoa effects doctrine (1991) U. Pitt. L. Rev. 289, at p 322-3. 
156 See Parliament resolution on the Comrrussion's 28h Report on Competition Policy (1998), 
Comrnission Report: SEC (1999) 743 - Bull. 5-1999, at point 1.2.48. 
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countries seeking to develop systems for competition and antitrust law, but also for 
those in favour of establishing an international system of antitrust. 
The degree to which this experience is seen as valuable for these purposes depends on 
extrinsic as well as intrinsic factors. The former include the willingness of policy 
makers in other countries to utilize EC antitrust experience for inspiration. 
Conversely, intrinsic factors, on the other hand, include how the EC system of 
antitrust will develop in the light of new acts of accession to the EC and the 
relationship between the EC and national levels. How these factors will evolve and 
what kind of forces they will bring with them will undoubtedly shape the Community 
of today and tomorrow and will impact on the process of internationalization of 
antitrust policy. 
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Cha ter Seven p 
SOVEREIGNTY 
This chapter examines the doctrine of state sovereignty and its significance for the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. There is an abundance of literature discussing 
the doctrine in general and its considerations. However, there is very little said about 
sovereignty and antitrust policy, I and even less on the relationship between 
sovereignty and the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Part I examines the conceptual framework of 
sovereignty. It considers issues such as the legal, social and political roles of 
sovereignty. Part II considers the place of sovereignty under public international law 
generally. It analyzes questions such as relinquishment and acquisition of sovereignty 
which are of importance in the internationalization of antitrust policy. Parts III and IV 
deal with the relationship between sovereignty and the internationalization of antitrust 
policy and the emerging order in that relationship respectively. Finally, part V offers a 
conclusion. 
1. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF SOVEREIGNTY 
(A) Rethinking sovereignty 
Brierly has explained that under public international law a state occupies a definite 
part of the surface of the earth, within which it nonnally exercises, subject to the 
limitations imposed by public international law, jurisdiction over persons and things 
' See N. Averitt & R. Lande "Consumer sovereignty: a united theory of antitrust and consumer 
protection law" (1997) 65 Antitrust L. J. 713; S. Fanner "Altering the balance between sovereignty and 
competition: the impact of Seminole Tribe on the antitrust state action immunity doctrine" (1997) 23 
Ohio Northern U. L. Rev. 1403-, S. Fanner "Balancing state sovereignty and competition: an analysis of 
the impact of Seminole Tribe (Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 114 (1996) on the antitrust state 
action immunity doctrine" (1997) 42 Villanova L. Rev. 111; J. Griffin "When sovereignties may collide 
in the antitrust area" (1994) 20 Canada- United States L. J. 91 -, S. Snell "ControllMg restrictive business 
practices in global markets: reflections on the concepts of sovereignty, fairness and cornity" (1997) 33 
Stan. J Int'l L. 2 15. 
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to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other states, and that when a state exercises such 
authority it is said to be 'sovereign' over the temtory. 2 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an exhaustive examination of the 
origin and historical perspective of sovereignty, rather its aim is to examine whether 
sovereignty plays any role in the world today and if so, how this affects the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 
Over the years, sovereignty permeated the understanding of national and international 
relations. It grew in parallel to the evolution of the modem state '3 and it seems to 
reflect the evolving relationship between the state and civil society and, to a certain 
extent, between political authority and the business community. 4 However, 
sovereignty is not a fact, but rather a concept or a claim concerning the way political 
5 power is, or should be, exercised. 
Sovereignty has acquired many connotations over the centuries, which have given rise 
to the confusion surrounding it, in particular its association with national interestl 
national independence and national security. Other factors have also contributed to 
this confusion, such as the identification of sovereignty with the ability of states to 
impose their will in certain cases, whether on their citizens, foreign nationals or other 
stateS6 -a point that this and the next chapter shall explain, raises important questions 
under public international law in general and, the internationalization of antitrust 
2 J. Brierly The Law of Nations (Oxford, 1963), at p 162. See also Higgins "The legal basis of 
jurisdiction" in C. Olmstead (ed. ) International Law Association, Extraterritorial Application of Laws 
and Responses Thereto (Oxford, 1984), at p 5. 
3 J. Anderson (ed. ) The Rise of the Modem State (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986). 
' R. Ashley "Untying the sovereign state: a double reading of the anarchy problematIque" (1988) 17 J 
Int'l Stud. 23 1; R. Walker "Sovereignty, identity, community, reflections on the horizons of 
contemporary political practice" in R. Walker &S Mendlovitz (eds. ) Contending Sovereignties. - 
Redefining Political Community (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 1990); F. Halliday "State and society in 
international relations: a second agenda" (1987) 16 J Int'l Stud. 218; P. Muchlinski Multinational 
Enteiprises and the Law (Blackwell, 1995). 
5 F. Hinsley Sovereignty (London: C. A. Watts, 1966), at p 1. 
6 It has been argued that sovereignty should be seen in both positive and negative terms. In positive 
terms it may be described as the oneness of the legal system within the territory of a state, i. e. that the 
j. urisdiction over the territory is in the hands of one authority which is supreme. In negative terms 
sovereignty means a system of law and administration of justice which is free from outside 
interference. See D. Lasok & J. Bridge An Introduction to the Law and Institutions of the European 
Coininunities (Butterworths, 1982), at p 262. 
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policy, in particular. In light of this, in addition to the far-reaching transformation of 
the landscape of antitrust policy witnessed during the last century, especially in recent 
decades, the existence of such confusion creates a need to rethink the concept and 
practice of sovereignty. 
(B) Types of sovereignty 
There are two types of sovereignty. On the one hand there is "operational 
sovereignty" - the power needed to exert supreme legitimate authority. On the other 
hand, there is "state sovereignty", which remains the organizing principle of 
international relations. This chapter is concerned with state sovereignty. 
(C) The significance of sovereignty 
The significance of sovereignty raises difficult questions about its relevance to the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. At one end of the spectrum - especially with 
the emergence of new states - and for the purposes of the present study the emergence 
of new systems of antitrust - sovereignty seems to be an ever more important factor in 
the contemporary world. At the other end of the spectrum, lies the view that with the 
economic and cultural integration fuelled by the process of globalization, sovereignty 
seems to be a less significant factor. An accelerated process of globalization raises 
new questions about the practice of state sovereignty. 7 
(D) The roles of sovereignty 
The roles of sovereignty on the other hand concern its social, political and legal 
values. As far as the first two are concerned,, it has become arguable that sovereignty 
serves both as a shield protecting national interests against foreign interference and 
influences and as a means for combating restraints on individual freedom by 
economic power and wealthy individuals. Yet, the position is less clear as far as the 
legal role of sovereignty is concerned. To establish whether sovereignty has a legal 
role to play or whether it simply exists in the crossroads between law and politics, the 
content of sovereignty has to be identified. This is an issue which is dealt with below. 
7 
J. Rapsenau "Muddling, meddling and modelling: alternative approaches to the study of world politics 
in an era of rapid change" (1979) 8J Int'l Stud. 130. 
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In a way, the above discussion shows that there seems to be a paradox surrounding the 
concept of sovereignty, which has only recently emerged. In the 1970s, sovereignty 
was seriously questioned when both political scientists and international lawyers 
mounted strong challenge from the cornerstone of their disciplines. This is evident 
from the writings of scholars, such as Camillen and Falk who have widely argued that 
during that period sovereignty was residual. 8 In spite of this, however, the concept of 
sovereignty remains a vital issue in the world order. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the concept may be seen to have been 
under revision but not yet extinct. Sovereignty is believed to carry an Increasingly 
persuasive force. Indeed, "Claims to sovereignty are more widely and sometimes 
more vigorously asserted than ever before. The concept has, moreover, tended to 
become a bulwark behind which groups in the world community ... are apt to 
retrench themselves, and, within such groups, a protection of national freedom against 
super-power control or domination by extremist influences ... the catchword of 
sovereignty continues to intoxicate national policies". 9 
(E) Measuring the content of sovereignty 
It is doubtful whether many concepts under public international law have been more 
vehemently debated in legal doctrine than that of sovereignty. ' 0 In addition, hardly 
any other concept has been so elastic, so much subject to modifications and 
consequently so confusing as that of sovereignty. The manifestations of the concept 
have been numerous. For different writers, sovereignty vanes not only according to its 
alleged content, its legal implications and the prerequisites upon which it may be 
founded, but also the subject or object of which it is supposed to be an attribute. 
Diversity has also been a fundamental connotation of sovereignty. All these variations 
run so closely parallel to the political changes of time that it becomes almost 
impossible to determine whether the variation is a product of the political change, or 
' J. Carrulleri & J. Falk The End of Sovereignty?. - The Politics of Shrinking and Fragmenting World 
(Aldershot, Hants, 1992). 
9 C. Jenks A New World of Law. - A study of the Creative Imagination in International Law (Harlow: 
Longmans, 1969), at p 13 1; W. Friedmann The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia 
University Press, 1964), at p 35. 
10 M. Korowicz "Some present aspects of sovereignty in international laxv- (1961) 102 R. D. C 1, at p 
5. 
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vice versa. For these reasons, measuring the content of sovereignty does not seem to 
be particularly easy. 
(F) Some comments 
Whichever of the functions described above is attached to the concept of sovereignty, 
one cannot derive, extract or deduce substantive rules or principles, whether general 
or specific, from the concept. Prominent scholars such as Kelsen repeatedly 
emphasized the triviality of this. " One can thus conclude that it is an illusion to 
believe that legal rules can be denved from the concept of sovereignty. It is entirely 
unjustified to derive any rights for sovereign states from the concept of sovereignty. 
One cannot draw any conclusions from this concept, other than that a sovereign state 
is a subject of public international law, upon which rights are conferred and 
obligations imposed. As the discussion below shows, this constitutes a central aspect 
of the significance of sovereignty within the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
Sovereignty and the framework of ideas, which surround it are a dominant feature of 
contemporary political debate, analysis and policy. There seems to be a sovereignty 
discourse -a way of thinking about the world in which nation states are the principal 
actors, the repositories of power and the principal objects of interest. Debate about 
national policies, national competition, national culture and national actors and 
objectives are a constitutive part of this discourse. Measures that support the state, 
reinforce the sense of national community, advance the national interest, and 
represent actions in which this discourse plays a key explanatory role. 
11. SOVEREIGNTY UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Before addressing the significance of sovereignty in the internationalization of 
antitrust policy, it is essential to examine the scope of the doctrine under public 
international law generally. In particular, the present part of the chapter looks at the 
question of the acquisition and relinquishment of sovereignty since this is an issue of 
central concern for the purposes of the present thesis. 
" See generally H. Kelsen Principles of International Law (Holt, Rinehart & Winton, c 1996). 
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(A) Who enjoys sovereignty under public international law? 
Public International lawyers would agree that sovereignty is attributed to states in the 
world community. That much seems clear. States are considered to be sovereign 
according to a formula embedded in public international law. ' 2 Since only states can 
be sovereign, other subjects of public international law, such as international 
organizations and legal and natural persons would thus be subordinate. Looking at 
that formula would reveal the reasons for this. 
(B) Acquisition and relinquishment of sovereignty 
In order to know when sovereignty is relinquished or acquired, the relevant fon-nula 
under public international law must be consulted. The position here is as follows: the 
assumption is generally made that sovereignty concerns the ability (competence, 
authority) of a state to impose duties and confer rights, and that a state must retain a 
certain minimum of this power in order to be sovereign. This is the way in which 
sovereignty is acquired or retained. An issue that is of more importance for the 
purposes of the present chapter relates to the query of what does it take for states to 
relinquish their sovereignty. To illustrate, reference is made to the case of the EC. 
Member States of the EC have committed themselves to a legal order of unlimited 
duration. 13 The different treaties on which the EC, and later the EU, rest clearly have 
not led to a loss of the sovereignty of Member States, but a limitation, albeit in certain 
fields, thereof 14 An interesting question in this regard relates to what would be 
needed for Member States to relinquish their sovereignty and consequently for the EC 
as such to become a sovereign (federal) state. Surely, this would not happen with the 
abolition of the veto power of Member States in one sector. The position is less clear 
however, once the veto power is abolished in several sectors, in all sectors or even 
with the establishment of a central government in the EC. Somewhere along this 
12 Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States provides that: "The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications (a) a pemianent population; (b) 
a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states". 
13 See Article 312 EC. 
" See chapter 6, note 10. 
Arguably, this can be seen as a loss of sovereignty. However, one could say that Member States have 
not lost their sovereignty completely; but fetters in some cases, since they can always leave the EU, 
even if impossible politically. 
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continuum, the point must be reached where Member States are no longer sovereign 
under public international law. In spite of this, one point is very obvious: through 
creating a supranational system of antitrust as part of a wider legal order, Member 
States do not seem to have relinquished their sovereignty. This point has obvious 
implications for the internationalization of antitrust policy because, it may be possible 
to argue that creating an international system of antitrust cannot reasonably be 
expected to involve a relinquishment of national sovereignty. A limitation thereupon, 
however, can be legitimately expected. 
(C) Sovereignty is relative not absolute 
The general consensus under public international law is that sovereignty is not 
absolute. States do not enjoy 'unqualified sovereignty'. This means that as long as 
more than one state exist in the international family, states can not have absolute 
freedom of action individually. The understanding is that absolute sovereignty would 
conflict with the principles of public international law -a law binding on all states - 
and would afford states the opportunity to ignore the binding force of those principles. 
Thus, from the perspective of these principles, the sovereignty attributed to states 
cannot be of an absolute character - for otherwise there would be a contradiction in 
terms. In legal terms, the more acceptable view is that sovereignty must be relative: 
Public international law imposes restrictions on states; and their rights or freedom are 
relative to those restrictions. 15 
Relative sovereignty acknowledges the fact that states are included in a "web of 
relationships" which necessarily imposes certain limitations upon their Will. 
16 These 
limitations vary of course from time to time, all according to the development - 
whether in an expanding or retracting direction - of public international law. In this 
way, it is said that one of the characteristics of sovereign states as subjects of public 
international law is that they are immediately subordinated to public international law 
15 See H. Kelsen "The principles of sovereign equality of states as a basis for international 
organization" (1944) 53 Yale L. J 207, at p 208. See also Kelsen, at p 44 1, note II Ante. 
'6C. de Visscher Thýorie Et RMlitý En Droit International Public (Paris, 1953). 
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and, consequently, that there is no other intermediate supranational laxv governing the 
state. 17 
Thus, in order to determine whether a state is sovereign under public international 
law, and therefore subject to it, one must discover the character of the law 
immediately governing the state, i. e. whether the law is international or otherwise in 
nature. Here it would be meaningless to apply the definition of public international 
law, as a law binding on sovereign states. This can be illustrated with reference to the 
distinction between the EC and the US. 
In the EC, Member States are considered to be immediately subordinated to public 
international law, whilst in the US states are considered to be immediately 
subordinate to municipal law. If a treaty concluded between sovereign states is based 
on the understanding that one or several of its participants shall surrender some of the 
qualities which under public international law are considered essential for 
sovereignty, then the treaty, at least in that respect, is no longer public international 
law. The several states of the US federal system lost their sovereignty in the public 
international law sense, the Member States of the EC have not. 
(D) Vertical relationship 
Regarding the relation between public international law and national law, as opposed 
to the inter-state relation, there is no minimum competence required of the states in 
order to be sovereign. In this way, the notion of sovereignty would serve no purpose. 
As was seen earlier in the present chapter, public international law can restrict the 
freedom of states to any extent without reaching a point where the bounds of 
sovereignty are split. Such a point does not exist. International law may restrict the 
freedom of states, it may limit their competence (power) until there remain only minor 
administrative functions for the state to fulfil and may go even further. Public 
international law may even imply the abolition of multiple statehood altogether and 
the creation of a new world state. Obviously, in this case - with the absence of 
individual sovereign states - so,,,, ereignty is relinquished. 
17 Obviously, the position here is arguable, especially in the case of the EC. Member States of the EC, 
though subject to international law, are bound by the Treaties establishing the EC. The argument can 
still be made hov, 'ever, that Member States are still subject to international la-%N,, in spite of the existence 
of the EC. See pp 125-6,4iite. 
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Thus, sovereignty may be relinquished to another state, or group of states or all other 
states, but not to the sphere of public international law. Relinquishment of sovereignty 
is a horizontal, not vertical, phenomenon. This is not to suggest that international 
agreements always confer rights and impose duties upon states co-extensively, or that 
it is compatible with public international law that a state surrenders its sovereignty by 
concluding an agreement with other states, or that customary law, especially if 
particular in character, cannot have like effects. It is merely suggested that the 
international law system - in this case an international system of antitrust - may 
expand its jurisdiction at the expense of the national law systems - in this case 
domestic systems of antitrust - without infringing the sovereignty of states, and that 
this issue lies entirely within the realm of the public international law-national law 
relationship. In other words, all states cannot lose their sovereignty, unless a new 
world state is established as a consequence of which the multitude of states become 
extinct! 
(E) Substance of Sovereignty 
This seemingly obvious conclusion has one further implication. Under public 
international law, the formula on sovereignty cannot be substance-oriented. The fact 
that substance cannot constitute the criteria for sovereignty is based on the following 
points. First, there is the proposition that an international system may encroach upon 
national systems without infringing the sovereignty of states. Public international law 
may - by regulating and restricting the freedoms of states - reduce to any extent the 
domestic sphere, and thus there would be no field that cannot be regulated by public 
international law. Secondly, there is the fact that public international law is a flexible 
legal system in a process of continuous development. 
It follows therefore that the substance of sovereignty, if there is such a thing, vanes 
with the development of public international law. The substance of sovereignty can 
not be static as, in order to establish any kind of substance of sovereignty one must 
first analyze the principles of public international law in general. It is the total effect 
of public international law upon the domestic sphere that determines the boundaries of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty under public international law as a whole is in a constant 
state of change and evolution. The substance of sovereignty is viable; and cannot be 
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regarded as fixed and definite. It is important to both acknowledge and recognize this 
conclusion. 
Thus, the concept of sovereignty is intimately linked to matters falling v', ithin the 
domestic domain and unregulated by public international law. The fon-nula on 
sovereignty seems to relate to the possibility of a state independently go"'erning 
matters in the domestic domain. Or somewhat more concretely: in order to be subject 
to public international law, a state must be able to independently govern - N'ý'Ithout the 
legal authority of another state - those matters which fall within the domestic sphere 
(and not the international law sphere), that is, it must be sovereign. The scope of the 
domestic domain can be determined only on the basis of the relation between public 
international law and national law at a particular moment, and hardly with any 
precision. For instance, one could say that a state lacks sovereignty on the grounds of 
that relationship at a particular moment. Since - and this is vital - the substance of 
sovereignty is viable, there cannot be an international law fon-nula on sovereignty that 
is substance-oriented i. e. a formula which prescribes that, in order for a state to be 
sovereign, it must be able independently to govern certain matters. All that such 
forinula may predict is that sovereignty has to do with substance within the domestic 
domain. 
111. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
ANTITRUST POLICY 
(A) Searching for an appropriate nexus 
The concept of sovereignty has implications for the creation, operation and 
enforcement of domestic systems of antitrust. To an extent, the truth behind this 
statement is not hard to deduce. The idea of protecting competition itself is, in many 
ways, closely linked to elements of national interest and policy considerations which 
themselves are attached to sovereignty. Further, implications can be identified through 
considering the different dimensions of sovereignty. 
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(B) The two dimensions of sovereignty 
Sovereignty is a bi-dimensional concept, and a full account must be taken of each 
relevant dimension in order to facilitate an understanding of its relevance to the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 
1. Thefirst dimension: so vereign ty from a national perspective 
From a national perspective, sovereignty is relevant to the subject-matter of the 
present thesis for two reasons. The first concerns the view held by certain states that a 
form of internationalization of antitrust policy - through which autonomous 
international institutions will be created - amounts to a clear interference with their 
national sovereignty. One does not need to go further than the position of the US to 
deduce the accuracy behind this statement. ' 8 The second reason is related to the fact 
that extra-tenitorial application of the domestic antitrust laws of one state - an issue 
examined in the following chapter - may be deemed to encroach upon national 
sovereignty by other states. 19 The implications of these reasons prompt a particular 
need to examine the doctrine of sovereignty and its place from a national perspective 
under the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
2. The second dimension: sovereign ty from an in tern ation al perspective 
Having outlined the national dimension of sovereignty, the international dimension is 
examined next. State sovereignty faces certain limitations under the creation of an 
international system of antitrust. It is legitimate to suggest that a form of 
internationalization of antitrust policy - as a result of which autonomous international 
institutions are established - presupposes some kind of limitation on the sovereignty 
of individual states. Support for this suggestion can be sought from the previous 
chapter where it was demonstrated how the EC provides a good example of 
18 See J. Griffin "What business people want from a world antitrust code" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 
39, at p 45. 
19 The most frequent argument in the diplomatic protests lodged against reliance by states - especially 
by the US - on the doctrine of extra -territoria I ity in antitrust policy has been that the extension of 
enforcement Jurisdiction by states over foreign under-takings in antitrust policy matters transcending 
national boundaries infringes the sovereignty of other states. See claims by the Swiss Government on 
the application of US antitrust provisions in proceedings against the Swiss Watchmaking industry, 
where it argued that such an application would "Infringe Swiss sovereignty, would violate international 
la,, N, and vvould be harmful to the international relations of the US". See United States v. 4"atchmaking 
of'Sm-itzerland Infor7nation Centre, Inc. 133 F. Supp. 40 (S. D. N. Y. 1955). 
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limitations on the sovereignty of individual states. This, it was argued, is evident from 
the way the EC has created a "new legal order of international law" . 
20 The following 
chapter extends the scope of this issue to enforcement powers of states in antitrust 
matters, which transcend national boundaries. It will be argued in that context that 
curtailing reliance by individual states on the doctnne of extra-territonality can be 
regarded - albeit indirectly - as a kind of limitation on the sovereignty of the states 
concerned . 
21 Judged properly, such a limitation does not necessarily need to be 
regarded as either severe or undesirable. It can simply be seen as a necessary 
concomitant of the creation and/or operation of an international system of antitrust. 
(C) Towards an international system of antitrust 
The first thing to be said about sovereignty and an international system of antitrust Is 
that one cannot expect the latter to be as far reaching as either the Constitution of the 
US or the Treaties establishing the EC, and later the EU. For this reason, it would be 
an exaggeration, in principle, to hold that establishing an international system of 
antitrust would open up a relinquishment/acquisition of sovereignty debate in absolute 
terms. In other words, it would not be possible to argue that under this system, states 
would absolutely lose their sovereignty and that whatever autonomous institutions 
were created under it would become wholly sovereign as a result. Nevertheless, as the 
above discussion made clear, a limitation on national sovereignty in this respect can 
be expected. 
1. The existence of an international system of antitrust 
It would be a misuse of the concept of sovereignty to maintain that the existence of 
autonomous institutions in an international system of antitrust, endowed with the 
competence to bind different states, is incompatible with the sovereignty of 
contracting states under the system. The freedom of action of the contracting states 
would certainly not be any more restricted under this system than by, say, the EC. 
Yet, the difference between these two systems and between this system and all other 
20 See chapter 6, note 10. 
21 Arguably, reliance on the doctrine of extra -territoriality in antitrust seems to be triggered by 
sovereignty concerns. One can expect that certain states would claim that their aim in enforcing their 
antitrust laws extra-territorially is based on the need to protect their interests and prerogatives. Not 
infrequently such interests and prerogatives have been identified as defences of national sovereignty. 
See further chapter 8. 
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international systems remains only a quantitative, not a qualitative one, since under 
any legal order - whether national, regional or international - unlimited freedom of 
action for states is impossible. 
An international system of antitrust in this case may, as an international order with 
binding powers, differ from other international systems, but only in the degree of its 
centralization. It is not correct therefore, to say that such a system owing to its 
centralized character, should necessarily cause states to no longer be considered 
sovereign or for them to be deprived of the power to legally act independently in the 
international community. Neither the fact that autonomous institutions exist within the 
system does very much restrict the freedom of action of the contracting states, nor the 
fact that the system is more centralized than other international systems justifies the 
argument that the existence of the system is incompatible with the nature of public 
international law or the sovereignty of states. In any event, it is doubtful whether an 
international system of antitrust would be more centralized than the EC. Yet 5 in the 
case of the latter it is difficult to seriously assert that there has been a complete 
relinquishment of sovereignty. 
2. Transfer of competence 
In creating an international system of antitrust, one can expect a transfer of 
competence bottom-up under the system, from the national level to the international 
level. Of course, there are difficulties if only some states, as opposed to all states, 
commit themselves to such transfer of competence. For example, this would bring the 
entire existence of the system into question, in terms of how international this system 
would be. This issue is dealt with below. 
22 
The present chapter concentrates on this transfer of competence as opposed to its 
consequences. In particular, the chapter examines whether sovereignty does or does 
not presuppose a minimum competence, i. e. whether the sovereignty of a state would 
be unaffected if that state were to transfer its competence to autonomous institutions 
in an international system of antitrust. In light of the view that sovereignty within 
public international law can mean only the legal authority or competence of a state 
limited and limitable only by public international law the conclusion can 
be drawn 
22 See chapter 10. 
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that establishing an international system of antitrust in the sense of transfer of 
competence from national to international level should not necessanly amount to an 
infringement of the sovereignty of states. 
However, creating an international system of antitrust would be problematic if there 
would be an over-emphasis on the significance of the basis for the specific legal order 
which the contracting states establish. If the basis is a treaty, then it will be 
international law and would remain so, then the parties concluding that treaty will be 
subordinated to public international law alone - i. e., they will still be sovereign. Quite 
different is the case where a constitution of a federal state is established by an 
international treaty. Here national law arises from public international law. In 
separating treaties and constitutions into strict categories - public international law 
and national law - the above view that sovereignty may be relinquished only in 
quantity but not in quality can be upheld - i. e. that under a treaty the freedom of state 
action may be more or less restricted, without the relinquishment of sovereignty. 
Yet, there is a risk of over-formalism in this regard. If state A transfers its legislative 
competence in antitrust policy to state B, by establishing a framework between them, 
then from state A's standpoint, it is no longer the treaty implementing the framework 
that represents the highest level of the legal order, but rather state B's domestic 
system of antitrust. From the perspective of state B, it has full freedom of action as 
against state A, wherefore the new framework has become wholly incorporated into 
state B's sphere of power. Hence, there would be no international system of antitrust 
in the true sense of the word (denoting an agreement between states), since the system 
would extinguish the existence of state A in the world community. Therefore, it is 
important to distinguish between different systems of antitrust. A true international 
system of antitrust would first of all involve more than two different states, and 
secondly it would not involve a transfer of competence from one state to another. 
Thus, loss of quality as a state happens as the law created by the system assumes the 
character of national law because of the centralization of the order constituted under 
the system, as in the case of a treaty by which a federal state is established. Regarding 
the international law status of state A, in the example above, it can be said that the 
order constituted by the agreement between state A and state B is international only 
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with regard to its creation by a bilateral international agreement, but not regarding its 
structure. 
The conclusion then is that states, in order to be subjects of public international law, 
must be sovereign within a particular territory, and in order to be sovereign they must 
enjoy a threshold minimum competence. However, the state's competence must be 
enjoyed only in a horizontal respect - as against other states - and not in a vertical 
respect - as against public international law. 
IV. THE EMERGING ORDER 
Understanding the concept of sovereignty and its place and relevance to the 
internationalization of antitrust policy initially requires an examination of the nature 
and evolution of sovereignty, both at a conceptual framework, and as it emerges in 
contemporary political practice. Accordingly, the above discussion looked at these 
basic issues, briefly showing how the modem idea of sovereignty has emerged over 
the centuries as a particular way of associating the structure of political power with a 
corresponding structure of territorial space. 
(A) Is the state the principal actor? 
The theory of sovereignty portrays a world in which supreme power is exerted within 
a particular territorial boundary. Who or what exerts that power may not be 
straightforward, but it is usually assumed to be sovereign states. Consistent with this 
idea, nation, state and national power are often considered to coincide to form the 
c 4nati on- state". Within its own boundaries the state enjoys supremacy; recognizing no 
superior authority. Beyond the national boundaries are other sovereign states. 
In this image of the world, the principal actor is the nation-state. States are 
characterized by their particular national territories, national preferences and national 
interest and policy considerations. Associated with that territory are all the people 
who live within it - including undertakings operating therein - and who identify 
themselves as members of the national community. 
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(B) How has sovereignty evolved? 
One may of course anticipate an important conclusion that the theory of sovereignty is 
limited, either as a description of how the world is, how it is evolving or how it might 
develop. It is important to observe the ongoing process of relentless globalization. Not 
only is the world experiencing progressive integration but, perhaps paradoxically, it is 
also witnessing a process of progressive decentralization of power and authority. 
(C) The existence of other players 
Paradoxically, although the activity of states has been expanding, their role has 
increasingly been focused on the central goal of creating a suitable environment for 
their domestic undertakings to compete in what has become global markets. In 
attempting to meet this objective, the state is by no means the only player. 
International organizations such as the OECD and regional organizations such as the 
EC, play an increasingly complex and vigorous role in cultivating and shaping 
antitrust law and policy as well as other laws and policies. 
In this environment, the discourse of sovereignty may tend to marginalize many 
questions which increasingly seem relevant. These include the extent to which one 
can expect or rely on the state to shape technological change to meet social or national 
objectives, the extent to which the state can be said to be sovereign over a domain in 
which technological development is in part drawn from within it and in part required 
from outside, the extent to which the nation-state can even be said to be setting its 
own agenda and the extent to which due to level of independence this can reasonably 
be considered possible. 
Today's world is one of continuous and fast transition, with major implications for 
governments, business undertakings, communities and various other interest groups 
alike. This has brought about particular challenges, including how the relationship 
between the different players should be regulated, and whether the state should be 
considered the principal actor. The ansNvers herein may not be obvious, but clearly 
any alternative perspective to that depicted by the discourse of sovereignty must be 
sensitive to the significance of the economic and technological trans form ati ons. But 
the impact of change goes well beyond these factors. 
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(D) The emergence of business power on the international scene 
The present section does not examine in detail the relationship between sovereign 
states and private business undertakings, since this is an issue that is carefully covered 
in later parts of the thesis . 
23 The section merely provides some description of this 
relationship in the context of the present chapter. 24 
States and business undertakings stand in complete contrast. A state is expected to 
protect the public interest, and for long it was regarded as the only device for public 
participation and control in the shaping of society. Undertakings, by contrast, exist to 
promote their self-interests. The interesting developments which emerged during the 
twentieth century have dictated that the growth of multinational enterprises (NfNEs) 
has been matched by the growth in government regulation of economic activity, 
including regulation of NfNEs outside national boundaries. 25 
The theory and practice of political economy has for many years experienced no 
major problems with this: if an undertaking was deemed to limit individual freedomg 
the state concerned could, and sometimes did, intervene to prevent this. In other 
words, as communities of states developed and expanded, the sovereign powers of 
states developed and expanded in parallel, and continued to regulate those 
communities. This has led scholars such as Gilpin to profess the existence of a 
contrast between the state and the market. Gilpin has argued that underlying the state 
are the concepts of territory, loyalty, exclusivity and the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of coercion. Markets, on the other hand, are associated with the concepts of 
functional integration, conceptual relationships and expanding inter-dependence with 
consumers. 26 According to Gilpin, these present fundamentally different ways of 
23 See chapter 10. 
24 A useful discussion of these issues, especially with regard to the previous and contemporary 
positions can be found in Muchlinski, ch 1, note 4 Ante. 
25 For an account on the definition of the term 'MNEs" see Muchlinski, at pp 12-5, note 4 Ante. See 
also the work of other scholars such as Stopford and Strange, who have argued that the fact that the 
activities of NINEs can regulated and the fact that this may place them in a weak position promotes 
rather than excludes adopting a co-operative approach when examining the relationship between States 
and NfNEs. See J. Stopford & S. Strange Rival States, Rival Firms (Cambridge University Press, 199 1). 
26 See the interesting views of J. Jackson about markets and their relationship with States, noting in 
particular that "markets can be very beneficial, and, even when not beneficial, market forces demand 
respect and can cause great difficulties when not respected". See J. Jackson The Jurisprudence of 
GA TT and the WTO (Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 1, at p 6. 
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ordering human relations, and the tension between them has had a profound impact on 
the course of modem history and is a crucial problem in the study of political 
27 
economy. 
However, as the economic activity of undertakings is increasingly becoming more 
global, this description of the relationship is changing accordingly. It has been argued, 
that for the last three decades there has been an uncovenanted transfer of sovereignty 
from states to international undertakings; instead of being pooled (as it were) upwards 
into inter- or supra-national resevoirs of a consciously political nature (where it 
should be placed); sovereignty is seeping away downwards into the invisible tuber 
28 system of politically irresponsible business power. 
Such development seems to have enabled undertakings involved in international 
operations to evade or circumvent the laws of states, and therefore democratic control. 
With an increased process of globalization, these undertakings can employ their 
personnel and corporate structure to drain know-how away from one state to another 
in less than it takes to tell a tale. As Weintraub convincingly argued, it is total futility 
to talk about a "US undertaking" or a "German undertaking" when the factories of the 
undertaking are located in Malaysia, its IT programmes in India, and its executives 
are recruited worldwide. 29 The effect of this situation can, inter alia, mean that 
undertakings may choose to operate in jurisdictions with lax antitrust law 
enforcement. Thus, those undertakings will be able to avoid jurisdictions where 
antitrust law is strictly or seriously enforced. 
International political economy seeks to explain international political - economic 
relations and how they affect the global systems of production, exchange and 
distribution. International political economy views the nation-state as the key actor in 
the global system, and the organizor of the international political order. The state is 
treated as the alternative to the market, which in turn is seen as the organizor of 
f International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University '17 See R. Gilpin The Political Econoniv o 
Press 1987), at pp 10- 1. 
28 See L. Eden "Bringing the firm back in: multinationals in international political economy" in L. Eden 
& E. Potter (eds) Multinationals in Global Political Econonýv (New York, 1993). 
29 R. Weintraub "Globalization effect on antitrust lam, "' (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 27, at p 27. 
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economic relations. As the above reference to Gilpin shows, there seems to a 
4C particular emphasis on this contrast between states and markets 
However, the concept of states versus markets is flawed because the market is a 
structure, not an actor, and hence can not be considered a counterpart to the state. The 
appropriate counterpoint is the multinational undertakings, the key non-state actor 
dominating both domestic and international markets. 
Control by the state of business power led to the latter being used by the former to 
further many goals and national interests, in particular to extend the jurisdictional 
reach of domestic antitrust laws beyond territorial limits. As the following chapter 
demonstrates, the US in particular practised this method of extra-territonality. 30 
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has dealt with the concept of sovereignty, and how is it expressed in 
current political analysis, its relevance to the internationalization of antitrust policy 
and it impact on this process and vice versa. 
This sovereignty discourse is of far more than peripheral interest. It is the way in 
which mainstream discussions of many of the most contentious issues in the world are 
advanced, arbitrated and resolved. Yet, compared to the authority which the concept 
should exert, its basis and validity have received remarkably little attention. 
True, there is a body of literature dealing with some aspects of sovereignty - in 
particular the relation between sovereignty and public international law, and the 
relationship between sovereign states and their corresponding national communities. 
Nevertheless, overarching questions about the enduring value of the concept as a way 
of explaining how power in the contemporary world is actually exercised, or how 
change may be achieved, remain outstanding and require urgent attention. The 
purpose of this chapter was to explore a number of these questions and pave the way 
for finding answers. 
30 See R. Vernon Soi, ereigmyAt Bay: The Multinational Spread of U. S. Enterprises (New York, 1971), 
at pp 231-47; "Sovereignty at bay: ten years after" (1981) 35 Int'l Organization 517. 
139 
It is clear that an international system of antitrust will not prevent a state system from 
co-existing. However, it seems that such a system may override the construct of 
sovereignty to the extent necessary to achieve common goals. If there remain 
additional concerns on the part of states concerning sovereignty, then such concerns 
can be alleviated by introducing a principle of subsidiarity. Under this principle, states 
can continue to exercise those functions, which they can better perform than 
autonomous institutions within the system. 31 
31 See for example Article 5 EC which contains the principle of subsidiarity under EC Law. Some 
discussion on the issue can be found in chapter 6. See further J. Trachtman "L'etat, Cest nous: 




This chapter examines the doctrine of extra-territonality in antitrust policy and the 
difficult issues it has triggered over the years. Part I considers the question of 
jurisdiction under public international law. Part II evaluates some fundamental issues 
underlying extra-territonality. It advocates the view that the difficulties with extra- 
territoriality reside not only in the conflicts it has caused between states, but also in 
the search for a compelling definition of it. Part III gives an account of developments 
in the US and the EC in the area. Part IV deals with the responses of states, which 
have been generated by reliance on extra-territoriality by other states. Part V provides 
some reflections on extra-territonality. It examines, inter alia, the role of the judiciary 
in asserting extra-tenitonal jurisdiction in antitrust policy. Part VI examines and 
offers some proposals on how to avoid or minimize conflicts triggered by extra- 
territoriality. Finally, part VII concludes. 
1. THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
(A) Traditional principles 
It is apparent from the previous chapter that a fundamental attribute of sovereignty 
resides in the fact that an individual state is competent to enact laws that are binding 
upon persons as well as regulating conditions within its national boundaries. 
' This 
fundamental attribute of sovereignty arises from an important principle under public 
' The ability of a state to enact and enforce its laws rests primarily on two grounds. The first is subject- 
matter jurisdiction, also known as legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction. According to this type of 
jurisdiction, a state has competence to enact la, %vs, meaning "to lay down general or individual rules 
through its legislative, executive and judicial bodies". The second is enforcement jurisdiction. This type 
of jurisdiction covers a state's ability to enforce its laws, that is "the power of a state to give effect to a 
general rule or an individual decision by means of substantive implementing measures which may 
include even coercion by the authorities". See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in A. AhIstr6m 
0sukevhti, 5 v. Commission (ý Voodpulp) [ 1988] 4 CMLR 90 1, at p 923. 
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international law, namely the principle of territoriality. 2 On the basis of this principle, 
a state is able to enact and enforce laws within its boundaries. If a state seeks to assert 
jurisdiction over acts committed beyond its borders it might infringe the sovereignty 
of other states, an action which can amount to a violation of principles of public 
international law. Yet as public international law developed, it became apparent that 
exceptions to the principle were inevitable. Several exceptions, therefore, have been 
introduced where the competence of states may extend to certain situations beyond 
their national boundaries. 3 One exception is the nationality principle, which allows a 
nt, 
4 
state to assert jurisdiction over its nationals abroad .A second exception is the 
protective principle of jurisdiction which permits a state to regulate offences abroad 
targeting its national security such as its political independence or territorial integrity. 
A third exception relates to the passive personality principle which covers situations 
in which a state will be able to assert jurisdiction over acts committed beyond national 
boundaries, that harm its nationals abroad. A fourth exception is the objective 
territoriality principle, namely when an act is commenced outside the boundaries of a 
5 state but concluded within its territory. 
However, beyond the principle of territoriality and its exceptions, the competence of a 
state to assert jurisdiction over situations outside its territory, especially those 
involving foreign individuals, becomes highly questionable. In this situation, more 
than one state may assert jurisdiction, which means that a conflict is likely to arise 
between those states. Nevertheless, generally it is thought that as long as a state does 
not attempt to apply its laws to conduct performed within the territory of another 
2 See P. Brown "The codification of international law" (1935) 29 Am. J Int'l L. 25; 1. Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 1998); R. Jennings & A. Watts (eds. ) Oppenheim's 
International Law, vol. I (London: Longman, 1996), at pp 456-88; F. Mann "The doctrine of 
jurisdiction in international law" (1964) 111 R. D. C. 9; M. Akehurst "Jurisdiction in international law" 
(1972-3) 46 B. Y Int'l L. 145; D. Rosenthal & W. Knighton National Laws And International 
Commerce. - The Problem of Extra- territo riality (Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1982); A. Lowe Extra- 
territorial Jurisdiction. - An Annotated Collection of Legal Materials (Cambridge, Grotius, 1983); C. 
Olmstead Extra-territorial Application of the Laws and Responses Thereto (Oxford, 1984)-, B. Hawk 
United States, Common Market and International Antitrust (Princeton Hall Law & Business, 1993). 
3 See P. Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, 1995), at pp 124-6 for an 
interesting discussion of these exceptions, apart from the passive personality principle, in relation to the 
regulation of multinational enterprises. 
' Under customary international law, a state is able to enforce its laws against its nationals, even when 
these laws have some effects beyond national borders. See France i,. Turkey (S. S. "Lotus") (1927) 
P-CI. J. 9, at p 19; Denniark v GermanY (North Sea Continental Shelf) (1968) ICJ 3, at p 44-5. 
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state, a mere assertion of the subject-matterjurisdiction by the former over individuals 
in the latter may not lead to any conflict between the states concerned or to a -violation 
of principles of public international law. Should the former seek enforcement though, 
the possibility of conflict and violation becomes obvious .6 
(B) Areas of economic law 
The above principles of public international law were initially developed In the 
context of physical conduct - for example the scenario of the poison -7 and not in a 
context of economic conduct - for example in the case of an agreement between 
business undertakings. Whether these principles could be invoked in the latter context 
was, for some time, considered to be a difficult conundrum. These principles did not 
seem to be sufficient to address questions of economic conduct, since they emerged 
with physical conduct in mind. Thus, it was not clear whether an individual state 
could assert jurisdiction over acts committed beyond its borders on the basis that these 
acts produced economic effects within its territory. 
1. The "effects" doctrine 
To solve this conundruml harmful economic effects were considered to be equivalent 
to effects of physical conduct originating from the territory of one state but concluded 
in another. This shift in position has received recognition, not under public 
international law, but in the jurisprudence of certain states. 8 Given the imperative to 
address such economic harm, some states adopted an expansive concept of 
competence. In doing so, they have heavily relied on a doctrine of "effects", which 
has served as a basis to the doctrine of extra-territoriality in antitrust policy. 
The US was amongst the first of those states to recognize the "effects" doctrine, 9 
though it was believed at one point that US antitrust laws did not apply to activities 
5 International lawyers have frequently cited the example where one person sends poison from one state 
to another as an adequate illustration. 
6 See Rosenthal & Knighton, note 2 Ante. 
See note 5 Ante. 
8 See D. Gerber "The extraterritorial application of Gerrnan antitrust law" (1983) 77 Am. J Int'l L. 756, 
at pp 791-3. 
9 See Stroock, Stroock and Lavan "Convergence of trade laws and antitrust laws: unilateral 
extraterritorial U. S. antitrust enforcement - can it work to open Japan's markets? " in H. Coretesi (ed. ) 
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outside the US. 10 In United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, the Supreme Court 
allowed jurisdiction over conduct taking place within and outside the borders of the 
US. ' 1A similar conclusion was reached twenty years later in the famous case of 
United States v. Aluminum Co of America (Alcoa), in which Judge Learned Hand 
crafted the proposition that the US can assert jurisdiction over a cartel agreement 
concluded outside its territory by foreign undertakings, with the US undertaking not 
being party to the agreement. He stated that: 
"It is settled law ... that any State may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its 
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which has consequences within its boarders which 
the State reprehends; and these liabilities other States will ordinarily recognize. " 12 
Judge Hand reasoned that it was irrelevant under such circumstances that the 
agreement was of a completely foreign nature. Such an agreement could still be 
declared unlawful because a state may punish an economically harmful act, which it 
may reprehend, even if committed by individuals beyond its borders. 13 
2. A comment 
It is important to shed some light on the justification for employing the effects 
doctrine as a valid basis for asserting jurisdiction over foreign situations. Several 
factors can be found on which this justification can be based. First , it is obvious that 
the territoriality principle falls short of guarding the legitimate interest of a state in 
areas of economic relations. 14 An individual state which asserts subject-matter 
jurisdiction in antitrust policy alms to ensure proper protection of its national 
Unilateral Application of Antitrust and Trade Laws: Toward A New Economic Relationship Between 
the United States and Japan (New York: the Institute, 1994), at p 114. 
The origins of the doctrine of extra-territoriality are illustrated in several antitrust laws in the US. See 
the Sherman Act (1890), the Clayton Act (1912), the Robinson-Patman Act (1936), the Hart-Scott- 
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (1976), the Wilson Tariff Act (1994) and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (1994). 
10 See American Banana Co v. United Fruits Co. 213 US 347 (1909) in which the Supreme Court held 
that the Sherman Act did not apply to activities outside the US (American Banana). 
11 274 U. S. 268 (1927). 
12 Ibid, 148 F 2d 416 (2 nd Cir., 1945), at p 444. 
13 Ibid., at p 443. 
14 See D. Turner "Application of competition laws to foreign conduct: appropriate resolution of 
jurisdictional issues" (1985) Fordham. Corp. L. Inst. 23 1, at p 233. 
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economic order, and is justified by the fundamental rights of states to self- 
determination. In light of the increasing inter-dependence of states and the 
significance of international trade for the welfare of nations , it is difficult to disagree 
with the logic behind adopting an effects doctrine. Following the temtoriality 
principle in an area of economic law, such as antitrust, would place already strong 
undertakings in a position to evade all national regulation. 15 Undertakings would 
therefore be able to engage in harmful economic conduct without being subjected to 
any form of supervision, since their acts would have been committed "beyond" 
national boundaries. 
16 
Secondly, under public international law, an individual state's assertion of Jurisdiction 
needs to satisfy a requirement of a sufficiently close or reasonable link between its 
territory and the acts taking place beyond national boundaries. ' 7 States cannot assert 
jurisdiction if the minimum requirement of such national nexus is not met. Since 
jurisdiction in antitrust law cases cannot be asserted without the presence of direct, 
substantial and foreseeable anti-competitive effects, the effects doctrine can be said to 
meet this requirement of a reasonable link. In the absence of a definition in 
international law of direct, substantial and foreseeable effects, individual states will 
individually decide on the matter, using a minimum standard of reasonableness. 
Thirdly, although conflicts between states over the application of extra-territonality - 
especially in the case of the US - have arisen in the context of actions brought against 
foreign undertakings, many cases do involve domestic undertakings as well. 
In light of the above factors, the effects doctrine can be regarded as a legitimate basis 
to assert jurisdiction over acts committed abroad, but which adversely impact upon 
domestic situations under certain circumstances. It is essential to limit this 
proposition to certain circumstances. For example, there is no reason why, in 
principle, the validity of the effects doctrine should not be questioned, if the state 
relying on it fails to take into consideration the sovereign interests of other states. The 
Indeed, strict territoriality may transform states into havens in which undertakings could evade rules 
combating anti- competitive behaviour. This may well result in harm to consumers and competitors of 
those undertakings. See D. Gerber "Afterword: Antitrust and American Business Abroad revisited" 
(2000) 20 Nw. J Int'l L. & Bus. 307. Also, chapter 1, note 6. 
16 T. Dunfee & A. Friedman "The extra-territorial application of United States antitrust laws: a 
proposal for an interim solution" (1984) 45 Ohio State L. J. 883, at pp 889-90. 
17 See Mann, note 2.4nte. 
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most effective way of taking account of such interests would be for states to adhere to 
the principles of public international law. It seems, therefore, that although the effects 
doctrine may constitute a legitimate basis for asserting jurisdiction, its assertion is not 
absolute, i. e. it is subject to certain conditions - imposed under international law - 
which an asserting state must satisfy. 18 This is particularly so if the aim to minimize 
or eliminate conflicts arising as a result of extra-territoriality between states is to be 
achieved. 
11. SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 
(A) Definition 
It is desirable to examine whether extra-territoriality is susceptible to some kind of 
definition, especially since this issue has not received any adequate attention in the 
literature. It is submitted that proposing a compelling and shared definition is difficult, 
if not impossible. Perhaps the best definition that can be offered, it seems, is that the 
antitrust laws of a state are extra-territonally applied in a specific case when that case 
contains "foreign elements". Even then, the concept of "foreign elements" defies a 
general definition, especially in areas of economic law. For this reason, it is suggested 
that instead of searching for a definition, one should focus on identifying situations of 
extra-territoriality. Hence, all that can be supplied are examples: acts wholly or partly 
performed, contracts wholly or partly concluded etc., beyond the boundaries of the 
state. Still the term "beyond" would remain undefined. When, for example, is an act 
performed beyond those boundaries? 
When talking about extra-territonality in antitrust policy, at least three different 
situations can be envisaged: first, when antitrust laws of state A are applied by the 
judiciary and antitrust authorities of state B within the latter's territory; secondly, 
when these laws are applied by the judiciary and antitrust authorities of state A within 
state B; thirdly, when the same laws are applied by the judiciary and antitrust 
authorities of state A within its territory, but somehow affect undertakings operating 
in state B. 
18 See R. Alford "The extraterritorial application of antitrust la,, N, s: the United States and the European 
Commun-ity approaches" (1992) 33 Fit-ginia J Int'l L. 1, at p 5. 
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The specific situation identified in the present discussion is where a state applies its 
domestic antitrust law(s) to the behaviour and activities of foreign unde aki ,g rt 
ings takin 
place beyond national boundaries. Certain parts of this definition ment special 
emphasis. The ability of a state to control activities of its own undertakings beyond its 
own boundaries should be distinguished from its ability to control activities of foreign 
undertakings under similar circumstances. Whilst the former seems to be a recognized t) 
principle under public international law, the latter does not seem to have equal 
recognition, and thus it has given rise to classic questions of jurisdiction, which are 
amongst the most important and intractable conflicts of public international law. ' 9 
(B) Extra-territoriality and the internationalization of antitrust policy 
There are strong links between extra-territoriality and the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. First, arguably, relying on extra-territorial application of domestic 
antitrust laws would reduce the incentives of states for the internationalization of 
antitrust policy in a "bilateral" or "pluralist" sense. If, by relying on its own antitrust 
laws, a state is independently able to control activities beyond its boundaries, then its 
willingness to co-operate with other states on the interriational plane will not be 
particularly strong, unless it could achieve better results through co-operation. 20 
Secondly, an increased reliance on the doctrine of extra-territoriality will lead to an 
increase in conflicts between states, especially since the number of states instituting 
systems of antitrust has been rising. 21 In light of this, a state's extra-temitorial 
application of its antitrust laws would not necessarily be regarded as acceptable to 
other states. The reverse is often true. Experience in this area shows that many states 
have not been in favour of other states' reliance on extra-territoriality in antitrust 
19 See A. Lowe "The problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction: economic sovereignty and the search for 
a solution" (1985) 34 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 724, at p 727. 
20 This point can be illustrated with reference to the US and its use of its antitrust law in the period 
between 1930s and 1950s. As chapter 10 shows, the US, while expressing its views in favour of co- 
operation, delivered major blows to the efforts of states at that time to internationaliZe antitrust policy. 
At that time, "the US sat astride the world. The US government set the tone for much that happened in 
the no-conu-nunist world, and US economic interests tended to dorninate 'international markets. 
This 
situation induced or at least encouraged American legal and political decision-makers to extend the 
reach of US antitrust law to conduct within the territory of other countries. After all, the 
US had 
discovered the value of antitrust, and it was 'doing the rest of the world a favor' by using it to shape 
international econornic relations". See Gerber, at pp 307-8, note 15 Ante. 
21 R. Whish Conipetition Law (Butterworths, 200 1), at p 369. Also, see chapter 1, note 4. 
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pol ICY. 22 If a state's motive for applying the doctrine is to guard its national 
soverei Pty, 23 then other states' defiance of such a move, because they view this 
move as an intrusion into their internal affairs and territorial inte, ty and thus as a gri 
violation of their national sovereignty, should not be regarded as unacceptable. 
Thirdly, the resulting situation from extra-territorial application of national antitrust 
laws would be one of national antitrust imperialism in the world, where strong states 
will be able to impose their standards on other states. '15 Fourthly, examining extra- 
territoriality in antitrust policy paves the way to examining the role of the judiciary in 
the internationalization of antitrust policy and ultimately in an international system of 
antitrust . 
2' To this end, it is important to evaluate the contribution of the judiciary 
towards harmonization of antitrust policy standards on the international plane. At 
present, however, extra-territorial application of domestic antitrust laws, as sought by 
antitrust authorities and recognized by the judiciary in certain jurisdictions, conflicts 
with public international law. 27 Finally extra-territoriality, both in theory and practice, 
concerns situations which extend beyond the national level and move more towards 
the international plane. Therefore, strong links seem to exist between extra- 
territoriality and the internationalization of antitrust policy. By way of stating a sub- 
conclusion, one could argue that an increased reliance on the doctrine of extra- 
temtonality represents a step in the opposite direction to a groping for a meaningful 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 
22 See pp 164-9 Post. 
23 See chapter 7, note 21 and accompanying text. 
14 See Justice Holmes in American Banana where he said that the lawfulness of an act "must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act alone is done". Other-wise, the assertion of 
jurisdiction would be unjust and would be an interference with the sovereignty of another nation, which 
the other nation "justly Might resent". American Banana, at p 356. 
25 It has been argued that in applyin-, -, its antitrust 
law extra-terrltorlally, the US was, in the view of 
states, imposing respect for its antitrust laws on the entire world in order to serve US interests and 
promote its economic ethic. See D. Rishikesh "Extraterritoriality versus sovereignty in international 
antitrust jurisdiction" (1991) 14 World Comp. 33, at p 36. See also note 20,411te. 
26 This aspect of the debate would also complement the discussion in chapter 4, on the role of law 
courts. 
27 This view was even correct fifty years ago. See G. Haight "International law and extraterritorial 
application of the antitrust laws" (1954) 6 ý' Yale L. J. 639, at p 640. 
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(C) The political dimension 
Defining extra-territoriality in terms of situations of foreign developments and 
occurrence beyond national boundaries would almost bring one close to assuming that 
conflicts triggered by extra-territoriality may appear to be only a "dry" debate about 
jurisdiction and international law. Nevertheless, it will be argued that extra- 
territoriality lies in the crossroads between law and politics and that the conflicts it has 
28 triggered , involve important political questions, such as who can make and enforce 
29 
rules regulating behaviour of business undertakings . In other words, the argument 
30 
will be made that the nature and content of the doctrine is as much political as legal . 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the legal and political limits of extra- 
territoriality. 
111. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE US AND THE EC 
(A) The US 
1. After Alcoa 
The Alcoa case gave rise to conflicts between the US and other nations. 31 Due to the 
controversy surrounding the case - and in the light of the protests by foreign nations - 
later formulations of the effects doctrine by US courts had to be more carefully 
worded. 32 To this end, some US courts began to draw on the principle of judicial 
28 H. Maier "Extraterritorial jurisdiction at a crossroads: an intersection between public and private 
international law" (1982) 76 Am. J Int'l L. 280. 
29 See chapter 3. 
'0 Several writers have argued - quite incompletely - that the problem of extra -territoriality is one of 
legal conflict. See generally Rishikesh, note 25 Ante. 
Against this, some writers have argued that disputes arising as a result of extra-territoriality are not 
simply about legal theory; they are equally disputes about the policy objectives the law should serve. 
See J. Bridge "The law and politics of United States foreign policy export controls" (1984) 4 Legal 
Stud. 2; Lowe, at p 724, note 19 Ante. 
,I See K. Brewster Antitrust and American Business Abroad (McGraw-Hill, 1958), at pp 46-51; W. 
Fugate Foreign Commerce and Antitrust Laws (Little, Brown, 1958), at pp 344-6; N. Katzenbach 
"Conflicts on an ura-uly horse: reciprocal claims and tolerance in interstate and international lax- 
(1956) 65 Yale L. J 1087, at pp 1148-9; D. Rosenthal "Relationship of U. S. antitrust laws to the 
formulation of foreign econorruc policy, particularly export and overseas investment policy" (1980) 49 
Antitrust L. J. 1189, at p 1193; Mann, p 104, note 2 Ante; J. Sandage "Forum non conveniens and the 
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws" (1985) 94 Yale L. J. 1693, at 1694. 
32 In the case of Pinberlane, the US Court of Appeal held that the effects doctrine as enunciated in 
. 41coa is "by itself ... 
incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests. Nor does it 
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comity, 33 which seems to follow from the work of a prominent scholar in the late 
1950s, in which he advocated a "jurisdictional rule of reason", which involves a 
balancing exercise between national and foreign interests in a broad sense. 34 In 
Timberlane I, the US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit stated a number of factors 
that must be taken into account in this balancing exercise. These include: 
"The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties 
and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to -, xhich 
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of 
effects on the US as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit 
purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the 
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the US as compared with 
conduct abroad. 105 
Thus, in opting for a narrower approach, 36 it seems that some US courts have 
attempted to limit the scope of application of the doctrine by demanding not only the 
existence of a direct and substantial effect within the US, but also a balancing of the 
respective interests of the US in asserting jurisdiction, and of any other state which 
might be offended by such assertion. 37 
expressly take into account the full nature of the relationship between the actors and this country". See 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAmerica, 549 F. 2d 597 (9thCir. 1976), at pp 611-2. See also Alford, 
at p 10, note 18 Ante. 
33 The term "conllty" describes a general principle that a state should take other states' important 
interests into account in its law enforcement in return for their doing the same. The US Supreme Court 
has defined cornity as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens". See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113,163-4 (1865). 
See also Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F. 2d 909, at 937(D. D. Cir. 1984), 
where it was held that "the central precept of coMIty teaches that, when possible, the decisions of 
foreign tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international 
cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability". See H. 
Yntema "The cornIty doctrine" (1966) 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1. 
34 See Brewster, note 31 Ante. See also Gerber, at p 308, note 15 Ante. 
35 549 F. 2d, at p 614. 
36 In spite of this narrowing of the scope of the doctrine however, other states still held the , 'Iew that the 
doctrine offended against common principles of public international law. See generally A. Neale & D. 
Goyder TheAntitrust Laws of the United States of. 4merica. - A Study of Competition Enforced By Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
37 See Whish, at p 372, note 21 Ante; E. Fox "Extraterritoriality and antitrust-is reasonableness the 
answer? " (1986) Foi-dham Corp L. Inst. 49. 
It is arguable however, whether US courts fully endorsed the idea of reasonableness expressed in the 
Tiniberlane factors. Compare Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F. 2d 1287 (3d Cir. 
1979) (adopting similar factors) With Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F. 2d 
909 (D. C. Cir. 1984) (questioning the effectiveness of the factors). 
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2. The FTAIA approach 
In 1982, the US Congress adopted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
(1982) (FTAIA) to simplify the appropriate extra-territonal reach of US antitrust 
laws . 
38 To this end, the Act established a uniform test, whereby jurisdiction could 
only be asserted over conduct that has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable" effect on US domestic or export commerce. The Act seems to be neutral 
regarding the "jurisdictional rule of reason" - as adopted in Timberlane. This is 
evident from the legislative history of the Act, where it was stated that prior to its 
final adoption that the bill was intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional 
judicial recognition of the special international characteristics of transactions. The bill 
also provided that it would have no effect on the courts' ability to employ notions of 
comity or otherwise to take account of the international character of transaction where 
a court determines that the requirements of subject-matter jurisdiction were met. 39 
Nevertheless, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law in the US (1988) 
adopted the "jurisdictional rule of reason" type of approach . 
40 The Restatement 
considered that a balancing approach, derived from the principle of judicial comity, 
41 was necessary by virtue of principles of public international law . 
3. Guidelines of enforcement authorities 
The US antitrust authorities have not been consistent in their application of the 
doctrine of extra-territoriality. Some twenty years ago, the Department of Justice 
stated that the main purpose of extra-territoriality was to protect US export and 
investment opportunities against private restrictions. It also stated then that its concern 
was that each US-based undertaking exporting goods, services or capital should be 
allowed to compete and not be kept out of foreign markets by some restriction 
38 The Act amended the Sherman and the Federal Trade Commission Acts in regards to export 
commerce and wholly foreign conduct, but not with respect to import commerce. 
39 See H. R. Rep. No. 97-686 (1982), at p 10. 
40 See D. Murphy "Moderating antitrust subject matter jurisdiction: the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised)" (1986) 54 Uni. 
CliicinnatiL. Rev. 779. 
" See in par-ticular Sections 402,403 and 415 of the Restatement. For a good discussion of these 
provisions see Alford, at pp 23-7, note 18,4nte. 
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introduced by a stronger or less-principled undertaking. -'2 A few years later, the 
Department of Justice seems to have abandoned this concern and to transpose the 
consumer welfare objective into its operations within the international sphere. 
In its reaction to the test of reasonableness, the Department of Justice stated in its 
1988 Guidelines that in taking enforcement actions against export restraints that 
harmed consumers in the US and its exports, the Idea of reasonableness was a matter 
of "prosecutorial discretion" rather than law: 
"Although the FTAIA [Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act] extends jurisdiction under 
the Sherman Act to conduct that has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on 
the export trade or export commerce of a person engaged in such commerce in the United 
States, the Department is concerned with adverse effects on competition that would harm US 
consumers by reducing output or raising prices. 143 
Early in the 1990s this paragraph was repealed. At the time the Department of Justice 
explained that US Congress did not intend antitrust law to be limited to cases based 
on direct harm to consumers, arguing that when both imports and exports are of 
importance to the US economy, the Department would not limit its concern to 
competition in only half of US trade. 44 This different line of policy was later inserted 
into the 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations adopted 
jointly by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission which stated 
that the authorities may, in appropriate cases, take enforcement action against anti- 
competitive conduct, wherever occurring, that restraints US exports, if. first, the 
conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on exports of goods 
or services from the US, and secondly, the US courts can obtain jurisdiction over 
45 persons or undertakings engaged in such conduct . Along this new 
line of policy, the 
authorities agreed to consider legitimate interests of other nations in accordance with 
46 
the recommendations of the OECD and various bilateral agreements. The 
'2 See Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division 
(1988), at p 5. 
43 Ibid., footnote 159. See M. Lao "Jurisdictional reach of the U. S. antitrust laws: yokosuka and yokota, 
and 'footnote 159' scenarios" (1994) 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 82 1. 
4' See Department of Justice press release (April 3,1992) at p 2, <http: //wwNý, -. usdoi.. goN, >. 
45 Guidelines (1995), note 73. 
46 Ibid. By way of extension, note 7/4 of the Guidelines mentions a number of factors which the 
authorities would take into account when considering the legitimate interests of other states. These 
I ý-) 
Guidelines further explain that the Department of Justice would take into 
consideration, as a matter of "prosecutorial discretion", comity beyond whether there 
is a conflict with foreign law. 47 The Department of Justice has emphasized that it does 
not believe that it is the role of the courts to 'second-guess' the antitrust authorities' 
judgment as to the proper role of comity concerns under such circumstances. .4 111 
Although controversial, such comments seem to make it clear that the US remains 
determined to tackle foreign conduct that harms its exports, but would do so only after 
some account has been taken of the would-be reaction by foreign nations to this tact 
in policy. 
4. Hartford Fire 49 
In 1988, several US and UK insurance companies were alleged to have breached the 
Sherman Act by entering into agreements to alter certain ten'ns of insurance coverage 
and not to offer certain types of insurance coverage. In their response to the 
allegations, the UK based undertakings argued that the US courts should not assert 
jurisdiction over conduct that occurred in another jurisdiction and was lawful there, 
even if the conduct in question produced effects in the US. 
(i) The district court 
In its decision, the district court held that it could assert jurisdiction over the conduct 
of the UK undertakings under the Sherman Act because their decision to refuse to 
provide reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance to cover certain types of risks in the 
US had a direct effect on the availability of primary insurance in the US. 50 In dealing 
with the international comity point, the court, referring to Timberlane I, "51 held that 
factors have been derived partly from previous international guidelines and partly from the 1991 Co- 
operation Agreement between the US and the EC. 
47 The Guidelines provide, at p 20, that as part of a traditional comity evaluation, the Department of 
Justice would consider whether one state encourages a certain course of conduct, leaves undertakings 
free to choose among different strategies, or prohibits some of those strategies. In addition, the 
Department of Justice would take into account the effect of its enforcement activities on related 
enforcement activities of a foreign antitrust authority. 
48 Ibid., at pp 21-2. 
49 Case of Hartford Fire Insurance Co v. Californ ia 113 S. Ct. 2 891 (1993). 
50 lit re Insurance Antitrust Litigation., 732 F. Supp. 464 (N. D. Cal. 1989), at p 484. 
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extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction should give way to international comity 
considerations. 
(ii) The Court of Appeal 
Whilst agreeing with the district court on the existence of effects within the US, the 
Ninth Circuit for the Court of Appeal reversed the former's ruling with respect to the 
international comity consideration. 52 
(iii) The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court was divided on the issue. By a majority of 5-4, it was held that 
the Sherman Act does apply to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in 
fact produce some substantial effect in the US. 53 Regarding international comity 
considerations, it was held that there was no need to decide this question, and that in 
any case, "International comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in 
the circumstances alleged", even if asserting jurisdiction over foreign acts usually 
54 gives way to international comity considerations. 
An important point made in the judgment that is worth mentioning relates to the 
argument of the UK undertakings and Government, that the challenged conduct was 
not contrary to UK law and policy. The Court responded to this argument by saying 
that there was no "true conflict" between UK and US laws. 55 The Court referred to 
Section 415 of the Restatement (Third), holding that there cannot be a "true conflict" 
if the undertaking, subject to the laws of two jurisdictions, can comply with both. As 
there was no "true conflict" in this case, opined the Court, there was no need to 
" In Timberlane II, the 9th Circuit for the Court of Appeal held that in asserting extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, a court should examine "(1) the effect or intended effect on the foreign commerce of the 
United States; (2) the type and magnitude of the alleged illegal behaviour, and (3) the appropriateness 
of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in light of considerations of international comity and fairness". 
Timberlane lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, 749 F. 2d 1378 (9th 
Cir. 1984), at 1382. 
52 In re Insurance Antitrust litigation, 938 F. 2d 919,932 (9hCir. 199 1), at p 934. 
53 509 U. S. 764 (1993), at p 796, per Justice Souter. 
ý' Ibid., at p 798. 
55 Ibid., at pp 798-9. 
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consider whether a US court should, on the basis of international comity, refrain from 
asserting j uri sdiction. 
5. A comment 
The judgment of the Supreme Court raises several questions . 
56 The view of the 
majority that for a "true conflict" to exist, compliance with US law should lead to a 
violation of the law of another nation is difficult to accept. Indeed, in the case itself, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the minority, described this view as a "breathtakingly broad 
proposition". 57 One can anticipate that such a view would trigger conflicts between 
US antitrust law and the legitimate interests of other states. Moreover, the claim may 
be made that the judgment seems to have misinterpreted the approach of the 
Restatement (Third). Lowenfeld has written: 
"In determining whether state A exercise jurisdiction over an activity significantly linked to 
state B, one important question, in my submission, is whether B has a demonstrable system of 
values and priorities different from those of A that would be impaired by the application of the 
law of A. I am not suggesting that, if the answer to the question is yes, A must stay its hand. 
The magnitude of A's interest, the effect of the challenged activity within A, the intention of 
the actors, and the other factors that I hope will disappear from view remain important. But, 
conflict is not just about commands: it is also about interests, values and competing priorities. 
All of these need to be taken into account in arriving at a rational allocation of jurisdiction in a 
world of nation-states. iiH 
By emphasizing the need for a "true conflict". the Supreme Court seems to have 
departed from previous judgments in which it placed a specific emphasis on the 
56 Many of these questions have been noted in the literature on the case. See A. Robertson & M. 
Demetrious "'But that was in another country' ... The extraterritorial application of US antitrust 
laws 
in the US Supreme Court" (1994) 43 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 417; V. Gupta "After Harýford Fire: antitrust 
and comity" (1996) 84 Geo. L. J 2287; J. Trentor "Jurisdiction and the extraterritorial application of 
antitrust laws after Hartford Fire" (1995) 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1583; K. Dam "Extraterritoriality in an 
age of globalization: the Hartford Fire case" (1993) Sup. Ct. Rev. 289; L. Kramer "Extraterritorial 
application of American law after the insurance antitrust case: a reply to professors Lowenfeld and 
Trimble" (1995) 89 Am. J Int'l L. 750; P. Trimble "The Supreme Court and international law: the 
demise of Restatement section 403" (1995) 89 Am. J Int'l L. 53; P. Roth "Jurisdiction, British public 
policy and the Supreme Court" (1994) 110 L. Q. R. 194; E. Fox "U. S. law and global competition and 
trade - jurisdiction and cornIty (1993) Antitrust Rep. 3; S. Calkins "The 
October 1992 Supreme Court 
term and antitrust: more objectivity than ever" (1994) 62 Antitrust L. J. 327, at pp 361-8; Hawk (Supp. 
1993), at p 148, note 2 Ante. 
57 
At p 820 of the judgment. 
58 See A. Lowenfeld "Conflict, balancing of interests and the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe: 
reflections on the Insurance antitrust case" (1995) 89 Am. J Int'l L. 42, at p51. Lowenfeld was the 
principal author of the part of the Restatement (Third) on which the Supreme Court relied in its 
judgment. 
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importance of taking into account the interests of foreign states, 59 as well as on the 
need to carefully inquire into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in 
antitrust cases. 60 It seems that it would be preferable for the US courts to refrain from 
asserting jurisdiction over foreign situations if such an assertion would be 
unreasonable. This would be in accordance with the Restatement (Third), especially 
section 403 thereof. 
61 
The difficult questions which the judgment raises also concern the use of the 
sovereign compulsion defence . 
62 In the judgment itself the requirement that the 
challenged conduct be compelled by foreign law appears to confuse the exercise of 
judicial discretion in the context of international comity with the evidence necessary 
to establish the affirmative defence of foreign sovereign compulsion. Thus, if the UK 
undertakings could have established their challenged conduct was compelled by UK 
law, they would have been entitled to dismissal pursuant to the foreign sovereign 
compulsion defence, without the need for any analysis of international comity. The 
majority opinion in Hartford Fire leaves open the question whether international 
comity could require a US court to consider abstaining ftom exercising jurisdiction in 
the absence of a true conflict and, if so, under what circumstances. 63 
59 See Doe i,. United States, 487 U. S. 201, (1988), at p 218 note 16; Soci&ý Nationale Undustrielle 
Aýrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U. S. 522 (1987), at pp 543-4. 
60 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U. S. 102,115 (1987). 
61 In the case Justice Scalia applied the section and the factors therein to the facts of the case and 
concluded these factors go against the application of US law. According to Justic Scalia, the relevant 
actions took place primarily in the UK, and the defendants are UK undertakings whose principal place 
of business was outside the US. He thought it was beyond imagination to consider that that an assertion 
of legislative jurisdiction by the US would be reasonable, and therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in 
the absence of statutory indication to the contrary, that Congress has made such an assertion; at p 819. 
62 Foreign sovereign compulsion defence calls for denial of jurisdiction by US courts in cases where an 
explicit law of another state compels the persons committing the anti-competitive acts to do so (who 
would face sanctions should they not comply). This is based on the assertion that sovereignty "includes 
the right to regulate commerce within the nation. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there 
have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign. The Sherman 
Act does not confer jurisdiction on U. S. courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. By it terms, it prohibits 
only anti -competitive practices of persons and corporations". See Interamerican Refining Corporation 
i,. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Suppl. (D. Del. 1970), at 1291; Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum 
Corp., 696 F. 2d 1287,1293 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust 
& Savings Association, 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); US v. Watchmakers of Switzerland., 1963 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S. D. N. Y. 1962). See also J. Leidig "The uncertain status of the defence of foreign 
sovereign compulsion: two proposals for change" (1991) 31 Virginia J Int'l L. 32 1. 
63 J. Grifffin "Extraterritoriality in U. S. and EU antitrust enforcement" (1999) 67 Antitrust L. J. 159, at 
p 193. 
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The difficulty raised by this issue can also be observed in the post-Harýford Fire case 
law, which is divided on the issue Of CoMity. 64 Some subsequent cases noted that 
Harýford Fire "did not question the propriety of the jurisdictional rule of reason or the 
seven comity factors in Timberlane F, 65 and in several cases the courts have struck 
out claims after finding "true conflicts" with foreign law, 66 whilst in other cases the 
courts refused to dismiss claims on the basis of international comity. 67 
Perhaps the most difficult question raised by Hartford Fire is where the case has left 
the US' enthusiasm for extra-territoriality in applying its antitrust laws and the 
principle of international comity. 68 The answer may be found in some subsequent 
rulings by the US courts. A good exposition is United States v. Nippon Paper 
Industries, Co . 
69The case involved a Japanese undertaking, Nippon Paper, charged by 
the US with conspiracy to fix prices in the US contrary to section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The district court dismissed the charge and held that criminal antitrust 
prosecution could not extend to wholly extra-territorial conduct. On appeal, the First 
Circuit, reversed the district court decision, holding that the US Government could 
prosecute Nippon Paper for conspiring to fix prices in the US. The Court stated there 
was no compelling reason why principles of comity should exempt Nippon Paper 
from prosecution. According to the Court, a finding in Nippon Paper's favour would 
encourage undertakings to use nefarious means to influence markets in the US, 
rewarding them for erecting as many territorial firewalls as possible between cause 
70 and effect . 
64 See Lowenfeld, note 58 Ante. 
65 Metro Indus. Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F. 3d 839 (9hClr. 1996), at p 846 note 5. 
" See Filetech S. A. R. L. v. France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 464 (S. D. N. Y. 1997); Trugman-Nash Inc. v. 
New Zealand Dairy Board, 945 F. Supp. 733 (S. D. N. Y. 1997), at p 736. 
67 See, for example, Caribbean Broad Sys. i,. Cable & Wireless Plc, 1998-2 Trade Cas (CCH) 72,209 
(D. C. Cir. 1998). 
68 It has been argued that the case will encourage US Government, state attorneys general and private 
plaintiffs to aggressively rely on extra-territoriality. See J. Griffin "Extraterritorial application of U. S. 
antitrust law clarified by United States Supreme Court" (1993) 40 Fed. B. News &J 564. 
69 109 F. 3d I (I" Cir. 1997), at pp 8-9. For a commentary on the case see A. Gluck "Preserving per se" 
(1999) 108 Yale L. J 913. 
70 Ibid., at 8. 
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It is difficult to estimate the far-reaching effect of Nippon Paper, especially since the 
Supreme Court did not give leave to the defendant undertaking to appeal. Howeý, er, it 
may be appropriate to agree that in the light of the Harýfbrd Fire case law, " in 
general, and in Nippon Paper in particular, US antitrust authorities have continued to 
be zealous in their reliance on extra-territoriality, and comity considerations appear to 
72 have had little impact on outcomes in antitrust cases . 
(B) The EC 
1. Wood Pulp 
The issue of whether EC antitrust law is capable of extra-territonal application arose in 
pUl 
. 
73 the case of Wood p In its decision, the European Commission stated that EC 
antitrust law does apply extra-territori ally where conduct outside the EC produces 
adverse economic effects within It. 74 The ECJ, on the other hand, declined to address 
this issue, 75 but held that Article 81 (1) EC would apply where a price-fixing agreement 
76 is implemented within the EC . 
71 See United States v. Cerestar Bioproducts BV, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,098 (N. D. Cal. 1998); 
United States v. Heeremac, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,097 (N. D. 111. Dec. 22,1997) (Case Nos. 
4323-4324); United States v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,097, Cases Nos. 4277- 
8 (N. D. Cal. 1997). 
72 See Grifffin, at p 168, note 63 Ante. 
73 [1988] ECR 5193, [1988] 4 CMLR 474. The first occasion on which the Commission considered the 
question of effects was in 1964. In the case of Grosfillex, the Commission stated that the "territorial 
scope of [EC antitrust law] is determined neither by the domicile of the enterprise nor by ... where the 
agreement is concluded or carried out. On the contrary, the sole and decisive criterion is whether an 
agreement ... affects competition within the Common Market or is designed to have this effect". Grosfillex-Fillistorf [ 1964] 3 CMLR 237. See also Commission I Vh Report on Competition Policy 
(1981), referring to Grosfillex, where the Comrrussion stated that it "was one of the first antitrust 
authorities to have applied the internal effect theory to foreign companies". At p 36. See also Aniline 
Dyes Cartel [1969] 8 CMLR D23, at D33. 
" Ibid., at pp 499-500. For a general discussion of the issues here see M. Waelbroeck "Specific extra- 
territorial applications of jurisdiction resulting in conflict: the European Community approach" in 
Olmstead, note 2 Ante; L. Whatstein "Extraterritorial application of EU competition law-conu-nents and 
reflections" ( 1992) 26 Israel L. Rev. 195. 
75 See L. Brittan Competition Policy and Merger Control in the Single European Market (Grotius, 
1991), at pp 7-9. The ECJ avoided this question earlier in the case of Dl, estuffs, in which the ECJ 
declined to accept the suggestion of Advocate General Mayers to adopt the effects doctrine, and instead 
asserted Jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of territoriality, relying on the "econoryuc entity" 
doctrine. Cases 48/69 etc. [1972] 3 ECR 619. See F. Mann "The Dyestuffs Case in the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities" (1973) 22 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 35. 
76 In contrast to what was said above about the position of the Commission, it has been argued that the 
ECJ remains dedicated to "an objective teMtoriality principle" (which requires that a foreign 
undertaking engage in a "consummating act" within the EC in order to extend jurisdiction) and to 
furthering the goal of single market integration when dealing with antitrust law cases. See Alford, at pp 
1ý8 
2. After Wood Pulp 
After Wood Pulp, the Commission's decisional practice seems to have been largelV 
based on the implementation doctrine. Two cases can be mentioned as examples to 
illustrate. In the first case, PVC, 77 the Commission based its decision on the doctrine of 
implementation in asserting jurisdiction over a Norwegian manufacturer of PVC for 
allegedly participating in a price-fixing cartel. In another case, LdPE, 78s the 
Commission also employed the implementation doctrine to bring an action against 
several manufacturers of theroplastic low-density polyethylene for fixing prices and 
engaging in other forins of collusion. Interestingly however, the Commission singled 
out Repsol, the Spanish undertaking, because unlike the other Austrian,, Finnish and 
Norwegian, Repsol did not implement its agreement in the EC, but rather in Spain, 
before the latter acceded to the EC. The Commission stated that this fact did not 
immunize Rapsol from legal action. Thus, according to the Commission, it was 
entitled to assert jurisdiction to the extent that Rapol )s involvement in the cartel 
affected competition within the EC . 
79 Hence, it may be observed that the Commission 
seems to have moved beyond the implementation doctrine,, in this particular instance, 
towards an effects doctrine. 80 
More recently, in a case under the Merger Regulation 4064/89 EC, Gencor v. 
Commission, 81 the European Court of First Instance (CFI) held that the Merger 
Regulation was applicable to a concentration consummated in South Africa, 
explaining the jurisdictional criteria of the Regulation to be consistent with the 
judgment in Wood Pulp. It also considered that, as a matter of public international 
law, there could be no objection to the assertion of jurisdiction on the part of the 
31-7, note 18 Ante; J. Griffin -EC & U. S. extraterritoriality: activism & cooperation" (1994) 17 
Fordham. Int'l L. J 353, at pp 378-9. 
77 The Comniunity v. Atochem SA [1990] 4 CMLR 345. 
78 The Communio, v. Atochem SA[1990] 4 CMLR 382. 
79 Ibid., at pp 409- 10. 
80 Quite interestingly, K. van Miert seems to have indicated on several occasions that in asserting 
jurisdiction in extra- territoria I situations the Cornmission will make use of the "effects" doctrine. See 
"Analysis and guidelines on competitive policy", address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London (May 11,1993); "Global forces affecting competition policy in a post-recessionary 
environment- (1993) 17 World Comp. 135. 
8 '' Case T-102'96 [1999] 4 CMLR 971. 
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Commission under the Merger Regulation in relation to a concentration outside the 
EC, provided that its effects within the EC would be immediate, substantial and 
foreseeable. The CFI stated respectively at paragraphs 90 and 98 that: 
"Application of the Regulation is justified under public international lav. - when it is foreseeable 
that a proposed concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect in the 
Community. " 
"Immediate" was interpreted by the CFI to mean "medium term". This was followed 
by the explanation that: 
"The fact that, in a world market, other parts of the world are affected bv the concentration 
cannot prevent the Community from exercising its control over a concentration which 
substantially affects competition within the Common Market by creating a dominant position. " 
Commenting on this judgment, Fox argued that there are several remarkable aspects 
about this ruling by the CFI, the most important of which seems to be that its 
expressed understanding of appropriate j unsdiction corresponds precisely with the US' 
understanding of appropriate jurisdiction (and with the US understanding of the effects 
test): that a state may regulate conduct that has a direct, substantial and foreseeable 
effect on its commerce. 82 
(C) A comment 
In the EC, whilst the Commission has shown it is willing to move closer to the 
position of the US, 83 the ECJ has revealed a clear reluctance to endorse a US effect 
82 E. Fox "The Merger Regulation and its territorial reach: Gencor Ltd. v. Commission" (1999) 20 
ECLR 334, at p 335. 
83 See Alford, at p 29, note 18 Ante; C. Bellamy & G. Child Common Market Law of Competition 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1993); K. Stockman "Foreign application of European antitrust lavvs" (1985) 
Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 25 1, at p 266; K. Messen "Antitrust jurisdiction under customary international 
law" (1984) 78 Am. J Int'l. L. 783, at p 797; Commission I I'hReport on Competition Policy (198 1), at 
p 37; Whatstein, note 74 Ante; J. Bellis "International trade and the competition lav. - of the European 
Economic Conu-nunity" (1979) 16 CMLRev. 647; S. Waller Antitrust andAmerican Business Abroad 
(Clark Beardman Callghan, 1997), ch 4. 
Some writers have argued that the Corrinussion has supplemented Its Integration agenda "-ith the US 
notion of conUty. See B. Pearce "The cornity doctrine as a barrier to judicial jurisdiction: a U. S. -E. U. 
comparison" (1994) 30 Stan. J. Int'l Laiv. 525, at p 576. 
160 
based doctrine. The division between the ECJ and the Commission confirms that the 
doctrine plays a very weak role within the EC. 
84 
This delay on the part of the ECJ can be explained with reference to several factors. 
First, the delay seems to be related to the ECJ's commitment to the goal of market 
integration, to which it accords primacy. Secondly, the ECJ seems to uphold that US 
type solutions are not necessarily sensitive to conditions within the EC. " Thirdly, one 
could argue that the ECJ has not really needed to make a finding on this matter in its 
case law. 
Regarding international comity, the EC seems to generally respect the principle, 
especially regarding the OECD Recommendations on the matter. 86 As far as the 
Commission is concerned, it has made clear that the assertion of jurisdiction does not 
give way to international comity if the application of EC law: first, does not require 
the undertakings concerned to act in breach of their domestic laws; or secondly, does 
not adversely affect the important interests of a third country. In any case, according 
to the Commission, the interests of third countries must be so important in order to 
prevail over the fundamental interest of the EC in maintaining undistorted 
competition in the Internal Market. 87 
Unlike the Commission, the ECJ has offered a limited explanation regarding its 
position on international comity. Over the years, it has only occasionally touched on 
the issue. In the case of IBM, for example, in response to the argument of IBM that 
the Commission should have considered international comity before initiating its 
84 See A. Himelfarb "International language of convergence: reviving antitrust dialogue between the 
United States and the European Union with a uniform understanding of 'extraterritoriality... (1996) 17 
Univ Penn. J Int'l Econ. L. 909, at pp 926-7. 
85 See Pierce, at p 577, note 83 Ante. 
86 The Recommendations state that member countries recognize "the need ... to give effect to the 
principles of international law and comity and to use moderation and self-restraint in the interest of co- 
operation in the field of anti-competitive practices". See Revised Recommendations of the 
OECD 
Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting 
International Trade, OECD Doc. No. C (95) 130 (Final) (July 27,1995). 
87 See Aluminuin Imports fi-oin Eastern Europe OJ [1985] L-92/1, at p 14.7. In the case, the 
Commission seems to have implicitly recognized that in certain cases EC fundamental interest of 
ensuring undistorted competition has to give way to comity considerations. At p 
48. 
Brittan stated that the Commission considers itself obliged to have regard to comity when exercising its 
j. urisdiction in antitrust cases involving foreign elements. See Brittan, at p 16, note 
75 Ante. 
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proceedings and formulating its decisions, the ECJ held that the Commission need not 
do so. 88 This brevity of the ECJ in dealing with the matter can also be seen in light of 
Wood Pulp. 89 
The US, on the other hand, has not retreated from its core value of promoting extra- 
temtoriality. For example, in the 1995 Guidelines the US antitrust authorities 
continued to assert jurisdiction under the effects doctrine in accordance with both 
Hartford Fire and the "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" test 
under the FTAIA. On the one hand, there seem to be some signals that the US 
authorities will seek to co-operate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions to 
address cross-border anti -comp etiti ve behaviour. 90 Nevertheless, the 1995 Guidelines 
make it clear that the possibility of a unilateral action by the US antitrust authorities is 
not ruled out, especially in cases where foreign states fail to take action or take 
inadequate action to address anti -competitive behaviour, which the US condemn 
within its boundaries. 
Several comments are worth making on the scope of the differences and similarities 
between the developments on either side of the Atlantic. Perhaps the most obvious 
point of distinction relates to the effects and implementation doctrines. 91 Any practical 
88 Cases 60/8 1 R& 190181R IBM v. Connnission [1981] ECR2639, at p 2655. It has been argued that as 
the ECJ has never rejected the effects doctrine, the Commission remains able to employ it, and might 
do so. See remarks by Brittan, quoted in W. Collins "The coming of age of EC competition policy" 
(1992) 17 Yale J Int'l L. 249, at p 249. According to Griffin this even suggests that the ECJ considers 
international comity an issue within the Commission's discretion, at least in facts sirrUlar to Wood Pulp, 
i. e. the challenged conduct was not compelled by foreign law as the remedy does not require the 
undertakings to act in any way contrary to their national law. See Griffin, at pp 358-9, note 76 Ante. 
89 In the judgment, the ECJ devoted only one paragraph to its position regarding the application of 
international comity, holding that with regard to "the argument relating to disregard of international 
corrUty, it suffices to observe that it amounts to calling in question the Community's jurisdiction to 
apply its competition rules to conduct such as that found to exist in this case and that, as such, that 
argument has already been rejected". See Woodpulp, at p 5344. 
90 See US Department of Justice, Press Release "Justice Department closes investigation into the way 
AC Nielsen Co. contracts its services for tracking retail sales" (December 3,1996), 
<http: //www. usdoj. jzo >. 
91 It may be of interest to observe in this regard the Nriew expressed by the US Department of Justice 
that the "Implementation" test adopted in the ECJ usually produces the same result as the US effects 
doctrine employed in the United States. See Guidelines (1995), at 20,589-8, note 5. 
Against this, it has been argued that this view cannot be accepted, since the ECJ has consciously 
rejected the effects doctrine. See P. Torremans "Extraterritorial application of EU and U. S. competition 
law" (1996) 21 ELRev. 280; W. Van Gerven -EC jurisdiction in antitrust matters: the Wood Pulp 
judgment" (1989) Foi-dhain Corp. L. Inst. 45 1, at pp 466-7. 
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importance of the distinction between anti -competitive conduct outside the EC 
"implemented" within it and the "effect" of such conduct is limited to a few, rare 
cases-such as concerted refusal to buy from, or export to, the EC or agreements to 
restrict non-EC production to create a scarcity outside the EC that would have the 
effect of raising prices within it. 92 
This preference towards limiting the areas of application of the implementation 
doctrine has been expressed by Alford who has argued that it was necessary for the 
EC to exclude certain antitrust prohibitions from its jurisdictional purview, if the 
implementation doctrine to remain consistent with the expressed will of the ECJ to 
assert jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality principle. " 
Still it is not very clear which areas should be included and which should be 
excluded. It has been recommended that anti -competitive practices, such as the refusal 
to supply, should be covered under the implementation doctrine, 94 whilst others have 
argued that this would stretch the current jurisprudence of the ECJ. A more important 
issue relates to how the Commission will act in cases which are not covered under the 
implementation doctrine. It is of interest to see whether the Commission will remain 
faithful to the implementation doctrine, whether it will utilize the effects doctrine in 
those cases or whether it will rely on the positive comity principle as covered in the 
EC-US bilateral agreement. 
The impact of Harýfbrd Fire and Gencor is also important. The Supreme Court in 
Haqford Fire adopted a wide formulation of the extra-territorial scope of US antitrust 
law. It has been argued that in doing so, the Supreme Court has ignored the limits 
placed on the US' jurisdiction by public international law. Moreover, it has forgone 
the opportunity to place the US' approach to extra-territonality upon the same 
In practice, the ECJ of Justice's notion of "Implementation" will be sufficient to catch most agreements 
concluded outside the EC which seriously harm competition within it; however there may be some 
cases which would not be caught under the "Implementation" doctrine, but would be under the "effects" 
doctrine: for example a boycott by non-EC undertakings not to supply raw materials to EC 
undertakings. 
L) Griffin, at p 187, note 63 Ante. 
93 Alford, at p 36, note 18 Ante. 
9' See T. Christoforou & D. Rock-, vell "European Economic Community law: the terr-itorial scope of 
application of EEC antitrust la,, N, " (1989) 30 Harv. Int'l L. J. 195, at p 204; J. Santos "The terr-itonal 
scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (1989) Fordhanz Corp. L. Inst. 571, at pp 575-7. 
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principles as those which underpin other systems of antitrust in the world, in 
particular the EC system of antitrust as animated by the ECJ's jurisprudence on the 
topic. It is likely that this triggers a conflict between the world's two major systems of 
antitrust. 95 By contrast, in Gencor, the CFI seems to have brought the EC position on 
extra-territoriality closer to that of the US. 
Nevertheless, a mutual liberal extra-territonal application of antitrust law between the 
US and the EC does not necessarily mean the elimination of all the difficulties 
associated with extra-temtonality. Nor does it mean that such a mutually expansive 
scope for the laws of one jurisdiction will be free of friction. However, taken in 
parallel with the above description of the extra-territorial reach of US antitrust laws, 
the ruling by the CFI in Gencor makes it clear that sooner rather than later, the 
question of whether an international system of antitrust is needed - albeit in limited 
areas, such as mergers - will have to be faced. 
96 
It may be anticipated that differences between the US and the EC systems of antitrust 
will impact on the position of the parties, with respect to their relationship. For 
example, in the bilateral co-operation agreement between the EC and the US, whilst 
the comity rights granted in Articles V& VI of the agreement apply to both parties, it 
seems that the benefits to both parties will be disproportionate, since the EC's 
recognition of the doctrine of extra-territoriality in Woodpulp was virtually one-sided. 
In sum , it seems that the 
EC and the US do not share the same conception of comity 
principles and extra-territonality. Moreover, in the US the position on extra- 
territoriality does not seem to be entirely consistent as two different standards have 
been employed. 97 The first is the common law test of whether, in the light of 
international comity concerns, jurisdiction should be exercised on the particular 
facts. 98 The second is the "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" test under 
the FTAIA, under which the position is not clear with regards to whether comity 
considerations are always taken into account as an adequate substitute for the criteria 
95 See further chapter 10. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See V. Sharma "Approaches to the issue of extra-territorial Jurisdiction" (1995) 5 .4 us. J Corp. 
L. 45. 
98 See Alford, at p 16, note IS . 4nte. 
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of "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable". 99 These criteria appear to focus 
exclusively on establishing a sufficiently close link with the US to justify the assertion 
of jurisdiction, without reference to international comity. 100 The existence of different 
tests may cause inconsistency and lack of uniformity in how US antitrust law and 
policy develop. 101 On this side of the Atlantic, the Commission seems to be more 
willing than the ECJ to move closer to the US position on extra-territoriality. 
However, the EC seems to remain committed to territorial requirements, and 
unwilling to follow the US' version of effects doctrine and comity principles. Such 
differences in the position of the EC and the US exemplify the difficulties that are 
bound to appear in both the interaction between antitrust policy and public 
international law and in bringing the EC and US systems of antitrust closer together 
which , in turn, will 
have a major impact on the internationalization of antitrust 
Policy. 102 
IV. RESPONSES TO EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY 
In vigorously pursuing the extra-territonal reach of its antitrust law, the US seems to 
have encouraged other *urisdictions to follow suit, by adopting the "effects" doctrine 
03 
under their systems of antitrust. ' However , it has also provoked vehement responses 
99 See B. Hawk, at p 150, note 2 Ante. 
100 It has been argued that the nature and intensity of the US' interest in regulating extra -territorial 
conduct cannot alone determine the proper limits on extra-territorial jurisdiction. See "Predictability 
and cornity: toward common principles of extra-territorial jurisdiction (1985) 98 Hai-v. L. Rev. 13 10, at 
1320 (Notes section). See also Messen, at pp 784-5, note 83 Ante, stating that this is exactly the view of 
the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumbei- Co. v. Bank of America 549 F. 2d 597 (9 th Cir. 1976), which 
established that although a state may have jurisdiction whenever a sufficient number of connecting 
factors are present, it should nevertheless refuse to exercise jurisdiction if the regulatory interests it is 
pursuing are outweighed by the interests of one or more foreign states who are likely to be seriously 
injured by the assertion of such jurisdiction. 
101 See E. Rholl "Inconsistent application of the extraterritorial provisions of the Sherman Act: a 
judicial response based upon the much maligned 'effects' test" (1990) 73 Marquette L. Rev. 435. 
102 See ftirther chapter 10. 
103 An OECD Report on "Restrictive business practices of multinational enterprises" (1977) concluded 
at para. 120 that at that time 13 systems of antitrust had embraced the effects doctrine, although it 
included in this list the EC system as to -which the position is uncertain. 
Quite interestingly, there have been calls for more reliance by the US on extra-territoriality and for the 
US to encourage other nations to do so. See generally Gupta, note 56 Ante. 
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from other states. 104 Over the years, the number of states which have resisted the US 
position on extra-territonality within antitrust policy has increased piecemeal. 105 
A strong advocate against the US extra-territoriality has been the LTK, 106 which has 
argued on more than one occasion that the US assertions that foreclosure of a foreign 
market or refusal to adopt US technical standards is sufficient to establish the 
requisite effect, show US antitrust law being used as a trade policy tool to open 
markets perceived as closed to US undertakings. This, according to the UK is an 
objectionable and inappropriate use of antitrust law. 107 In the EC, the Commission has 
noted that the accent on unilateral action by the US authorities under the 1995 
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations in fact is contrary to on 
the one hand the commitment to respect comity principles and on the other hand, the 
efforts of the US authorities to support international co-operation. ' 08 For this reason, 
and bearing in mind the need to respond to such an assertion of extra-territonality, 
several methods have been used to resist expansive extra-territoriality, which are 
three-fold: diplomatic protest, blocking through statutes and blocking through case 
law. 
(A) Diplomatic protest 
Diplomatic protest by foreign governments has been the most immediate reaction to 
US extra-territorial application of antitrust laws. Over the years, intense diplomatic 
dialogues, at the highest level, have occurred between Washington and no fewer than 
twenty other capitals in the world. 109 At the heart of diplomatic protest lies the claim 
'04See Sandage, at p 1693, note 3 1. 
'05 See J. Griffin " Foreign governmental reactions to U. S. assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction" 
(1998) 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 505. For an account of the position of the Pacific countries vis-6-vis US 
extra-territoriality see S. Chang "Extraterritorial application of U. S. antitrust laws to other pacific 
countries: proposed bilateral agreements for resolving international conflicts within the pacific 
community" (1993) 16 Hastings Int'l & Coinp. L. Rev. 295. 
'06See Sharma, at pp 50-2, note 97 Ante. 
107 Comments of the UK Government on the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International 
Operations (1995) (December, 1994). See J. Griffin "International antitrust Guidelines send mixed 
message of robust enforcement and cornIty" (1995) 19 World Comp. 5. 
log Comments of the European ComrTussion Services (February, 1995). 
'09 See Diplomatic Notes, reprinted in Lowe, note 2 Ante; G. Haight "Extracts from some published 
material on official protests, directives, prohibitions, cominents, etc. ", in Report of the 51" 
International La,. v Association Conference (1964), at pp 565-92; J. Davidow "Extraterritorial antitrust 
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that the extra-territorial application of US antitrust law adversely affects other states' 
interests. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether diplomatic protest, and ultimately 
diplomatic dialogues, can effectively help foreign states in their international antitrust 
conflicts with the US, especially in light of the uncertain position of comity 
considerations in the latter. 
(B) Blocking through legislation 
As a result of the unproductive nature of dialogues at the diplomatic leveL 110 states 
have sometimes felt it necessary to strengthen their domestic legal systems to deal 
with what they feel is an unacceptable intrusion by the US into matters within their 
own jurisdictions. III A series of legislation was introduced in several states to thwart 
excessive assertions of jurisdiction by the US. The most common type of legislation 
states have equipped themselves with has been blocking statutes. 112 These statutes 
prohibit the disclosure, copying, inspection or removal of documents located in the 
territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities. 
The UK has passed two such statutes. ' 13 The first was the Shipping Contracts and 
Commercial Documents Act (1964), enacted in reaction to the US investigations of 
the liner conferences. The second was the Protection of Trading Interests Act (1980), 
and the concept of comity" (1981) 15 J W. T L. 500, at p 508; M. Weiner "Remedies in international 
transactions: a case for flexibility" ( 1996) 65 Antitrust L. J. 26 1. 
"0 In some cases diplomatic efforts have been fruitftil in the past. See J. Atwood Antitrust and 
American Business Abroad (McGraw-Hill, 1981), at pp 136-45; M. Sennett & A. Gavll "Antitrust 
jurisdiction, extraterritorial conduct and interest balancing" (1985) 19 Int'l Law. 1185, at pp 1213-4. 
111 Cases 48/69 ICI Ltd. v. Commission [I 972], CMLR 557. 
112 These "blocking statutes" concern various issues, such as discovery of documents, enforcement of 
foreign judgments and prohibiting compliance with foreign court orders under different circumstances. 
See the Onatrio Business Records Protection Act (1947), enacted as a result of the discovery order in In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), the first of such legislation. 
See also P. Pettit & C. Styles "The international response to the extraterritorial application of United 
States antitrust laws" (1982) 37 Bus. Law. 697, at pp 707-14; A. Carroll "The extraterritorial 
enforcement of U. S. antitrust laws and retaliatory legislation in the United Kingdom and Australia" 
(1984) 13 Denvor J Int'l L. & Pol ý3 77. 
For a good overview of these instruments see A. Lowe "Blocking extraterritorial jurisdiction: the 
British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980" (1981) 75 Am. J Int'l. L. 257; Hen-nann Conflicts of 
National Laws with International Business Activity Issues of Extra territoria liti, (Howe Institute, 1982), 
at pp 56-68. 
113 For an overview see M. Novicoff "Blocking and clawing back in the name of public policy: the 
adjudications" United Kingdom's protection of private econonuc interests against adverse forel 
(1985) 7 Nýi,. J MO. L. & Bus. 12. 
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which came to replace the (1964) Act. 11 -' France introduced legislation that made it a 
criminal offence to communicate documents relating to commercial or technical 
matters for use in foreign proceedings, except pursuant to treaty or international 
agreement. ' 15 Similar statutes have also been introduced in several other states, ' 16 
especially those with domestic undertakings involved in the uranium proceedings. ' 17 
(C) Blocking through case law 
Blocking attempts of extra-territoriality through case law is a third method which 
some states have employed to resist reliance on extra-territonality in antitrust policy 
by the US. In the UK, the earliest attempt made by domestic courts to prevent the 
extra-territonal application of US antitrust laws arose in 1952. In British Nylon 
Spinners v. ICI the Court of Appeal ordered ICI not to comply with a court order from 
the US, requiring ICI to re-assign certain patents to Du Pont. 118 The Court of Appeal 
disregarded an earlier order by Judge Ryan in US v Imperial Chemical Industries 
(ICI) 1 19 to dispose of industrial property abroad because it was said that this 
constituted an attempt to assert extra-territonality which UK courts did not 
114 This Statute empowers the Secretary of State to prohibit compliance with foreign measures for 
regulating or controlling international trade and the supply of any commercial documents or 
information in response to the requirements of a foreign court. See A. Huntley "The Protection of 
Trading Interests Act 1980: some jurisdictional aspects of enforcement of antitrust laws" (1981) 30 
Int'l. & Comp. L. Q. 213. 
115 See Law No. 80-538 (July 16,1980), J. O., at p 1799. 
116 For example, Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. Some of these countries re- 
inforced their legislation by amending them under the influence of the UK legislation. For example, 
Australia replaced its previous legislation with the Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 
(No. 3 of 1984), and so did Canada and South Africa with the passing of the Foreign Extraterritorial 
Measures Act, S. C. 1984 c. 49 and the Protection of Business Amendment Act (No. 71 of 1984) 
respectively. 
See Rosenthal & Knighton, note 2 Ante; Hermann, note 112 Ante; J. Griffin "Possible resolutions of 
international disputes over enforcement of U. S. antitrust law" (1982) 18 Stan. J Int'l L. 279; M. 
Harvers "Good fences make good neighbours: a discussion of problems concerning the exercise of 
jurisdiction" (1983) 17 Int'l Law. 784; M. Joelson "International antitrust: problems and defences" 
(1983) 15 Law & Pol y Int'l Bus. 112 1; D. Sabalot "Shortening the long arm of American antitrust 
jurisdiction: extraterritoriality and the foreign blocking statutes" (1982) 28 Loyola L. Rev. 213 
(includes table of different states with blocking statutes). 
117 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation: lVestinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F. 2d, 1248 
(7 th Cir. 1980). See note 132 Post. 
118 British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. ICI [19531 1 Ch. 19. See 0. Khan-Freund "English contracts and 
American antitrust law: the Nylon patent Case" (1955) 18 M. L. R. 65. 
119 US v. ICI 100 F. Supp. 504, at p 592 (S. D. N. Y. 195 1). 
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recognize. 120 Referring to the statement In Judge Ryan's opinion that it is not an 
infringement of the authority of a foreign state for a US court to order harmful effects 
on US trade be removed, 121 the Master of the Rolls said: 
"If by that passage the learned Judge intended to say (as it seems to me that he did) that it %vas 
not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign to make directions addressed to that foreign sovereign or to its courts or to nationals of that foreign power effective to remove (as 
he said) 'harmful effects on the trade of the United States', I am bound to say that, as at 
present advised, I find myself unable to agree with jt. 1,122 
More than twenty years later, in Rio Tinto Zinc v Westinghouse Electric Corp' 23 a 
similar antithesis to the US extra-territorial approach was expressed In the House of 
Lords. Lord Diplock submitted that the use of the US Government of US judiciary as 
a means to investigate activities of UK undertakings taking place outside the US on 
the basis that those activities iriffinged US antitrust laws amounted to an unacceptable 
invasion of the sovereignty of the UK. 124 
(D) A comment 
It is suggested that the US - and indeed any other nation seeking extra-territonal 
application of its antitrust law - should take the above concerns and interests of 
foreign nations seriously. A decision by the US to take action under its antitrust laws 
against anti -competitive acts beyond its national boundaries should be sensitive to any 
potentially negative consequences, to both relations with other nations under its 
foreign policy, and its efforts to promote co-operation with antitrust authorities in 
different jurisdictions. 1 25 Over the years, however, this sensitivity has not been clearly 
demonstrated. 
120 British Nylon, at p 24. 
121 US v. ICI 105 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y. 195 1), at p 229. 
122 British Nylon, at p 24. 
123 [1978] 1 All E. R. 434. 
124 Ibid., at p 639. For a good discussion of this case see G. Newman "Potential havens from American 
jurisdiction and discovery laws in international antitrust enforcement" (1981) 33 Univ Fla L. Rev. 240. 
See also the sinular view expressed in the same case by Lord Wilberforce, that "it is axiomatic that in 
antitrust matters the policy of one state may be to defend , N-hat is the policy of another state to attack". 
At p 448. 
'25 See G. Born "Recent British responses to the extraterritorial application of United States law: the 
Midland Batik decision and retaliatory legislation involving unitary taxation" (198 5) 26 Virginia J Int'l 
L. 91. 
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A due regard for the sovereignty and independence of other nations in matters relating 
to their own trade and national interest requires restraint on the part of states 
attempting to impose their own laws and methods of regulating economic conditions 
outside their own territorial boundaries. Whilst states have an absoiute sovereign right 
to deal with acts committed within their borders which infringe their laws, such a 
desire to apply their laws beyond their boundaries - and even their absolute belief that 
their own laws and methods are ideal for all jurisdictions _126 cannot justify an 
absolute assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction over economic activities of foreign 
undertakings. 
V. SOME REFLECTIONS 
(A) Extra-territoriality as an act of aggression 
When state A seeks to extend its jurisdiction over acts in state B to nationals of state 
B, this will non-nally be a breach both of the law of the latter and of international 
comity. Looking closely at this situation, it becomes obvious that , in effect, this is an 
act of aggression. 127 In antitrust policy and as far as the US is concerned, this has been 
an act of judicial aggression, 128 which seems to contradict a well established 
understanding between nations, namely that in the absence of a clear legislative intent 
to the contrary the courts of one state will apply and enforce the principles of public 
international law. 129 One such principle is that the domestic laws of an individual state 
cannot extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regard its own nationals. 
States should recognize that their jurisdictional competence is governed by this 
126 In considering whether the US should cease attempting to impose its antitrust laws upon other 
peoples, President Eisenhower pledged in his Inaugural Address that in honouring "the identity and 
heritage of each nation of the world, we shall never use our strength to try to impress upon another 
people our own cherished political and economic institutions". 
Obtained during a research visit to the Library of Congress, Washington D. C. 
127 See D. Wood "The impossible dream: real international antitrust" (1992) 1992 U. Chi. Legal. F. 
277, at pp 280-1. 
128 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593 (195 1); United States v. Minnesota 
Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 
F. Supp. 504 (S. D. N. Y. 195 1); Holophane Co. v. United States, 3 52 U. S. 903 (1956); United States v. 
Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S. D. N. Y. 1962), order 
modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S. D. N. Y. 1965). 
129 See The Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64,118 (U. S. 1804). 
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territoriality principle. ' 30 US courts, however, through ignorance or disregard of this 
principle seem to seek to address the extra-territonal behaviour of foreign 
undertakings over which they have obtained jurisdiction according to US rules. This 
is a real judicial obstacle to the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
The above-mentioned US cases can be relied on in support of this viexv. These cases 
demonstrate a basic misconception regarding the competence of the courts under 
public international law, to proceed against foreign undertakings under their domestic 
laws. If a state can assume extra-territorial jurisdiction over acts by foreign 
undertakings because they have "consequences" within its territory and because it 
"reprehends" such acts, the door will definitely be opened to an almost unlimited 
extension of this jurisdiction. Clearly, there is a need to know where to draw the line. 
Therefore, examining the role of law courts seems to be the logical next step in this 
analysis. 
(B) The role of law courts 
The manner in which the US courts have applied the doctrine of extra-territonality 
raises several questions with regard to the role of the judiciary in the context of extra- 
territoriality and international comity. First, it is not clear whether it is a proper task 
for the judiciary to decide such issues in this context. "' In an area which is the 
juxtaposition of law and politics, it is doubtful whether judges are in the best position 
to assess the impact that any decision they make will have on foreign relations. ' 32 
Furthermore,, there is always the risk that this would compromise their independence. 
If the national legislature has not given a clear signal regarding its aim to regulate 
130 See judgment of Lord Finlay in the Lotus case, at p 56. 
131 See J. Stanford "The application of the Sherman Act to conduct outside the United States: a view 
from abroad" (1978) 11 Corn. Int'l L. J. 195, at p 213 note 46. 
132 See Maier, note 28 Ante; D. Blair "The Canadian experience" and M. Joelson "The Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Guide for International Operations" in J. Griffin (ed. ) Perspectives On The 
Evraterritorial Application of U. S. . 4ntitrust and 
Other Laws (ABA, Section of International Law, 
1979). Interestingly, some US courts have shed some doubt on the competence of the courts to handle 
issues of this nature. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N. D. 111.1979), at p 
1148. 
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activities beyond national borders, 133 it is questionable whether courts are justified in 
interfering. ' 34 
Secondly, it seems that in practice, US courts have not been completely objective in 
their analysis, tending to give more weight to domestic than foreign interests. 13 -5 
Arguably, it is difficult to expect domestic courts to arrive at an impartial balance 
between national interests and those of other states. The balancing of these interests, 
as may be observed in the US, is not confined to the discipline of law as such, but 
seems to take place within the context of other domains, 136 including international 
comity. For this reason, the balancing may in some cases be a more political than 
legal exercise. ' 37 In the absence of herculean detachment, there is inevitably a risk of 
a "home town" decision merely by virtue of the fact that US courts have a different 
perspective from courts in other jurisdictions. 138 This will inevitably lead to 
application of the Lexfori. 139 
133 It has been argued that if the US Congress has not expressed its views on the matter, US courts in 
dealing with the extra-territorial scope of US antitrust law should proceed on the presumption that 
Congress did not intend to violate principles of international law. See generally Trentor, note 56 Ante. 
The case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), at pp 198-200 seems to establish that a court should 
refrain from dealing with an action based on a federal statute unless the prohibition constituting the 
subject-matter of the action has been declared by Congress unlawful. See E. Craig "Extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act: the search for a jurisdictional standard" (1983) 7 Suffolk Trans. L. J. 
295, at p 295. 
134 Lowe, at p 73 1, note 19 Ante. It is interesting to observe the attitude of the US Court of Appeals for 
Seventh Circuit in the Uranium Cartel case where the court described the foreign states, despite the 
encouragement of the US Department of Justice to them to subnut their arguments to the US courts, as 
"surrogates" for absent defendants, adding that "shockingly to us, the governments of the defaulters 
have subserviently presented for them their case against the exercise of jurisdiction". In re Uranium 
. 4ntitrust litigation, at p 1256. 
135 See H. Maier "Interest balancing and extra -territorial jurisdiction" (1983) 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 579; 
Lowe, note 19 Ante; D. Bowett "Jurisdiction: changing patterns of authority over activities and 
resources" (1982) 53 Y B. Int'l L. 1. 
136 See generally L. Jaffe "Standing to secure judicial review: public actions" (1961) 74 Harv. L. Rei,. 
1265, at p 1304. 
137 It has been written that balancing of interest by the courts is neither appropriate nor workable 
because it requires balancing sensitive political and diplomatic concerns traditionally considered non- 
justiciable. See Sandage, at 1700, note 31 Ante. 
138 See generally Akehurst, at pp 185-6, note 2Ante; Maier, at p 317, note 28 Ante. 
139 See Ehrenz-ýNreig "The le. y. fori-basic rule in the conflict of laws" (1960) 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637, at p 
643. 
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Thirdly, even if courts are able to undertake such an exercise, it seems that resolving 
such issues should occur using inter-governmental consultation and negotiation. 140 It 
is difficult to expect that public international law will apply in an international 
antitrust issue, which is really a manifestation of a policy conflict between states. In 
such cases, it is more appropriate to resolve the conflict through means of consultation 
and negotiation. It is thought that if one state seeks to resolve the conflict in its favour 
by invoking its domestic antitrust law, this cannot be considered to be the rule of law 
but a regretable support, in judicial guise, in favour of the principle that economic 
might is right. 14 1 The view of the Court of Appeals in the case of Laker Airways 
supports this approach. 142 
Fourthly, performing this exercise of extra-territoriality within US courts can also 
give rise to uncertainty in law and policy, 143 in general, and for undertakings, in 
particular. 144 At the moment, it is extremely difficult for a foreign undertaking 
operating outside the US to predict whether any of its conduct may potentially give 
rise to liability under US antitrust law. 145 The jurisprudence of US courts in general, 
140 Former Australian Attorney General, P. Durack, once argued that law courts should not decide on 
the justification of law and policy in extra-territoriality conflicts, stating that in this kind of conflicts an 
important matter is the question of the impact of the conflict upon foreign relations which is not 
justiciable, as it falls within the realm of diplomatic negotiations. See P. Durack "Extraterritorial 
application of U. S. antitrust law and U. S. foreign policy", address before the ABA Section Of 
International Law (August 12,1981) (Library of Congress, File 1055); J. Snyder "International 
competition: towards a normative theory of United States antitrust law and policy" (1985) 3 B. U Int'l 
L. J. 257; Rishkesh, at p 63, note 25 Ante. 
141 See Stanford, at p 213, note 46, note 131 Ante. 
142 Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F. 2d 909 (D. C. Cir. 1984). 
143 See J. McNeill "Extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction: continuing the confusion in policy, law, and 
jurisdiction" (1998) 28 Calif. Western Int'l L. J. 425; J. Shenefield "Extraterritoriality in antitrust" 
(1983) 15 L. & Pol ý Int'l Bus. 1109. 
Indeed, the claim can be made that the practice of the courts in the past has been confusing and 
contradictory. See Craig, at pp 296-7, note 133 Ante; J. Ongman "Be no longer chaos': constructing a 
normative theory of the Sherman Act's extraterritorial jurisdictional scope" (1977) 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
733. 
144 
See Maier, at p 317, note 28 Ante. 
145 In Laker Airways, Laker Airways rejected the jurisdictional rule of reason because it considered US 
courts ill-equipped to deterrnine whether the vital national interests of the US or those of other nations 
should predominate, opining that balancing "generally incorporate[s] purely political factors which the 
court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing". At pp 949-50. 
See also the view expressed by Turner that there "are serious doubts that courts are an appropriate 
forum for evaluating conflicting national and foreign interests on a case-by-case basis". At p 233, note 
14 Ante. 
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and the decision of the majority in the Supreme Court in Harýfbrd Fire in p, -micular, 
double, if not treble, this uncertainty. 
146 
Against these arguments however, stand other arguments suppo ing a judici rt 'al 
involvement in the context of extra-territoriality and Comity. 147 In particular, it has 
been noted that analyzing comity considerations is a proper exercise for the courts and 
that the involvement of foreign elements or foreign relations does not ipso facto 
render the courts incompetent to deal with the matter. It has been said however, that it 
should not be supposed that a case touching or concerning foreign relations lies 
beyond judicial cognizance. US antitrust cases in this field seem invariably to show a 
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed , in terms of the history of its 
management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the 
light of its nature and posture in the specific case and of the possible consequences of 
judicial action. 148 
(C) A comment 
In light of the above, it seems to be appropriate to view the problem with extra- 
territoriality as not solely, or indeed essentially, a legal one. It is a national problem - 
the relation of one state with other states. Not infrequently, a state may have a genuine 
national interest of considerable importance in the continued existence of a cartel or 
another type of practice, 149 or in some state-owned or other important national 
undertakings not having to face large fines, not having to reveal certain 
information, 150 or not having to comply with a particular kind of remedy order, which 
may all anse as a result of extra-territonal application of other states' domestic 
antitrust law. 151 The involvement of a substantial national interest in this regard is 
146 Also, note the existence of the treble damages remedy increases the dangers in US litigation, hence 
the enhanced risk for foreign undertakings. See pp 179-181 Post. 
147 See S. Burr "The application of U. S. antitrust law to foreign conduct: has Haqford Fire 
extinguished considerations of comity? " (1994) 15 Uni. Penn. J Int'l Bus. L. 22 1. 
148 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,211, at pp 211-2 (1962). 
149 See D. Rosenthal "What should be the agenda of a presidential corrirruission to study the application 
of the international application of U. S. antitrust Law? " (1980) 2 Nw. J Int'l L. & Bus. 372; Pettit & 
Styles, at p 699, note 112 Ante. 
"0 D. Papakrivopoulos "The role of competition law as an international trade remedy in the context of 
the World Trade Organization" (1999) 23 World Comp. 45, at p 59. 
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bound to trigger problems. The fact that a state has the right to protest against the 
extra-territorial application of antitrust law of another state would not wither away 
such problems. Certain states have very strong beliefs about what they see as literally 
being dominated by other states, and it is irrelevant that this may arise only 
occasionally. This is a real psychological attitude on the part of certain states, and this 
must be recognized as a fact. Thus, genuine conflicts of national economic interests 
may anse in this context. 
VI. DEALING WITH EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY AND ITS CONFLICTS 
The Problem of extra-territoriality cannot be solved merely by jurisdiction or comity 
rules, whether judicial or of any other type. The problem is far more considerable than 
that. It seems that an increase in bilateral and multilateral negotiations between states 
in antitrust policy is required to resolve these issues. 152 Closer forms of co-operation 
between nations should be fostered. The situation will only deteriorate if states 
continue to exchange court orders and blocking statutes. The amount of animosity and 
ffiction produced by this issue can have very serious implications for relations 
between states and effective efforts towards co-operation between states in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. This problem urgently needs to be solved in 
the most effective and expedient way possible. 
The most desirable result, it seems, is to avoid extra-territonal application of domestic 
antitrust laws, provided that less harmful effective means may be found to replace 
extra-territoriality. In the absence of such effective means, it is suggested that 
alternative possible means should be found to resolve conflicts inherent in extra- 
territoriality in antitrust policy. ' 53 
151 See generally J. Shenefield "Thoughts on extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust 
laws" (1983) 52 Fordham L. Rev. 350. 
152 See T. Anderson "Extraterritorial application of national antitrust laws: the need for more uniform 
regulation" (1992) 38 Wayne L. Rev. 15 79, at pp 15 89-97. 
153 The literature on solutions suggested by scholars is abundant. See Rosenthal & Knighton, note 2 
Ante; Shenefield, note 151 Ante, Davidow, note 109 Ante; R. Feinberg "Econorruic coercion and 
Econornic sanctions: the expansion of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction" (1981) 30 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 323; Griffin, note 116 Ante; M. Grippando "Declining to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction on 
grounds of international comity: an illegitimate extension of the judicial abstention doctrine" (1983) 23 
Virginia J Int'l L. 395, B. Grossfeld & P. Rogers "A shared values approach to jurisdictional conflicts 
in international econorruc law" (1983) 32 Int'l. & Comp. L. Q. 931; B. Hawk "International antitrust 
policy and the 1982 Acts: the continuing need for reassessment" (1982) 51 Fordham L. Rev. 201; 
ik 
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(A) Avoiding extra-territoriality 
It seems that in most cases extra-temtoriallty has been employed In order to deal with 
anti -competitive acts committed beyond national boundaries which forecloses foreign 
markets. 154 If one proposes the elimination of extra-territoriality, other effective 
means will have to be proposed to take its place. One alternative means could be to 
employ trade policy to deal with such market foreclosure stemming from anti- 
competitive behaviour taking place beyond national boundaries. This suggestion 
seems to arise from the fact that domestic antitrust law falls short of providing a 
remedy when more than one jurisdiction is involved in the matter, especially when it 
comes to collecting information and evidence located in foreign jurisdiction. 155 Added 
to this fact, not every domestic antitrust authority can be relied upon to take effective 
action to protect the interests of other states and their undertakings. 156 
According to this proposal, since anti -competitive behaviour beyond national 
boundaries raises barriers to market access, the adequate response should be to adopt 
an effective trade policy as opposed to antitrust policy instruments. One such 
instrument would be for domestic trade agencies to undertake empirical analysis and 
market access evaluation into foreign market restraints. An inquiry of this kind has 
been suggested by some antitrust law practitioners on the other side of the Atlantic. 157 
Although very attractive, such a proposal seems to be problematic in many ways. In 
addition to the confusion which may be added to the roles of antitrust and trade 
Maier, note 28 Ante; J. Mirabito & W. Friedler "The Con=ssion on the international application of 
the U. S. antitrust laws: pulling in the reins" (1982) 6 Suffolk Trans. L. J. 1; Rosenthal, note 149 Ante. 
'5' See J. Farlow "Ego or equity? Examining United States extension of the Sherman Act" (1998) 11 
Transnational Law. 175. 
155 The following chapter deals with antitrust and trade policies with respect to market access- 
restraining private anti -competitive behaviour. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Some US antitrust practitioners believe that such an inquiry could "(1) identify large markets where 
there are few or no imports; (2) identify where there are no exports from one major country to another; 
and (3) identify where persistent and dramatic price differentials exist between markets". See Report of 
the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the US Attorney General and the 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (2000), at p 249 (ICPAC (2000)). Note that a similar proposal 
seems to have come from some undertakings. The Eastman Kodak Co. proposed during 1999 that an 
independent body make a finding that a restrictive practice is taking place on foreign markets and thus 
constitutes a hindrance to market access; this will then be used as a presumption on the part of antitrust 
authorities that it is necessary to initiate an enforcement action. See <http: //www. kodak. com>. 
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policy, 158 imbuing trade agencies with the task of antitrust policy does not seem to be 
appropriate. 159 Apart from the lack of expertise of trade agencies in antitrust policy 
matters, it is likely that this would complicate antitrust policy enforcement and result 
in uncertainty. On the other hand, whilst it would be appropriate to recommend 
involving trade and antitrust policy experts in transnational antitrust policy matters, 160 
it is less appropriate to suggest the exclusion of the latter. A recent report from the 
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the United States Attorney 
General and for the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (ICPAC) has argued 
against applying the trade methodology to practices of undertakings beyond US 
borders. ICPAC stated there is a risk that undertakings operating within the US and 
others in foreign markets will be subjected to different standards with the 
consequence being adverse for the latter. ICPAC also warned of the risk that applying 
different standards would also trigger parallel actions by other nations, something that 
US undertakings are very certain to contest. 161 
(B) Minimizing or avoiding conflicts of extra-territoriality 
Instead of avoiding extra-territoriality in the above manner, one may advocate a closer 
co-operation between states in order to minimize (or better still avoid) conflicts 
ansing as a result of extra-territoriality. The following section examines several 
proposals to realize that aim. 
1. Taking account of the ability offoreign antitrust authorities to deal with anti- 
competitive acts on their territory 
An antitrust authority should be encouraged to consider the ability of other antitrust 
authorities to deal with anti-competitive acts committed beyond its own boundaries 
and within the latter's jurisdiction, before it should seek extra-territonal enforcement 
of its own antitrust laws. ' 62 The authority should examine whether its concerns can be 
158 See chapter 9. 
'5' See chapter 9. 
160 See chapter 11. 
161 See ICPA C (2000), at p 25 1, note 157 Ate. See, however, the recent MCIWorldcomlsprint case for 
a good example of real co-operation between the US and the EC, with the US 
leaving EC matters to the 
European Comnussion to handle, discussed in chapter 6. 
102 See D. Valentine "Building a co-operative framework for oversights in mergers-the answer to 
extraterritoriality issues in merger review" (1998) 6 Geo. Mason L. 
Rei,. 525. 
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addressed more effectively by its counterparts in other jurisdictions. The above 
discussion makes it clear that the recent position adopted by the US mirrors such a 
proposal, albeit to a limited extent. 163 The 1995 Guidelines make it clear that the US 
authorities may consult with interested foreign nations through appropriate diplomatic 
channels to attempt to eliminate anti-competitive effects in the US instead of bringing 
their own enforcement actions. 
164 
2. Reverting to extra-territoriality in the most exceptional circumstances 
A second alternative could be to rely on extra-territonality only when it is first, 
apparent that there is a link between the anti-competitive behaviour taking place 
beyond national boundaries and the commerce of a state and secondly, only in the 
absence of the ability of other antitrust authonties to deal with the matter 
themselves. 165 Thus, extra-territonal application of antitrust laws in this instance 
should be confined to cases in which co-operation with other antitrust authorities is 
not possible. 
As a way of expressing respect for the interests of other states, US courts, for 
example, developed several devices to achieve that end. These are the Act of state 
doctrine, the principle of comity, the sovereign immunity and the foreign sovereign 
compulsion defence. 166 To this, as was said above, US courts added the jurisdictional 
rule of reason. 
163 See C. Lytle "A hegemonic interpretation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust: from American 
Banana to Haqford Fire" (1997) 24 Syracuse J Int'l L. & Com. 4 1, at pp 69-72. 
164 See Guidelines, at p21. 
165Note that this is an improvement on previous positions adopted by the US, under which the US 
applied its antitrust laws to foreign activities that had a "direct, substantial, and foreseeable" anti- 
competitive effect on its commerce regardless of whether the activities in question were sanctioned by 
other antitrust authorities or not. See United States v. Watchmaking of Switzerland Information Centre, 
Inc. 133 F. Supp. 40 (S. D. N. Y. 1955). 
"" For a good discussion of these instruments see J. Griffin "United States antitrust law and 
transnational transactions: an introduction" (1987) 21 Int'l Law. 307, at pp 327-33; P. Areeda & L. 
Kaplow Antitrust Analysis. - Problems Text, Cases (Little, Brown, 1988). 
Under the Act of state doctrine, US courts would refrain from questioning the legality of acts adopted 
by other states within their jurisdiction. This is because a "sovereign state is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign state and the courts in one country will not sit in judgment on 
the acts of a government of another state done ý, Nithin its own territory". See Underhill v. Hernandez 
168 US 250 (1897). See also D. Gill "Two cheers for Timberlane" (1980) 10 Swiss Rev. Int'l Comp. L. 
7. 
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However, this proposal has limitations. It is very doubtful whether other states would 
accept such a proposal, even in light of the fact that extra-territoriality is being g 
asserted in the most exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, more than one claim can 
be made against the adequacy of these defences introduced by US courts as way of 
minimizing conflicts resulting from extra-territoriality. It has been written: 
"As welcome as these methods are for the avoidance of international antitrust conflicts, they 
unfortunately have their limitations too... to force other States to regulate by compulsion is a 
strange objective for a state trying to reduce state interference in the private sector. Of course 
it is equally true to say that there is no rule of international law which demands respect for 
other states' policies. However, if this non-respect amounted to an intervention in, or denial 
of, the freedom to choose one's own socio-economic system, then there could be a violation of international law. 167 
This criticism is applicable to all the defences. Moreover, the devices are applied in a 
political rather than a legal context. Consequently they seem to be, in essence, 
discretionary "politically-oriented" devices. US courts seem to have the discretion to 
attach relative weights to every factor considered under each device and then weigh 
them against one another. To complicate matters even further, the Department of 
Justice has insisted that US courts should refrain from the use of comity, for example, 
in antitrust actions brought by US antitrust authorities. Thus, such actions should not 
be subject to dismissal by US courts on the basis of comity. If the Department of 
Justice decides to pursue an antitrust action, it amounts to detennination by itself that 
the interests of the US should be given priority over the interests of any foreign nation 
and that the challenged conduct is more harmful to the US than any injury to foreign 
relations that might result from the antitrust action. 168 Thus, although it seems an 
attractive way to minimize conflicts of extra-territoriality, in practice, this "conflict of 
Under the Sovereign immunity defence, a state should not be made a defendant in US courts with 
regard to its political activities, as opposed to commercial activities. See The Schooner Exch. v. 
M'Faddon, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See also H. Pittney "Sovereign compulsion and 
international antitrust: conflicting laws and separating powers" (1987) 25 Columbia J Trans. L. 403. 
In the US, Congress enacted the Foreign sovereign Immunities Act (1976), which gives US courts 
exclusive responsibility to decide when a foreign sovereign is entitled to immunity in US courts. Note 
that recently US Congress narrowed the immunity in 1976 by establishing that immunity does not 
extend to the commercial activity of foreign governments. See the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
28 U. S. C. 1605(a)(2)(a) (1998). 
For comments on the sovereign compulsion defence and comity see notes 62 and 33 respectively Ante. 
167 Rishikesh, at pp 47-8, note 25 Ante. 
168 Guidelines (1995), note 167. 
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laws" proposal seems to fall short of reaching the desirable end of avoiding or 
minimizing such conflicts. 
3. Respectfor principles ofpublic international law 
Greater respect for principles of international law by US courts should enable them to 
resolve conflicts of extra-territoriality in a more objective manner without tipping the 
balance in favour of national interests and national undertakings at the expense of 
interests of other states and foreign undertakings. Such respect therefore calls for a 
more careful balance of interests exercise to be undertaken by US courts. 169 Within 
this exercise courts should take into account interests of foreign states beyond the 
confines of national laws and policy goals. 170 As a result, it would be expected that 
fewer intrusions into the sovereignty of other states would anse and would ensure 
more respect for the principles of public international law, such as that of non- 
intervention. 171 
4. Abandoning treble damages 
The first thing to be said about the treble damages remedy is that it has been unique to 
US antitrust law. In some jurisdictions, injured parties may bring their own legal 
action but only after the state in question has condemned the conduct. The existence 
of this type of remedy under US system of antitrust has given rise to a tension in the 
relationship between the US and other nations. 172 The view held by several nations 
has been that it is not particularly appropriate for their national undertakings to be 
liable in treble damages in cases before US courts, especially since actions in these 
cases do not infringe their own antitrust laws. 
Despite this protest, the US considers treble damages remedy to be a useful means of 
combating domestic and foreign anti -competitive behaviour and for this reason it has 
169 See generally Grippando, note 153 Ante; E. Eric "The use of interest analysis in the extraterritorial 
application of United States antitrust law" (1983) 16 Corn. Int'l L. J 147. 
"0 See the proposal suggested by some writers for the courts to substitute juridical factors of forum non 
conveniens for political decision-making in resolving extra-territorial antitrust cases. See Sandage, at p 
1707-14, note 31 Ante. 
171 See the Uranium Case and US. v General Electric Co., 170 F. Supp. 596 (S. D. N. Y. 1959). 
172 Report of the American Bar Association Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and 
Practice on The Intern atiOnalizatio n of Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence 
(December, 1999), at pp 21-2. 
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emphasized that there is no consideration of abandoning this remedy. ICPAC 
provided several reasons for this position. First, US antitrust law makes no distinction 
between US and foreign defendant undertakings. Secondly, whilst removing the treble 
damages remedy in export restraint cases might result in fewer conflicts with the laws 
of other nations, it would also reward jurisdictions that have consistently been against 
the extra-territorial application of US antitrust laws. According to ICPAC, such an 
approach would result in foreign defendant undertakings gaining better treatment 
under US law than US defendants and could open floodgates regarding whether the 
offending conduct harmed "imports" commerce or "export" commerce. Thirdly, as 
the case record shows, a distinction between the two situations may itself be very 
difficult to make; most of the cases included claims involving both situations. ICPAC 
concluded that in spite of the potential benefits from increased co-operation from 
foreign authorities and undertakings, it is not advisable to alter the treble damages 
remedy. 173 
Regardless of how compelling this explanation is, addressing foreign restraints that 
may impede access to markets through private litigation is problematic. For example, 
though the authorities in the US have begun to consider principles of comity before 
applying their antitrust laws extra-territorially, there is no obligation on private 
undertakings to do so. 
A question that is raised at present concerns whether abandoning the trebles damage 
remedy would be considered a positive step forward. The answer suggested by some 
writers has been in the positive. 174 One of the reasons why abandoning treble damages 
is important is that although actions brought to claim such damages seem to advance 
the public policies enshrined in antitrust policy, they actually represent personal 
interests as opposed to the public interest. These actions stand in complete contrast to 
173 See ICPAC (2000), at pp 247-8, note 157 Ante. Further reasons for retaining the remedy are that it 
underpins 95% of antitrust litigation in the US and is circumscribed by the antitrust injury requirement 
established in certain US cases which means that plaintiffs may only recover if they suffer losses 
flowing from the anti-competitive act itself Hence, for example, if there was a failing undertaking, not 
necessarily failing and a market leader merges with it, then another fledging undertaking could not 
claim treble damages for subsequent losses arising from this merger as it had not suffered any antitrust 
injury as such. 
174 See Rosenthal & Knighton, note 2 Ante, at p 88. However, other writers are not particularly 
optimistic about abandorung private treble damages. See J. DavIdow "Treble damage actions and U. S. 
foreign relations: tarrung the 'rouge elephant"' (1985) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 37. 
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public actions which are brought in the name of the latter's interest. Hence, private 
parties have no responsibility to balance a broad range of public interest on whether 
they should initiate an action. It is not beyond logic to even suggest that private 
parties may intentionally contribute to widening the difference between their own 
state and other states in antitrust policy in order to enhance their chances of receiving 
a favourable judgment. To this end, it seems that abandoning the treble damages 
remedy would be an effective way to minimize extra-territonality conflicts. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to force upon states the elimination of treble damages, 
because public international law has no scope of application with regard to the way in 
which a state elects to organize its own economic, legal and political orders. It can 
only interfere in cases of antitrust conflicts between states. 
(C) Developing a common approach 
Surely at this point in the development of antitrust policy internationally, at a time 
when more and more nations are instituting systems of antitrust with laws aimed at 
similar types of conduct, the judiciary in all states should acknowledge that the 
question of applying their domestic laws to conduct entered into outside the national 
territory by undertakings not located in that territory cannot be answered purely by an 
analysis of the national law. Just as anti -competitive conduct of foreign undertakings 
can have an effect in a state's territories, so too can judicial decisions in the state 
affect persons and conditions outside it. 
Hence, though the US Supreme Court purported to take into account how the conduct 
in question would be regulated in the state where it took place, judges should also 
look at the relevant law in that state concerning extra-territorial jurisdiction in such 
matters. 175 This is not just to advocate an exercise in judicial reciprocity or an attempt 
to establish a lowest common denominator in extra-territoriality. Rather, it is to argue 
that the judiciary should develop common international standards and promote 
harmonization in the extra-territonal application of antitrust laws. This would be an 
appropriate exercise of comity. This would also produce positive influence on the 
175 See J. Quinn "Sher-man gets judicial authority to go global: extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of 
U. S. antitrust laws are expanded" (1998) 32 J Marshall L. Rev. 14 1, at p 158. 
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practice of antitrust authorities, and enhance consistency in decision-making as well 
as confine any exercise of discretion by those authorities. 176 
As an extension to this proposal, one could also encourage nations to strive to develop 
multilateral standards on the effect(s) of extra-territoriality. As an alternative, bilateral 
agreements between nations should be welcomed, in order to ensure reciprocity and 
international comity. There is no doubt that the disadvantages of extra-territonality 
are one reason why considerable emphasis has been put in recent years on the 
development of mechanisms for bilateral, regional or even global co-operation 
between nations in the field of antitrust Policy. 177 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the main objection to extra-territonality is that the techniques of the 
nineteenth century are not necessarily suitable or even sensitive to conditions and 
developments of the twenty-first century. Other objections seem to extend to the 
approaches adopted to minimize and solve conflicts arising as a result of extra- 
territoriality. 
The above discussion makes it clear that aggressive use of extra-territonality seems to 
be the primary source of tension between nations in antitrust policy. Nevertheless, 
there was an acknowledgement that in certain cases, extra-territonality can be a valid 
basis for asserting jurisdiction, since traditional territoriality rules are inadequate to 
deal with acts of economic nature. In light of this, a state asserting jurisdiction extra- 
territorially should not do so extensively, without regard to the legal, economic and 
political interests of other states. 
In any case, extra-territoriality, whether relied on expansively or in a limited manner, 
seems to have tnggered various negative responses by states. In an attempt to resolve 
the conflicts which these responses have generated, the chapter examined several 
ways in which they may be avoided or minimized. An ideal situation would be to 
reach the stage where an international system of antitrust is effectively in place. 
However, this would require not only elimination of conflicts of extra-territoriality, 
176 See chapter 4. 
177 WTO Annual Report (1997), at pp 31-2. 
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but also uprooting the latter entirely. A "second best" world would call for some 
action to be taken by the judiciary and domestic antitrust authorities, in order to foster 
harmonization and co-operation in antitrust law and policy between different states. 
Finally, the chapter indicated that a great deal of extra-territonality revolves around 
addressing anti -competitive conduct of domestic undertakings in one state which 
impedes the access of undertakings of another state to the markets of the fon-ner. This 
issue has quite frequently surfaced in antitrust policy debates in recent years. It is 
examined in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Nine 
ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES 
This chapter is concerned with hindrances caused by the anti-competitive behaviour 
of domestic private undertakings to market access by foreign undertakings. In 
particular, the chapter examines the roles that antitrust and trade policies play in 
addressing this issue and the factors which may limit the role of either policy in this 
regard. The chapter considers the relationship between antitrust and trade policy, 
since, as will be seen, there are implications for both policies, especially in the case of 
hybrid practices. The purpose of the chapter however, is not to give a detailed analysis 
of both policies independently, but rather to examine how antitrust policy interacts 
with trade policy in an increasingly integrated and liberalized global economy. In so 
doing, the chapter evaluates the implications and lessons which one policy holds for 
the other. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Part I gives an overview of some important 
points. Part 11 describes the different restraints which may affect the access of foreign 
undertakings to domestic markets. Part III deals with the differing perspectives of 
antitrust and trade policy. Part IV highlights the possible approaches currently 
available under antitrust and trade policy which can be used to address market access 
concerns involving anti-competitive behaviour of private undertakings. It also outlines 
the shortcomings of these approaches in both the short and long term. Part V 
advocates an alternative approach to deal with these practices. Part VI gives an 
account of developments in the area during the course of the last decade. Part VII 
contains some implications of the analysis and part VIII gives a conclusion. 
1. OVERVIEW 
The efforts of the international community have, for many years, been primarily 
concentrated on removing hindrances to the flows of trade and investment between 
I- 
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nations erected by states. ' Whilst these efforts have contributed to the growth seen 
over the years in these flows, it seems that further growth can be achieved if 
hindrances caused by anti-competitive behaviour of private undertakings are 
2 completely removed . This is an issue to which attention has been turning., especially 
since governmental hindrances have decreased in significance. 3 
The recognition that anti-competitive behaviour of private undertakings may affect 
the flows of trade and investment between nations that has been increasing, raises 
some important questions in the internationalization of antitrust policy which need to 
4 be addressed . Before dealing with these questions however, it is desirable to cast 
some light on why restraints in general, and those caused by private undertakings in 
particular, are an issue of concern in the first place. 
' These efforts have been in the form of agreements between nations. A good example is the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which has served as a tool to liberalize trade in the post 1950s 
era. Other efforts can be seen in the light of the events leading to the birth of the WTO. See C. 
Fedderson "Focusing on substantive law in international economic relations: the public morals of 
GATT's Article XX(a) and 'conventional rules of interpretation"' (1998) 7 Minn. J Global. Trade 75, 
at p 79. Efforts have also taken roots at the regional level, where different states have concluded several 
agreements among themselves towards trade liberalization, such as the EC, NAFTA and the Asia 
Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC). 
2 See statement of J. Klein at the Hearings on Antitrust Enforcement Oversight, before the US House 
of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., I" Sess. (November 5,1997), 
<http: //www. law. house. izov>. Also, D. Wood "The internationaliZation of antitrust laws", address at 
the DePaul Law Review Symposium (February 3,1995). 
3 See S. Waller "Can U. S. antitrust laws open international markets" (2000) 20 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 
207, at pp 208-10; E. Fox "Foreword: mergers, market access and the MIllennium" (2000) 20 Nw. J 
Int'l L. & Bus. 203, at pp 203-4. See WTO Annual Report (1998). Also, WTO Annual Report (1997), at 
p 33. 
Even before the WTO, the GATT recognized as early as 1960 in the decision of its contracting parties 
of November 18,1960 that "business practices which restrict competition in international trade may 
hamper the expansion of world trade and the economic development in individual countries and 
thereby frustrate the benefits of tariff reductions and removal of quantitative restrictions or may 
otherwise interfere with the objectives of GATT". 
Interestingly enough, the International Chamber of Commerce does not believe that anti-competitive 
behaviour of private undertakings restraining market access necessarily presents a problem in the 
global economy, but rather such result may be explained with reference to divergence in the 
international strategies of undertakings. See the ICC Joint Working Party on Competition and 
International Trade's replies to questions posed by the WTO Working Group (October 6,1998), at p 2, 
<http: //www. iccwbo. or >. Also, see p 235 Post. 
4 See H. Applebaum "Antitrust and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1998" (1989) 58 
. 4witrust L. J. 557, at p 
565; C. Ehlermann "The international dimension of competition policy" (1994) 
14 Fo? -dha? n Int'l L. J 833, at p 839. 
186 
There are several ways in which concerns may arise. The most obvious way is when 
the access to domestic markets by foreign undertakings is impeded. Two important 
terms should be elucidated here. The first is "hindrance", 5 which in the context of the 
market connotes anything that makes it difficult for an undertaking to enter a 
particular market. Nevertheless, it may not be easy in practice to draw a clear line 
between what amounts to hindrance and what does not. The second tenn is that of 
44market access", which, though familiar, is a controversial issue in antitrust policy. 6 
Surprising as this may be, there is no universal consensus on the meaning of "market 
access v). 7 In the present discussion, market access is taken to connote the conditions 
associated with the entry of an undertakings into a particular market in order to sell 
goods and provide services. 8 This is not intended to be a comprehensive definition of 
what market access is in reality, but rather an explanation in order to facilitate a better 
understanding of the issues at hand. 
Hindrance to market access can be caused by practices of undertakings, practices of 
states and in some cases practices of both - known as "hybrid" or "mixed" practices. 9 
5A term that can be regarded as a synonym in antitrust policy is "barriers to entry". It may be of 
interest to observe the way different scholars have defined "barriers to entry". Chicago School scholars 
have given a very restrictive view on exclusionary practices. Bork has argued that a barrier to entry is 
anything that makes entry more difficult. He believes that generally barriers to entry is a nusunderstood 
concept. See R. Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With ltseýf (Basic Books, 1978), ch 16. A 
more detailed account has been offered by Bain, whose work has done much to popularize the concept. 
He listed among barriers to entry such things as economy of scale, capital requirements and product 
differentiation, arguing that virtually any impediment to market entry should be regarded as a barrier. 
See J. Bain Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956), @ pp 114-5. 
6 It may be interesting to observe in this regard that EC antitrust law and German antitrust law focus 
much more than US antitrust law on conduct that tends to exclude competitors, first, because of their 
concern of protecting small and middle-sized undertakings and secondly, because of a perceived link 
between competitors access to markets and consumer interests. 
7 The International Chamber of Commerce has remarked that there is a need to expand the concept of 
market access to a wider conception in order to include International rules regulate business activities at 
a global level. See "The present and future agenda of the World Trade Organization" (April, 1996), 
<http: //www. iccwbo. orjz>. See also H. Hauser "Proposal for a multilateral agreement on free market 
access (MAFMA)" (1991) 25 J. W. T L. 77. 
8 To an extent, this definition is similar to that given by the WTO. According to the WTO, market 
access "describes the extent to which a good or service can compete with locally-made products in 
another market. In the WTO framework the term stands for the totality of government- imposed 
conditions under which a product may enter a country under non-discriminatory conditions". See 
"TAR: what is market access? ", Available at <http: //www. wto. orp, /enplish/thewto e/what is 
e/eol/e/wto02/wto2 65. htm>. 
9 Several complains about private or hybrid practices have surfaced over the years. See for example 
claims by the American Electronics Association about restraining practices in the Japanese electronics 
market (Submissions to the US Trade Representative (USTR) (1991)) and complains from auto parts 
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If the hindrance is of the first type, one can expect it to be addressed under antitrust 
policy. If, on the other hand, the hindrance Is of the second type, then one can expect 
that trade policy and its tools will become relevant. However , if the hindrance is of 
the third type, the position becomes less clear. In this case, one can expect there will 
be implications for both antitrust and trade policy. Using this division of types of 
hindrance, the responsibility for hindrance to market access may not always be easily 
apportioned between private undertakings or states. There may be cases in which the 
responsibility may have to be attached to both undertakings and states, since the 
restraints may be "mixed" or "hybrid" in nature. 
11. THE DIFFERENT RESTRAINTS 
(A) Private anti-competitive behaviour 
1. Horizontal agreements 
Horizontal agreements amongst domestic undertakings can hinder access to domestic 
markets by foreign undertakings if the former for example, agree to refrain from 
purchasing or distributing products imported by or from the latter, or to withhold from 
the latter materials, supplies or other necessary inputs. For example, if undertakings 
X, Y, and Z in state A, which enjoy a position of economic strength, decide to stop 
importing a specific product of state B, the consequence of this agreement may 
prevent those domestic undertakings handling that product in the latter state from 
penetrating the domestic market of the fori-ner. 
2. Vertical agreements 
Agreements between domestic undertakings at different levels of the economy, for 
example, between a supplier and a distributor may have the effect of hindering the 
ability of a foreign undertaking to develop a distribution network which it needs in 
order to access the domestic market. Normally, this is the case in exclusive 
distribution systems, which can substantially raise barriers to entry by foreign 
undertakings and exclusive purchasing agreements. 
makers in Europe and the US about similar practices in Indonesia and Korea. See 
<hyp: //www. ustr. jzov>. 
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3. Abuse of a dominant position 
Hindrance to market access by foreign undertakings may occur in the case of 
dominant domestic undertakings which engage in abusive behaviour, such as 
predatory pricing designed to exclude those foreign undertakings. ' 0 
4. Mergers 
A merger between undertakings may generate anti-competitive spillover effects 
beyond the borders of the state(s) where the merger is taking place. The development 
of a national champion undertakings through domestic mergers can harm markets 
beyond national boundaries, as well as hinder the ability of potential foreign 
undertakings to penetrate domestic markets. Alternatively, a state may raise concerns 
over a merger taking place in foreign markets because it wants to ensure that such a 
transaction does not preclude its domestic undertakings from entering those markets. ' 
(B) Practices of states 
There are several ways in which practices by states may directly or indirectly impair 
market access by foreign undertakings. ' 2 The following two points illustrate how 
states could be held accountable for hindering market access by foreign undertakings. 
1. Exemptionsfrom antitrust law 
States may directly exempt the anti -competitive behaviour of domestic undertakings 
from the application of their domestic antitrust laws. This issue has for many years 
been subjected to close scrutiny 13 but is relevant to the present discussion on the effect 
of practices of states on market access because exemptions from those states antitrust 
10 Restraints can also take the form of abuse of intellectual property rights. Technology licensing 
arrangements that exclude licensees from a market after the life of the intellectual property right has 
expired can also harm the ability of undertakings to enter a foreign market. See generally S. Anderman 
EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights (Oxford, 1998). The author provides an 
interesting account on the relationship between the issue of exclusivity and market access. Ibid., at pp 
250-1. 
11 See D. Baker & W. Miller "Antitrust enforcement and non-enforcement as a barrier to imports" 
(1996) 14 Int'l Bus. Law. 488, at p 490. 
12 Waller, at p 208, note 3 Ante. 
13 See R. Inman & D. Rubinfeld "Making sense of the antitrust state action doctrine: balancing political 
participation and economic efficiency in regulatory federalism" (1997) 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203. 
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laws may have consequences beyond their domestic borders in general, and for 
undertakings aiming to access the market in those states in particular. The concern 
about exemptions in this case is a serious one, especially since there is no indication 
of willingness on the part of states to unilaterally confine the scope and application of 
exemptions from their domestic antitrust laws. The reluctance of states to abandon 
their existing exemptions and exclusions can be seen from the OECD 
Recommendations on Hard core Cartels (1998). Despite the willingness of 
participating states, as expressed 1 to co-operate on in the Recommendations, 
enforcement action against hard core cartels, the Recommendations did not attempt to 
impose any disciplines on exemptions by states and instead admitted that 
arrangements are excluded directly or indirectly from the coverage of a participating 
state's domestic laws; or are authorized in accordance with such laws. 14 As a result, 
an extensive use of exemptions could easily lead to a substantial amount of economic 
activity around the world avoiding the antitrust laws of different jurisdictions. ' 5 
2. Strategic application of domestic antitrust law 
States may indirectly strategically apply their domestic antitrust laws in order to 
promote "national champions" at the expense of foreign undertakings. A state may 
undertake strategic measures for the protection of anti -competitive behaviour of 
domestic undertakings because it gains more from those measures than foreign states. 
In a tactical application of its domestic antitrust law, a state may immunize private 
anti -competitive behaviour by virtue of different measures, such as the "State Action" 
doctrine. 16 
(C) Mixed or hybrid restraints 
As outlined above, restraints on market access can be mixed or hybrid in nature. This 
is, for example, the case where the practices of the state facilitate the anti -comp etiti ve 
" See OECD web site at <http: //www. oecd. or > 
15 A study carried out by Hawk, comirussioned by the OECD in 1996, found substantial exclusions 
from antitrust law in several sectors in II different jurisdictions, including employment-related 
activities, agriculture, energy and utilities, postal services, transport, communications, defence, 
financial services and media and publishing. See pp 212 Post. 
16 See E. Fox "The problem of state action that blesses private action that harms 'the foreigners"' 'in R. 
Zach (ed. ) Towards WTO Competition Rules: Ke -y 
Issues and Comments on the WTO Report (1998) on 
Trade and Competition (Kluwer Law International, 1999), at p 325. 
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behaviour of private undertakings. 17 The following examples may be used to 
illustrate. 
1. Limitingforeign direct investment 
One way in which a foreign undertaking may access a market is through foreigm direct 
investment. An action by a state to give an association of undertakings in a particular 
domestic industry the power to decide, for example, whether or not to grant licenses 
to individual undertakings, can mean that the association may use this power in an 
exclusionary manner against foreign undertakings. 
2. Standardization 
Standardization in industries, by standard setting bodies especially in the hi-tech 
sector, such as telecommunications and inforination technology, can offer 
considerable advantages to domestic undertakings. In a global market, the activities of 
standard- setting bodies will have an increasing impact on the flows of trade between 
nations. Undertakings and consumers will seek to use technological standards that can 
work easily abroad. A foreign standard that is not compatible with other technologies 
- mainly because of the decision of the domestic standard setting body - can tilt the 
development of those technologies towards a domestically selected standard. As a 
result, the ability of a foreign undertaking, which does not have any presence in the 
standard- setting body, to access the domestic market may be hindered. 
3. Lack o enforcement by antitrust authorities f 
Anti -competitive behaviour of private undertakings may also be encouraged 
by the 
lack of enforcement of antitrust policy by their domestic antitrust authorities. Such 
lack of enforcement may give tacit implication to those undertakings that their anti- 
17 An example of repeated allegations of hybrid restraints may be found in the history of the Japanese 
passenger vehicle industry. See generally J. Rill & C. Chambers "Antitrust enforcement and non- 
enforcement as a barrier to import M the Japanese automobile industry" (1997) 24 Empirica 109. 
A more recent allegation of hybrid restraint that was the subject of a proceeding under Section 301 of 
the US Trade Law (1974), as amended, involves an alleged government-approved concerted refusal to 
deal in Mexico. In 1998, the US Corn Refiners Association complained to the USTR about the 
practices of the Mexican government, which was alleged to have supported a restrictive agreement 
between the Mexican sugar producers' association and the major Mexican soft drink bottling 
companies. The petition claimed that the parties agreed to lirMt the amount of high fructose corn syrup 
(HFCS) they would buy. See USTR Press Release 99-44 (May 14,1999), available at 
I- <htti): //www. us! l. ov>- 
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competitive conduct is permissible. Policy-makers in one state may even adopt a more 
active role by encouraging undertakings, for example to divide markets thinking that 
this will lead to stabilization in a domestic industry in its infancy. 18 
(D) Some remarks 
In the case of hybrid restraints, anti-competitive behaviour of private undertakings 2ý 
may hinder market access because it may be facilitated by some supportive action by 
the state. The fact that this matter - mainly due to the involvement of public and 
private elements- cannot be addressed satisfactorily under antitrust or trade policy 
separately, 19 blurs the lines of accountability of states and undertakings. As a result, 
one can expect that economic and political tensions will materialize between states 
and between states and undertakings. 
The involvement of a state in hybrid restraints is a matter of legal significance in their 
analysis under antitrust and trade policy. Interestingly however, that legal sIgnIficance 
differs under the two policies. As far as antitrust policy is concerned, state 
involvement means that the behaviour of a private undertaking, which would 
otherwise be considered anti -competitive and possibly prohibited, may escape being 
caught by antitrust law. 20 Under trade policy on the other hand, such state 
involvement means that catching hybrid restraints is more possible. 21 Still, whereas 
active participation by a state in hybrid practices may be caught by trade policy, for 
" See generally M. Dabbah "Measuring the success of a system of competition law: a prelirrunary 
view" (2000) 21 ECLR 369. 
19 Current trade policy tools have not yet been tested with respect to hybrid restraints. For example the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement at the WTO prohibits the use of standard setting for the 
purpose of impeding market access. As yet, however, there has not been a WTO dispute settlement 
panel decision under the TBT concerning this problem. See chapter 11. 
20 See generally ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments 1049 (1997), 
<hM2: //www. abanet. org>. A good example is provided in the light of various doctrines such as, the 
foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, and the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine and the Act of 
state doctrine. See chapter 8, notes 62 and 166. 
Also, note that under US antitrust law a restrictive conduct of an undertaking may be defended on the 
ground that it has been authorized by a US state government as part of a clearly articulated policy to 
displace competition with regulation and where the state government actively supervises the conduct at 
issue. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943) and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. US 
471 U. S. 48 (1985). 
2' The US, for example, argued that the market access restraining practices in the KodaklFuji case were 
orchestrated by the Japanese government. See pp 197-9 Post. 
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example by the WTO rules, there is less certainty whether a lesser state role - such as 
sanctioning or tolerating the private practice - can be caught. " 
During the last decade or so, market access-restraining hybrid practices have become 
a major new element in the antitrust and trade policy debate. Whilst there has been no 
comprehensive empirical study with economic or statistical analyses, there seems to 
be an increasing recognition and sufficient indication that the effect of private anti- 
competitive practices on trade and investment flows between nations can be as serious 
as public impediments. 23 Equally, there seems to be a growing recognition that the 
anti-competitive behaviour of private undertakings may be blessed by state actions, 
policies and practices. 24 Under many of these factual patterns an important question 
raised is whether, and to what extent, the resulting antitrust policy problems from 
market acc ess -restraining hybrid practices are attributable to the state as opposed to 
the private undertakings concerned. 
Lastly, an important comment should be made about the place of the concept of 
"market access" in antitrust and trade policy. Whilst the removal of artificial 
impediments to market access is perhaps the most obvious goal of trade policy, 
especially post-1945, it is not apparent that ensuring market access has been 
recognized as an appropriate goal for antitrust policy internationally. 
25 In order to 
understand these differing perspectives on the place of concept of market access under 
both policies, one should consider their differences in general. 
22 See how the US Congress, for example, has attempted to reach such lesser government roles through 
the concept of "toleration" within the meaning of Section 301 Trade Act (1974). See pp 203-5 Post. 
23 It is interesting to observe that at present when access to proprietary technologies or to the facilities 
or services offered by dornInant undertakings may be essential for other undertakings, especially 
foreign ones, as shown with respect to Intemet-related areas, both antitrust policy and trade policy 
seem likely to focus increasingly on private access-denying practices. 
24 US undertakings in different industries have repeatedly argued that their access to Japanese markets 
is hindered by the behaviour of Japanese private undertakings. See <hltp: //www. ustr. Rov>. 
Hybrid market access restraints in trade in services have received particular attention 
in international 
trade negotiations. Articles VIII and IX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) deal 
specifically with the obligations of Members to address the trade-restricting business practices of 
dornInant undertakings and those which supply exclusive services as well as undertakings which offer 
other services. 
25 Indeed, it can be argued that this is symptomatic of the lack of vision in global antitrust policy 
generally. 
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111. THE PERSPECTIVES OF ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES 
Antitrust and trade policies have different perspectives. 
26 First, these policies address 
economic distortions of different kinds and origin. Antitrust policy is primarily 
concerned with the conduct of private undertakingS27 and is nationally determined and 
28 is centrally focused on protecting the operation of the market. Trade policy, on the 
other hand, is internationally determined and is principally focused on the behaviour 
of states, aiming to remove discriminatory acts by the latter that foreclose access to 
domestic markets for foreign undertakings. 29 Secondly, the legal basis of antitrust 
policy enforcement is wider than that of trade policy. According to Doern, this is 
because trade policy is decided through more political than legal processes. 30 Thirdly, 
trade policy has to be based on the political consent of those who are winners and 
losers from the expansion of trade and hence a greater weight is given to "producer 
interests". 31 Antitrust policy, on the other hand, tends to be more concerned with 
consumer interests than trade policy. 32 Fourthly, not all antitrust policy concerns are 
relevant to trade policy. For example, the procedural and substantive features of 
multi -j un sdictional merger reviews are not matters customarily considered under 
trade policy. In addition, international cartels appear to be a serious problem for 
individual states and the global economy, which provide serious antitrust policy issues 
but do not, directly at least, influence trade policy issues. Fifthly, when there is an 
26 For a general comparison of antitrust and trade policy, see H. Applebaum "The Interface of the 
Trade Laws and the Antitrust Laws" (1998) 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 479; Also, Draft Report of the 
International Chamber of Commerce Joint Working Party on Competition and International Trade, 
"Competition and trade in the global arena: an international business perspective" (February 12,1998). 
See <httr): //www. iccwbo. oriz>. 
2' Note, however, the existence of state aid rules in the antitrust policy chapter in the Treaty of Rome, 
such as Article 86 EC, underwhich the European Commission is able to control anti-competitive 
behaviour effected by governments. 
28 See R. Hudec "A WTO perspective on private anti-competitive behavior in world markets" (1999) 
34 New. Eng. L. Rev. 79, at pp 81-2. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See C. Doern Competition Policy Decision Processes in the European Community and United 
Kingdom (Ottawa, 1992). 
31 See G. Feketekuty "Reflections on the interaction between trade policy and competition Policy: a 
contribution to the development of a conceptual framework" (OECD Paris, 1993), at p 11. 
32 Ibid., at p 15. See also J. Finger (ed. ) Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt? (University 
of Michigan Press, 1993); T. Boddez & M. Trebilcock Unfinished Business: Reforming Trade Remedy 
Laws in North America (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1993). 
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overlap in antitrust and trade policy issues, different conclusions regarding the effects 
of a particular restraint may be reached. Judging a restraint from an antitrust policy 
perspective means that its effects have to be considered in terms of efficiency and 
consumer welfare and other goals mentioned in chapter 3, whilst a trade policy 
perspective will mainly consider whether the restraint adversely impacts on the flows 
of trade and investment between nations and access to markets by keeping foreign 
undertakings out of those market. Interestingly, from a trade policy perspective, the 
restraint can still be condemned even if it has positive effects on efficiency and 
welfare of those participants in the domestic market. 33 
Although, in broad terms these differences between the two policies seem to be real , it 
is arguable that regarding the degree of politicization, antitrust policy "is in some 
ways simply politicized 'differently' rather than 'less' than trade PoliCyi,. 
34 
IV. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
This part reviews the current approaches available under antitrust and trade policies 
which can be adopted to deal with restraints involving the ant'-competit've behaviour 
of private undertakings. 
(A) Approaches under antitrust policy 
1. Relying on extra-territoriality 
If a state fails to address the anti-competitive behaviour of its domestic undertakings 
which hinders the entry of foreign undertakings to the domestic market, the home 
state of those foreign undertakings may wish to apply its antitrust law extra- 
territorially to open such a "domestic" market. 35 Nevertheless, the efforts of the home 
state may be frustrated by several factors. This is a point that has emerged from the 
previous chapter, which stated that extra-territorial enforcement of domestic antitrust 
laws may not necessarily enjoy sufficient impact to address antitrust concerns beyond 
33 See WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 56. 
34 C. Doem & S. Wilks Comparative Competition Policy (Oxford, 1996), at p 336. 
35 The use of extra-territoriality to open foreign markets is referred to in the US as "outbound" extra- 
in which the US Department of territoriality. See US i,. Pilkington p1c, 59 Fed. Reg. 30604 (1994), 
Justice challenged restrictions imposed by Pilkington in the UK that prevented US undertakings from 
exporting to the UK. See finiher chapter 8. 
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domestic markets. To this, one can add the fact that reliance on the doctrine of extra- 
territoriality can aggravate conflicts between nations and disagreements over its 
application can lead to a serious friction in the interface between antitrust and trade 
policy. 36 To illustrate, the following hypothetical situation is used. 
Suppose that state A and state B both have effective systems of antitrust. Imagine that 
the anti-competitive behaviour of undertaking X in state A does not harm either 
conditions of competition or other undertakings in the market in state A, but rather it 
is preventing undertaking Y of state B from penetrating that market. Of course the 
primary concern of state A's antitrust authority would be to protect conditions of 
competition, and possibly competitors, in state A's market. The fact that no harm is 
done to conditions of competition and competitors may lead the antitrust authority to 
choose not apply its domestic antitrust laws - even if harrn is done to undertaking Y. 
However, state B's antitrust authority, being concerned about the lack of action on the 
part of state A's antitrust authority, may try to apply its antitrust laws extra- 
teMtorially in order to open the market in question for undertaking Y. The fact that 
more than one antitrust authority become involved and may reach different 
conclusions over one and same matter will lead to conflicts between state A and state 
B. 
Bilateral co-operation between antitrust authorities 
Bilateral co-operation between antitrust authorities in the enforcement of their 
antitrust laws may be seen as a good alternative to the extra-territonality option. Its 
effectiveness as a means to address anti -competitive behaviour restraining market 
access of private undertakings should be seen in light of the several problems 
associated with that option. " In particular, co-operation between antitrust authorities 
may eliminate conflicts between states in practice and remove many problems 
associated with access to information and other evidentiary matters which frequently 
surface in antitrust law cases. 38 The benefits of co-operation should also be seen 
against the backdrop of the fact that undertakings will be relieved from the burden of 
36 D. Papakrivopoulos "The role of competition law as an international trade remedy In the context of 
the World Trade Organization" (1999) 22 World Comp. 45, at p 59. 
37 See chapter 8. 
38 WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 31. 
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duplicated enforcement and inconsistent conclusions which may be reached by 
different antitrust authorities. 
39 
In the context of practices of private undertakings restraining market access, co- 
operation is likely to enhance this access and promote the growth of flows of trade 
and investment in the global economy. This chapter identifies three different types of 
mechanism of bilateral co-operation between antitrust authorities. 
(i) Agreements with positive comity principle 
Bilateral agreements using the positive comity principle are a positive mechanism 
through which co-operation between antitrust authorities can be facilitated. " Under 
this mechanism, one party to the agreement (known as the requesting party) can ask 
the other party (known as the requested party) to address anti -competitive behaviour 
within the latter's boundaries that has effect on the interests of the former. A good 
example of such an agreement with a positive comity principle is given by the 
September 23,1991 agreement between the EC and the US, which was extended by 
another agreement in 1998.41 
The significance of positive comity has increased not only due to its incorporation 
into more formal agreements between antitrust authorities, 42 but also through the use 
of the principle in antitrust law cases. However, it is of considerable interest to 
anticipate to what extent introducing a principle of positive comity in agreements 
39 See chapter 10. 
40 A recent report by the OECD has identified 6 potential benefits of a positive comity approach to 
cross-border enforcement. The benefits include improved effectiveness in remedying illegal conduct, 
improved efficiency in investigations, reduced need for sharing confidential and other information, 
avoidance of jurisdictional conflict, prevention of damage to the requested country's interests and 
protection for other legitimate interests of the protected country. See "Positive comity and related 
benefits" (May, 1999), <hqp: //www. oecd. or >. 
" See pp 99- 101 Ante. 
42 For example, a co-operative enforcement agreement between Canada and the EC provides for 
reciprocal notification and cross-border requests for enforcement action. Under the agreement, each 
side is required to take the other's interests into consideration. In addition to placing a high degree of 
emphasis on traditional comity, the agreement provides protection for the confidentiality of information 
collected during the enforcement process. See 
<h!! p: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/dg04/intem/multilateral>. Another example is the agreement reached 
between the US and Israel, which provides for enforcement co-operation and co-ordination, notification 
of enforcement action and confidentiality protections. See the US-Israel Agreement Regarding the 
Application of Their Competition Laws, (March 15,1999), available at 
<http: //www. usdoi. gov/atr/iDublic/intemational/2296. htm>. 
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between antitrust authorities may influence the natural tendency of those authorities 
not to take into account the effects of their decisions on the interests of other nations. 
It is desirable to suggest that the concept of comity should not be given an unduly 
restrictive interpretation, which would make It applicable only in cases of "pure 
conflict" where an undertaking cannot comply with the requirements imposed by one 
jurisdiction without infringing the laws of another. 
(ii) Defacto use ofpositive comity 
The second mechanism of co-operation that has arisen at times resides in what can be 
described as the defacto use of positive comity. In the absence of a fonnal agreement 
with a positive comity principle between domestic antitrust authorities, it may still be 
possible for one antitrust authority to make a positive comity type of referral to 
another authority. This was exactly what the US did in the KodaklFuji case. 43 
Here, Kodak alleged that it was unable to penetrate the Japanese photographic and 
paper market because of hindrances caused by the Japanese authorities and Fuji Photo 
Film Co. In handling Kodak's claim, the US Trade Representative (USTR) lodged a 
complaint with the WTO, arguing that the practices of the Japanese authorities and 
44 Fuji amounted to unreasonable hindrances . The USTR also referred the claims to the 
Japan Federal Trade Commission (JFTC). In its reference, the USTR stated that it was 
requesting consultations under a GATT decision concerning consultations on 
restrictive business practices. It also stated the US intended to discuss with Japan the 
significant evidence of anti -competitive activities that it had uncovered in this sector, 
and to ask the latter to take appropriate action. 45 The USTR confirmed the willingness 
43 See WTO Report WT/DS44/R (98-0886) "Japan-measures affecting consumer photographic film and 
paper" (March 31,1998), <htt-p: //www. wto. oriz/wto/ddf/ev/vublic. h >. 
" See "U. S. launches broad WTO case under GATT, GATS against Japan on film" (June, 1996), 
<httv: //www. wto. oriz/wto/ddf/ep/Sublic. htm>; Office of the USTR, "Section 304 determination: 
barriers to access to the Japanese market for consumer photographic film and paper" (1996), 
<hqp: www. ustr. gov>. A WTO panel decided this case adversely to the US complaints. See "Japan- 
measures affecting consumer photographic film and paper" (31 March, 1998), <http: //www. wto. or >. 
See J. Ramseyer "The costs of the consensual myth: antitrust enforcement and institutional barriers to 
litigation in Japan" (1985) 94 Yale L. J 604; J. Trachtman "International regulatory competition, 
externaliZation, and jurisdiction" (1993) 34 Harv. J Int'l. L. 47, at p 54-5; H. First "selling antitrust in 
Japan", (1993) 7 Antitrust 34; W. Fugate "Antitrust aspects of U. S. -Japanese trade" (1983) 15 Case W. 
Res. i Int'l L. 505, at p 524. 
45 Office of the USTR, Press Release, "Acting U. S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky 
announces action on film" (June 13,1996). See <htlp: //www. ustr. go >. 
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of the US to supply the JFTC with any necessary information that may assist the latter 
in its investigation. The US Department of Justice, for its part, said it was willing to 
assist the JFTC in its analysis of anti -competitive behaviour in the relevant market. 
The JFTC looked into the complaint, but determined that Fuji's behaviour did not fall 
within Japanese Anti-monopoly Law. The JFTC said that access to the relevant 
market, including channels of distribution, was adequately available to all 
undertakings, whether foreign or domestic. 
This outcome was not received favourably by the US, either at Govenu-nent level or 
the level of the industry. 46 The reason for this seems to go beyond the actual outcome 
of the case, and involves other factors, such as the US lack of confidence in Japan's 
commitment to combat anti-competitive behaviour and its enforcement of its antitrust 
laws. 47 The fact that Japan relied on administrative guidance and informal 
enforcement rather than a formal decision-making process seems to be another factor, 
which seems to have given rise to this lack of confidence given the US commitment 
to the principles of transparency and due process. 48 
Recently, the US and Japan entered into a co-operation agreement for the enforcement 
of their antitrust laws. The agreement includes provisions on notification of 
enforcement and positive comity. Under this agreement, one party will inform the 
46 See for example remarks by Senator M. DeWine, Chair of the Antitrust Sub-committee that while the 
US was making good progress with the EC under the positive comity agreements in place, serious 
problems remained with Japan. See "Senate Sub-committee focuses on international enforcement, 
positive comity" (May 6,1999). See <hl! p: //www. senate. gov/-dewine>. 
" See note 44 Ante. 
A recent example showing lack of satisfaction on the part of the US has been in the Japanese flat glass 
market. Responding to US complaints about overly restrictive vertical agreements between Japanese 
flat glass manufacturers and wholesalers, the JFTC ruled that it could not find any violations of the 
Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law. Several antitrust officials in the US predicted this outcome, claiming 
that it was difficult to expect the JFTC to generally find against Japanese undertakings. See "JFTC sees 
no antitrust offence in Japanese flat glass market" (May, 1999), <hllp: //www. usdoi. pov>. 
48 See generally, J. Haley "Administrative guidance versus formal regulation: resolving the paradox of 
industrial policy" and I. Hiroshi "Antitrust and industrial policy in Japan: competition and cooperation 
in law and trade issues of the Japanese economy" in G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura (eds) Law and 
Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy (University of Washington Press, 1986). 
Interestingly, Japanese regulators themselves have recognized that lack of resources have created 
loopholes in Japan's antitrust enforcement measures. See "JFTC issues fewer warnings, but staff 
perceives more offences" (June, 1999), <hqp: //www. iftc. adn-lix. go. jp>. 
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other of its enforcement activities and will consult with the other on matters anising 
under the agreement. However, the agreement does not strictly provide for a rigorous 
enforcement of Japanese Anti-monopoly law. Instead, the agreement was expected to 
be implemented in accordance with the existing laws of each party, which means that 
its effect is surrounded by uncertainty. 49 
(iii) Co-operation agreements other than those with positive comity 
Agreements with positive comity are not the only type of formal co-operation that 
exists between antitrust authorities. There are other types of agreements, such as those 
aiming at co-ordination of enforcement efforts through non-confidential information 
sharing which are likely to enhance the enforcement of antitrust policy globally. In 
addition, they have the potential to promote the flows of trade and investment 
between nations through enhancing market access. 
Generally, these agreements provide that one party to the agreement should seek to 
take into account the important interests of the other party and notify the latter when 
its enforcement activities may have an impact on those important interests. This is 
widely known as "negative comity". Also, it is not uncommon for these agreements to 
provide for consultations on annual basis between the officials of the enforcement 
authorities concerned which may address conditions under which the parties will offer 
assistance to each other and may further provide that, under appropriate 
circumstances, the parties may agree to co-ordinate enforcement activities. 
Several such agreements have been entered into by antitrust authorities over the years. 
As early as 1976, an agreement was entered into between the US and Germany. 
50 
Other agreements were entered into by the US with Australia in 1982 
51 
and with 
49 See Agreement Concerning US-Japan Co-operation on Anti-competitive Activities (October 7, 
1999), available at <http: //www. usdoj.. izov/aq/Xublic/intemational/docs. htm>. 
50 Agreement Between the US and Germany Relating to Mutual Co-operation Regarding Restrictive 
Business Practices (June 23,1976). Ibid. 
51 Agreement Between the US and Australia Relating to Co-operation on Antitrust Matters (June 29, 
1982) (April 23,1997). The agreement has been reinforced in 1999 by a mutual enforcement assistance 
agreement. 
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Canada in 1984.52 It may be interesting to observe that these agreements seem to be 
53 54 reinforced by the OECD Recommendations of 1986, last revised in 1995 . 
3. A comment 
The above types of co-operation are certainly helpful in promoting greater 
consistency in antitrust policy enforcement outcomes globally. It is also possible that 
such consistent outcomes may, in conjunction with continued consultation amongst 
domestic antitrust authorities, facilitate substantive hannonization and procedural 
convergence of domestic antitrust laws, 55 lead to more effective enforcement of 
antitrust policy globally and promote equal conditions of competition in all nations. 
Undoubtedly, all these factors are likely to foster the opening up of markets and 
growth in trade and investment. 
However, these types of co-operation suffer from certain limitations, mainly relating 
to the exclusion of provisions on the exchange of confidential inforinatlon. Antitrust 
authorities are unable to share confidential business infonnation amongst themselves 
56 
without the consent of the undertakings involved. This inability, it has been argued, 
makes it impossible for antitrust authorities to adequately address cross-border anti- 
competitive behaviour. 57 Nevertheless, it is thought that even if this confidentiality 
52 Memorandum of Understanding Between Canada and the US as to Notification, Consultation and 
Co-operation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws (March 9,1934) (June 17, 
1998). This Memorandum of Understanding was superseded in 1995 by the Agreement Between the 
US and Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices 
Laws (August 3,1995) (April 23,1997). 
53 Reconu-nendation of the Council for Co-operation Between Member Countries in Areas of Potential 
Conflict Between Competition and Trade Policies, OECD Doc. C(86)65(Final) (October 23,1986). 
The 1986 OECD Recommendation revised earlier versions issued on October 5,1967 
[C(5 67) 53 (Final)], July 3,1983 [C(73)99(Final)], September 25,1979 [C(7 9)154 (Final)] and May 21, 
1986 [C(86)44(Final)]. 
54 Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on 
Anti-competitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(95)130(Final) (July 27-28, 
1995). 
55 See chapter 3. 
56 See WTO Annual Repoi-t (1997), at p 32. See, for example, the US Antitrust Civil Process Act, the 
Federal Trade Commission Act and Grand Jury Secrecy Rules which contain confidentiality provisions 
which prohibit the antitrust authorities in the US from disclosing investigative infon-nation to all but a 
very limited US group of persons. 
57 In 1994, the US Congress passed the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act which 
perryuts the US antitrust authorities to obtain and exchange with foreign antitrust authorities, where 
relevant, investigative information otherwise protected by confidentiality provisions. The Act also 
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limitation were removed, this would not resolve all the problems associated with these 
agreements because these agreements are not vehicles of conflict resolution. It seems 
that, although as a result of the agreements the practices of antitrust authorities are 
brought closer together, even with regard to rules which may originally be far apart 
(e. g. rules relating to vertical restraints), the agreements are unlikely to replace the 
need to agree on basic principles relating to their enforcement, in particular, 
commercial frictions may remain unresolved in the absence of a dispute settlement 
procedure based on a set of jointly determined antitrust rules. It is also difficult to 
imagine the emergence of a level playing field in global antitrust policy if this were to 
be founded only on a category of inevitably heterogeneous bilateral agreements. 
Furthermore, the scope of these types of co-operation is constrained by differences 
remaining in antitrust law and its enforcement in different jurisdictions. For example, 
in the light of the discussion in chapter 6, it is clear that the goals of EC antitrust law 
do not only aim to enhance consumer welfare and efficiency of undertakings, but also 
to further the integration of the single market. Consequently, in the US the latter goal 
is neither recognized nor necessary under domestic antitrust law. Such differences are 
bound to lead to differences in approach between the two jurisdictions, 58 especially 
with respect to cases of vertical restraints and abuse of market dominance. 59 
Other limitations also arise given the inherently long-terin nature of building a 
framework of co-operation between antitrust authorities and development of a 
provides that US authorities may open proceedings to obtain such information from nationals on behalf 
of foreign authorities, subject to them being satisfied that the latter will safeguard the confidentiality of 
the information and undertake to ensure reciprocity. In 1999, the US entered into an agreement with 
Australia which was based on this Act. See US Department of Justice Press Release "International 
enforcement to be boosted by new agreement with Australia" (April 17,1997); D. Rosenthal 
"Equipping the multilateral trading system with a style and principles to increase market access" (1998) 
6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 543, at 568. Other, albeit more limited, agreements have been concluded by the 
US with other states, including Canada. The latter, for example, has been confined to crirmnal 
investigations, including criminal antitrust law cases. See A. Bingaman "U. S. antitrust policies in 
world trade", address before the World Trade Center Chicago Serrunar on GATT After Uruguay, 
Chicago, Illinois (May 16,1994), available at <http: //www. usdoj. gov/atr/public/speeches/94-05- 
16. txt>. 
58 See chapter 10. 
59 See, for example, how the EC antitrust rules in relation to vertical restraints have been reformed, 
with the enactment of Regulation 2790/99 EC. See R. Whish "Regulation 2790/99: the Commission's 
cnew style' block exemption for vertical agreements" (2000) 37 CMLRev. 887. Also, With regard to 
market dominance, Article 82 EC jurisprudence is admittedly far more substantial than S. 2 Sherman 
Act case law. 
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globally comprehensive principle of positive comity. At present, the number of 
agreements with positive comity is very small. Hence, antirust authorities should be 
encouraged to develop a network of such agreements, particularly one that would 
include states other than those, which most vigorously enforce their antitrust policy 
today. Adopting the EC-US agreement as a model, and building on the efforts of 
antitrust authorities which have entered into similar agreements, seems to be the most 
appropriate step to take at present. 
(B) Approaches under trade policy 
1. Rules within the WTO 
The WTO rules do not cover anti-competitive behaviour of private undertakings. 
Those rules are meant to address governmental practices as opposed to the practices 
of private undertakings. As things stand, no international rules address directly anti- 
competitive behaviour of private undertakings. However, the possibility of extending 
the scope of some WTO rules to the latter is not ruled out completely. 60 A few 
possibilities may be identified through which the WTO rules may address the 
behaviour of private undertakings. Several WTO provisions and mechanisms are of 
possible relevance: the consultation and co-operation arrangements under each of the 
main WTO agreements, the general rules of the WTO relating to non-discrimination 
and transparency, the areas where the WTO already provides for some minimum 
standards that governments are to follow in combating or regulating anti-competitive 
enterprise practices (notably in the area of basic telecommunications), the provisions 
which allow for remedies to enterprise practices, notably in the area of anti-dumping, 
and the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism. Furthen-nore, the number of areas where 
the multilateral trading system is already addressing antitrust policy issues has 
increased with the result of the Uruguay Round and the subsequent work of the 
WTO. 61 
60 The issues here regarding the role of the WTO in antitrust policy are highly controversial. See D. 
Papakrivopoulos, note 36 Ante; Report of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition policy to the General Council (December 8,1998) WT/WGTCP/2, 
<htti): //www. wto-orp->; Waller, at p 211, note 3 Ante; S. Waller Antitrust and American Business 
Abroad (Clark Boardman Callghan, 1997), at 18.11. 
A fuller account of the role of the WTO can be found in chapter 10. 
61 WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 32. 
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The WTO could turn to each nation member to create and enforce a system dealing 
with private anti-competitive practices. 62 This could be in the form of general 
principles, such as those covered in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)'63 which the state concerned must follow. A second possibility would be for 
the WTO to lay down detailed substantive provisions, such as those provided in the 
64 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
.A 
third possibility would be to introduce a requirement to set up and maintain a 
procedure in the domestic legal order for private individuals to enforce their rights 
under domestic law. 
65 
1. Domestic trade laws 
The other way to reach private access-denying practices in foreign markets is using 
the trade laws of individual states. However, success here cannot be guaranteed better 
than the previous option since no domestic trade law directly reaches such practices. 
However, in theory at least, such practices may be reached indirectly. One example is 
discussed below. 
(i) Case study: US Section 301, Trade Act (1974) 
In the US hindrance to market access by private practices may be considered 
"unreasonable foreign practices" within Section 301 of the Trade Act (1974), as 
amended. 66 
62 Under the Standards Agreement, Member Governments are required to "take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-governmental standard-setting bodies comply 
with the Agreement's MFN, national treatment and other requirements". See Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (April 15,1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 1A, at Art. 3.1 
& 8.1. The Agreement also states that as to certain of its requirements, member nations "shall 
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in support of the observance by other than 
central govenu-nent bodies". See Art. 3.5. 
63 See Article IX of the GATS (April 15,1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 
113. The GATS provides no definition or explanation of the "certain business practices" that "may 
restrain competition and thereby restrict trade". That failure, together with the absence of an explicit 
requirement that a trade-restricting practice be elinUnated, makes this a much less useful approach to 
private access-denying practices than is typical of other WTO Agreements disciplining such practices. 
64 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (April 15,1994), Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex I C. 
65 See chapter 11. 
66 19 U. S. C. 2411 (1 974). 
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The Act oi ffers only limited application to governmental practices that 
tolerate anti-competitive pnvate restraints. See A. Smith "Bringing down private trade barriers-an 
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Section 301 tackles practices or policies of foreign states that are "unfair", 
"unjustifiable", 6 unreasonable" and "burden or restrict US commerce". This includes 
practices or policies that are contradictory to international norms and principles, such 
as the principle of Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN). Practices or policies which amount 
to "toleration of systematic anti -competitive practices" are also considered to be 
unreasonable and therefore are addressed under the Section. 67 For the purposes of the 
Section, where the access by US undertakings to the market of a foreign state is 
hindered by one or more undertakings in the state behaving "systematically" in an 
anti-competitive manner that "burdens or restricts US commerce", then that state will 
be taken to have tolerated that behaviour, personally by failing to enforce its domestic 
antitrust laws. 
In practice, however, the effectiveness of Section 301 is limited for three reasons. 
First, the Trade Act 1974, in general, and Section 301, in particular, do not offer any 
definition of the terms "toleration", "anti-competitive" or "systematic". 68 Secondly, 
the USTR - which is in charge of administering the Act - enjoys full discretion 
regarding whether or not to initiate an action in a given case . 
69Finally, a proceeding 
under the Section does not involve litigation, adjudication and ultimately a remedy. It 
is true that the Act refers to initiation of action, an investigation, a hearing and 
possibly trade "retaliation". But , in practice it seems that all these elements do not 
always feature in a Section 301 proceeding. Hence, it would be more appropriate to 
regard Section 301 as a medium for the USTR to negotiate with authorities in foreign 
states for the removal of an unfair trade practice. Even when it comes to retaliation, it 
seems that in the majority of cases, Section 301 proceedings lead to negotiated 
resolutions rather than trade retaliation. Two fundamental reasons can be identified 
for this view. 
assessment of the United states' unilateral options: Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and the 
extraterritorial application of U. S. antitrust law" (1994) 16 Michigan J Int'l L. 24 1. 
67 See subsection I (d)(3). 
68 In 1988, US trade law was brought closer to its antitrust law by making "unreasonable" practices 
under Section 30 also applicable to those governmental actions that constitute systematic toleration of 
anti -competitive activities by foreign undertakings that restrict market access. See Applebaum, at p 
483, note 26 Ante. 
69 The use of discretion by administrative bodies and the difficulties this triggers in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy was discussed in chapter 4. 
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First. ) retaliation as a last resort seems to be damaging to the US petitioning industry, 
except for rare cases in which there is two-way trade in the product as to which 
market access problem exist. In those rare cases the retaliatory trade restrictions 
would benefit the petitioner in the US market. Apart from those rare cases however, 
the US industry does not gain anything from trade retaliation. In most cases, the unfair 
practice in the market of the foreign state which is the petitioner's problem, remains 
unresolved and the retaliatory action taken provides the petitioner with no offsetting 
benefit. Secondly, in cases where the practice is considered "unreasonable", the 
USTR might run the risk of violating WTO rules if retaliatory measures are taken. 
One can expect a foreign state to take the matter to the WTO dispute resolution in 
response to the retaliation. This of course involves a high degree of probability that 
the US will be ordered by the WTO to cease the retaliation. 
(H) A comment 
It is not clear however, that the US will refrain from retaliation. For example, for eight 
years the Clinton administration's policy was that trade retaliation in Section 301 
proceedings would be adopted in certain cases even if this would trigger a strong 
reaction from the WTO. There is no reason however, to believe that such certain cases 
will not be rare. In the KodaklFuji dispute, for example, the USTR ultimately decided 
not follow a Section 301 route and instead referred the complaint to the WTO with 
regard to the claims of government unfair practices and turned to positive comity in 
dealing with the private anti -competitive practices. If Section 301 type of action was 
not adopted in a case of private anti-competitive behaviour such as KodaklFuji, then it 
must be questioned whether the Section will be employed in many, indeed any, future 
market access disputes. Nevertheless, it will be of some interest to observe how the 
new Republican administration under the Presidency of George W. Bush will 
forinulate its policies under Section 301 and the US trade and antitrust laws more 
generally. 
V. MARKET ACCESS PRINCIPLE 
The first thing that must be said is that the above options of antitrust and trade policy 
in terms of substance, especially the positive comity approach, may have the potential 
in the long run to be used as an effective means of combating market access- 
206 
restraining private practices. However, this does not detract from the fact that 
currently each option suffers from certain limitations in respect of its approach. For 
example, the doctrine of extra-territoriality seems to raise more concerns than it 
actually solves. As far as the mechanisms of co-operation between antitrust authorities 
are concerned, these mechanisms suffer from an inherently prolonged process of 
developing an adequate global framework for them. The limitations facing trade 
policy options on the other hand, are more obvious and primarily relate to the fact that 
these options do not directly address anti-competitive behaviour of private 
undertakings. 
Yet the issue of market access-restraining private practices remains. To effectively 
address this concern, it is believed, requires the development of an adequate 
international approach to such practices in antitrust policy terms. This is an issue that 
goes to the heart of the internationalization of antitrust POIICY. 70 
(A) Using domestic antitrust laws 
Most domestic antitrust authorities - specially those in the US - do not accept the 
view that the application of their domestic antitrust laws should consider the adverse 
effects on foreign undertakings or foreign economies. In the US for example, the 
recent focus in antitrust law on allocative efficiency and consumer welfare addresses 
the role of foreign undertakings (as it does for domestic undertakings) from the 
71 standpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the marketplace . To this end, 
there does not seem to be any consideration of whether those foreign undertakings 
suffer adverse effects from practices of domestic competitors . 
7' This means that quite 
often the anti-competitive behaviour of domestic undertakings will be exonerated 
where, on balance, it benefits domestic consumers and enhances market efficiency. It 
also means broader concepts of global welfare, including harm to foreign 
70 Fox has written that "[t]he internationaliZation of antitrust law has been suggested as a response to 
claims by United States firms that their entry and expansion into Japanese markets has been blocked by 
private and hybrid public/private restraints of trade". See E. Fox "Toward world antitrust and market 
access" (1997) 91 Am. J Int'l L. 1, at p 1. 
71 See Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U. S. 1,4 (1958) 
'2 See The EC Communication to the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy (November 24,1997), <hM: //www. wto. orjz>. 
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undertakings who are denied access to domestic markets are ignored. 
73 Furthen-nore, 
whilst domestic antitrust laws at best could contribute towards the establishing of a 
liberal multilateral trading order, they fall short of fostering the exports of individual 
74 
states . 
At a time of relentless globalization, this approach of domestic antitrust authorities in 
several countries does not seem to be suitable or satisfactory. 75 The OECD and the 
WTO, for example, have expressed certain reservations about this approach. A 1995 
OECD report has stated: 
"As trade policy should be made much more responsive to the interests of consumers, so 
should competition policy probably take international considerations and the interests of both 
producers and consumers beyond domestic jurisdictions greater into account. , 76 
The WTO has expressed a similar view: 
"Even where the criteria of allocative efficiency are solely applicable, the fact that such 
criteria are generally applied in respect of efficiency and welfare within the jurisdiction in 
question and may not take into account adverse effects on the welfare of producers and 
consumers abroad may lead to situations where the enforcement of national competition law 
will not adequately take into account the interests of trading partners. , 77 
Clearly, such views of international organizations will contribute towards the 
internationalization of antitrust policy by shifting the focus of domestic antitrust 
authorities from national to global welfare and efficiencies. It is less clear, however, 
whether there is a prospect in the foreseeable future that this can win the support of 
different states and their domestic antitrust authorities, or at least the US and its 
antitrust authorities. Also, certain important organizations have expressed some 
scepticism in this regard. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
has stated that it is not in favour of including antitrust policy on the multilateral trade 
agenda in the near future. The ICC has argued that the "understanding of the complex 
73 WTO Annual Report (1997), at p31. 
74 See S. Waller, at p 208, note 3. 
75 See D. Baker "Antitrust & world trade: tempest in an international teapot? " (1974) 8 Corn. Int'l L. J 
16. 
76 New Dimensions of Market Access in Globalizing World Economy (Paris, OECD, 1995), at p 254. 
77 WTOAnnual Report (1997), at p 75. 
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issues involved [in trade and antitrust policy] and their ram1ficatlons has not 
progressed sufficiently for this subject to be included' 78 
(B) Market access principle under antitrust policy 
It is submitted that market access-restraining private practices can be effectively 
addressed through developing a universal antitrust market access principle - as a 
counterpart to the market access principle under trade policy. This principle would 
prohibit all forms of anti-competitive impediments - including all those involving 
private and public elements _79 to the ability of foreign undertakings to penetrate 
domestic markets. It is suggested that the principle could be initially introduced 
within the WTO, for the benefit of securing a wider agreement among nations on it. 80 
When introduced, the principle could then be adopted in the domestic systems of 
different states, who would assume the responsibility of this task. States would be 
required to provide effective enforcement mechanisms, tools for discovery, 
procedural enforcement and fair process with a principle of non-discrimination and 
sufficient remedies to states and direct actions to undertakings within the national 
legal systems. The WTO would be responsible for monitoring whether states are 
adopting and enforcing the principle. 81 
(C) Developing the principle 
1. Restraints covered 
It would be over-ambitious, and possibly unrealistic, to argue that a market-access 
principle under antitrust policy should be adopted in the first instance regarding all 
types of restraints, including horizontal cartels, vertical restraints, abuses of 
dominance and mergers. It is suggested that the principle could be adopted first 
regarding certain types of restraints and then as it develops and its familiarity 
78 See "ICC opposes inclusion of antitrust in next round of trade negotiations" (June, 1999). See 
<hq: //www. iccwbo. org>. See also p 235 Post. 
79 Including private and public practices avoids the difficulty associated with the existence of hybrid 
restraints. 
80 Note however that at present trade policy is well-developed at the WTO. Thus it is essential, as the 
present chapter argues, to consider divergences between trade and antitrust policies. 
81 See Communication of the Council of the European Commission, submitted by L. Brittan & K. van 
Miert, COM (96) 296 Final, at p 11 - 
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increases with time, it can be extended to cover other types of restraints. For example. 
it seems sensible to begin with hard core cartels and mergers first, as opposed to 
vertical restraints and abuses of dominance. There is consensus internationally that 
cartels deserve immediate attention. 82 Furthermore, merger control also seems to be 
an issue of some urgency and importance. On the other hand, vertical restraints are an 
issue of some difficulty, 83 whilst abuses of dominance do not seem to be a matter of 
considerable need for immediate attention, since there are very few undertakings that 
enjoy such dominance in world markets. 84 
2. The use ofNeofunctionalism 
It is proposed that the development of a principle of market access under antitrust 
policy could be done through the use of the theory of Neofunctionalism. This theory 
has already been examined in chapter 5. The thrust of the theory revolves around the 
concept of spillover from one area to another. 85 The spillover in the case of 
developing a market-access principle in antitrust policy, it is believed, will take place 
in two contexts. First, there will be a spillover from trade policy (which has an 
effective market access principle) to antitrust policy. The suggested approach is to 
82 See the OECD Report on Hard Core Cartels, introduced at the initiative of the US, 
<hiip: //www. oecd. org/daf/clp >. Also see the view of the EC that priority attention should be given to 
cartels, including export cartels. Ibid., at p 9. The OECD Recommendation proposed to participants to 
ensure that hard core cartels are addressed effectively under their domestic antitrust laws. The 
Recommendation is subject however, to any exceptions and authorization contained in the laws of a 
participating states. Nevertheless, it does provide that derogation should be transparent and reviewed 
periodically to assess whether it is necessary and suitable to overriding policy objectives. 
" This point is clear in the light of the fact that there is hardly any evidence of consistency and clarity 
on how should vertical restraints be approached within one and the same jurisdiction. Hence it may be 
appropriate to opine that the position of individual states must be first clarified and consolidated on the 
regulation of vertical restraints before examining the prospect of internationalization. See Fox, at p 18, 
note 70 Ante. Also, P. Marsden "The impropriety of WTO 'market access' rules on vertical restraints" 
(1998) 21 World Comp. 5. 
The EC, on the other hand, has advocated a WTO market access rule that would address, inter alia, 
private vertical restraints. The European Commission has been quite explicit in supporting a rule on 
vertical restraints that would condemn them for access-denying effects even where, taken individually, 
they are not inconsistent with domestic antitrust law. It is worth noting however, that the US has been 
opposed to introducing this principle, especially within the WTO. See Brittan & van Miert, at p 11, 
note 80 Ante. See ftirther chapter 11. 
84 See p 257 Post. 
85 Indeed, the theory seems to be receiving an increasing support. For example, scholars such as R. 
Kanbur have argued that in present market circumstances - the writer using globalization as an 
example in point - any debate on the pro and anti of globalization needs to be worked out on a sector 
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initially adopt a market access principle in relation to private anti-competitiVe 
behaviour. Secondly, once this is achieved, the principle could be adopted in relation 
to certain types of restraints, such as cartels and mergers, and then it can be expanded 
over time to cover other types of restraints, such as vertical agreements and abuses of 
dominance. 
VI. DEVELOPMENTS OF SOME INTEREST 
Several efforts have been made at international, regional and national levels to 
consider the relationship between antitrust and trade policy, which are of some 
interest. This section reviews the different efforts witnessed in the last decade. 
(A) Work within the WTO 
In 1996, due to the seriousness of market-access antitrust policy questions, a Working 
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy was established 
within the WTO . 
86 The mandate of this body, along with the Singapore Working 
Program set up in December 1996, reflects the close relationship between antitrust 
and trade policy. The efforts have been aiming at regulatory reform in order to foster 
markets that are more open, contestable and competitive, to the benefit of foreign and 
domestic undertakings alike. At the same time, a discussion of antitrust policy within 
the WTO also reflects the long-standing recognition that private restraints can 
adversely affect the benefits of negotiated trade liberalization measures, thereby 
reducing their benefits and potentially hindering the success that nations witnessed in 
removing public hindrances to the flows of trade and investment. 
Over the course of the last two years, a few reports have been produced within the 
WTO considering the intersection of antitrust and trade policy. Of particular 
importance is the WTO Annual Report (1997), which contains some examination of 
the relationship between antitrust and trade policy and the place of antitrust policy in 
the multilateral trading system more generally. 
by sector basis. See R. Kanbur's recent 
h! lp: // vww. people. comell. edu/papes/skl45/papers. htm. 
papers, available at 
86 See document WT/MIN (96)/Dec., at para. 20, <http: //wý, ý-, \N,. wto. orjz> 
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(B) Work within the OECD 
There have been several reports by the OECD over the last ten years on the 
relationship between antitrust and trade policy. 87 The reports cover a wide range of 
topics concerning this relationship. Particular emphasis however has been placed on 
the consistencies and inconsistencies between the two policies. Some of these reports 
emphasized that differences between the two policies still remain, especially on both 
perspective and approach . 
88 However, the reports have failed to identify how much 
differences between the two policies hinder the operation of one or the other policy. 
Remarkably, the reports - despite realizing the existence of important differences 
between the two policies - have reached the important conclusion that the two 
policies are broadly compatible. It has been said that the two policies are 
complementary with basically the same goals: free trade and free competition are 
mutually supportive. 89 
As far as the issue of market access is concemed, some of the reports - especially the 
Hawk report which was produced on behalf of the Trade Committee and the 
Competition Law and Policy Committee 90 explained how market access is related to 
the enforcement of domestic antitrust rules. For example, the report argued that 
strengthening domestic antitrust laws in this respect would help minimize or alleviate 
trade policy disputes ansing as a result of market access-restraining private anti- 
competitive behavolur. The report noted that this also would help reduce the need for 
extra-territonality. 
During the last two years, particular attention at the OECD has been paid to pursuing 
the following "desirable and complementary" future options in building global 
antitrust policy: enhanced voluntary convergence in domestic antitrust laws; enhanced 
Over the years, the OECD established some important programmes. See 
for example the Report on 
Competition and Trade Policy: Their Interaction which was produced in 1984 
by the Committee of 
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices. The Report examined the possible approaches to 
developing 
an improved international framework for dealing with problems arising at the 
frontier of antitrust and 
trade policy. See <htip: //www. oecd. orjz>. 
88 See Consistencies and Inconsistencies Between Trade and Competition Policies (OECD, 1999). 
'9 See Trade and Competition policyfor Tomorrow (OECD, 1999). 
90 SeeAntitrust and Market Access (OECD, 1996). 
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bilateral co-operation between antitrust authorities; fostering regional agreements 
containing antitrust policy provisions; building plurilateral antitrust policy agreements 
and moving towards multilateral antitrust policy agreements. 91 These recent initiatives 
are important because, inter alia, they seek to engage non-member countries, 
academics and representatives of the business community. The initiatives are also 
important because they are inter-disci linary in nature. 92 P 
(C) Work within the US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division 
The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) was fon-ned in 
November 1997 by former US Attorney General, J. Reno, and former Assistant 
Attorney General for Antirust, J. Klein, to examine what new tools and concepts are 
needed to address antitrust policy issues that are appearing on the horizon in the 
global economy. Part of ICPAC's efforts were devoted to the interface between 
antitrust and trade policies. A report was produced by ICPAC in February 2000 
which covered a wide range of issues. It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to 
give an account of all these issues. 
As far as antitrust and trade policies are concerned, ICPAC evaluated the current 
approaches to these practices. It concluded that no particular approach is appropriate 
to respond to all antitrust policy problems in the global economy, but without giving a 
particular set of proposals. It is argued that this is not satisfactory, and that there is a 
need for such a set of proposals. 93 
(D) Work within the American Bar Association 
In January 2000, the Antitrust and International Trade Sections Task Force of the 
American Bar Association produced a joint report concerning private anti -competitive 
practices as market access barriers. The report urged governments to take action 
against private anti -competitive practices that restrain market access 
by foreign 
undertakings in ways that substantially distorts competition in the markets within an 
individual state's jurisdiction. The task force did not suggest that states agree on the 
details of substantive antitrust law or procedure. Instead, it recommended that states 
91 See Report on International Options to Improve the Coherence Between Trade and 
Competition 
Policies (OECD, 2000). 
92 See Trade and Competition Policy: Exploring the Way Forward (OECD, 1999). 
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take actions consistent with the principles of national treatment and Most-Favoured- 
Nation treatment, as well as provide a fair, transparent process, accessible to foreign 
undertakings where complaints can be made of access-denying practices and a 
resolution will be reached within a reasonable period of time. The ABA took no 
position as to what, if any, dispute resolution mechanism should be established to deal 
with the situation where one state is aggrieved by another state's failure to take action 
against foreclosure by a private practice that substantially lessens competition. Also, 
the report did not offer a view on the appropriate role of the WTO. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANAILYSIS 
Artificial barriers leading to market foreclosure cause trade tensions. Where entry to 
markets is restricted by a private act, rather than a public act, which amount to 
antitrust violation then antitrust policy will be available - but not necessarily so - to 
dispel the tension. Yet, there are cases in which the restraint is not only implemented 
by undertakings. For example, a state may elect not to enforce its antitrust policy 
against market-access restraining private anti -competitive behaviour, which means 
that trade tensions may be triggered between nations as a result. In such a case, the 
problem of market-access is not an easy one since it is hybrid in nature. 
(A) Substitutability of antitrust and trade policies 
The above discussion illustrates how, at present, antitrust and trade policy approaches 
fall short of addressing hybrid restraints in general, and private restraints in particular, 
affecting market access. However, the discussion did not address the question of 
whether , in this case, one policy can 
be a substitute for the other. Of course, if trade 
policy can obviate the need for antitrust policy regarding impediments to market 
access involving, or arising as a result of, private anti-competitive behaviour, then 
there would be no need to consider the adoption of the market access principle under 
antitrust policy, or under any other principle. 
" See chapter II- 
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1. Using trade policy instead of antitrust policy 
However, it is possible to be sceptical about the claim in favour of trade policy 
rendering antitrust policy unnecessary, even if this result is achievable. 
94 This is 
because while a free trade stance greatly reduces the scope of the task facing antitrust 
authorities, it does not imply that antitrust law and policy have no purpose to serve. 
Free trade must be complemented by the freedom of entry, including the possibility to 
contest markets, in particular through foreign direct investment, especially in the 
services sector and as far as products confined to domestic markets are concerned. 9ý 
This view is in line with another on the potential role of antitrust policy in addressing 
private restraints that may arise in international trade. One of the driving forces of 
globalization is liberalization of trade and investment. Removing barriers to trade and 
investment does not necessarily ensure access to markets. As undertakings attempt to 
improve or maintain their competitive position in an increasingly more global 
environment, they may take actions aimed at effectively keeping foreign competitors 
out of their domestic market. While the dividing line between meeting competition 
and restricting it by hindering access can admittedly be a fine one, it nonetheless 
emphasizes the potential contribution of antitrust policy to addressing problems of 
access and presence encountered by foreign undertakings. 96 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that there is a need for 
antitrust policy in the global economy, and that the existence of trade policy does not 
affect this conclusion. 
94 See chapter 8. 
95 B. Hoekman & P. Mavroidis "Linking competition and trade policies in Central and East European 
Countries", Policy Research Working Paper 1346, (The World Bank, Washington, D. C., 1994), at p 3; 
W. Shughart, J. Silverman & R. Tollison "Antitrust enforcement and foreign competition" in F. 
McChesney & W. Shughart (eds. ) The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public Choice 
Perspective (Chicago, 1995), at p 180. 
The Joint Progress Report on Trade and Competition Policies submi'tted by the Commiittee on 
Competition Law and Policy and the Trade Committee at the 1993 Ministerial Meeting of the OECD 
argued that globalization was expected to lead to more efficient production and marketing, lower prices 
and improved product quality and variety, but that it will "fail to do so unless market access and 
competition can be preserved and enhanced". At p 2. See also M. Trebilcock "Reconciling competition 
laws and trade policies: a new challenge to international co-operation" in Doern & Wilks, at p 270, 
note 34 Ante. 
96 A. B. Zampetti & P. Sauve "New dimensions of market access: an overview" (OECD, Pans 1995), at 
p 19. See also WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 32. 
215 
2. Using antitrustPolicy instead of tradepolicy 
The flip-side of this debate relates to whether antitrust policy obviates the need for 
trade policy, especially in the case of hybrid practices, and if so, what form antitrust 
policy should take in a liberal trade policy environment and moreover in a global 
economy. Of course, whilst trade policy tools remove public impediments to 
competition from foreign undertakings, such tools do not tackle private restrictions on 
competition within domestic markets, including competition from foreign 
undertakings. 97 In this way, inadequately framed or enforced domestic antitrust policy 
- to the extent that it permits anti -competitive behaviour which precludes effective 
market access or an effective market presence by foreign undertakings - may be an 
impediment to foreign competition and the flows of trade and investment between 
nations. 
Using antitrust policy to combat private anti -comp etiti ve practices affecting 
international trade may be desirable. Nevertheless, its effectiveness as a remedy in 
this instance gives rise to several concerns. First, there is little awareness of the nature 
of similarities or differences between antitrust and trade policies with regard to market 
access. 98 Secondly, it is not clear whether a commonly understood antitrust rule which 
is applicable to market access-restraining practices exists. Thirdly, there is a nsk that 
nations may drawn in deep market access disputes of an antitrust nature. Nations do 
not often seem to have confidence in the ability of the institutions of one another to 
resolve such disputes, something that is likely to trigger differences between nations 
over dispute reso ution. 99 
These concerns are mainly related to the scope and goals of antitrust law. 
100 It was 
argued above that domestic antitrust law may be limited by the existence of 
97 The WTO's web site is rich with information on submissions by nations on this matter to the WTO 
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy. See <http: //www. wto. org>. 
98 See the different documents produced by the OECD, pp 210-212 Ante. 
99 E. Fox "Competition law and the agenda for the WTO: forging the links of competition and trade" 
(1995) 4 Pac. Rim L. & Polic. 1, J. 1, at 15. 
100 See WTO Annual Report (1997), at pp 46-8. 
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exemptions. 101 A particular example of how exemptions can diminish the 
effectiveness of domestic antitrust law to address trade policy issues is the case of 
export cartels, for which all major trading nations provide some form of exemption. 102 
The scope of domestic antitrust law can also be limited in terms of its enforcement. 
The importance of the issue of enforcement may be observed in three different 
contexts. First, the extent to which foreign undertakings can have a private right of 
action to enforce the domestic antitrust laws of the host-state. ' 03 Secondly, the extent 
to which domestic authorities responsible for the enforcement of antitrust policy will 
act in cases where foreign interests are involved. 104 Thirdly - and this is a point that 
arises due to the political nature of trade policy - the extent to which domestic 
antitrust authorities are immune from political pressures. The effectiveness of 
domestic antitrust law in resolving trade policy issues will depend upon the 
independence of domestic antitrust authorities. Ensuring adequate independence of 
these is likely to encourage and enable them to initiate and deal with cases involving 
alleged anti -competitive practices that adversely affecting foreign interests. 105 
Regarding the goals of antitrust law, reference should be made here to chapter 3, 
which contains a detailed discussion of this topic. 106 Proceeding from that discussion, 
it is clear that domestic antitrust laws in different jurisdictions serve different goals. In 
the US, the main objective of antitrust law generally accepted is economic efficiency 
101 See pp 188-9 Ante. 
102 See U. Immenga "Export cartels and voluntary export restraints between trade and competition 
policy" (1995) 4 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol ý J. 93, at pp 96-107. Also, WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 20. 
103 The position here rests on two factors: first, whether the relevant domestic system of antitrust 
provides for private actions generally and secondly, whether relevant undertakings have locus standi to 
institute actions in the host state if they are neither incorporated nor have other legal presence therein. 
See chapter 11. 
104The scope of national antitrust policy to respond to trade concerns of foreign nations can be limited 
by a possible non-enforcement. This issue triggers formidable difficulties, especially since enforcement 
of antitrust policy falls within the discretion of national antitrust authorities. See further chapters 4 and 
10. 
105 See p 50-1 Ante. 
106 See pp 38-45,4nte. 
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and consumer welfare. In the EC, on the other hand, other goals have equal status 
such as furthering market integration-' 07 
It seems that economic goals of efficiency and consumer welfare are regarded as more 
favourable to the use of antitrust law as a trade remedy, than those relating to fairness 
and political concepts-108 This is because the fon-ner goals are neutral, whilst the latter 
goals might be used to support domestic undertakings to the detriment of foreign 
undertakings and consumers. Wider political goals are likely to undermine the role of 
antitrust law and policy as an effective means to combat market access-restraining 
practices. 
(B) Consistencies and inconsistencies between the policies 
One caveat however is that even if economic efficiency and consumer welfare are 
recognized as appropriate goals of antitrust policy, it is not certain that antitrust and 
trade policies will coincide with how concerns relating to market access should be 
handled. 109 Nevertheless, if there was a disagreement between the two policies, then it 
can be regarded as one of perspective rather than of principle, which can be justified 
by the traditional roles of both policies and the tension associated with them. 110 
Antitrust and trade policies are compatible as far as concerns relating to market access 
are concerned. "' The aim of both policies is to improve the efficient allocation of 
resources. Trade policy contributes to efficiency by removing barriers that impede the 
ability of foreign undertakings to access new markets. Antitrust policy contributes to 
107 See V. Korah An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1994). See also chapter 6. 
108 The first recital of the WTO Agreement sets out the objectives of the multilateral trading system. 
Reference in the recital to "raising standards of living" and "optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objectives of sustainable development" seems to indicate that promoting efficiency 
and welfare in a global economy are among such objectives". 
'09 The point can be explained here with reference to the way in which vertical restraints are addressed 
under antitrust policy. See Marsden, at pp 9-10, note 82 Ante. The author observed in the same context 
that this is not a problem, if the issue is considered from a shared perspective, antitrust and trade policy. 
Ibid., at p 10. 
Trebilcock, at p 269, note 88 Ante. 
'11 This can be seen in the context of the free movement and free competition provisions in the 
EC, 
where the two have always been considered complementary in achieving the goals of the 
EC including 
promoting a continuous, harmonious and balanced development of economic activities throughout the 
single market. 
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efficiency by preventing undertakings from harming competition. "' Under antitrust 
policy analysis, however, foreign or domestic competitors may be excluded from a 
market, so long as competition is not thereby hanned. In these cases, the objective of 
both policies is met and an efficient outcome is achieved. ' 13 
The above discussion also indicated the extent to which anti-competitive or 
exclusionary practices restrict access to markets around the world and whether this is 
a problem which demands the immediate attention of policy-makers of the 
international community. It was argued that this type of restriction is a serious onel 
especially in the case of hybrid restraints. These restraints make the distinction 
between the application of antitrust and trade policies quite difficult to draw. Trade 
policy is sufficiently developed on the international plane, particularly within the 
auspices of the WTO. Antitrust policy, by way of contrast, is significantly less 
developed on the international plane. However, the need for international 
developments in this regard has been advocated throughout this thesis because this is 
where the central challenge facing the antitrust communities of nations lies. 
Over the years, the interest in the intersection between antitrust and trade policies has 
grown, mainly due to the growing integration and expansion of the world economy. 
This development has revealed that anti -competitive behaviour of private 
undertakings increasingly may have wide cross-border dimensions. Furthermore, with 
the rise in flows of trade and investment in the global economy, foreign undertakings 
are concerned with whether domestic antitrust laws are fit and apt for addressing the 
anti-competitive behaviour of domestic undertakings which hinders their entry to 
domestic markets. 
At present, antitrust policy remains primarily national in outlook and there are neither 
rules which enforceable on the international plane nor an international enforcement 
agency to enforce such rules. However, antitrust policy is addressed indirectly, albeit 
in limited aspects, in the main agreements that make up the WTO. Outside the 
WTO, 
consultation and co-operation on anti -competitive restraints are 
facilitated through a 
number of bilateral, regional and multilateral mechanisms and 
frameworks, such as 
112 See generally Dabbah, note 18 Ante. 
113 Marsden, at p 9, note 82 Ante. 
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the EC, NAFTA, ANCESTRA, UNCTAD, the World Bank and the OECD. ' 14 For 
example, the OECD has adopted a series of recommendations and guidelines 
addressing anti-competitive behaviour of private undertakings. However, compliance 
with the majority of these rules is on a voluntary basis and so they are not legally 
binding. 11 5 
(C) Market access principle 
In the absence of international antitrust rules, this chapter has proposed an effective 
application of antitrust policy through the development of a market access principle. It 
was seen that from a trade policy point view, this is desirable. A nation that has 
undertaken trade liberalization measures has every interest in ensuring that the 
welfare and efficiency benefits ansing from such measures are not lost due to anti- 
competitive practices by undertakings. Avoiding the nullification or impairment of 
trade liberalization commitments, as a result of such practices, is also a matter of 
legitimate concern for members of the global trading family. Antitrust law and policy 
do not normally have specific trade objectives, such as promoting market access. 
However, in pursuing the goals of promoting economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare, an effective application of antitrust law is essential for tackling barriers to 
entry set up by undertakings in the market or other anti -competitive practices which 
affect both foreign and domestic undertakings. 
Furthermore, adopting a market access principle under antitrust policy would not only 
lead to a growth in the flows of trade and investment, but also provide more 
consistency in the application of antitrust policy tools as a complement to trade 
policy. This can then be followed by the fostering of international co-operation, 
which seems to be desirable from a trade policy perspective: it seem that all nations 
would benefit from the effective application of antitrust law to anti-competitive 
practices which hinder access to markets. The substantial removal of hindrances to the 
flows of trade and investment between nations erected by states has greatly 
contributed to enhanced conditions of competition. At the same time, in the absence 
of an effective antitrust law framework undertakings may have an incentive to engage 
in anti -competitive behaviour with a view to protect the domestic market against 
114 
See WTO Annual Report (1997). 
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foreign competition. The risk of conflicts of jurisdiction arising from the application 
of the antitrust laws of nations can also have repercussions for the global trading 
system. The scope for such conflicts is the greater if antitrust authorities pursue trade 
policy goals by seeking to apply domestic antitrust law to anti -comp etiti ve practices 
affecting exports and which do not have a substantial impact on the domestic 
market. 116 There is also a risk that, in the absence of effective remedial action in the 
antitrust field, pressure could grow for the unilateral use of trade sanctions or of such 
bilateral trade agreements that may run counter to the principles adhered to by the 
global trading family. Clearly the sensible thing to do in these instances would be for 
a nation to apply its domestic antitrust law to practices which are both contrary to 
domestic welfare and the legitimate interests of other nations. Enhanced international 
co-operation in the antitrust field would therefore lead to significant gains from both 
the antitrust and trade policy perspective. 
(D) Antitrust policy at the WTO 
The dominant form of co-operation between antitrust authorities has taken the form of 
bilateral agreements. The inclusion of several important provisions, such as the 
principle of positive comity, have considerable potential for reducing the scope for 
conflict using close co-operation between antitrust authorities with the shared 
objective of protecting competition, including cases where foreign interests are 
involved. However, despite the actual and potential benefits of this form of co- 
operation, there is an increasing awareness of the need for an additional role by a 
multilateral framework. The WTO can be seen as a suitable forum for this task. ' 17 
First, unlike other existing international organizations with actual or potential agenda 
for antitrust policy, the WTO comprises developing and developed states. Secondly, it 
is capable of combining the establishment of binding disciplines with the flexibility 
required to take into account differences in antitrust law and practice and the 
particular concern of developing states. ' 18 The possible development of such 
"5 Ibid. 
116 See chapter 8. 
117 However, note the US resistance to pursuing antitrust policy programmes within the WTO 
generally. See finIher chapter 10. 
118 See chapters 10 and 11. 
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multilateral framework using the WTO could substantially develop a market access 
principle under antitrust policy and complement trade policy tools as well as 
contribute towards the achievement of the objectives of global economy. The WTO 
has argued that any stance on antitrust law or enforcement, including the decision not 
to have a antitrust law at all, or not to enforce the existing law, is a policy choice. This 
implies that it is often difficult to separate out private restraints from public policy, 
since the fact that the private restraints exist might be attributable to the government's 
choice not to interfere, or not to apply laws under which it could intervene. ' 19 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Foreclosure of domestic markets by restraints can involve private anti -competitive 
behaviour. This can be in the case of pure private restraints or in the case of hybrid 
restraints. In the former, antitrust policy tools are obviously relevant. However, it is 
not clear to what extent these tools currently deployed to effectively address such 
restraints. The case of hybrid restraints on the other hand, is a more difficult one 
because they involve issues of both antitrust and trade policy. It was argued that 
neither policy tool at present is a good fit to address the concerns arising from these 
restraints. Hence, the chapter proposed the development of an alternative approach to 
deal with hybrid restraints in general, and private restraints in particular. This, 
advocated the internationalization of antitrust policy. The discussion concentrated on 
a particular aspect of the debate, namely the adoption of a market access principle 
under antitrust policy. 
Whilst acknowledging that the WTO rules do not regulate the behaviour of private 
undertakings, the chapter suggested adopting the Principle within the WTO. Indeed, 
the question should not be raised with regard to whether the WTO should or should 
not address private restraints. Rather the fundamental question that seem to arise 
concerns the extent to which nations are willing to establish a global framework 
within antitrust policy in order to further trade liberalization objectives. This 
particular aspect of the debate is examined in the following chapter, which gives a 
broader comparative overview of the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
119 See WTO A nnual Report (1997). 
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Chapter Ten 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter brings together the different strands of past, present and some possible 
future developments of the internationalization of antitrust policy. The chapter is 
structured as follows. Part I looks at past developments. Part 11 constructs an 
institutional framework of the capabilities of international organizations to pursue 
global antitrust policy. Part III attempts to link present developments with the type of 
internationalization of antitrust policy, which seems to be emerging on the horizon. 
Part IV deals with the issue of political power and the interests of business and the 
state. Part V gives an account of various model systems of antitrust. Part VI examines 
the EC-US conflict in the internationalization of antitrust policy. Part VII sheds some 
light on the issue of convergence and harmonization of antitrust law and policy of 
different nations. Part VIII considers some substantive issues. 
1. SOME IMPORTANT PAST DEVELOPMENTS 
To help to understand where the internationalization of antitrust policy should go, it is 
important to examine its past experience first. 
The first quarter of the twentieth Century witnessed some general antipathy towards 
anti -competitive practices. This antipathy, which can be seen from the way the 
League of Nations considered international cartels as 'can enemy of world trade", was 
given a stronger impact in the early 1930s. During those years, cartels were employed 
by several nations, notably Germany, Italy and Japan, as a means for mobilizing for 
what became World War II. In an attempt to address international cartels and in 
general anti -competitive practices, the Draft Havana Charter was introduced. The 
Draft Charter aimed to, inter alia, establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) 
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and introduce provisions dealing with restrictive business practices. I The Draft 
Charter imposed an obligation on member nations of the proposed ITO to prevent 
undertakings from engaging in activities, which may "restrain competition, limit 
access to markets or foster monopolistic control in international trade" where these 
restraints interfered with the trade liberalizing aims of the Charter. 2 The Charter 
stated that members could bring complaints about such restraints to the ITO. The 
latter would then be entitled, under Article 48 of the Charter, to investigate and 
recommend action to the home states of the undertakings engaged in restrictive 
practices. However, due to US objection to this effort towards internationalization of 
antitrust policy, the ITO never actually materialized and the Charter was deemed to 
fai 1 
.3 This result may be considered to be surprising, particularly in light of the US' 
hostility at that time towards restrictive practices, 4 which can be seen from the 
following letter addressed to former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull by former 
President Franklin Roosevelt: 
"During the past half century the United States has developed a tradition in opposition to 
private monopolies. The Sherman and Calyton Acts have become as much part of the 
American way of life as the due process clause of the Constitution. By protecting the 
consumer against monopoly these statutes guarantee him the benefits of competition. 
This policy goes hand in glove with the liberal principles of international trade for which you 
have stood through many years of public service. The trade agreement program has as its 
objective the elimination of barriers to the free flow of trade in international commerce; the 
antitrust statutes aim at the elimination of monopolistic restraints of trade in interstate and 
foreign commerce. 
Unfortunately, a number of foreign countries, particularly in continental Europe, do not 
possess such a tradition against cartels. On the contrary, cartels have received encouragement 
from some of these governments. Especially is this true with respect to Germany. Moreover, 
cartels were utilized by the Nazis as governmental instrumentalities to achieve political ends. 
The history of the use of the I. G. Farben trust by the Nazis reads like a detective story. The 
defeat of the Nazi arrrues will have to be followed by the eradication of these weapons of 
econornic welfare. But more than the elimination of the political activities of German cartels 
will be required. Cartels practices which restrict the flow of goods in foreign commerce will 
have to be curbed. With international trade involved this end can be achieved only through 
collaborative action by the United Nations. 
1 See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, UN Doc. E/Conf 2/78 (1948). Printed in 
C. Wilcox A Charter for World Trade (Macmillan, 1949). See also P. Muchlinski Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, 1995), at p 403. 
2 Ibid., Article 46. 
3 See A. Lowenfeld Public Controls on International Trade (Matthew Bender, 1983). 
4 See T. Arnold Bottlenecks of Business (Reyal & Hichcock, 1973); C. Edwards Control of Cartels and 
Monopolies. - An International Comparison (Oceana Publications, 1967), at pp 228-30; 1. Bruce & E. 
Clubb United States Foreign Trade Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991). 
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I hope that you will keep your eye on this whole subject of international cartels because we 
are approaching the time when discussions will almost certainly arise between us and other 
,5 nations. 
Five years after the unsuccessful attempt of the Havana Charter, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) recommended the inclusion of a draft 
convention that would have established a new international agency endowed with the 
responsibility to receive and investigate complaints of restrictive business practices. 
However, the US rejected the draft convention because it felt that disparities in 
domestic policies and practices were so substantial that they would render an 
international organization ineffective. 6 The US also was not in favour of the "one 
state, one vote" provision. According to the US, such a provision would afford 
inimical states the chance to abuse this provision. 
Little progress was made in the global antitrust policy scene until 1958, when a 
GATT Experts Group made some recommendations that practices of private 
undertakings should be excluded from dispute settlement review. It was thought that 
the absence of consensus and experience in this policy made it particularly difficult - 
and quite unrealistic - to try to reach any form of multilateral agreement on how to 
deal with restrictive business practices with international components. 7 The group 
also stated that more internationalization needed domestic antitrust laws and antitrust 
institutions. This was followed by a 1961 report in which the GATT recommended 
that parties to a dispute should engage in consultation with each other on the control 
of restrictive business practices. 8 
11. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The second half of the twentieth century saw an increase in the number of nations 
around the world which have instituted systems of antitrust. However, it is obvious 
5 Obtained by the writer during a research visit to the Franklin Roosevelt Library, New York, File 277. 
See also Muchlinski, at p 387, note I Ante. 
6 D. Wood "The impossible dream: real international antitrust" (1992) U. Chi. Legal F. 277, at pp 284- 
5. 
7 GATT Resolution (November 5,1958) cited in D. Furnish "A transnational approach to restrictive 
business practices" (1970) 4 Int'l Law. 317, at p 328. See also M. Janow "Competition policy and the 
WTO" in J. Bhagwati & M. Hirsh (eds. ) The Uruguay Round and Beyond (University of Michigan 
Press, 1998). 
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that differences still exist in experience with antitrust law and policy, as well as in the 
way that internationalization thereof is conceived amongst those nations. Until now, 
the international antitrust policy scene has not witnessed the conclusion of binding 
international agreements on antitrust law policy. 9 Instead, a variety of consultative 
mechanisms have been instituted. ' 0 
Despite this, it seems that the internationalization of antitrust policy has gained 
renewed impetus and those in favour of internationalization have not lost hope in 
pushing the project forward. " New or expanded international efforts must however be 
structured in a flexible manner to recognize remaining differences between nations. In 
light of this, the following discussion looks first at the institutional capabilities of 
existing international organizations. This will be complemented by the discussion in 
the following part, which considers the views of different interest groups with regard 
to the appropriate role of those organizations in antitrust policy. 
(A) The WTO 
The WTO is a unique international organization and rule-making body, partly because 
of its wide membership base, which includes 135 developing and developed states, 
partly due to the availability of professional staff and partly because of its centrality as 
a forum for negotiating binding rules governing the economic conduct of states. 12 
This uniqueness has been further enhanced with the increase of areas for convergence 
introduced in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations as well as by its 
improved dispute settlement mechanisms. 
GATT Resolution, BISD 28 (9hSupp., 196 1). 
9A. Fiebig "A role for the WTO in international merger control" (2000) 20 Nw. i Int'l L. & Bus. 233, 
at p 244. 
10 See generally S. Waller "The internationalization of antitrust enforcement" (1997) 77 B. U L. Rev. 
343. 
See E. Fox "International antitrust: cosmopolitan principles for an open world" (1998) Fordham 
Corp. L. Inst. 271; 1 Halverson "Harmonization and coordination of international merger procedures" 
(1991) 60 Antin-ust L. J. 531; E. Petersmann "International competition rules for the GATT-MTO 
world trade and legal system" (1993) 27 J IV. T L. 35, Flebig, at p 233, note 9 Ante. 
12 Fiebig, at p 247, note 9.4nte. 
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Like the GATT, the WTO deals principally with trade-distorting acts of governments. 
Thus, the WTO rules, except those on anti-dumping, have not been focused on the 
behaviour of private undertakings. Instead, the WTO has adopted a comprehensive set 
of rules obliging member governments to observe common non-discrimination 
principles and market-opening commitments included in different schedules. 
Prior to the WTO, several GATT cases had come to light where states claimed that 
other states supported or fostered restrictive practices by undertakings that foreclose 
access to markets. Neither the GATT nor the WTO has been a primary forum for 
resolving such disputes. Furthermore, save in circumstances such as those mentioned 
in chapter 9 and at the beginning on the present chapter, international trade rules have 
not held governments accountable for the actions of private undertakings. In this way, 
the WTO does not hold a multilateral set of rules that make governments responsible 
for market access restraining practices of undertakings. Nevertheless, the WTO 
cannot be seen as lacking the features necessary to achieve antitrust policy 
objectives. 13 Indeed, the basic non-discrimination principles of national treatment, 
Most-Favoured-Nation treatment, and transparency that underpin the WTO also 
support the operation of impartial systems of antitrust. 14 Furthermore, a domestic 
policy framework that ensures that private undertakings do not, through private 
arrangements, restrict the flow of trade and investment that nations worked hard 
towards achieving is equally important to support the international trading system. In 
these ways, the two policy frameworks are complementary. 15 In addition, antitrust 
policy concepts appear in several WTO agreements such as: the Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement, 16 the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 17 
" See P. Nicoliades "For a world competition authority" (1996) 30 JWTL. 131; M. Matsushita 
"Reflections on competition policy/law in the framework of the WTO" (1997) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 
3 1; F. Weiss "From world trade law to world competition law" (2000) 23 Fordham Int'l L. J. 250; E. 
Peten-nann "Proposals for negotiating international competition rules in the GATT-WTO world trade 
and legal system" (1994) 49 Aussenwirtschaft 231; P. Marsden "'Antitrust' at the WTO" (1998) 13 
Antitrust 28; H. Arai "Global competition policy as a basis for borderless market economy" (July 22, 
1999), address, available at <htlp: //www. n-ýti. jzo. ip/topic-e/eWT00997e. htn-d. >. 
" See chapter 11 - 
15 See H. Applebaum "The coexistence of antitrust law and trade law with antitrust policy" (1988) 9 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1169; Petersmann, note II Ante. 
" See Section 1.1 of the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
17 See Articles VIII, IX and Article IX: 2. 
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Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures9' 8 Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights19 and the Accounting Disciplines Agreements. 
(B) The OECD 
1. General 
The OECD has been playing a leading role in looking at the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. 20 Through this role, the OECD has become not only an important 
consultative body for nations with systems of antitrust, but also a source of technical 
assistance to many nations introducing or aiming to introduce antitrust law and policy 
in their domestic legal systems. 21 In particular, the OECD has been helpful to national 
judges in such nations who are keen on developing their decisional mechanisms in 
antitrust cases. 
At a more substantive level, the OECD has issued non-binding recommendations, 
such as a recommendation in 1986,22 another in 1995 on international co-operation 
amongst domestic antitrust authorities and most recently in 1998 a recommendation 
condemning hard core cartels. 23 
The OECD has been particularly active in encouraging soft convergence amongst 
member nations. The OECD consists of most, if not all, of the world's developed 
states, and as such one can expect that greater substantive convergence in antitrust 
policy matters could contribute towards building global antitrust policy. Despite the 
' 8See Article 9. 
See for example Article 41 of the TRIPS. 
20 In 1976 the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as revised were adopted which deal with a 
variety of antitrust policy issues. See also OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (June 21,1976). 
21 For a fuller description of the OECD's activities in antitrust policy, see P. Lloyd & K. Vautier 
Promoting Competition in Global Markets: A Multi-National Approach (Elgar, 1999), at pp 131-8. 
22 Recommendation of the Council for Co-operation between Member Countries in Areas of Potential 
Conflict between Competition and Trade Policies [C(8 6)65 (final)], printed in OECD, Competition 
Policy and International Trade (OECD Instruments of Co-operation, 1987), at pp 24-7. The 
Recommendation encouraged participating states not to distort competition through abusing unfair 
trade laws, take into account the effect of export/import restrictions on competition and trading partners 
when considering approval of such restrictions, ensure that their procedures are transparent and notify 
other states of anti -c ompeti tive behavior of their domestic undertakings. 
23 see <httL--/-/www-0e2dý-Or '- 
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OECD's contributions in this regard, it still suffers from certain institutional 
limitations which constrain its ability to play a more expansive role in developing a 
global approach to antitrust policy. Moreover, many non-member nations regard the 
organization as one for more developed countries. More recently, the failure of the 
negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) at the OECD may 
have put its ability to serve as a forum for negotiating international antitrust 
agreements in doubt. Notwithstanding these limitations, the OECD certainly enjoys 
strong experience in a wide range of antitrust and trade policy issues. Its contributions 
remain important and currently it is involved in designing joint antitrust projects with 
24 other international organizations, such as the World Bank. 
2. Committees 
Several OECD committees are engaged in programmes dealing with antitrust policy. 
Two of these are worth mentioning. 
(i) The Competition Law and Policy Committee (CLP) 
The CLP consists of representatives from domestic antitrust authorities of the 29 
OECD members. 25 The aim of the CLP is primarily to promote common 
understanding and co-operation among antitrust authorities. 26 This is carried out 
through meetings of officials of domestic antitrust authorities which have contributed 
towards facilitating greater convergence between the antitrust laws of the nations 
concerned. Through publishing regular reports and holding discussion groups, the 
CLP has been offering the OECD family an opportunity to bring their understanding 
of antitrust policy principles closer together. 
(ii) The Joint Group on Trade and Competition (JGTC) 
The JGTC has pursued a different strategy from the CLP. In particular, it has focused 
on fostering the understanding of member nations on issues relevant to the interface 
24 More, up-to-date infonnation is available at <hlW: //www. worldbank. org> and 
<httv: //www. oecd. oig>. 
25 Known pre-1987 as the Conirnittee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, The 
CERBP was 
established by the Organization for European Econornic 
Cooperation (OEEC) in 1953. 
2" See <http: //www. oecd. or. 2, /daf/clp/COMMTE. htm>. 
229 
1 -7 between antitrust and trade policy. To this end, it has published several reports , 
which deal mainly with legal and regulatory exemptions under existing domestic 
antitrust laws and the relationship between the two policies. The JGTC has also 
facilitated meetings between antitrust enforcers trade and policy-makers to develop a 
common understanding about the framework for addressing matters of interest to both 
antitrust and trade policy communities. 
(C) UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code 
In 1973, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
began negotiations on the control of restrictive business practices 28 at the instigation 
of developing states. Eight years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
UNCTAD's Set of Multilaterally Agreed Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices. 29 The Code aims to ensure favourable treatment 
towards developing states by offering them protection from the restrictive business 
practices of multinational undertakings. 30 It provides that states should improve and 
enforce their laws on restrictive business practices, and that they should consult and 
co-operate with competent authorities of states adversely affected by restrictive 
business practices. It also requires multinational undertakings to respect the domestic 
laws on restrictive business practices of the states in which they operate. Despite 
being an important step forward, the Code is voluntary, is not binding, and has not 
been recognized as a source of public international law. Moreover, UNCTAD has yet 
to evolve into a dynamic body for the treatment of antitrust policy issues. 
27 See pp 210-12 Ante. 
28 The negotiations took place within three different groups: Group B, made of industrialiZed states; 
Group D, comprising principally socialist states; and Group of 77, containing developing and less 
developed states. 
29 See Muchlinski, at pp 403-11, note I Ante. 
'0 See also Draft UNCTAD Transfer of Technology Code, proposed by 
developing countries In the 
1970s to address exploitative practices in licensing patents, technology and other intellectual property 
by multinational undertakings of developing countries domestic undertakings. 
The proposal however 
did not go beyond negotiations stage because of three main issues: 
first, whether to adopt a rule of 
reason on the qualification of prohibited restrictive practices, secondly, whether 
to exempt restrictions 
in agreements between affiliated undertakings, at 
least where they do not impose anti-competitive harm 
on unaffiliated undertakings, and thirdly, whether to allow ustification of export restraints. 
See E. Fox 
"Harnessing the multinational corporation to enhance 3' world development-the rise and 
fall and 
ftiture of antitrust as a regulator" (1989) 10 Cardozo. 
L. Rev. 1981, at pp 1992-6. 
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111. FROM PRESENT TO THE FUTURE 
An important question confronting the antitrust communities of nations at present 
concerns what the next step should be, especially at the WTO, in the area of 
internationalization of antitrust policy. The relevance of this question seems to be 
growing in light of attempts to initiate another round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Thus, there is a question with regard to whether in the short-term 
antitrust policy should become part of any multilateral trade negotiations between 
nations. Any view in favour of including antitrust policy issues must be clear on what 
should be considered in those negotiations: a set of rules subject to dispute settlement 
procedures, fTameworks for transparency and non-discrimination obligations to 
remove hindrances to market access, or some other aspect of the problem. More 
importantly, there is a need to detennine the appropriate role for the WTO over the 
longer term on antitrust policy matters. 
In discussing this vision for the future, it would be helpful to consider the views of 
different member nations on establishing an international system of antitrust in 
general and on the appropriate role of the WTO in particular. The WTO Working 
Group received various communications from many nations. The discussion offers a 
description of some of these views. 
(A) The views of different nations 
1. The US 
The position of the US on the appropriateness of the WTO as a forum for negotiating 
antitrust rules has been inconsistent. Whilst the US actively has supported efforts 
within the WTO's Working Group, it has expressed some reservation on the greater 
practical value of the WTO as a forum for negotiating any antitrust policy rules. The 
US has raised several concerns with respect to the WTO venturing into the domain of 
antitrust policy. The main view held by antitrust officials in the US 
is that the world 
antitrust community lacks the necessary knowledge on whether and to what extent 
key antitrust and trade policy issues may benefit 
from binding international 
agreements, let alone the difficulty of developing a consensus on 
these issues. In 
particular, US antitrust officials believe that there is an 
inherent risk that the WTO 
would second-guess prosecutorial decision making 
in complex evidentiary contexts - 
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a task in which the WTO has no experience and for which it is not suited - and would 
inevitably Politicize international antitrust enforcement in ways that are not likely to 
improve either the economic rationality or the legal neutrality of antitrust decision 
making. 31 The main ingredient of US international antitrust policy has been to 
concentrate on the conclusion of bilateral agreements between different domestic 
antitrust authorities. 32 
2. The EC 
Reference can be made at this stage to chapter 6, where it was argued that the EC has 
been in favour of a more internationalized antitrust policy. In particular, the European 
Commission has moved beyond placing a heavy emphasis on the importance and 
effectiveness of bilateral co-operative agreements between different antitrust 
authorities; the foundation tools in international antitrust policy issues. For the last 
decade or so, the Commission has been supporting the creation of an international 
system of antitrust. The Commission has recommended that preliminary negotiations 
look at restrictive business practices and abuse of market power, provide adequate and 
transparent enforcement and provide for international co-operation through exchange 
of non-confidential information, notification, and positive comity provisions. 
According to the Commission, a wider substantive convergence could be reached over 
time. The proposal suggests that these rules should be subject to dispute settlement, 
initially only for breaches of common principles or rules relating to the developing of 
systems of antitrust at the national level. Dispute settlement might also be used for 
alleged patterns of failure to enforce antitrust law in cases affecting the trade and 
investment of other WTO members. 33 
31 J. Klein "A reality check on antitrust rules in the WTO, a practical way forward on international 
antitrust", address before the OECD Conference on Trade and Competition (June 30,1999), at p 6. See 
<h! q2: //www. usdoj. gov>. 
32 J. Klein has on more than one occasion argued in favour of bilateral agreements, such as those 
concluded by the US and Australia, Canada and the EC. See J. Klein "No monopoly on antitrust" 
Financial Times (February 13,1998), at p. 20, where he stated: "the US experience has shown that a 
crucial component of international antitrust policy is co-operation in the enforcement of national or 
regional competition laws ... What is needed is to 
develop a culture of sound antitrust enforcement, 
built on the basis of shared experience, bilateral co-operation, and technical assistance to countries just 
starting down this road". 
31 See K. Mehta "The role of competition in a globalized trade environment", speech before the 3 
rd 
WTO Symposium on Competition Policy and the Multilateral Trading System, Geneva (April 17, 
_. 
/wwýLw. wt! qo. org>. See also the proposal of the EC Group of Experts, discussed in chapter 1999), qt1p. / 
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This position of the EC has won some support by a number of nations, including 
Australia, Canada and Japan, although each of these also has communicated its vieWs 
to the WTO. For example, Japan appears in favour of developing international 
antitrust rules but also has concurred with developing countries, particularly from the 
Asia-Pacific region, by emphasizing that multilateral negotiations on antitrust policy 
must include anti-dumping issues. 34 
3. Developing states 
Doubts have been expressed by several developing states about the point of 
negotiating an antitrust agreement on the international plane, in general, and within 
the WTO in particular. 
(i) Kenya 
Kenya submitted its own views to the WTO, in which it noted that some developing 
states view the creation of an international system of antitrust as a way of "clipping 
the wings" of comparatively stronger undertakings of developing states so that they 
are not able to compete with strong undertakings of the developed states. 35 Therefore, 
Kenya proposed that any international system of antitrust should include a code of 
conduct for multinational undertakings. 36 Kenya also contributed its views on behalf 
of the African Group, emphasizing that the existence of domestic systems of antitrust, 
including effective enforcement authorities, was not common to all African states. 
The African states have recommended continuing with the educational, exploratory, 
and analytical work of the WTO's Working Group with enhanced technical assistance 
offered to developing states. 37 
6. "Competition policy in the new trade order: strengthening international co-operation and rules" 
COM (95) 359, available at <http: //www. europa. eu. int>. 
34 See Communication from Japan, WT/GC/AV/308 (August 25,1999). Ibid. 
35 See Communication from Kenya, WT/GC/AV/233 (July 5,1999), at p 9. Ibid. 
36 Note however, that efforts toward reaching consensus between developed and developing states for 
such a code failed previously at the LTN. See Muchlinski, at p 10, note I Ante. 
37 See Communication from Kenya on behalf of the African Group, WT/GC/W/300 (August 6,1999), 
note 33 Ante. 
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00 South Africa 
South Africa has recommended embarking on a thorough educational process that 
would incorporate "huge analytical demands on developing states regarding the 
preparations of the next round" of negotiations. 38 To ensure fruitful results ftom this 
initiative, South Africa suggested that process should extend over a period of at least 
two years. It also recommended that resources be provided to developing states in 
order to allow them to participate in the formal negotiations in a meaningful manner. 
4. Other states 
(i) Korea 
Korea generally supports the creation of an international system of antitrust with an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism. It has recommended however transitional 
periods for the application of the rules under the system according to the level of 
economic development in each state and other domestic conditions. 39 
(ii) Norway 
Norway has been in favour of establishing an international system of antitrust within 
the WTO, taking due account of the special needs of states at different stages of 
development through transitional arrangements and technical assistance. 40 
(iii) Venezuela 
Venezuela has recommended the development of an international system of antitrust, 
but it has not offered a detailed account on how this can be achieved; nor has it 
suggested what the content of the rules within the system should be. 41 
(iv) Turkey 
Turkey has taken the view that creating an international system of antitrust would be 
helpful to achieve the objectives of the WTO, and has proposed that future work 
should be fostered to reach a common understanding on the issue. In its opinion, a 
38 See Communication from the Republic of South Africa, WT/WGTCPAV/ 13 8 (October 11,1999), at 
pp 2&4, note 33 Ante. 
39 See Communications from Korea, WT/GC/W/298 (August 6,1999), note 33 Ante. 
40 See Communications from Norway, WT/GC/W/3 10 (September 7,1999), note 33 Ante. 
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multilateral framework of antitrust rules should include provisions for transitional 
periods in order to allow members at different stages of development to subscribe to 
the commitments. 
42 
(B) Business undertakings 
One of the most important issues to be considered as far as private undertakings are 
concerned, is how they view the role of international organizations, such as the WTO. 
In the US, Business Roundtable has repeatedly voiced its anxiety about the necessity 
and productivity of antitrust policy negotiations at the WTO. According to Business 
Roundtable, international consensus on antitrust policy was a precondition to 
establishing any form of an international system of antitrust. In particular, Business 
Roundtable argued that consensus should be reached with regard to WTO's 
institutional competence in antitrust policy matters. Concerns have also been 
expressed regarding the possibility that the multilateral balance struck in the WTO 
Antidumping Code might be disturbed by the involvement of developing states in the 
negotiations. The roundtable indicated that a more appropriate role for the WTO 
would be to establish a new work programme to assist nations in developing antitrust 
policy issues, to act as an information "bank" and to provide technical assistance. 43 
The International Chamber of Commerce believes that a basis for an international 
system of antitrust within the WTO has yet to be established. 44 Mirroring this view 
are the words of the President of the US Council for International Business, opining 
that it would be premature for the WTO Working Group to consider adopting dispute 
45 
settlement mechanism coupled with new international antitrust rules . Instead, 
both 
46 
groups are in favour of enhancing the educational tools in this area. 
" See Communications from Venezuela, WT/HGC/W/281 (August 6,1999), note 33 Ante. 
42 See Communications from Turkey, WT/GC/W/250 (July 13,1999), note 33 Ante. 
13 See --ýhttpj-//wwAw-wtO 
44 See <hqp: //www. iccwbo-or >. 
45 See ICPA C, at p2 68. 
46 
. 
//wwýwý. us cl See <hqpýE-wA _ipb. oAr,, 
>. 
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(C) Some analysis 
Issues of international antitrust policy have been receiving increasing attention, within 
different groups and at different levels. The antitrust communities of nations have 
been largely occupied with working out what the next step should be in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. Thus far, their efforts have not been confined 
to a particular topic or indeed any group of institutions. Clearly, it is advisable to 
further international antitrust policy initiatives through existing international 
organizations such as the WTO, the OECD and UNCTAD that have already instituted 
comprehensive programmes on antitrust policy. Some groups have even gone further 
by recommending that states examine the prospect of building co-operation between 
them and existing international organizations to forge a new initiative where 
government officials, private undertakings, non-governmental organizations and other 
interested parties can consult on matters of antitrust law and policy. This proposal has 
been put forward in 2000 by ICPAC, which stated that this could be called a "global 
antitrust initiative". It has recommended that this initiative should be open to 
developed and developing countries, be comprehensive or at least open to the 
possibility of breadth in its coverage of issue areas; and be accommodating to the 
private sector, non-govenu-nental organizations and other interested parties. 
Recommending the introduction of a "global antitrust initiative" connotes the need for 
a change in the present direction of internationalization of antitrust policy. Such a 
change is being considered due to the obvious limitations from which all existing 
international organizations dealing with issues of antitrust policy seem to suffer. 
Looking at the nature of WTO and the OECD would explain why a change is crucial. 
1. The WTO 
Whilst the WTO is of crucial significance in developing international antitrust policy, 
it seems to be subject to certain limitations. Notably, the WTO is broadly inclusive in 
its membership, but is principally concerned with governmental trade restraining 
practices. This gives rise to an important limitation because - in light of the 
discussion in the previous chapter - not all antitrust and trade policy problems 
overlap. Reflecting the general views of the US, ICPAC has argued that first, the 
traditional mandate of the WTO - negotiation of rules, which are then subject to 
dispute settlement - may be inappropriate for antitrust policy issues, which should 
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rather be discussed broadly and in a consultative manner; secondly, only a limited 
range of antitrust matters, If any, are likely to be successfully enforced in any 
organization that requires a binding commitment from nations; thus, it is inappropriate 
to add antitrust policy issues to the agenda within the WTO. 47 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the WTO should not be regarded as totally 
unsuitable to pursue antitrust policy issues. Whilst it Is acknowledged that not all 
antitrust and trade policy issues overlap, the fact that there is a close nexus between 
the WTO objectives of trade liberalization and the commitment of an increasing 
number of nations - most of whom are members of the WTO family - to instituting 
systems of antitrust and reinforcing existing ones is a factor in favour of developing 
an antitrust policy agenda at the WTO. Furthermore, the fact that the WTO is likely to 
receive support from other important organizations in the near future is another factor 
that is likely to enforce this argument. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that certain 
institutional and policy limitations at the WTO have to (and can) be taken care of. 48 
2 The OECD 
Like the WTO, the OECD constitutes an important forum for dealing with 
international antitrust policy issues, but equally is subject to its own limitations. As 
was seen above, discussion of international antitrust policy issues within the OECD 
have been conducted within the CLP and the JGTC, which have been particularly 
helpful in forging links between the domestic antitrust policies of the OECD's 
member nations, between antitrust and trade authorities and, to an extent, between the 
antitrust authorities of member nations and non-member nations. Amongst all existing 
international organizations, the OECD is the only organization where nations have 
committed themselves to obligations on antitrust policy. This is evident from the 
analytical and policy-oriented studies of global antitrust problems undertaken within 
the various committees. In this regard, the CLP deserves special mention due to the 
furthering of "soft convergence" of antitrust policies among member nations of the 
49 
OECD and its promotion of the technical assistance to certain non-member nations . 
47 See the views of the US, at pp 231-2 Ante. 
48 See chapter II- 
49For up-to-date information on the various programmes at the OECD, see h! lp: /, www. oecd. orjz. 
237 
However, little success has been achieved by the OECD in establishing rule-making 
or dispute settlement mechanisms. This is, of course, an obvious limitation to which 
the OECD is subject. Another obvious limitation concerns the fact that there are only 
29 nation members within the OECD family. This means that several nations that 
either have systems of antitrust in place or are considering instituting such systems are 
not members of the OECD. In addition, the current deliberations at the OECD do not 
seem to be particularly receptive to the specialized needs of non-member states with 
new systems of antitrust. 
3. A comment 
As a result of the limitations associated with the WTO and the OECD,, it is 
understandable why a serious (perhaps even a fresh) consideration of antitrust policy 
and in its place in the global economy should be undertaken. Undoubtedly, the work 
of these organizations has been extremely valuable - and continues to be so - in 
furthering the scope and idea of the internationalization of antitrust policy. 50 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that it is necessary at present to expand on the agenda, 
institutional capabilities and mechanisms of these organizations. 51 
IV. POLITICAL POWER AND PERSPECTIVES OF STATES, 
UNDERTAKINGS AND CONSUMER INTERESTS 
(A) Overview 
Having looked at the role of existing international organizations which deal with the 
internationalization of antitrust policy, the discussion now turns to analyzinp- the 
issues from the perspective of the states, undertakings and consumers. Previous 
chapters have already made it clear that in the internationalization of antitrust policy, 
sovereign states are not the only actors; there are also forces from above and below 
the state. From above, stand regional and international organizations, such as the EC, 
NAFTA, the WTO, OECD etc. Examining these political forces in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy, as chapters 5 and 7 argued, is important 
before 
one can complete an analysis of the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
From 
50 See J. Shelton "Competition policy: what chance for international rules", speech at the Wilton Park 
Conference (November 24,1998), available at <ht! p: //www. oecd. orWdaf/clp/speeches/JS- 
WILTO. htm. >. 
51 See chapter II- 
238 
below, on the other hand, there are equally important forces. One such force is the 
role business undertakings, which have gained increasing importance in the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. 
An examination of future possible directions of more internationalized antitrust policy 
must be sensitive to the basic forces of international political power and the views of 
not only states but also undertakings. Doern has argued that this variable has received 
little attention in the literature partly because the internationalization of antitrust 
policy is a more recent phenomenon, but more importantly because lawyers and 
52 economists do not tend to concern themselves with these issues. 
(B) States on the international plane 
If one categorizes the different views on the role of the state on the international 
plane, it may be possible to conclude that there are several schools of thought. 
Chapter 5 gave an account of some of these. It may be appropriate to mention in the 
present context one additional school of thought: public choice theorists. This school 
is keen to reverse assumptions made by Realist and Neorationalist scholars on the 
primacy of states, 53 with the result that domestic politics would dominate the 
international scene. However, the public choice approach does not pervade actual 
domestic decision-making institutions. In addition, it even plays down international 
organizations because the state is viewed as standing at the centre. For this reason, 
this approach does not seem to add anything to what Realism and Neorationalism 
have already supplied. Nevertheless, the public choice approach is interesting because 
of its focus, unlike the latter schools of thought, on institutional dimensions. 
(C) Perspective of undertakings 
Private economic power constitutes a central element in the study of international 
political economy and domestic policy formulation. On the one 
hand, undertakings 
exercise power in a profound functional sense simply and 
directly because they play a 
role in enhancing the economic prosperity of nations, especially 
developed ones. On 
52 See C. Doem & S. Wilks Comparative Competition Policy (Oxford, 
1996), at p 306. 
53 See chapter 
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the other hand, the lobbying capacity of undertakings affords them the opportunity to 
acquire political power. 54 
The economic power of multinational undertakings can also be observed in light of 
market globalization. Thus, multinational undertakings are a crucial variable in 
determining the extent to which antitrust policy is internationalized. Business 
undertakings have always played an important role in the developing of the antitrust 
laws of nations, but such laws contain provisions that may also limit the freedom of 
action of those undertakings, especially when competition in the market place is likely 
to be distorted. 
At the moment, amidst relentless globalization, it is not yet clear which particular 
industrial sectors or key multinational undertakings will support or resist the move 
towards gTeater internationalization of antitrust policy. Business advisory groups are a 
part of the OECD and EC antitrust policy network, and thus business views are often 
expressed - albeit in a limited manner - within these forums. 
55 Moreover, among 
some sectors there is the presumption that the electronic commerce sector will be 
especially interested in new antitrust rules at the international level. 56 
Perhaps what can be said is that much more needs to be known about the views and 
needs of business undertakings in light of all efforts to further the internationalization 
of antitrust policy. This is a topic that has received insufficient attention by lawyers 
and economists alike. 
It is generally assumed that business undertakings are in favour of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy and the creation of an international system of 
antitrust. Several business concerns can be mentioned here in support of this 
assumption. 
54 See A Olson The Logic of Collective Action (Schochen Books, 1965); D. Mueller 
Public Choice 
(Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
55 See <ht! 12: //www. oecd. org>. 
56 For a good account of this issue see the ICPAC, at pp 
287-92. 
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1. Ensuring uniformity 
Business undertakings prefer uniformity in the way antitrust cases are handled and 
decided. As business operations increasingly transcend national boundaries, such 
operations become subject to the jurisdiction of more than one domestic antitrust 
authority. As the number of domestic systems of antitrust increase around the world, 
more and more domestic antitrust authorities are likely to become involved in one and 
the same business operation. 57 Equally likely is the possibility that these authorities 
may reach conflicting decisions - or at best different conclusions - over the legality of 
58 the same practice. The business community is not so much concerned about the 
possibility of more than one domestic antitrust authority asserting jurisdiction over a 
particular operation as much as they are concerned about the possibility that these 
authorities may reach inconsistent decisions. 59 
2. The possibility of conflicts between states 
The involvement of more than one antitrust authority and the reaching of inconsistent 
results by those authorities in a particular transaction may lead to international 
conflicts between the states concerned,, especially over industrial policy. Business 
undertakings are generally interested in the prospect of being caught in such conflicts, 
where it is normal for industrial policy considerations and other considerations to 
override antitrust policy considerations. 60 
57 The ExxonlMobile operation was notified in no fewer than twenty jurisdictions. For a comment on 
this issue see "Exxon-Mobile: conquering the world" (1999) 13 Antitrust 16; The Wall Street Journal 
(Nov. 30,1998). Also, the MCIIWorldCom transaction in 1997 was reviewed by more than 30 antitrust 
authorities. See A. Frederickson "A strategic approach to multi -jurisdictional filings (1999) 4 Eur. 
Counse123. 
58 See ShelIlMontedison Commission Decision 94/811 OJ [1994] L-332/48; also Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas OJ [1997] L 336/16. 
59 See D. Wood & R. Whish Merger Cases in the Real World: A Study of Merger Control Procedures 
(OECD, 1994), at pp 85-95. Note however that reaching conflicting decisions may be inevitable in 
some cases, mainly due to the structure of the relevant market and the 
levels of its concentration. Also, 
differences in the legal standards employed by different antitrust authorities can contribute to 
inconsistencies. See further chapters 3 and 4. 
60 Other considerations include restructuring of industries, such as 
defence (See J. Nannes "Strategies 
alliances and converging industries: the government's perspective on corporate combinations", address 
before the American Bar Association Section of Public Utilities, Communications and 
Transportation 
Law (August, 1999), available at <http: //www. usdoi. pov/atr/public/speeches/'2356. htm>), liberalizing 
international air travel (European Commission Press 
Release "European Cornmission publishes its 
conditions for approving the British Airways/American 
Airlines air alliance (July 8,1998), available at 
<h D: //www. europa. eu. int/rapid/start/c. vi/izuesten. 
ksh>) and deregulating the telecommunications 
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I Differences in procedures 
Business undertakings are concerned by the length of time required for different 
antitrust authorities to reach a decision on a particular operation because delays in 
decision-making may be harmful to the interests of business undertakings, especially 
in the case of mergers. Hence, business undertakings seem to favour speedy decisions 
by antitrust authorities. One does not need to look beyond the examples provided by 
the EC and US merger review regimes to deduce the concern of undertakings in this 
context. " Surely, differences in procedure may subject undertakings to the burden and 
expense of having to comply with the laws of different nations. 62 
4. The use of confidential information 
Business undertakings are generally concerned about situations in which one antitrust 
authority hands over confidential information about those undertakings to another 
one. The fear is that the latter may use this information for economic espionage. Also, 
there is an anxiety when information is handed over to a jurisdiction which allows 
private actions. 63 These actions are considered to be a "rogue elephant" because 
private plaintiffs in these actions are not under the same constraints as antitrust 
authorities, for example regarding breach of confidence. 64 So, there may be a risk of 
confidential information disclosed to other undertakings and individuals. 
market (See Department of Justice Press Release "Justice Department clears WorldComlMCI merger 
after MCI agrees to sell its Internet business" (July 15,1998), available at 
<hiip: //www. usdoj. p, ov/atr/Xublic/i)ress releases/ I 998/1892. htm>). 
An obvious example where business undertakings may be caught in conflicts between states relates to 
the doctrine of extra-territoriality. See chapter 8. 
61 See J. Griffin "What business people want from a world antitrust code" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. Rei% 
39, at p 42. 
62 See Remarks by P. Condit, CEO of Boeing Corporation, about the conflicting results reached by the 
EC and the US in the Boeing/McDonell Douglas merger, "Boeing Responds to European 
Commission 
Reconunendation", Boeing Press Release (July 16,1997). See <http: //www. boeip-g. com>. 
63 See pp 180-1 Ante. 
64 See W. Knighton "Nationality and extratemtonal jurisdiction: U. S. law abroad", address at 
Georgetown University Law Centre (August 13,198 1). 
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(D) Consumer perspective 
It is believed that the interests of consumers and producers in a global economy would 
be maximized if antitrust rules as wide as markets were introduced. This view is 
based on the understanding that a global vision would better facilitate the appraisal of 
positive as well as negative impacts of international operations of undertakings. 
Important organizations, such as the OECD, World Bank, the WTO and Consumers 
International65 have in recent years devoted special attention to consumers interest in 
global markets, as well as advocating ways to protect this interest. A clear consensus 
has been emerging, especially at the WTO and the OECD, that introducing global 
antitrust rules would enhance the welfare and interest of consumers in global markets. 
A 1995 OECD report has stated: 
"As trade policy should be made much more responsive to the interests of consumers, so 
should competition policy probably take international considerations and the interests of both 
producers and consumers beyond domestic jurisdictions greater into account. 1166 
The WTO has expressed a similar view: 
"Even where the criteria of allocative efficiency are solely applicable, the fact that such 
criteria are generally applied in respect of efficiency and welfare within the jurisdiction in 
question and may not take into account adverse effects on the welfare of producers and 
consumers abroad may lead to situations where the enforcement of national competition law 
will not adequately take into account the interests of trading partners. 1167 
The argument in favour of global antitrust rules aside, it seems that currently there is a 
heated debate on whether globalization in general would benefit consumers. It may be 
of interest to note the position of pro and anti globalizers. The former tend to assume 
markets are competitive, including developing countries and those in transition. 
According to pro -glob alizers, liberalization will benefit consumers. Anti - globali zers 
on the other hand, have adopted a different stance, arguing that liberalization would 
have the opposite effect, namely leading to damaging monopolies. 
65 See http: //www. consumersintemational. org. 
66 New Dimensions of Market Access in Globalizing World Economy ( OECD, 1995), at p 254. 
67 WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 7-5. 
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However convincing the arguments of either camp , it seems clear that this is another 
situation where a Neofunction a list approach would be appropriate . 
68 Thus, 
disagreements between anti and pro globalization as far as the benefit to consumers is 
concerned should be worked out on a country-by-county basis and industry-by- 
industry basis. There is simply no room for assumption. 
V. MODEL SYSTEMS OF ANTITRUST 
(A) Several examples 
This part is not intended to be an exhaustive study of different model systems of 
antitrust in the world. The aim is merely to provide an account of several models, as 
they represent important polarities. 
1. The US model 
The model served by the US system of antitrust is essentially one based on the 
principle of free market. The system, as evidenced in the interpretations and analyses 
applied to the US antitrust laws, mainly aims to combat anti -competitive behaviour 
that harms consumer welfare and reduces efficiency. The system is based on the 
ideology that, save for cases where a specific behaviour is seen as anti -competitive, 
public intervention in the market is unnecessary. Every undertaking is free to 
compete, including dominant undertakings, even if some competitors will be injured 
along the way. 69 
The statutory language of the US antitrust laws is generally very broad. Congess did 
not provide an interpretation of the various terms covered under these laws. As a 
result, US courts gave a common law interpretation to these provisions. For example, 
Section I of the Sherman Act 1890 prohibition covers "restraint of trade". The federal 
courts have held that only "unreasonable restraints of trade" should be covered . 
70 The 
jurisprudence of the courts has developed around two complementary modes of 
68 The theory of Neofunctionalism has already been discussed in chapter 5, and was employed in 
chapter 9. 
69 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U. S. 447 (1993); Brooke Group Ltd. 1'. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U. S. 209 (1993). 
70 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1,58 (1911); Chicago Board of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U. S. 231,238 (1918). 
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analysis: the per se and rule of reason approaches .71 The former covers a restraint that 
"facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output" rather than "one designed to increase economic 
1,72 efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive' . The latter is an 
inquiry whether a restraint "is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses 
competition", looking at the circumstances, details and logic of the restraint. 73 
There are several striking features about US system of antitrust that must be 
mentioned. First, under the system, the Department of Justice and the Federal trade 
Commission - the antitrust authorities in charge of enforcement of US antitrust law - 
lack competence to grant exemptions to undertakings from the prohibitions of 
antitrust laws, and even to issue a binding decision on undertakings in the first place. 74 
Rather the authority in charge in a particular case is under an obligation to approach 
the judiciary to establish a violation before an injunction may be granted or a fine 
issued. Secondly, serious violations of US antitrust laws can be prosecuted criminally 
e. g. price fixing cartels . 
75 Thirdly, attorney generals in different states can bring 
actions to enforce US antitrust laws, even where the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission have reviewed the matter and reached a different 
76 conclusion . Fourthly, the US system of antitrust allows private injured parties to 
The academic literature on this issue is abundant. See R. Bork "The rule of reason and per se 
concept: price fixing and market division" (1965) 74 Yale L. J 775; T. Piraino "ReconcilMg the per se 
rule and the rule of reason approaches to antitrust analysis" (1991) 64 So. Cal. L. Rev. 685; "Making 
sense of the rule of reason: a new standard for section 1 of the Sherman Act" (1994) 47 Van L. Rev. 
1753; 0. Black "Per se rules and rule of reason: what are they" (1997) 18 ECLR 145; V. Korah "The 
rise and fall of provisional validity - the need for a rule of reason in EEC antitrust" (1981) 3 Nw. J 
Int'l L. & Bus. 320; R. Joliet The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law. - American, German and Common 
Market Laws in Comparative Perspective (Hague, 1967); R. Whish & B. Sufrin "Art. 85 & the rule of 
reason" (1987) 7YE. L. 1; V. Korah "EEC competition policy - Legal form or economic efficiency" 
(1986) 39 C. L. P. 85. 
72 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U. S. 1, (1979), at pp 19-20. 
73 National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679 (1978), at p 69 1. See also 
MuchlInski, at p 392, note I Ante; S. Anderman EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights 
(Oxford, 1998), at pp 31-2. 
74 See chapter 4. 
75 Only Japan and Canada allow criminal prosecution under their domestic antitrust laws. 
76 111 It may be interesting to compare this situation with those in Canada and Mexico, where provinces 
and states are not allowed to enforce national antitrust laws. 
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bring their own antitrust actions. Fifth, the US system includes a treble damages 
remedy and the "Noerr" doctrine, dealing with antitrust petitioners immunity. 77 
2. The EC model 
This model has been extensively discussed in chapter 6, therefore it does not ment 
repetition at present. 
3. The Federal German model 
The German system of antitrust is based on social market principles, in particular on 
the significance of antitrust as a "regulator" to protect against abuses of political as 
well as economic power in part by safeguarding the freedom of private enterprise. The 
system shares several common features with the US system. Nevertheless the 
following differences may be observed. First, the system is more interventionist than 
its US counterpart as far as abuse of dominance is concerned. Secondly, the system 
ascribes greater importance to the protection of competitors in merger cases than the 
US system. 78 
4. The Japanese model 
The Japanese system of antitrust is based on the principle of industrial policy with 
competition and significant government intervention, a model also in existence in a 
few Southeast Asian nations . 
79The origins of the system date back to the 1940s when 
the US attempted to export its antitrust tradition into Japan. Some common features 
can be identified between the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law and the US Sherman Act. 
However, differences can be deduced in the case of vertical restraints. Under the 
Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law, vertical restraints are covered under the section on 
unfair business practices. The section covers, inter alia, passing-off and all conducts 
77 See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 365 U. S. 127 (1961) and 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965). Under the doctrine, it is not unlawful to 
petition the government for anti-competitive restraints against competitors. 
Indeed, the right to petition 
is well-founded under the US Constitution, First Amendment, Right to 
Petition. It may be of interest to 
note that in the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International 
Operations (1995), the Federal 
Trade Commission and Department of Justice stated that they would apply the "Noerr" 
doctrine to the 
petitioning of foreign governments in the same manner they treat attempts 
to petition the US 
government. 
78 See the German Cartel Office's web site <hM: //www. bundeskartellamt. 
de/english. ht . >. 
'9 One such country is Korea. For a good exarrunation of the system see 
D. Sakong Korea in the World 
Economi, (Institute for International Economics, 1993). 
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considered unfair, which in the US are not considered as "antitrust law issues" as 
such. 
80 
Initially, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry enjoyed extensive 
powers in controlling the national economy. It adopted a regulatory policy, based on 
its regulatory law, encouraging undertakings to co-operate between themselves and 
with the government. This co-operation took the shape of the creation of associations 
of undertakings which shared common directors, ownership of shares and suppliers 
and customers. These were called "keiretsu". 8 1 The integration of Japan into world 
trade has, however, somewhat undermined the position of Keiretsu and the regulatory 
barriers which these often erected. Nevertheless, complaints from Japan's trading 
partners are sometimes made about market access barriers, which seem to indicate 
that the idea of Keiretsu has not been entirely extinguished. 82 
5. The Chinese model 
The Chinese model is essentially statist. Until recently, the state owned all business in 
China though, unfair competition law prohibits passing-off, boycotts and behaviour 
deemed unfair. There is no antitrust authority in China but more recently, a proposal 
83 to introduce a system of antitrust has been prepared. 
(B) A comment 
The introduction to the thesis stated that nearly 90 nations have introduced systems of 
antitrust in the world. The flip-side of this means that many others do not have such 
systems. Some nations have free-market principles but have not yet adopted antitrust 
laws. For example, Hong Kong and Singapore have relied on the market itself to 
provide the forces of competition, choosing free trade as their antitrust policy. Other 
nations have laws against restrictive business practices such as several African and 
80 Note that in the US, fair trading laws have been repealed. 
81 See J. Davidow "The application of U. S. antitrust laws to kieretsu practices" (1994) 18 World Comp. 
5; Muchlinski, at pp 69-70, note I Ante. 
82 See pp 197-9 Ante. For more information about Japanese system of antitrust law see the Japan Fair 
Trade Commission's web site <http: //www. iftc. admix. po. i >. 
83 See T. Yu "An anti-unfair competition law without a core: an introductory comparison between U. S. 
antitrust law and the new law of the People's Republic of China" (1994) 4 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 
315. 
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Southeast Asian nations, a number of which have some reservations regarding 
capitalism. 84 
The fact that many nations do not have antitrust laws may affect the role of antitrust 
policy in the global economy as an effective means to address anti -competitive 
behaviour that impedes and distorts the flows of trade and investment between 
nations. These nations are at a disadvantage in combating certain anti -competitive 
behaviour with international components, both because multinational undertakings are 
likely to be more responsive to the antitrust authorities of the major economies where 
such behaviour is concerned and because of their greater need for accessing 
information outside the jurisdictions. This highlights the importance of international 
co-operation for them. But these nations generally do not participate in the most 
active instruments, which have the advantage of building a long process of mutual 
confidence. They sometimes do not have antitrust authorities and, where they do, they 
may be resource constrained. 85 
Undoubtedly, most of these disadvantages should disappear if these nations are 
encouraged, or actually seek, to adopt antitrust laws in their national legal orders. 
Another comment should be made on the fact that the above mentioned model 
systems of antitrust differ in many ways. The fact that this is so is bound to affect the 
internationalization of antitrust policy, especially if strong models are likely to impose 
their standards on the weaker models. In addition, differences may lead to conflicts 
between the different models, especially between the stronger ones, as the following 
discussion shows. 
84 Arguably, the collapse of many Asian economies in 1998 seems to have heightened the fear of these 
states about capitalism. See W. Kovacic "Capitalism, socialism and competition policy In 
Vietnam" 
(1999) 13 Antitrust 57; "Merger enforcement in transition: antitrust controls on acquisitions in 
emerging econornies" (1998) 66 U Cin. L. Rev. 1075; "Getting started: creating new competition 
policy institutions in transition economies" (1997) 23 Brooklyn J Int'l 
L. 403; N. Pakaphan "Indonesia: 
enactment of competition law"; W. Cho "Korea's economic crisis: the role of competition policy"; 
S. 
Supanit "Thailand: Implementation of competition law" (1999) 27 Int'l Bus. Law. 491,495 and 497 
respectively. 
85 WTO Annual Report (1997), at p 32. 
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VI. THE EGUS CONFLICT 
Previous chapters put forward several reasons why attention has been turning to the 
internationalization of antitrust policy. Those reasons are important. However, one 
can find at least one additional reason, which seems to be of considerable importance. 
The reason concerns the conflict between the EC and the US. As was said before, the 
EC has been in favour of more internationalized antitrust policy. It has proposed 
developing antitrust rules within the WTO. The US, on the other hand, has been very 
sceptical about this, and has rejected any move to that effect. 
Equally however the conflict between the EC and the US is caused by differences in 
the substantive laws and procedures of the two jurisdictions. This as well as chapter 8 
have spelt out these differences and how they impact on the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. The fact that the economic policies prevalent in the two jurisdictions 
also differ make this impact all the greater. 
The EC has given the world community a conception in respect of the 
internationalization of antitrust policy, which in some way has been based on the 
challenge to build a single integrated market. This conception seems to have been 
strengthened by the fact that Member States have been converging their domestic 
antitrust laws towards EC antitrust law, with the result that major business operations 
in the EC will be relieved from the burden of multiple application of different antitrust 
laws with different standards. This strength has also been enhanced by the fact that 
Central and Eastern European Countries have been taking steps to approximate their 
antitrust laws towards EC antitrust law. 
It may well be anticipated that the internationalization of antitrust policy and the 
creation of an international system of antitrust will eventually depend on the 
respective positions of the EC and the US. The above discussion made it clear that the 
systems of antitrust in both jurisdictions have grown in significance and this ensured 
the influence of both systems on the international plane, perhaps with the balance 
tilted toward the EC system of antitrust. 86 
16 The EC and the US have been particularly active in encouraging nations to introduce systems of 
antitrust law, especially ones based on the EC and US models, in their 
legal orders. See Fiebig, at p 
236, note 9.4nte; R. Rice "Brittan urges basic competition rules" Financial Times (November 
8,1993), 
at p 3; K. van Miert "Competition policy in relation to the 
Central & Eastern European Countries- 
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Some states have based their antitrust laws exclusively on EC antitrust law. These 
include most Central and Eastern European Countries. 87 Other states seem to haN, e 
turned to the US model and not to the EC when adopting antitrust laws. One such 
state is Mexico whose adoption of antitrust law formed part of the state's opening of 
national economy in anticipation of NAFTA. 88 Between these two ends, a few states 
have adopted combined aspects of EC and the US antitrust laws. For example, 
Canadian antitrust law on dominance is similar to that of the EC, while provisions on 
mergers, horizontal and vertical agreements are similar to US antitrust law. 89 Other 
states include Australia, 90 New Zealand, 91 Argentina, 92 Columbia, 93 Venezuela 94 and 
95 Brazil . 
Against these categories stands an independent category of states - normally 
developing ones - who have opted for neither the EC nor for the US type of antitrust 
laws because they fear that antitrust law is a tool for developed states to exploit the 
economy of less developing states. This is an interesting situation, because it seems 
achievements and challenges" (1998) 2 Comp. Polý NewsL. 1; K. McDermott "U. S. officials provide 
competition counselling to Eastern Europe" (1991) 5 Antitrust 4; S. Singham "US and European 
models shaping Latin American competition law" (1998) 1 Global Comp. Rev. 15. 
87 M. Ojala The Competition Law of Central and Eastern Europe (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999); M. Cowie 
& M. Novotria "Pre-merger notification in Central and Eastern Europe" (1998) 12 Antitrust 19; C. 
Brzezinski "Competition and antitrust law in Central Europe: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hundary" (1994) 15 Mich. J Int'l L. 1129; G. Oprescue & E. Rohlck "Competition policy in 
transition economies: the case of Romania" (1999) 3 EC Comp. Pol'y NewsL. 62. 
88 See G. Castafteda & F. Ugarte "Mexico still setting the pace for Latin America" (1998) 1 Global 
Comp. Rev. 12. More information can be found on the Mexican antitrust authority's web site 
<hltp: //www. cfc. gob. >. 
It may be observed that NAFTA requires all participating states to "adopt or maintain measures to 
prescribe anti-competitive business conduct, and ... take appropriate action with respect thereto". 
See 
Article 1501(l). 
89 See the Canada Competition Bureau's web site, <hllp: //www. strateizis. ic. gc. ca/coiLipetitio >. 
90 See the Australian Competition and Consumer Authority's web site, <htt-p: //www. accc. jzov. au>. 
9' See the New Zealand Commerce Commission's web site, <http: //www. comcom. govt. nz> and New 
Zealand Ministry of Commerce's web site, <http: //www. moc. jzovt. nz>. 
92 See Argentina antitrust authority, Corms16n Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia's web site, 
<httD: //www. mecon-gov. ar>. 
., ov. co> and 
the 93 See the Superintendencia Brancia's web site, <htýp: //www. superbancaria.. p 
Superintendencia de industria y comerclo's web site <hllp: //www. sic. pov. co>. 
94 See the Procompetencia's web site, <hM: //www. procoLnpetencia. gov. ve>. 
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that these states are keen on ensuring adequate control on anti -competiti ve 
behaviour, 96 especially since they may be subject to the risks of such behaviour in 
light of the dismantling of state barriers to the flows of trade and investment between 
nations and since they may be subject to the extra-territorial application of antitrust 
laws of other states. 
VII. CONVERGENCE AND HARMONIZATION 
During the last ten years or so, domestic antitrust laws have been converging, which 
has been facilitated by several factors. Perhaps the most obvious one is the inforinal 
process of bilateral co-operation between domestic antitrust authorities. Domestic 
antitrust authorities have, albeit to a limited extent, 97 increasingly engaged in informal 
consultations among themselves in enforcement matters in cross-border antitrust law 
cases. 98 Co-operation has been particularly common in merger cases. 99 For example, 
Canadian, EC and US antitrust authorities quite frequently exchange views on their 
analytical approaches on issues such as market definition and economic analysis in 
general in these cases. Furthermore these antitrust authorities have offered valuable 
technical assistance to states with economies in transition and others with infant 
experience using the concept of competition and antitrust law. This process of 
technical assistance has generated many benefits. Perhaps the most important of 
which is the fact that the very process of exchange of information-sharing has 
clarified differences between the EC and US systems as well as differences between 
what mature systems offer and what developing states think is appropriate for their 
economic and political conditions. By the same token, co-operation helps identify the 
areas of agreement among nations, promote convergence and further common 
95 See the Brazilian Competition Tribunal's web site, <h": //www. mi. gov. br/cade>. 
96 1. Kyvelidis "State isomorphism in the post-socialist tradition" (2000) 4 European Integration Online 
Papers, available at <hqp: //www. eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/2000-002. htm>; J. Hellman "Constitutions and 
economic reform in the post-communist traditions" (1996) 5 East Eur. Const. Rev. 46; Fiebig, at p 237, 
note 9 Ante. 
97 For example limitations of confidentiality restrictions in national laws. 
98 The US and Germany have organized international meetings of enforcement officials from antitrust 
authorities around the world to discuss enforcement matters against cartels and other restrictive 
practices. 
99 See, for example, how the US and the EC co-operated in a meaningful way in their handling of the 
MCI Ij, OrjdComlSprin t operation. See chapter 6, note 107. 
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understanding. The benefits of co-operation and technical assistance can be obsen, ed 
in the case of South Africa and Israel, where antitrust authorities have relied heavily 
on information from other jurisdictions when interpreting, applying and enforcing 
their laws. ' 00 
Convergence of antitrust laws may be observed in different forums, including the EC, 
in the US, and even in the OECD. It has been argued that convergence is a 
prerequisite to any move towards comprehensive internationalization of antitrust 
policy, including the creation of an international antitrust code. 101 Whether this is a 
valid argument or not depends on certain factors, which will be alluded to in chapter 
11 , as well as on the advantages and disadvantages associated with such convergence 
that are important to highlight. 
(A) Advantages 
1. Sovereignty and related considerations 
An obvious argument that has been advanced is that convergence, especially soft 
convergence, is preferable to the creation of an international system of antitrust with 
autonomous institutions or an international code of antitrust. This is because, unlike 
the latter, it hardly threatens the sovereignty of states and the enforcement 
prerogatives of different national antitrust authorities. 
2. The needs of states with no antitrust laws 
Another argument in favour is that the creation of an international system of antitrust 
is quite ambitious for the moment, so for this reason one must focus on important 
intermediate steps in convergence. Harmonization, in this regard, is seen as such an 
important step, which can help states with no antitrust laws to develop them. 
3. Relieffor undertakings from dealing with multiple systems 
Convergence of domestic antitrust laws offers substantial benefits to undertakings 
operating in international markets. In particular, undertakings would be offered relief 
from the burden of having to deal with different systems of antitrust. The net result 
'00 See Israel's antitrust authority, <hgR: //www. antitrust. gov. ll> 
"1 See Group of Experts, at p 14, note 33 Ante. See further chapter II- 
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would be that the cost of their operations and compliance would be substantially 
reduced as well as enhancing an efficient marketplace. Moreover, it is guaranteed 
that, with convergence, uniformity of approach by different antitrust authorities will 
be more likely than otherwise. This is especially so in merger review cases. 102 
4. Removing hindrances to market access 
Convergence is likely to enhance the flows of trade and investment between nations 
by removing market access-restraining private anti -comp etiti ve behaviour. This is 
especially valuable in the case of those states which have not been tough enough on 
private anti -competitive behaviour within their own boundaries and thus have 
impaired the entry to domestic markets by foreign undertakings and in the case of 
states with no antitrust laws. 
(B) Disadvantages 
Offsetting these advantages there are some disadvantages associated with 
convergence of domestic antitrust laws which must be mentioned: 
1. The longprocess inherent in convergence 
It would not be difficult, in the light of the discussion in chapters 3 and 6, to point out 
the fact that convergence of domestic antitrust laws is a very slow process, and as a 
matter of fact its success cannot be guaranteed. In the EC, despite the strength of the 
EC system of antitrust and its influence on Member States' domestic systems of 
antitrust, convergence has been developing for more than fifty years without reaching 
its full maternity. On the basis of this situation, it is difficult to imagine that better 
progress, or even an equal one, will be made in the convergence of domestic antitrust 
laws in the world. Nations do not share common antitrust traditions. Furthermore, 
their seriousness in enforcing their antitrust laws differs, not to mention the fact that 
some nations do not even have antitrust laws in place at the moment. 
2 The different goals of antitrust law 
Those nations with antitrust laws differ with regards to what the goals of antitrust law 
should be. Whilst some nations have opted for economic goals, others have used their 
102 See p 242 Ante. 
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antitrust laws to further social and even political goals. 103 Of course, an attempt to 
converge antitrust laws with different goals risks collision between them. In addition 
it is very likely that some goals advocated by strong nations will override competing 
ones advocated by weaker nations. 
3. Defining "competition " 
It is not clear whether nations agree on how the concept of "competition" should be 
defined and understood. Furthermore, there does not seem to be full consensus on 
whether antitrust law should be used to protect competition. As was said earlier in the 
chapter, some nations have opted for systems based on the principle of restrictive 
business practices as opposed to competition, a fact that will undoubtedly widen the 
differences between nations. ' 04 
VIII. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
In 1993, a Multilateral Antitrust Code with substantive principles to be enforced by an 
autonomous antitrust authority was proposed by the Munich Group, a private group 
made of 12 scholars and experts. ' 05 A proposal was put forward by the Group to 
establish minimum standards which could then be incorporated into the WTO. Those 
standards would be enforceable by domestic antitrust authorities in their jurisdictions. 
In case of disputes, the Group suggested that they should be heard by a permanent 
international antitrust panel, forming part of a wider dispute settlement mechanism. 
The areas which were proposed to be covered under the standards included specific 
principles of antitrust law, national treatment, supervision of enforcement by an 
independent authority empowered to request domestic courts and antitrust authorities 
to initiate investigations and inter-governmental dispute settlement procedures. 
At a supranational level, several proposals have been made. One is to establish an 
international variant of the domestic systems of antitrust. The idea here is to develop 
through the support of the WTO structural features of systems of antitrust. Here, the 
WTO would create a set of rules with a dispute settlement mechanism, which would 
103 See pp 38-45 Ante. 
104 See chapter one. 
'05 International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Code as a GA'IT-MTO Plurilateral 
Trade Agreement (July 10,1993). 
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require states to introduce antitrust laws in their jurisdictions. Another proposal put 
forward for involving the WTO has been to develop general principles, both 
procedural and substantive of antitrust law. 106 The OECD and the World Bank have 
been seeking for the last three years to develop a "Global Corporate Governance 
Forum". 107 The OECD has also developed a set of "best practices" principles on 
corporate governance, which complement its joint projects with the World Bank. The 
joint initiative has been hosting meetings and workshops attended by representatives 
of the business community and governments of nations. 
There seems to be a recognition that states may be prepared to co-operate in 
meaningful ways on the internationalization of antitrust policy, but are not necessarily 
prepared to be legally bound by substantive provisions under public international law. 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) has been built on this 
recognition that it is possible to advance some liberalization and harmonization of 
practices outside a framework binding legal instruments. The proposed global 
antitrust initiative by ICPAC is built on the premise that nations can usefully explore 
areas of co-operation in the field of global antitrust policy and facilitate further 
convergence and harmonization. Nations do not seem to be prepared to be bound in 
all areas of restrictive business practices. In some cases,, nations seem to prefer 
developing a common understanding through consultations and non-binding 
principles. 
*** 
From the above , it seems that the 
internationalization of antitrust policy has evolved 
into a topic of great contemporary importance and debate. Over the last eighty years 
or so, considerable efforts have been made to address this topic and these continue to 
be of crucial significance. The chapter analyzed these efforts, drawing comparative 
analyses where appropriate. It seems that one can expect this topic to be subjected to 
heated debate in the years to come. At present, antitrust policy vanes in terms of its 
development and understanding, whether within individual states or within existing 
106 See the suggestion by J. Shelton, former Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD, made in 
1999, 
<http: //www. oecd. o-r-g>. 
107 See <h_ttP)_-. /Avxvý ý-cgif _M'Q'ý>- 
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international organizations. The fact that this is so leaves a general consensus between 
nations on the creation of an international system of antitrust, or even substantiý'e 
harmonization amongst different systems of antitrust, far from appearing on the 
horizon in the near future. 108 
It seems that the success in making consensus more imminent, and even going beyond 
this, depends in large part on the position of the EC and the US, and the extent to 
which it is possible to create a common ground between the two systems of antitrust 
in the internationalization of antitrust policy and the desirability of an international 
system of antitrust. 109 The EC has expressed very positive views in favour of building 
an international system of antitrust in order to better address trans-national antitrust 
issues and tackle political conflicts resulting from the overlap in application of 
different antitrust laws. 110 Conversely, the US remains doubtful about the need and 
desirability for such system. ' 11 The fact that the EC has been active in the 
international antitrust policy scene and that EC system of antitrust has developed into 
a strong system have meant that the US has lost the dominant position that it held for 
many years in this scene. Today, there are nearly 90 nations which have adopted some 
antitrust law and more than 25 others are currently seeking to develop the process. At 
present, EC antitrust law and US antitrust law stand in the positions of equals. Within 
the EC, the antitrust laws of several Member States, most notably Germany play 
important role in regulating many business operations with international components. 
Moreover the antitrust law of Japan has gained greatly in significance and impact in 
108 G. Drauz & T. Lingos "The treatment of trans-border mergers in the 1990's: a European 
perspective" in Policy Directions for Global Merger Review, a special report by the Global Forum for 
Competition and Trade Policy (1999), at p 58; J. Klein "A note of caution with respect to a WTO 
agenda on competition policy", address before The Royal Institution of International Affairs, London 
(November 18,1996); D. Melamed "Antitrust enforcement in a global economy" (1998) Fordham 
Corp. L. Inst. 1; W. Baer "International antitrust policy" (1998) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 247; A. Schaub 
"BoeinglMDD" (1998) 1 EC Comp. Pol ý NewsL. 2, at p 4. 
'09 See D. Gerber "Afterword: Antitrust and American Business Abroad revisited" (2000) 20 Nw. J 
Int'lL. & Bus. 307, atp 310. 
110 See K. van Miert "The WTO and competition policy: the need to consider negotiations", address 
before Ambassadors to the WTO (April 21,1998), available at <http: //www. insidetrade. com/sec-cizi>. 
See D. Valentine "Building a cooperative framework for oversight in mergers-the answer to 
extraterritorial issues in merger review" (1998) 
6 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 525, at p 529; D. Wood 
"Caution necessary concerning WTO agenda on competition rules: Justice officials warn" 
(1996) 13 
Int, l Trade Rep. 1856. 
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recent years, and even in Latin America, the African continent and the Middle East 
antitrust law is being taken more seriously. 112 
Reaching some form of consensus on the internationalization of antitrust policy is 
subject also to other challenges. However, perhaps the greatest challenge in this 
instance is to convince national politicians and antitrust regulators that fostering 
greater internationalization of antitrust policy culminating in the creation of an 
international system of antitrust is in their domestic interests, ' 13 as well as in their 
overall best interest. 114 As a matter of fact, this proposition is applicable not only to 
the US, but also to many other nations, whether developing or developed; though the 
task is much harder in the case of the former. Politicians are not generally in favour of 
surrendering power, even to a limited extent, to autonomous institutions in an 
international system of antitrust. 115 This point can be illustrated with reference to 
merger control. 
Decisions in merger cases often have important political value because they can be 
employed to impose costs on foreign undertakings or prevent unemployment, which 
normally accrue from rationalization following mergers. " 6 One does not need to go 
beyond the BoeinglMDD case to be able to deduce the political value of mergers 
approval decisions. 117 Due to the importance of the attitude of politicians and 
competition regulators, a study on the internationalization of antitrust and an attempt 
to create an international system of antitrust must be sensitive to political realities. In 
this sense, one can trace the failure of efforts toward internationalization thus far to 
112 See Gerber, at p 309, note 104 Ante. 
113 See generally A. Guzman "Is international antitrust possible" (1998) 73 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1501 
114 See Fiebig, at p 245-6, note 109 Ante. 
115 See chapter 5. Chapter 6 also demonstrated how the role of politicians in Member 
States is 
influential with regard to the success of EC system of antitrust. 
116 M Coate "Bureaucracy and politics in FTC merger challenges" in F. McChesney & W. Shughart 
(eds. ) The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust. - The Public Choice Perspective (Chicago, 1995), at p 
229; W. Shughart & R. Tollison "The employment consequences of the Sherman & Clayton Acts" 
(1991) 147 J Inst. & Theo. Econ. 38. 
117 E. Fox "Antitrust regulation across national borders: the United States Boeing versus European 
Union of Airbus" (1998) 16 Brookings L. Rev. 30. 
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the fact that those efforts have been over-ambitious and neglected to take into account 
political realities. 
The whole project of the internationalization of antitrust policy may be reduced to the 
reaching of consensus on the issue. Of course, it is not sufficient to recognize that the 
project involves reaching such consensus. One has to go further to determine the 
need, and moreover the urgency, for this consensus. In this regard, the following 
quote sounds a keynote: 
"What is the size of the problem? In regard to an international or "global" competition la"N' 
regime, are we really talking about more than about 500 large corporations operating 
worldwide? In regard to mergers, are we talking about more than a few mega merger cases in 
which international antitrust co-operation is really important? However, whatever it is we are 
talking about, there seems to be a measure of consensus that we should go at a fairly steady 
pace, in other words, hastening slowly, in addressing the problem of a "global" competition 
law regime. "' 18 
C. Bellamy "How can we harmonze" (1999) 34 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 134 
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Cha ter Eleven Ip 
CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD 
The purpose of the thesis has been to examine the internationalization of antitrust 
policy and to furnish an account of the law and politics thereof. Each of the previous 
chapters dealt with a specific set of issues and each chapter was closed with a specific 
set of conclusions. This chapter presents a summary of the analysis as a whole and 
offers a glimpse of the future. 
The internationalization of antitrust policy has developed with alacrity. With the 
various developments witnessed throughout the twentieth century, it has become 
essential to bring this topic under close scrutiny. In particular, the relentless process of 
globalization has increased the number of antitrust cases with international 
components. This can be observed in light of how trans-national cartels and 
international merger cases have come to form an increasingly significant part of the 
work of antitrust authorities. Not infrequently, such cases involve undertakings and 
information located in several jurisdictions. This may present hurdles when antitrust 
authorities seek to enforce their antitrust laws in those cases as well as trigger 
difficulties when they actually do so. Very often, international antitrust issues can 
only be effectively addressed through enhanced international co-operation between 
different antitrust authorities. Such co-operation also provides relief for business 
undertakings, which may in some cases face excessive costs, in time and money, 
caused by concurrent antitrust investigations initiated in different jurisdictions. 
Effective co-ordination of enforcement between antitrust authorities cannot however 
be expected to deliver fruitful results unless the antitrust laws of nations are aimed to 
id (public/pri I address practices of undertakings, whether private or hybri ivate), wh ch 
may have anti -competitive effect, especially one capable of preventing foreign 
undertakings from penetrating domestic markets. Nor can the extra-temton'al 
application of domestic antitrust laws be considered appropriate, if at all effective, in 
dealing with such behaviour. Extra-territoriality can give rise to disputes between 
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nations as well as prove ineffective where vital infonnation and evidence is located in 
foreign jurisdictions. 
International antitrust issues in general and those with market access dimension in 
particular can only be addressed satisfactorily if nations recognize the ý, alue of 
competition and adopt effective antitrust law and policy and enforce them vigorously. 
The last few decades witnessed an impressive record of removing governmental 
restrictions to the flows of trade and investment between nations. This has helped 
identify the extent to which market access by foreign undertakings to domestic 
markets can be hindered by private anti -competitive behaviour of domestic 
undertakings. Such situations generate great concem, especially since such behaviour 
may not only harm the welfare of the state where it occurs, but also threaten the 
legitimate interests of other nations. The fact that anti -competitive practices of private 
undertakings may be blessed by goverrimental ones - creating thus hybrid practices - 
complicates the situation further. In this case, there is no substitute for an effective 
enforcement by the nation concemed of its antitrust law. Antitrust policy in this way 
complements trade policy. It is important both to acknowledge and support this 
conclusion. 
The recent years have witnessed an interesting move on the part of many nations with 
regard to the role of governments in the global economy. In parallel with the move on 
the part of many nations away from monopolization and exerting strict control and 
planning over their domestic economies, systems of antitrust have been introduced as 
well as reinforced in many nations at all levels of developments. With nearly 90 
systems of antitrust world-wide and more than 25 nations actively engaged at present 
in adopting some form of antitrust law, a clear international consensus, 
despite certain 
differences between nations, has been emerging on the need for antitrust law as a vital 
instrument to protect competition and as an integral part of the 
domestic reform 
nations usually undertake in order to integrate in the global economy. 
This 
development is important for developed and developing states alike. 
It also shows that 
antitrust law has become an issue of vital interest 
for all states at different levels of 
development. Hence, international co-operation should involve developed as well as 
developing states, especially with regard to providing technical assistance 
by states 
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with strong systems of antitrust to others where antitrust law is a very young 
phenomenon, exchange of information and co-ordination in enforcement practices. 
By the same token, this development also shows how business undertakings have 
become important players in the global economy. In light of this, there is a need to 
devote special attention to the concerns and needs of business undertakings as well as 
their relationship with sovereign states in the context of the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. 
There is no doubt that these factors enhance the proposal to build global antitrust 
policy and to facilitate a vigorous antitrust law enforcement with regard to anti- 
competitive behaviour with an adverse effect on the flows of trade and investment 
between nations. However, it is essential to shed light on all the elements necessary in 
order to pursue this and to offer an insightful account on the way forward. 
The efforts of nations and their antitrust communities towards the internationalization 
of antitrust policy thus far have been channelled mainly through the conclusion of 
bilateral co-operation agreements; convergence and harmonization; proposals for an 
international antitrust code; and suggestions regarding a multilateral antitrust 
agreement as a means to develop an international system of antitrust. These four 
"examples" of the internationalization have been discussed in previous chapters. 
There is no reason to believe that these examples, albeit their differences, are not fully 
consistent. It is very true that they differ greatly in terms of how ambitious, realistic 
and possible the achievement of each example independently is. Nevertheless, they 
are complementary. This can be observed, for example, in the case of bilateral co- 
operation and the pluralist approach, furnished by the proposal to create an 
international system of antitrust. 
A pluralist approach toward internationalization would strengthen antitrust 
law 
enforcement by all participating nations in the global trading system. 
It would also 
foster the conclusion of bilateral agreements among the antitrust authorities 
in those 
nations which are willing to engage in closer enforcement co-operation. 
This has been 
the experience within the OECD, where the Organization's recommendations on co- 
operation produced over the years, have provided a solid ground 
for the conclusion of 
bilateral agreements between Member Nations. With about 90 antitrust authorities in 
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the world, it is legitimate to anticipate that building a comprehensive network of 
bilateral agreements is bound to be a very slow process. This may render the process 
neither realistic nor effective. There is the possibility that not all antitrust authorities 
will be able to participate in this network, with the inevitable result that an adequate 
account would not be taken of the interests and needs of developing states. In this 
way, at least, a pluralist approach can be expected to complement efforts under 
bilateral co-operation. 
That the bilateral and pluralist approaches are consistent and complement each other 
can also be observed in the case of EC antitrust law experience. Chapter 6 
demonstrated beyond doubt the commitment of the EC to both regional integration 
and the development of an international system of antitrust. A great part of the EC's 
efforts towards co-operation in antitrust policy revolves around strengthening EC 
antitrust law and fostering a consistent, effective application of its provisions in 
Member States, developing a framework of regional agreements such as Partnership 
and Co-operation Agreements and Association Agreements with Central and Eastern 
European Countries and to a certain extent agreements with some Mediterranean 
countries. The European Commission has also sought to expand and deepen its 
bilateral co-operation with partners beyond Europe. Agreements have been entered 
into with several states such as the US, Canada and South Africa. In parallel to these 
efforts, the Commission has supported the case for reaching a multilateral agreement 
in antitrust policy. Over the years, the Commission has made it clear that it is 
convinced that bilateral agreements, however, are not sufficient to meet all the 
concerns raised by globalization, adding that a comprehensive multilateral agreement 
is vital if nations are to reap the benefits of greater trade liberalization. 
Nevertheless, it ought to be acknowledged that a transformation of a pluralist 
approach - which the EC and other nations support - from a proposal on paper to one 
put into practice is bound to face severe objections from some nations, especially the 
US. The view held on the other side of the Atlantic is that it is not desirable at present 
to pursue any pluralist approach, which may lead to the creation of an international 
system of antitrust. There is a particular US objection to concluding a multilateral 
agreement within the WTO. According to the US, the WTO option suffers 
from both 
institutional and policy difficulties. The US is sceptical over whether nations enjoy 
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the necessary experience and knowledge. Furthermore, the US is against any proposal 
which would threaten its sovereignty and usurp its prerogatives in antitrust policy. 
Instead, it has proposed that nations work on consensus building, through encouraging 
links between antitrust authorities where views can be exchanged and technical 
assistance can be offered to nations at an early stage of developing antitrust law. The 
US seems to be in favour of pursuing this within a forum similar to that of the OECD. 
It is important to be aware that this scepticism is likely to affect efforts towards global 
antitrust policy. However, this does not mean that one should not attempt to support 
these efforts, especially reaching a multilateral agreement within the WTO. The WTO 
is very inclusive in its membership, combining both developed and developing states. 
The fact that there is a close nexus between the WTO objectives of trade liberalization 
and the commitment of an increasing number of nations - most of whom are WTO 
participants - to effective antitrust law enforcement is another factor in favour of 
developing such an agreement under the auspices of the WTO. 1 Furthen-nore, it seems 
that currently there are bright prospects for other important international organizations 
to support the WTO. One such organization is the World Bank, which is believed 
could provide "fire-power" to the WTO. This is especially important since the World 
Bank is willing to devote its research capabilities to supporting the WTO. 2 
It is crucial to warri however that such an agreement should be based on realistic aims. 
Policy-makers, economists and lawyers - judges, practitioners and academics - 
should remain aware of the sensitivity of this area, where a delicate balance needs to 
be struck between diverse forces: states and undertakings, developed and developing 
states, states and international organizations and to an extent between antitrust 
authorities and law courts. 
1 Note the precedent of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) at the WTO. By 
incorporating IP provisions within the WTO, there is no reason in principle why the WTO should 
be 
viewed as a trade-only organization. Furthermore, when analyzing GATT Article I on "Most-Favoured 
Nation" (MFN) principle and Article III on "National Treatment", when assessing the likeness or 
substitutability of products, the WTO panels and Appellate Body (AB) are already adept at using 
market definition e. g. cross-price elasticity analysis. Hence, they should 
be competent to handle the 
application of antitrust rules. 
2 See remarks by N. Stem, the chief economist of the World Bank "Bright prospects seen for new trade 
round", Financial Times 
(January 30,2001). 
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The following recommendations, which are fundamentally different from various 
3 recommendations produced by different bodies over the years, can be used as 
guidelines in order to ensure that this is achieved and to guarantee that any agreement 
contemplated is fair and workable with regard to the interests and needs of all parties. 
1. It is recommended that nations create a Global Antitrust Framework (GAF), 
preferably under the auspices of the WTO. 
2. It is recommended that GAF should include a principle on the binding 
commitment of nations to introduce antitrust law in their domestic legal systems. 
In this way, nations, especially those with economies in transition, will be able to 
develop antitrust laws to suit their own legal, economic and political conditions, as 
opposed to parachuting in antitrust laws. Nations with strong systems of antitrust 
have an important role to play, where they can provide technical assistance on 
how antitrust systems can be developed. It is essential that transitional periods be 
introduced, in order to cater for the needs of nations at different levels of 
development. 
3. GAF should require nations to adapt their domestic antitrust laws and enforcement 
mechanisms to the agreed rules under GAF. It is recommended that private 
undertakings do not have a direct right of action before the body responsible under 
GAF. 
4. It is essential to include principles of non-discrimination and transparency under 
GAF. The first principle has become of central significance in the global trading 
system. The principle can be useftil in antitrust policy, insofar as there would be a 
commitment to extend progressively antitrust law to all sectors of domestic 
economies and apply the law in the same manner to all undertakings, public and 
private, domestic and foreign. 
The transparency principle, on the other hand, is useful to ensure that antitrust 
enforcement is effective and non-discriminatory. It ensures both openness in the 
decision-making of antitrust authorities and adequate control of the exercise of 
discretion by those authorities. To this end, there is a need for the availability of 
direct actions by interested parties against antitrust authorities before the courts. 
By the same token, there is a need for a guarantee that undertakings enjoy a 
protection of confidential information submitted by them to antitrust authorities. 
See chapter 10 for a discussion on these recommendations. 
264 
5. GAF should facilitate co-operation procedures among antitrust authorities. It is 
recommended that it enhance the use of principles of "Positive comity", 
"traditional comity" and infori-nation sharing in general. The inclusion of such 
principles, on a non-binding basis, is bound to lead to market access issues being 
addressed effectively. 4 
6. GAF should not aim to force on nations convergence and harmonization of their 
antitrust laws. Convergence of the substantive provisions of the antitrust laws of 
nations may not be very effective, or realistic. Furthermore, convergence of the 
goals of antitrust law can lead to goals advocated by some nations prevailing over 
goals advocated by other nations. However, convergence can be used in order to 
identify those issues that require immediate attention and build consensus among 
nations with respect to how can these be addressed. 
7. It is recommended that GAF include a dispute settlement procedure in order to 
address differences, which may anse between nations individually. However, the 
procedure should not extend to a review of antitrust cases on a case by case basi S. 5 
8. Within GAF, nations should be encouraged to substitute the use of extra- 
territoriality with the offer of technical assistance to one another and reliance on 
co-operation. 
In this respect, at least, reaching a multilateral agreement on antitrust policy is both 
desirable and possible. An agreement based on these principles cannot be regarded as 
a real threat to the sovereignty of nations. It is true that the agreement would call for 
some limitation on the sovereignty of nations. However, this should be regarded as 
understandable and acceptable in light of the benefits which nations will be able to 
reap through opting for the conclusion of a multilateral agreement. Building such an 
agreement within the WTO in particular can ensure a wider consensus among nations 
4 Support for this can be found in the case law of the AB of the WTO. The AB insists on the least 
restrictive trade measures being adopted and accordingly on the primacy of multilateral negotiations 
and co-operation. See the Gasoline (available at 
hl! p: //www. wto. org/english/tratop - 
e/envir e/edisO7 e. htm) and Shrimp-turtle (available at 
http: //www. wto-org/en. glish/tratop e/dispu e/distab e. htm) cases. 
Also, the case law of the AB has introduced an unarticulated doctrine of proportionality, which would 
be an important "selling-point" for advocating GAF since it would maximize market access and ensure 
unnecessary burdens on trade and competition are avoided. 
5 If GAF is adopted within the WTO, then it would be desirable to introduce an amendment to The 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which is 
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as well as complement trade policy objectives, which are already pursued within the 
WTO. This will enhance the flows of trade and investments between nations as well 
as expand the way forward by facilitating more and better globalization and 
supporting the desirability of further internationalization. 
covered under Annex 2 to the 
WTO Agreement, to allow antitrust lawyers to sit on panels and on the 
AB , in addition 
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